Since we register here the history of the KSA, we feel bound to register at first its history with ourselves and its bad influence on our life since 1984 until the present moment. It all began when we were working an assistant professor in the Civilization and History Department, Al-Azhar University, Cairo, Egypt. We were struggling at the time against the dignitaries and notables among the Egyptians Sufis, led by the head of Al-Azhar at the time, Dr. Abdel-Haleem Mahmoud, who adamantly refused to hold the viva of our Ph.D. thesis about the influence of Sufism in Egypt during the Mameluke Era, because our thesis criticizes Sufism as a creed against Islam (the Quran alone) and details the negative impact of Mameluke Era Sufism within the religious, moralistic, ethical, political, cultural, and social aspects within the civilization of Egypt at that era. This persecution of us was perpetuated for three years (1977 - 1980), and it ended in our getting the Ph.D. degree with highest honors, only after the amount of two-thirds has been omitted from our thesis! The viva was held to discuss the remaining one-third only! We have been poised, since then, to discover the wide abyss between the Sunnite creed and thought on one hand and the Quran on the other hand, as we have did with tackling the contradictions between the Sufi creed and the Quran. During our work at Al-Azhar University as an assistant professor, the Saudi temptations and generous financial rewards were trying to approach us, and we kept refusing them, and the reason for their initial praise of us was that we authored a book titled ''Al-Sayed Al-Badawi between Truth and Myth", in 1982, in which we refute and debunk Sufism; we tackle in this book the true character of a Sufi saint in Egypt, Al-Sayed Al-Badawi, as a hidden political conspirator and agent who shrouded his being a spy with a veneer of Sufism, as his real mission was to topple the Ayyubid Dynasty and the Mameluke monarchs later on in Egypt. The KSA and its societies and bodies in Egypt received our book with hearty welcome, as Wahabis consider Sufis as their No. 1 enemy, and especially when such bodies heard of our anti-Sufism sentiments and our refutations of this creed as a foreign one in relation to Islam. Even one man of the KSA-affiliated bodies in Egypt sent a copy of our book to the Saudi sheikh Ibn Al-Baz, who wrote a word in praise of it, with some amendments suggested by him, in a message addressed to us. When this man gave us the message of Ibn Baz, we shouted at him in a fit of fury that we do not work as a servant to anyone; how dare he ask us to write in a manner that would please him?! We reminded this man, the message-bearer, that this Saudi sheikh never knew that our Ph.D. thesis submission was postponed for three years to coerce us to change and modify in it but we never relented. When our turn came to be seconded outside Egypt in 1983, all financial temptations were offered to us to accept a secondment to the KSA, but we adamantly refused to leave Egypt and our job at Al-Azhar University, whereas other professors and deans sought hard to be accepted for secondment by the KSA panel that tested them to choose from them, to the extent that they would flatter the panel in a self-humiliating spectacle; they were ready to sacrifice literally anything to get seconded: all this was for the sake of growing rich there! We remember very well that our in-law felt enraged against us when we left the Egyptian capital, Cairo, and escaped into his house to avoid being nagged and urged by all means to accept the secondment; he wanted us to work abroad to save money and grow rich! We never knew how KSA-affiliated Azharite men managed to get the address of our in-law, who was not residing in our village; they sent us there a telegram, notifying us that they require urgently that we would meet with the KSA panel of secondments before the panel would leave Cairo. Our in-law felt enraged because of our refusal of such a rare opportunity that might have made us rich beyond measure! A secondment to the KSA was something to fight for and to die for, at the time; everyone would compete fiercely to get it! We tried to make him understand that there were some shared points of understanding between us and the KSA panel and some other, greater in number, points of contention and disagreement; the members of the panel were astounded by the mutual point of refuting and attacking Sufism, but they felt alarmed by our refutation and vehement attack against the Sunnite thought. We made our in-law understand that if we would accept the secondment to work there in the KSA, we would never hide such disagreement; rather, we would declare it openly and in an outspoken and vociferous manner. We felt keenly that the intention of offering us secondment was to work under the auspices of the KSA and be lured by its money as a bribe to write what the Wahabis would desire us to write; the Saudi Wahabis would never accept a professor who would teach them things they never knew before. This dispute about the offered secondment and our adamant refusal to accept it occurred in 1984. Earlier in 1982, we joined a well-known Salafist society, occupying the posts of its secretary-general and the editor-in-chief of its magazine. The head of this Salafist society went to the KSA within a secondment in 1984, which made us the de facto head of the society at the time. This Salafist society, like all Salafist past and present societies in Egypt, was financed by the KSA, and such financing was used in building mosques in several Egyptian cities and governorates such as Greater Cairo, Giza, Al-Menoufiya, Tanta, Damietta, etc. and in covering the expenses of the magazine and the salaries of preachers/imams. The Saudi financier/sponsor of this society used to reside in Cairo, working in trade, and he felt extremely worried and wary of us because we used to refuse taking remuneration in return for our work in the magazine or as a preacher, as we used to be the No. 1 preacher within the mosques built by this Salafist society after the secondment of its head. In 1984, we began to preach Friday congregational prayers Quranist sermons, asserting using the Quranic verses that 1) Prophet Muhammad will never undertake any sort of intercession in the Hereafter and the Last Day, 2) his infallibility was confined to conveying God's verses lone, as in his lifetime he used to commit errors and mistakes as we know from the Quran itself, and 3) it is a grave sin to assert that Muhammad was the best among all human beings or among God's prophets and messengers, because God orders us in the Quran to make all prophets equal to one another, whereas preferring one of them above the other is confined to God alone in the Last Day. Preachers within this Salafist society began to be convinced with what we preached then, and when our sermons reverberated to the KSA, the Saudis hurriedly sent the head of the society back to Cairo to face the situation. This head brought with him tens of thousands of EGP to distribute them among the society council members and its main preachers, within a meeting extraordinaire held to discuss our ideas preached in sermons, considering them as a violation against the policies of this Salafist society. All preachers and council members turned against us despite their previous one-year-old admiration of our Quranist ideas, and we tendered our resignation and left them with no regrets. Meanwhile, we have authored five books on the above-mentioned topics (intercession, infallibility, and preferment) to teach them to Azharite students within History Department in the 1984-1985 semesters, and the titles of these books are as follows: "Prophets in the Quran", "The Islamic World between the Era of the Righteous Caliphs and the Era of the Abbasid Caliphs", "Separatist Movements within Islamic History", "The Moghuls Conquests", and "Studies on Intellectual Movements within the Islamic Civilization". To our surprise, Al-Azhar University took the decision on 5/5/1985 to suspend us from working, prevent us from traveling abroad, prevent us from getting promoted, and to interrogate us later on by an Inquisition-like committee within Al-Azhar University. Needless to say, we felt the Saudi influence behind all this; the KSA was trying to pressurize us so that we might step back, eat our words, and retreat into a puppet-like professors like the rest of the herd. We refused to surrender to such pressures, and within the interrogation, we showed additional proof from Quranic verses that support our views. Result: decisions of Al-Azhar University were not revoked; rather, a new one was added against us: preventing us from receiving our monthly salary and other due remunerations related to our post at Al-Azhar University until we declare that we give up and renounce our views in public. We adamantly refused such coercion; we tendered our resignation to Al-Azhar University in 1986, but it was not endorsed nor accepted, which led us to bring a lawsuit against Al-Azhar University at The Egyptian Council of State to force the administrators of Al-Azhar University to accept and endorse our resignation. Shortly before The Egyptian Council of State would issue a decision on our favor, Al-Azhar University administrators officially and promptly fired us in March 1987. This seemed an attempt of saving face of Al-Azhar University. Several Saudi and non-Saudi Arab newspapers and magazines published parts of the interrogation underwent by us without mentioning a word from our self-defense speech. This was a sign clear enough showing the influence of the KSA apparatuses and their being alarmed because of us, despite the fact that at the time in the 1980s, rapprochement and rapport between Cairo and Riyadh were almost nonexistent. The KSA and its agents/sheikhs held a conference in Islamabad, and within one of its events, they discussed our book titled "Prophets in the Quran" and another book authored by Dr. Al-Tayeb Al-Najjar on the topic of prophets as well. People within this conference unanimously agreed to give Dr. Al-Najjar an award for his book, within a celebration party attended by the Pakistani president at the time Zia-ul-Haq. Soon enough, Dr. Al-Najjar was appointed as the head of a center specialized in the so-called Sunna and Sirah (i.e., traditions and sayings as well as the life-story or biography ascribed falsely to Muhammad after his death), and this center was sponsored by the large sum of 4 million EGP, with the sole mission to face and refute our Quranist views! As usual, this center and its money vanished into thin air soon enough, leaving no trace. The next step of the KSA was to accuse us, as the author of book titled "Prophets in the Quran", of apostasy and rejection of Islam, urging our immediate trial and punishment! Such decisions were asserted once more within another conference held in the city of Jeddah, in the KSA. The Saudis began to pressurize the Egyptian government to exact a punishment against us. Meanwhile, we dedicated our time to sermons inside mosques, discussing extremist Sunnite thought and notions and how they contradict the Quran. This resulted in immediate interference to hinder and deter us, especially after we published, in print, our book titled ''Are Sinning Muslims Getting out of Hell to Enter Paradise'', and we were about to publish another book titled ''Naskh in the Quran Means Assertion and Affirmation, Not Deletion and Omission''. Thus, we got arrested in November 1986, accused of forming a secret cell or organization to spread the notion of denying the Sunna. This accusation was laughter-inducing; why would anyone form a ''secret'' organization for the sake of intellectual thought, which has nothing to do with governing, politics, and indeed any transient worldly issues. Our intellectual thought has been related to correcting of concepts and notions of faith, based on the Quran alone, caring especially for the Last Day and the Hereafter. We wondered at the time: why such intellectual endeavor would bring animosity and enmity of people toward our person? The answer was simple enough: our intellectual school of thought denies, refutes, and contradicts inherited notions and traditions of the 'holy' forefathers. Why should we organize a secret cell while we seek no material rewards, worldly ambitions, or political gains of any type? We seek no reward except from Almighty God, and we used to bear patiently the harm done to us at the time by everyone. Secret cells or organizations normally seek control, power, authority, rule, and the struggle for the transient pomp and glories of the world, and thus would endeavor to please and gratify the masses. Within the police investigation with us, the accusation of forming a secret organization was dropped, for lack of evidence. In addition, investigators found out soon enough the differences in views and opinions between us and those arrested ones who used to attend Friday congregational prayers to listen to our sermons. Thus, investigations ended in our release with no bail and with no trial in courts. But before being released, we have spent, pending investigations, two months in jail in the (well-known Egyptian prison) ''Turaah Farms''. Later on, it was transpired that our imprisonment/punishment was part of the deal between the KSA and Egypt to normalize relations and to make the rapprochement gain momentum! Another reason for our being punished was to appease the anger of extremists, clergymen, and sheikhs who were appalled and felt troubled by our exposing the wide abyss between their schools of thought and the Quran. Later on, we will write elsewhere more details and secrets about this. We knew later on that the KSA had rewarded the Egyptian Interior Minister at the time, Zaki Badr, who framed us by this false accusation, by appointing him as their security consultant once he was fired from his ministerial position in Egypt. The file of this case of ours has still been open until the present moment under the sponsorship and auspices of the KSA and the circles of its influence in Egypt. Yet, what we have preached during the period 1985-1987 has become, to our surprise, well-known and circulated among some Azharite men, who preached it without being encumbered by fear. Despite all this, persecution of us went on since then (until we left Egypt in 2001), and this persecution was perpetuated by agents employed by the KSA, agents who were lured by countless sums of SR. We feel bound to mention here that during the 1990s, the Egyptian government paid a heavy price for persecuting a peaceful thinker like us to appease extremists inside and outside Egypt: when extremists returned from Afghanistan, they directed their terrorist attacks inside Egyptian soil, causing fear all over Egyptian cities for a while. It was the KSA the main culprit in this; it created an organization called Islamic World Union to collect and gather volunteers to fight in Afghanistan, and the head of such an organization was the spearhead of the relentless effort to incite the Egyptian government against us in 1985-1987, and maybe after this period as well. The KSA paid a heavier price for extremism when Bin Laden and his allies turned against Saudis, causing terrorist explosions and attacks inside the KSA, causing fear among citizens of the KSA for a while. Hence, our research and studies in this book stretch to cover the period from Middle Ages to the modern age of today and include not only the Sunnite heritage and traditions of imams and scholars of Abbasid Era to the Mameluke Era, but also extremist thought and faiths of contemporary figures of our age. This book includes the study of the roots of religious extremism in Egypt, a study that we once have submitted as the intellectual foundation of the Popular Movement for Facing Terrorism, an organization that we cofounded in 1993, and our research expanded and some of it was published in some periodicals. We prove in our research that the roots of religious extremism in today's Egypt hark back to the endeavors of the current third KSA and its founder, Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdul-Rahman Al-Feisal Al-Saud, in spreading Wahabis in Egypt. We have been encouraged by our research results to go on to study the roots inside the history of the KSA itself since the era of King Abdul-Aziz and how he established the terrorist group Najd Brothers that turned against him in a revolt later on. Our intellectual and scientific appetite for research was whetted to study and research the opposition movements inside the KSA from Juhayman Al-Otaybi to Dr. Al-Masaary; thus, we end up researching historically all the Sunnite opposition movements and their roots inside the KSA in the 20^th century, bearing in mind our unfulfilled revenge against the KSA.

-2-

Terrorist waves of violence struck Egypt since the early 1990s, reaching unprecedented rates at the time, and extremism reached a certain apogee and zenith in its control and hegemony in Egypt. We were living in dire impecuniousness at the time, making us wish to return to prison! We were authoring a book titled "The Quran and Secularism", and while we were in the process of writing it, the pen was suddenly empty of ink, and we had to stop writing for a while: for we had not the sum of 5 piasters to buy another pen! During such dire, difficult times inside our household, in Cairo, we heard by chance, through the loudspeakers, a silly, ignorant sermon preacher in the nearby mosque saying that Prophet Muhammad was born in the KSA! We felt extremely grief and shocked at such insult to Muhammad; this was worse than our painfully needy state of poverty at the time, and this insult was as deadly a blow as the despicable conditions of our beloved country, Egypt, as it has fallen prey to Wahabi/Salafist time bombs, with many victims of the Salafist thought who commit violence and aggression against their homeland and people. We remember very well at the time that we were engrossed in thought: what did this preacher mean?! Was this the corrupt culture of the generation of ignoramuses of the 1990s in Egypt, under the dominant Saudi influence which has caused several predicaments to us and to our beloved Egypt?! Did this ignorant preacher think that the KSA stretched back to the pre-Islamic era 7^th century until now?! Was the Arabian peninsula called the KSA at the time Muhammad was born?! Ironically, this preacher held a university degree and a certain level of culture; yet, the Saudi impact on his mind controlled his brain. This preacher never knew that the KSA was established three times and came to an end twice, and is most likely to come to an end for the third and last time soon enough in the 21th century. This current third KSA was established within a process of bloodshed and struggle within the period 1902 and 1932, making it the newest and most nascent state within the region that came to be called Middle East, shortly before the establishment of Israel. This ignoramus of a preacher was blinded by the Saudi impact on his brain to the extent that he never knew the true nature of our beloved Egypt; it is in fact the most ancient central country in the whole planet, from which all humanity learned the arts of writing, building cities, agriculture, politics, literature, as well as religion, divinity, conscience, and civilization. Egypt with its countless miracles and gifts to humanity is more ancient and came into existence eons ago before the existence of Arabs in Arabia. Arabs of Arabia were dazzled by the civilization and cities of Egypt when they conquered it; they found that Egyptian life and cities differed a great deal from the Bedouin culture and life style of Arabia. That was why the Arabic term for Egypt (i.e. Misr) meant originally and literally the modern, contemporary city or community, with its Arabic plural form (Amsar), meaning modern cities or communities. Egypt is the country mentioned in the Quran within Quranic stories about prophets and messengers of God, showing signs of its ancient civilization, buildings, cities, armies and troops, as we have detailed in our previous book titled "Egypt in the Quran". Egypt is humanity's most ancient state and civilization, the only one talked about in the Quran with details and features that still remain inherent in Egypt until the present moment. This great country called Egypt has been attacked since 1970s (i.e., the last quarter of the 20^th century) with Wahabism/Salafism, the destructive school of thought coming from a new, recent country called the KSA, whose age is less than the age of the Egyptian Al-Ahram daily newspaper and the Cairene well-known clothes-stores Omar Effendi and Sidnawi. Thus, this ignorant preacher was so brainwashed that he forgot his great homeland and he was led to assert the flagrant falsehood of Muhammad being born in the KSA! Grieved and shocked, we added such immense grief to the accounts to be settled between us and the terrorist KSA. Such immense grief was increased by our impoverished state (when Saudis urged the Egyptian government not to hire us in any work and not to give us our dues in Al-Azhar University) and weeping over victims of terrorist Salafism, which was being spread in Egypt as Islam. Our seeking revenge was a desire increasing by the moment as an Egyptian thinker who cares for his beloved Egypt and Egyptians, who has authored many articles, books, and researches about its history past and present, both published and unpublished ones, and who felt urged to write the history of the KSA and its opposition Sunnite movements, so that we might learn and derive moral lessons from such history.

-3-

An important query is raised: is this revenge-seeking spirit of ours for the sake of personal settling of accounts and for the sake of saving Egypt, as a national duty, will influence our writing here on the topic of the KSA history? It is a well-known fact that writing about the KSA has never been objective anywhere on the whole planet; because of the might and influence of the Saudi money, the SR, used to bribe, lure, and tempt some of the cultural elite members in Egypt them to write in praise of the KSA. On the other hand, the Saudi Wahabi extremism led several free secular thinkers among the cultural elite members in Egypt to vehemently attack the KSA. Thus, between exaggerated praise and heated censure and rebuke, objectivity is lost when writing about the KSA. Of course, our revenge-seeking spirit toward the KSA might lead readers here to think that objectivity will be out of the question in this book. We personally believe that objectivity is lacking in most, if not all, writings on human sciences and controversial issues, even if authors claim otherwise. The claim of our lacking objectivity in this research/book is reinforced by our public, well-known stance against the Wahabi thought, showing that any writing of ours on the KSA would be biased against it and against its Wahabism, especially when our stance is supported by Quranic verses and countless proofs from history and from the Sunnite traditions and heritage, making Salafist scholars and imams unable to refute us, and their inability to refute us led then eventually to coerce us in religion and to terrorize us by making the Egyptian government persecute us and to reduce us into the impecunious state in the 1990s. it is naturally that we would seek revenge using our pen, the only thing we have, of course after our deep faith in God and in the Last Day. Hence, we have every possible reason that would lead us to be biased against both the KSA and its Sunnite opposition movements that emerged in its soil, while claiming to be 'objective' and adhering to neutrality, based on our depending on the authoritative sources, speeches, and history of both the KSA and its Sunnite opposition movements. Yet, our methodology here in this research/book on the KSA and its Sunnite opposition movements includes an introductory chapter in which we assert using some Quranic verses that the KSA lack legitimacy from the very inception of its establishment. The reason: because its Wahabi principles contradict the Quran: such Wahabi/Salafist principles led Wahabis to endorse the massacres, rape, and looting of Muslims. After this introductory chapter, we assert this lack of legitimacy when we tackle the Sunnite opposition movements against the KSA during the reign of Abdul-Aziz, as he endorsed mass-killings and murder of all non-Wahabis, as well as looting and conquering countries of others. We cast doubts on the legitimacy of the opposition movement of the Najd Brothers too, the former allies of Abdul-Aziz who turned against him later on, become more extremist that he was. The same goes for other foes of the KSA, like Juhayman Al-Otaybi, whose aggression led him to attack and occupy the Kaaba Mosque in Mecca, and like the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, as both opposition movements sought to coerce and compel people in religion. We conclude this book/research by asserting the curses against the KSA and its opposition figures/foes that were more extremist and violent than the KSA, thus achieving our revenge against the KSA, on both the personal and national levels, and if we lack objectivity and if we are biased, no one, however, can possibly refute us. The reason: we oppose, refute, judge, and condemn the KSA stances and views along with the views and stances of the opposition figures using the Quranic verses. The Quranic verses have distinct, lucid, clear, undeniable, and irrefutable meanings, and no one can deny the scientific body of history-literature about the KSA and its Sunnite opposition figures and Sunnite/Salafist scholars and imams, as we have used information from well-known authoritative and acknowledged Saudi published sources. Our book here is filled with appetizers: a heavy dose of sarcastic, funny tales and scandals, copied from the writings of the Saudi opposition figure Dr. Al-Masaary, about the KSA royal family members, with details, names, numbers, locations, and timing. Saudis ignored Dr. A,-Masaary and never cared to refute his writings, a heavy mark showing their inability to refute him, as his writings and those of others are historical facts that condemn the Saudi royal family. Such facts will certainly increase the readability and readership of this book, thus gaining the wide spread and never losing objectivity.

- 4 -

Despite of all of the above, we have decided to remain really objective by researching the Sunnite opposition movements against the KSA and their intricate, complicated relation with the KSA with a neutral, objective historical research, with no prior claims of writing the decisive, final word about the subject or having the absolute truth about it; rather, our writings remain intellectual conclusions and innovations in light of research findings and results, and no one is kept away from making errors or mistakes in any research. We bore this in mind as we were writing this book, as enmities are transient, whereas writings of historians and researchers outlive authors, and Time will judge for or against such writings. Every one of us will meet Almighty God in the Last Day, and our belief in God and in the Last Day entails us to verify the truth and the justice in all our writings on all topics. We must adhere to justice as the supreme value of Islam in the Quran; thus, all our past and present troubles caused by the KSA and Wahabism/Salafism dwarfed before our eyes while we were gathering all material for this research and studying them carefully, and we could not stop ourselves from admiring Abdul-Aziz in terms of the political aspect only, as we used to consider him a very demon from Hell. Yet, we admired more the KSA opposition figure Nasser Al-Saeed, despite the fact that many of his views differed from ours. Imitating the manners and ways of a judge who verifies truth and justice, we passed historical judgments in our book here as per available knowledge within historical facts that we hope to be deemed true; as there was no lawyer on behalf of the defendants. We had to extract from the sayings of the defendants what they might have said in their own defense, as we did in tackling the topic of Dr. Al-Masaary and his stances regarding the KSA, the country that never paid heed to refute his accusations against it. Thus, we had to examine carefully his accusations leveled against the KSA by comparing them with assertions of other neutral witnesses to examine different views on the case. In most times, the KSA refused to respond and to refute any of the accusations laid on its doorstep! This lends credibility to the narratives asserted by the opposition figures like Dr. Al-Masaary and Al-Saeed. Our analysis was confined to demonstrate all opposing views and their historical conditions, weighing every view against its opposite one trying to follow all traces and come nearer to the truth as much as possible, as will be felt in this research. Within the conclusion of this book, we focus on the future of the current third KSA, and factors that will possibly lead to its downfall and how to remedy this. Our book is filled with quotations that are taken from some pages of some authoritative resources on which our book is based, and as per scientific research methodology, we had to quote such passages with no change at all: we offer our apologies here for any offensive material in them, and we declare here that we never approve of general accusations and virulent attacks and verbal abuse of the KSA royal family members. Yet, this is a chance for readers to perceive how we dealt with such texts objectively, never taking them as absolute truths or facts despite their authenticity and the stamp of truth apparent in them. Yet, we extracted from these quotations different views, as long as the KSA defendants remain silent and never defended themselves against any of the accusations leveled at them. The quotations include excerpts from the book titled ''History of the Family of Saud'', authored by Nasser Al-Saeed, excerpts from the letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, from writings of Dr. Al-Masaary, and finally from documents of human rights organizations. Last but not least, we have written this book basically to satisfy our scientific research appetite for knowing better those who have harmed our person, our sons, and our homeland (beloved Egypt), and caused countless trouble to us. We know quite well that this book will never appeal to the Saudis and to their fundamentalists Sunnite opposition figures among the extremists; we seek only to gratify and please Almighty God, and we hope He will come in our aid in our life-journey.

Signature:

Dr. Ahmed Subhy Mansour

26^th of June, 2001, Cairo, Egypt

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER: Written on 8th of June, 2015

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER: Written on 8^th of June, 2015

Within the earlier omitted introductory chapter of this book, we have demonstrated the principles of the Islamic country or state as it should be and how to apply such principles within justice and liberty, as done by Prophet Muhammad within the city-state of Yathreb in the 7^th century Arabia, and we have called this religious legitimacy, not to be confused with the term theocracy, an abhorrent term which is foreign to Islam. We later on demonstrated how the city-state of Islam during Muhammad's life time was succeeded by regimes (monarchies) based on power, and we have called this political legitimacy, such as the Sunnite Abbasid Caliphate, the Shiite Fatimid Caliphate, the Sufi Sunnite Mameluke Caliphate, and the Sufi Sunnite Ottoman Caliphate. When M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab emerged in Arabia as a foe of both the Sufi and Shiite creeds, he called for his doctrine, Wahabism, which is an extremist Sunnite sub-creed. Abdul-Wahab suffered persecution at first, which led him to seek political protection and aid by allying himself to the family of Ibn Saud; this alliance resulted in the establishment of the very first Saudi state, which was destroyed and toppled by the governor of Egypt at the time, Muhammad Ali Pacha, in 1818 A.D. Yet, a second Saudi state was established, but to collapse soon afterwards, and the Saudi royal family fled to the Gulf region that came to be known later on as Kuwait. Later on, in the 20^th century, Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdul-Rahman Al-Feisal Al-Saud managed to establish the third current Saudi state and monarchy, called the KSA, with the help of his allies and supporters, the "Najd Brothers'' group members, who later on turned against him and opposed his reign, becoming his fiercest enemies. This turnabout of events asserts the fact that any theocracy holds inherent factors of its collapse and downfall; as it produces unwittingly from inside it religious opposition movements from within the same doctrine, when the opposition figures try to prove themselves as more 'pious' and 'devout' than the existent regime.

With the above summary, we have decided to omit the rest of the earlier written introductory chapter, as details of it were published in several of our earlier articles and researches; yet, it is sufficed here to quote below some passages, from the omitted introductory chapter, about the relation between Ibn Abdul-Wahab and Ibn Saud that resulted in the establishment of the very first Saudi state of kingdom.

An overview of the history of the sheikh M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab:

1- It is reported that he was born in 1703 A.D., and his father, sheikh Abdul-Wahab Ibn Ali, from the city of Brida, of the tribe of Tamim, worked as a judge in the city of Al-Eineiya, in Haneefa valley, in the Najd region, which was ruled at the time by Abdullah Ibn M. Ibn Al-Muammar. Sheikh Abdul-Wahab, besides his job as a judge, was also teaching the ancient interpretations of the Quran, hadiths, and fiqh (i.e., jurisprudence) of the Ibn Hanbal doctrine; hence, his house was a mecca for scholars and imams who seek to further their knowledge of theological studies. Within such atmosphere, the child M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab memorized the Quran before he reached the age of ten, and he attended lessons, sermons, and lectures of his father. Later on, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab read, and was well-versed in, the books of Ibn Taymiyya, the scholar/imam that influenced M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab a great deal later on in his life. The eruditeness of M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab was shown early, to the extent that his father made him, as a youth, the imam of congregational prayers, saying to others that he drew useful lessons from his son in many fatwas and issues of jurisprudence (27).

2- It is reported that when he reached the age of 13, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab performed pilgrimage in Mecca, and he made pilgrimage to the so-called tomb ascribed to Prophet Muhammad in Yathreb, where he stayed for two months. M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab felt shocked and condemned the sanctification and worshipping of this tomb, considering that practices of worship at tombs and mausoleums as polytheistic acts. Later on, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab went to Hejaz region to further his theological studies, and he met in Yathreb sheikh Abdullah Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Al-Seif, who was from Najd, the reformist scholar well-known at the time, who befriended M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab. Moreover, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab was taught there by sheikh M. Hayat Al-Sanady, one of the biggest scholars/imams of Yathreb (28). Later on, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab returned to Najd to stay for a while, and then, he left it to Iraq, visiting Baghdad, and staying four years in Basra, where he studied fiqh and hadiths by sheikh M. Al-Majmouey. M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab was vociferous and outspoken in his condemnation of the Shiite rites and practices of worshipping and sanctifying tombs and mausoleums as well as their belief in endless myths related to them. When people of Basra asked him about such practices and acts of worship, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab would tell him that worship is never deemed acceptable except when it is dedicated to God alone, and they used to be astounded by such declarations (29). People of Basra grew more furious because of the views of M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab, and they gathered to drive him forcibly out of the city. This led him to consider moving to the Levant, but his impecuniousness foiled such a plan. Thus, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab left for Al-Ahsa region, in Arabia, for a while, where he was the guest of sheikh M. Ibn Abdul-Latif of Al-Ahsa. Later on, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab returned to the city of Heirmeila, where his father resided. Reaching the age of 36, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab repeated his perusal of all books of Ibn Taymiyya, which exerted a considerable influence over him, despite the fact that the works of Ibn Taymiyya were authored four centuries before M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab was born. It is noteworthy that the religious rites and notions fought against by Ibn Taymiyya, who died imprisoned in a fortress in Damascus in 1327 A.D., were the same rites and notions fought against by M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab in Arabia and Iraq and elsewhere, and thus, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab walked into the route of Ibn Taymiyya in the fight against polytheism (30).

The movement of sheikh M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab in spreading his call:

1- M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab engaged into several intellectual disputes and heated debates with both laymen and other theological scholars, yet, his call that came to be known later on as Wahabism was not crystalized until the death of his father in 1740, as M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab used to hide his sentiments and call from his father, who used to adopt different methods in calling and preaching (31). Thus, once his father died, the book of M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab titled "Monotheism Is God's Right within Human Beings" spread all over Arabia, as M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab became free from restrictions imposed on him by his late father, and he moved everywhere to spread his call in all cities such as Heirmeila, Al-Eineiya, Al-Deireiya, and Riyadh. As a result of such popularity, the number of his foes augmented, to the extent that some of them tried to have him murdered, and M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab had to flee his birth city and to settle in Al-Eineiya, as he was welcomed by its ruler/emir, Othman Ibn M. Al-Muammar, who was among the followers of Wahabism. As countless persons followed Wahabism, violent groups were formed to demolish all mausoleums of the so-called saints, which included the famous tomb of Zeid Ibn Al-Khattab in the region of Al-Jabaleiya, destroyed by M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab himself. Believers in saints waited for a curse or malediction to fall on the head of M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab, but nothing happened to him, and as a result, he gained more followers to his call of Wahabism. Some new followers cut off the 'holy' trees that were being worshipped at the time, including the well-known Tree of Zeinab (32).

2- Settling in the city of Al-Eineiya, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab applied the corporal punishment of stoning an adulteress, who confessed her sin and witnesses asserted her confession, and Othman Ibn Al-Muammar participated in stoning her, to declare the application of the Sunnite sharia laws that were abolished before in the region of Najd and other regions of Arabia at the time. M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab grew more famous, and his foes, especially the scholars of the Seheim family in Riyadh, wrote letters to rulers of all cities to warn them against Wahabism that would make the masses revolt against their rulers. These scholars presented a formal complaint against M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab and Othman Ibn Al-Muammar, ruler of Al-Eineiya, to Suleiman, the governor of Al-Ahsa, which was the region in which Al-Eineiya was located. The governor ordered Othman to promptly kill M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab, threatening to wage war against Othman if he would disobey this command. Scholars and theologians of Al-Eineiya who bore grudges against M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab frightened Othman and he had to follow their advice by urging M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab to leave the city at once, as he could not face the governor of Al-Ahsa in fighting (33).

3- M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab had to move to the city of Al-Deireiya, which was ruled at the time by the Saud family since 1682, since the days of Miqrin Ibn Markhan and his son Saud, and the grandson M. Ibn Saud who ruled it from 1725 to 1765. At the time, Mashary and Thanyan, Brothers of M. Ibn Saud, converted to Wahabism, and consequently, the city dwellers welcomed M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab and a new era began by the pact created between M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab and the ruler/emir M. Ibn Saud. Turba and Al-Kharama

The pact between M. Ibn Saud and M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab in 1745:

Principles and formulation of the pact:

1- It was reported that within the influence of Mashary and Thanyan, sons of Saud and Brothers of M. Ibn Saud, as well as that of the wife of M. Ibn Saud, the ruler/emir M. Ibn Saud met with M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab in the house of Ahmed Ibn Suweilam, where he resided. M. Ibn Saud said to M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab: "Feel glad to reside in a city better than yours, where you will find prosperity, pride, and glory", and M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab replied: "We urge you to feel the glad tidings of pomp and wealth and authority, using the testimony of There is no God but Allah, and as you support it and stick to it, you will reign supreme over people and lands, for this is the testimony preached by all prophets of God".

2- M. Ibn Saud feared that if he would support M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab, the latter would later on leave him to seek further aid from other emirs, and he feared as well that M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab would refuse taxes imposed on the dwellers of the city of Al-Deireiya, and thus, he said to M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab: "O pious imam! We feel no doubt that this is the religion of God and His messenger, and we bear you glad tidings of victory and we promise you to declare jihad to fight those who refuse monotheism, but we stipulate two conditions; firstly, we fear if we militarily supported you and subdued cities for the sake of your call, you would leave us for the sake of other supporters and allies; secondly, we fear that you would object to tributes and taxes we impose of people of this city". M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab replied: "We assure you, O Emir, that as for the first thing, we are to remain with you always, blood for blood and destruction for our enemies, as for the second thing, we hope God will come to our aid in conquering other cities that would increase your wealth". Thus, both M. Ibn Saud and M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab shook hands and declared their pact and allegiance to perform jihad for the sake of God's religion and sharia laws by commanding people to do righteous acts and prevent them from evil deeds (34). Thus, the very first KSA was established based on coercion and compulsion in religion and on jihad, or blood for blood and destruction for all who disobeyed the family of Saud. Thus, their 'jihad' means here to fight to death all those who opposed Wahabism and its call, and declare them as 'infidels' who must be robbed, raped, and murdered. When news of this pact reached all the Najd region, all supporters of Wahabism came to the city of Al-Deireiya, turning it into a capital of a military and political theocracy; the space of city increased and expanded as more residents came to settle and build houses and as all spoils and zakat money were collected into it. Thus, this pact and the Najd region forced the so-called Islamic world into entering a new phase.

The meaning of this pact:

1- Sufism was the dominant religion in Najd, and indeed the whole Arab world, before this pact came into being; each city had its local patron saints, or rather deities, of the two types: living saints/clergymen and dead ones in their 'holy' tombs. This was in addition to deification and sanctification of all dead imams, theologians, and scholars as well as Prophet Muhammad and his progeny and family members, as a dominant faith tenet among both the Sunnites and the Shiites, and symbolic mausoleums were erected in their memory. Moreover, the Sufi religion used up all sentiments of the Muhammadans in general; as they leant on it to replace their being repressed and shut out of political life, which was based, as always, on injustices, tyranny, and bloody struggle and conflict. Hence, negative values thrived: submission to people, counting on others, passivity, laziness, and renouncing the world and its affairs, especially in major cities by the river-banks, in Egypt and Iraq. Thus, ruling and authority were for those who would achieve military victory, either by mercenaries within the Ottoman Empire or by tribal fanaticism in the Arabian Peninsula. Within the Najd region in Arabia, after the military Shiite call of the Qarmatians, no religious call emerged among rulers and governors that would use tribal fanaticism to fight others under the banner of creeds. Thus, the struggles were mainly political within local rulers with no manipulation of religion at all, and the victorious ones used only their intelligence and pacts with allies, who might as easily switch their fealty for other allies/foes, for the sake of more loot. Thus, the very first pact of military-religious nature in Najd was between M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab and M. Ibn Saud, creating thus a new status quo: political and military invasion, rechristened as 'jihad' for God, under the banner of the Sunnite Ibn Hanbal doctrine of Wahabism, declaring its foes as infidels and enemies of Islam! Those infidels were of course other cities whose residents and rulers were Sunnite or Shiite Sufis.

2- This pact was new in its kind at the time: it considered all other rulers and their nations as infidels/polytheists who deserved to be murdered, invaded, raped, and robbed, and thus, they must be fought to be coerced and forced to convert to the 'only true' religion: Wahabism: i.e., the Sunnite Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Hanbal doctrine as presented and understood by M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab. To use theological terms of Sunnite sharia jurisprudence, this new pact considered all countries and cities of the Muhammadans and Arabs who did not like Wahabism as ''lands of war and disbelief'' that should be fought, conquered, invaded, and occupied just as in the case of Arab conquests of the 7^th century and the purported battles of Prophet Muhammad in his so-called biography written a century after his death. Hence, the ''lands of war and disbelief'' were no longer Christian Europe, but rather all Arabs among the Muhammadans of all non-Wahabi sects and creeds that reject Wahabism.

Factors that led to consolidation of this erroneous concept of ''lands of war and disbelief'':

1- These are two factors. The first factor is as follows: the ordeals M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab underwent by his foes, as he was expelled from several cities, like Basra in Iraq, in disgrace, and the attempt on his life in his birthplace town. This did not differ much from the persecution suffered by Ibn Taymiyya by his foes four centuries earlier, as mentioned in his books, admired and perused a lot by M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab. Thus, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab had to peremptorily attack other cities using a military and political pact; otherwise, he might have been imprisoned like Ibn Taymiyya or might have been murdered. We are to remember that at the time, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab have not reached the stature and fame of Ibn Taymiyya in his era. M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab witnessed hoe the ruler/emir of Al-Ahsa ordered his murder; thus, he was to either revoke and renounce his call to stay alive or to go one by waging wars against his foes, armed by a military political pact with an ambitious ruler. Thus, the motto ''Blood for blood and destruction for all enemies!'' echoed his ardent desire for revenge, to make his foes pay the price for his suffering and humiliation in Najd and Iraq. The second factor is as follows: M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab, as an ambitious well-versed sheikh and scholar, waited patiently to revive the historical background of Najd region and its people: this background included revolts and religious opposition movements of desert-Arabs and the Bedouins in Najd and Al-Ahsa and other regions. Within such movements of rebellion, a new creed would be created that reflects the social nature of desert-Arabs and Bedouins, especially their raids of looting, robbing, stealing, enslavement, destroying, and rape. With this new man-made, tailored creed, such Bedouin raids for loot would be rechristened as 'jihad': i.e., to loot and rape and presumably end up in Paradise in the Hereafter as a reward for such crimes! Such earthly creed entails the existence of the notion of declaring the others (i.e., those who oppose the new creed) as infidels and disbelievers who deserve to be murdered, raped, and robbed. Thus, the earliest background of the history of Najd simply began with the revolt of Al-Khawarij and later on revolts of the Shiite Qarmatians and the Zanj rebellion. Hence, within such revolts, the military power and the belligerent nature of the desert-Arabs and Bedouins would unite together in the struggle for rule, power, and authority, instead of mere looting, thus turning their violence and fighting into a religious jihad. Thus, such repetitive pattern in the history of Najd could be revived easily enough by M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab by turning raids for loot into jihad within the new creed of Wahabism. Hence the Ibn Hanbal extremist doctrine, rechristened as Wahabism, would seize the chance at the time to avenge persecution of both Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya that occurred centuries ago.

Lastly: This is NOT Islam:

1- It was natural that Wahabis would consider Wahabism as 'real' Islam and that their 'duty' was to fight everyone among Arab Muhammadans as infidels and polytheists, as well as Jews and Christians if they possibly can fight them. This fighting was not just for loot and rule, but also to coerce all humans to convert to Wahabism, and later on, coerce all those under Wahabi control to perform religious duties as per Wahabi compulsion traditions of imposing 'good' deeds and fighting 'bad' ones.

2- This compulsion of religion was a tradition came down by historical accumulation to the mind of M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab, who considered this compulsion and coercion as part of religion, and a notion of vital importance on which he based his pact with M. Ibn Saud. Both this compulsion of religion and this aggression consisting of violence, fighting, and violation against those who were peaceful and never attacked first are notions against Islam as per the Quran. Yet, we find both notions to exist normally in centuries of history of the Arabs/Muhammadans, beginning with the crime of Arab conquests perpetrated by the so-called companions of Prophet Muhammad after his death, until aggressions committed by the Ottoman Empire within Europe and the Arab and non-Arab worlds within the countries of the Muhammadans

3- In fact, Muhammadans of the Middle Ages were living the culture of the Middle Ages like all nations of the globe at the time, with its values of extremism, fanaticism, religious wars, and Inquisitions, and people of that era in human history had to invent, fabricate, and create creeds, religions, and sharia laws that would endorse such Middle-Ages culture and values of aggression of all sorts. In the case of the Muhammadans, they had to distort Islam by deliberately misinterpreting Quranic verses and overlooking other verses, fabricating the so-called hadiths, and finally by giving great importance and focus in theological branches of thought like fiqh, in order to justify the logic of the Middle-Ages culture. Later on, such books that contained such notions and hadiths etc. were made holy, sanctified, and revered with the passage of time as ascribed to Prophet Muhammad himself (a falsehood adopted and propagated by the Sunnites), to the relatives, progeny, family members, and in-laws of Prophet Muhammad (a falsehood adopted and propagated by the Shiites), or finally to holy, sanctified saints and imams (a falsehood adopted and propagated by the Sufis).

4- If people would draw Islam and its tenets from such subjective, human viewpoints of the Muhammadans of such eras, they would learn nothing but terrorism, aggression, violations, and violence. If people want to discover and learn real Islam and its tenets, they must rely on the sole source of them: the Quran. The Quranic teachings, tenets, concepts, notions, and sharia laws, if studied closely and focused upon, show clearly that Islam is the religion of tolerance, peace, justice, goodness, and charity and that God sent Muhammad as a mercy to the humankind, NOT to fight, invade, and conquer the lands of the humankind to coerce them in religion.

Footnotes:

27- Hussein Ibn Ghannam: ''History of Najd'', edited by Nasser Al-Assad, page 26.

28- Othman Ibn Bishr: "Title of Glory in History of Najd" 1/17.

29- Hussein Ibn Ghannam: ditto, page 28.

30- Dr. Abdel-Hameed Al-Batreek: "Wahabism as a Religion and a State", an article published in the Magazine of Girls College, Cairo 42:43, 1964.

31- Hussein Ibn Ghannam: ditto, page 77.

32- Amin Al-Rihany: "Modern History of Najd", the 39^th edition, Beirut, 1954 and Fareed Mustapha: "The Saud Family in History", the 9^th edition, Damascus, 1949.

33- Hussein Ibn Ghannam: ditto, page 79 and a book titled "The Brilliant Comet" by an unknown author, edited by Ahmed Mustapha Abou Hakma, page 324, Beirut, 1967.

34- Othman Ibn Bishr: ditto, 12:11/1 and Hussein Ibn Ghannam: ditto, page 81.

PART I: Opposition Movement during the Reign of Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud: The Najd Brothers and Abdul-Aziz

1- Between 1902 and 1932, Abdul-Aziz managed to establish the third current Saudi state, giving it the name of his family, the KSA, and this new monarchy was put to a hard test; those who helped it its establishment with their swords became later on a powerful opposition movement against the founder of the KSA, their former leader Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, or rather Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud, as he was called formerly at the time. It was he who turned them from merely fighting Bedouins and desert-Arabs, who would launch raids on one another for food, into a creed-based strong military organization, named the Najd Brothers.

2- What happened between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers is not something novel in the course of history; usually, disputes and conflicts arise between the founder of any new kingdom or state and the military leader(s) of his armies. This pattern was repeated, for instance, between Abou Jaffer Al-Mansour, the real founder of the Abbasid Caliphate and his ally, the Persian military leader, Abou Moslem Al-Khorasany. This pattern occurred between the Fatimid Shiite leader Al-Mahdi and his ally the Shiite clergyman Abou Abdullah. This pattern occurred as well within the Mameluke Era in Egypt, between Queen Shagaret Al-Dor and her military leader, named Aqtay, on the one hand, and between her and her husband, a sultan named Aybak, on the other hand. Numerous instances of this pattern occurred within the Umayyad caliphate in Spain (Andalusia) and within the 20^th century Arab world: like the conflict between the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser and his minister of defense, Abdel-Hakeem Amer.

3- Within the political aspect, the Saudi case has its own uniqueness, embodied by the features and traits of the Najd Brothers and the nature of the character and personality of Abdul-Aziz.

3/1: The features and traits of the Najd Brothers represented a culture that was looking forward to re-create the past: this past is filled with events like revolts and temporary desert states that would continuously raid the neighboring countries to invade and conquer them eventually, with every possible acts of bloodshed rechristened as jihad (e.g., the Zanj rebellion and the Qarmatians). Despite the fact that this was the dominant pattern in the Middle Ages, the desert men of Arabia never managed before to create a stable state within the whole of Arabia at the time. Hence, to re-create this mentality of jihad, conquests, and bloodshed in the 20^th century was sheer madness within our modern times. At the time, the Ottoman Empire, sick man of Europe, grew weaker and its past culture began to fade away, and this encouraged Abdul-Aziz to revive the KSA that was militarily defeated and crushed twice before. At the time, the West countries controlled affairs in the Middle East at the time, especially GB, when Abdul-Aziz established the KSA. Thus, GB allowed and directly aided Abdul-Aziz and it remained silent and overlooked many deeds he committed.

3/2: Accordingly, the unique character and personality of Abdul-Aziz differed a great deal from both the belligerent nature of the Najd Brothers and the political mentality of the Middle Ages, as he manipulated the exceptional conditions at the time in the 20^th century to serve his purposes: internally in the Najd region and other regions in Arabia and the Gulf, especially Kuwait, Yemen, and Hejaz, regionally within the relations with the Ottoman Empire, Iraq, and Egypt, and internationally within close relations with GB and its stance against the Ottoman Empire and its allegiance with Al-Sharif Hussein in Hejaz, within the events of WWI. Within gaps inside this intricate, complicated network of regional and international relations, Abdul-Aziz managed to establish the kingdom of Al-Saud, expanding its territories in Arabia as much as he could without engaging in needless battles that would have led to the loss of his army and his dream. Thus, he was not forced to face powerful entities that would have defeated him; he needed not to use mottoes or promises that he would not be able to apply and keep. The one who fell into this trap was Al-Sharif Hussein of Hejaz; he was powerful and more well-known on the international level than Abdul-Aziz at the time. Al-Sharif Hussein lost his throne by his folly, and his throne was consequently appropriated by Abdul-Aziz. Those who failed the test as well are those whose expansionist ambitions led them to try to change the map of their region to establish a new empire: like the European leaders Hitler and Mussolini and the Arab leaders Abdel-Nasser, Saddam Hussein, and Kaddafi, as such leaders wasted efforts and wealth of their respective nations in trying to achieve the impossible within the modern age. Yet, Abdul-Aziz managed to establish his kingdom and fulfilling his ambitious dreams of conquering and ruling Arabia. Of course, we say this within a political perspective, not an Islamic/Quranist one. If it had not been for the political acumen and shrewdness of Abdul-Aziz, the KSA would have ended soon enough like the first and second Saudi states established before, as the first one was destroyed by the army of the Egyptian Sultan Muhammad Ali Pacha, and the second one by internal strife and conflicts.

3/3: It is noteworthy that there is a vast contradiction between the culture of Wahabism (a religious corrupt culture related to the Middle Ages and whose roots harken back to the theological school of thoughts of both Ibn Taymiyya in the Mameluke Era in Egypt and Ibn Hanbal in the Abbasid Era) and the culture of the 20^th century of secularity and opposes theocracies, and hence categorically rejects Wahabism altogether. This vast contradiction appeared as early as the 19^th century between Wahabism, as a creed in Arabia, and the modernization processes and movements (in Egypt and elsewhere) that became outspoken and vociferous in calling for the secular model of the West. Such movements began in Egypt after the French occupation (a.k.a.: L'Expédition d'Égypte) ended and during the reign of the Sultan Muhammad Ali Pacha, the one who crushed the very first Saudi monarchy. Here, the two opposite poles collided: the modern Egyptian state of Muhammad Ali Pacha and the first Wahabi KSA of the 19^th century, and of course, the Egyptian army defeated the Wahabis as Muhammad Ali Pacha was compatible with the age, whereas the Wahabis at the time danced to a rhythm of an era that no longer exists. Even the Ottoman Empire that clung to the past had to modernize some of its aspects when Muhammad Ali Pacha engaged in a war against it, but the pace and tempo of the Ottomans were not fast enough, and the Ottoman caliphate was dwarfed and then collapsed eventually. When Abdul-Aziz emerged in the 20^th century, the modernization in Europe and the USA grew faster in pace, and even in Egypt, modernization went further with reforms of Khedive Ismail in the next half of the 19 century. The 20^th century modernization became more contradictory than ever with Middle-Ages Wahabism, the tool by which Abdul-Aziz established his KSA and brainwashed his soldiers and allies: the Najd Brothers. Despite the discrepancy between Wahabism and the modern age in the 20^th century, Abdul-Aziz managed to manipulate a certain policy that suited his age in Arabia to establish a monarchy that ran contrary to the modern era, and he later on succeeded in militarily defeating the Najd Brothers when they revolted against him, thus establishing his kingdom on the basis of his assumed right to retrieve the monarchy of his forefathers, not just on the basis of the creed of Wahabism.

4- As for our topic here about Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers, it is the unique character and personality of Abdul-Aziz that was the decisive factor in his using the Najd Brothers in establishing his Wahabism-based and traditional Najd-culture-based kingdom, and once the Najd Brothers posed a threat to Abdul-Aziz and the burgeoning, nascent KSA, he summarily got rid of them with the least possible amount of damages and losses, because he made use of their incompatibility with the modern era in the 20^th century, though he was the one who trained and brainwashed them using this backward culture and mentality. When the Najd Brothers were annihilated physically, politically, and militarily, as their very existence came to an end, Abdul-Aziz dressed all left wounds that emerged as a consequence, urging all parties involved who remained alive to forget the past, confining it to lines of history for drawing useful lessons. Thus, the real political success of any leader is to make very good use of the conditions and circumstances of his era and what factors elements to change and the ones unchangeable, so that he would be compatible with the culture of his age as well as future elements and factors; otherwise, all would be lost in the abyss of the past.

5- Within this PART I of our book, in which we tackle the Saudi opposition movement during the reign of the founder of the third current KSA, Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdul-Rahman Al-Feisal Ibn Saud, we discuss the following topics within the coming five chapters:

- CHAPTER I: The Formation of the Najd Brothers and their Role in the Establishment of the Monarchy of Abdul-Aziz

- CHAPTER II: Historical Account of the Najd Brother Opposition Movement

- CHAPTER III: The Ideological Formation of the Najd Brothers Is the Basis of the Saudi Opposition Movement during the Reign of Abdul-Aziz

- CHAPTER IV: Features of the Ideological Formation within the Behavior of the Najd Brothers Opposition Movement

- CHAPTER V: Analysis of the politics of Abdul-Aziz in his Dealing with the Najd Brothers Opposition Movement

CHAPTER I: The Formation of the Najd Brothers and their Role in the Establishment of the Monarchy of

CHAPTER I: The Formation of the Najd Brothers and their Role in the Establishment of the Monarchy of Abdul-Aziz

Firstly: the formation of the Wahabi Najd Brothers and the establishment of the Bedouin colonies:

A historical overview: the aim ofAbdul-Aziz in turning the desert-Arabs and Bedouins into the Najd Brothers group:

The historians who experienced this era and process assert that the main aim of Abdul-Aziz in turning the desert-Arabs and Bedouins into the Najd Brothers group was to enable him to win them over to his side and to earn their continuous unrelenting allegiance and fealty to him. The only way by which he could manage to achieve this was to turn them away from their nature of fluctuation between loyalty and betrayal to any ruler, as they saw fit for their interests, into a loyal brethren to him whose interests are directly linked with him in a religious bond that associates this life with the Hereafter. The earlier Saudi family members suffered a lot before from being betrayed by desert-Arabs and Bedouins, especially during the Egyptian armies, led by the son of M. Ali Pacha, crushing and wiping out the very first Saudi kingdom. At the time, the Bedouins reneged on their words and allegiance because of money, as they soon enough betrayed their defeated Saudi ruler and attacked his armies to rob the soldiers, without the slightest pangs of remorse or feelings of disgrace (1). Thus, in order that Abdul-Aziz would control gain over the Bedouin youth, they had to imbibe the Wahabi call so that they would swear allegiance to him forever and to fight fiercely on his side in hope of winning Paradise. Such Wahabi mottoes held a strong influence over such youths, and Wahabi notions stress the fact that being reluctant to engage into fighting is considered blasphemy and disbelief, a demeanor to be punished by being killed and eternally tormented in Hell in the Hereafter, as per the Wahabi creed. Hence, the Bedouins had to settle into colonies to enable Abdul-Aziz to inculcate them Wahabism to turn them into its soldiers, loyal to him.

Was Abdul-Aziz the very first one to think of such devilish plans?

Dickson, the British ruler of Kuwait and contemporary to the Najd Brothers crisis, asserted that the real founder of the Najd Brothers was Abdul-Kareem Al-Maghraby, who came from Iraq into Najd in 1914 after he was disappointed by the immorality and decadence of the Iraqi Shiites; he established in Najd the very first group in Al-Artaweiyya (2). This view is refuted by the researcher John Habeeb (3), as well as by Jalal Kishk in his book titled ''The Saudis and the Islamic Solution'', as he writes that Ibn Abdul-Wahab began to execute the idea, but historians never paid heed to that respect, and then Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud came later on to revive the idea and to give it its organization and goals (4). Yet, the history of the Najd region during the Middle-Ages has witnessed similar attempts of forming groups of religious fighters; for instance, the Qarmatians in their beginning phase during the Abbasid Era established the so-called ''immigration colonies'' in 277 A.H.in Mahimazad, a village near the Iraqi city Al-Kufa, and fortified it after christening it as the ''immigration colonies". Another example is the Qarmatian leader Abou Saeed Al-Janaby, who gathered young boys to bring them up on the basis of his call and creed and the blind obedience to him and to train to fight fiercely, and he later on formed an army that managed to conquer Al-Ahsa region in Arabia as well as the islands of Bahrain, until this leader was killed in 301 A.H. (5).

The meaning of ''immigration'': immigration in relation to the Najd Brothers:

It is historically known that the weak early believers immigrated from Mecca to Yathreb to flee religious persecution, and they had been commanded for a long time not to fight back despite the incessant attacks by the Qorayish tribe on them after chasing them out of their homeland and possessions. Later on, the divine permission in the Quran of self-defense fighting was revealed in the Quran to cur such attacks. We understand this from the following verses: "Permission is given to those who are fought against, and God is Able to give them victory. Those who were unjustly evicted from their homes, merely for saying, "Our Lord is God." Were it not that God repels people by means of others: monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques-where the name of God is mentioned much-would have been demolished. God supports whoever supports Him. God is Strong and Mighty." (22:39-40). In Yathreb, Quranic verses revealed at the time come with legislation of self-defense fighting, confining fighting to cases and purposes of self-defense only: "And fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not commit aggression; God does not love the aggressors." (2:190).

In contrast, the notions of immigration for the aggressors like the Najd Brothers consists of forming camps/villages of armed fighters for training established by Abdul-Aziz, calling them ''immigration colonies'' to urge others to join him by invoking history of early believers. Abdul-Aziz used to mobilize the youths of Bedouins (desert Arabs) into camps or colonies in which they lived together and where they had been trained and taught Wahabism to become later on what is called the Najd Brothers. Their training included aggressive fighting and how to raid and attack others aiming at murdering and robbing them as well as enslaving their women. The clergymen and sheikhs of Wahabism used to preach daily in such colonies to urge the fighting youths that their acts constituted ''real'' Islam as adopted and applied by Prophet Muhammad. This was a falsehood, of course. Based on this lie, such colonies/camps or villages came to be known as immigration colonies to invoke Muhammad's immigration to Yathreb. Historically, the early believers with Muhammad had to forsake their homeland, houses, possessions, money, and families in Mecca because of being religiously persecuted. In contrast, the propaganda of Abdul-Aziz directed at the Bedouins consisted of urging them to sell all their possessions, cattle, and tents to follow Al-Saud. This means that the desert Arabs could sell their possessions at leisure at any convenient price to later on join Abdul-Aziz in the ''immigration'' camps, and it is noteworthy that Ibn Abdul-Wahab considered this Wahabi sort of immigration as an obligatory item or condition to fulfill one's faith in Wahabism, as he writes in his letter titled ''Six Stances Copied from the Sunna of Muhammad''. The term ''immigration'' within Wahabism came to be known as shunning and deserting other non-Wahabis as ''infidels'', for the purposes of deserting falsehoods of worldly life to embrace ''real'' Islam. The next step was to fight all non-Wahabis everywhere, who were mostly peaceful ones who never began to fight anyone at all. This contradicts the Quran of course: "As for those who have not fought against you for your religion, nor expelled you from your homes, God does not prohibit you from dealing with them kindly and equitably. God loves the equitable. But God prohibits you from befriending those who fought against you over your religion, and expelled you from your homes, and aided in your expulsion. Whoever takes them for friends-these are the wrongdoers." (60:8-9). Early believers during the lifetime of Muhammad needed, in their new homeland in the Yathreb city-state, to stand side by side as brethren in faith to cooperate in self-defense fighting and to defend Yathreb against incessant attacks by the Meccan Qorayish tribesmen who went on with their aggression after expelling them out of Mecca. In contrast, Abdul-Aziz took the overt notion of immigration; urging his fighters to become Brothers of the sword and to call each other Brothers in faith while other non-Wahabis were declared as infidels and non-Muslims. Hence the name the Najd Brothers came into being later on. Thus, they cooperated to attack the peaceful non-aggressive innocent Arabs; unlike Muhammad and the early believers who cooperated to defend themselves and their city against marauding, raiding attackers. Abdul-Aziz called his groups of murderers the Najd Brothers and used this Quranic verse as a motto on his banners: "And hold fast to the rope of God, altogether, and do not become divided. And remember God's blessings upon you; how you were enemies, and He reconciled your hearts, and by His grace you became brethren…" (3:103). The term ''Brothers'' has become part of literature of all movements of religious revolts and revolutions in the contemporary history of the Middle East as well as terrorist organizations attributing themselves forcibly to Islam, such as the terrorist MB group member originating in Egypt and later on branching in all the Arab world countries.

When did the movements of forming camps and colonies begin?

The very first colony or camp of Wahabi ''immigration'' was established in the name of Al-Artaweiyya in 1330 A.H. (1911 A.D.), and its inhabitants were a mix of the youths from the tribes of Harb and Mateer, and the second one was called Al-Ghatghat, whose inhabitants came from the tribe of Otaybah, whereas the third one was named Dakhna, with its youths coming from the tribe of Harb, and finally, the fourth colony was christened Al-Ajfar, whose youth came mostly from the tribe of Shamar (6). A controversy emerged concerning about the target of establishing such colonies due to the secrecy of the matter at the beginning; some claimed that the aim of such colonies was to train Bedouins to be peasants who were to be experts in agriculture so as to make them avoid raiding, stealing, and robbing typical of nomads' life in Arabia at the time, and to begin to acquire new habits of living. The author Jalal Kishk vehemently refutes this agricultural purpose in his writings (7). Apparently, the Brothers living in such colonies never learned anything about agriculture and values of peasants. The reason: those inhabitants of such camps and colonies grew fiercer and more violent than ever, fighting and murdering with no bounds, without taking care if their victims were fighters or peaceful civilians, killing mercilessly children, women, and elderly men, thinking their heinous deeds as acts of worship, faith, devoutness, and jihad. Of course, this was far from the ethics of ordinary secular soldiers in any armies, let alone values and ethics of peasants. Hence, the rumor of teaching agriculture to Bedouins was linked to another easily refuted humor which was less spread: accusing the inhabitants of such colonies of being communists related to the Bolshevist Revolution. Such rumors and questions kept appearing in writings of those who witnessed the establishment of such camps, and Habeeb Ali has refuted such rumors and accusations in his writings (8).

The two phases of establishing such colonies:

The fluctuating and wavering justification and discussion of the phenomenon of establishing such Wahabi colonies are linked to the two phases of forming such colonies/camps; a secretive phase and a public one. Within the secretive phase, Abdul-Aziz took a great deal of care to hide such activity from the author Amin Al-Rihany so as not to blow the whistle to GB that numerous colonies of Wahabi jihadists are being formed, so that no one would knew the real reason for such camps. Despite the fact that Abdul-Aziz maintained his communication with GB, he feared that the British might not like the notion at all; his fears were revealed five years after the success of the colonies and their aims in 1917 A.D. (1336 A.H.) (9).

The two main colonies/camps of the Najd Brothers:

Al-Artaweiyya: this was the very first colony, built around a group of water wells on the route between Kuwait and Al-Qassim region. Its establishment began with skirmishes in the village of Al-Hurma between the Bedouins under Abdul-Aziz and the residents of this village because of the extremism and bigotry of Wahabis who came recently to reside there. Wahabis were forced to leave the village and to establish their colony in Al-Artaweiyya area in eastern Al-Sedeir region, where tribes and caravans used to get some rest and be supplied with water, and that region was under the control of the Mateer tribe. The very first group of 50 Wahabis to inhabit Al-Artaweiyya was from the tribe of Harb, the group as known as Al-'Eirimat, who built some new water wells and some houses for themselves, headed by their leader Saad Ibn Met'eib, and soon enough, they were joined by others. Abdul-Aziz used to visit them frequently, spending the night in preaching them and giving them pieces of advice. The leader and emir of Al-Artaweiyya was Feisal Al-Daweesh, who was appointed by Abdul-Aziz when he fought fiercely and bravely and won victory at Al-Ahsa region. The inhabitants of Al-Artaweiyya colony reached the number of 10.000 men, but Al-Artaweiyya was razed to the ground when Abdul-Aziz decided to put an end to the Najd Brothers movement in 1930. Its inhabitants were mostly from the tribes of Mateer and Harb (10). The Wahabi preachers under Abdul-Aziz used to roam all tribes of Arabia, calling youths of every tribe to join Al-Artaweiyya colony to be recruited as Brothers, urging and enticing them to leave their tribes and folks as infidels who deserved to be conquered and smitten. Many tribes realized the danger and the threat posed by such a call; they faced the Wahabi preachers and sometimes prevented them from entering the houses and tents of the tribes. That was why Abdul-Aziz urged those preachers to use the sword when necessary, as they were properly trained to fight. When some men of the Harb tribe tried to fight those preachers, Abdul-Aziz fought them fiercely with his armies, and the Harb tribe had to acquiesce and to submit to the new reality and new order that was being formed (11). Their giving up was a pattern often repeated by other tribes, leading the notion of immigration colonies to succeed eventually, especially after the establishment of Al-Ghatghat colony.

Al-Ghatghat: this was the second Wahabi colony formed directly after the first one, in 1912 A.D., and it contained inhabitants (i.e. Brothers) coming from the Otaybah tribe. It was populated at first by about 100 men, mostly from the Otaybah tribe and ten men from the Qahtan tribe, led successively by the following leaders: Deigheilab Ibn Kamhan, Fayeith Al-Habrah, Muqham Ibn Ramizan, and Hussein Ibn Jusham. After the passage of 8 months, they were joined by Majeed Ibn Khuthayla and Alloush Ibn Hameed. A year later, the colony was led by Sultan Ibn Bajad, and its inhabitants grew to be about 12 thousand men. Al-Ghatghat colony was located within 100 miles from Riyadh, and it was destroyed in 1929 and re-established in 1956 (12). Soon enough, more than 200 immigration colonies were established within 15 years, mostly in the region of Najd, and some of them in other regions like Hejaz, near Qatar, near the borders of the Empty Quarter Desert, and near the borders with Syria and Jordan. Hence, Abdul-Aziz had formed for himself a network of colonies/camps to control and mobilize deluded youths and to preach Wahabism among them (13).

How the immigration colonies were administrated?

The choice of the location of each colony was carefully planned; it had to be relatively away from routes of trade caravans, to help those Bedouins forget their deep-rooted habit of raiding and attacking such caravans; they were trained to attack instead the other cities and regions to conquer them and to force them to swear allegiance to Abdul-Aziz and join his project under his rule as a king. Another item that was taken into consideration was the existence of water wells with plenty of water. The last item to be heeded with utmost care at this phase was guarding the secrecy of the project of establishing such colonies. Abdul-Aziz had set a system by which a colony was to be built; the very first building to be erected was mosque and a yard surrounding it, and then houses with a square amidst them. In that square, the banner would be raised to indicate the mobilization of the Najd Brothers to begin their aggression on others in the name of jihad. Inside each colony, Abdul-Aziz had set a water-distribution system, names-registration system, and arms-distribution system. Each colony was headed by its emir (i.e., prince or ruler) and its judge; the emir was responsible for the execution of sentences uttered by the judge within the consultation council, endorsed by Abdul-Aziz first. The judge was responsible for applying the Wahabi sharia. The emir was in direct contact with Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud, participating in choosing members of the consultation council and taking fealty of the house of Al-Saud from imams and clergymen, whereas the judge was linked directly to the high judge who controlled all judges in all colonies. Both the judge and the emir of each colony were responsible before Abdul-Aziz directly. Within each colony, there was a treasurer of the Treasury who used to collects zakat and alms money, with about tens persons to distribute post letters and to maintain security and peace in the colony. The religious authority was centered on the descendant of sheikh Ibn Abdul Wahab as per a hierarchal system led by a panel of Wahabi scholars, whose decisions were obligatory and forced upon all emirs to execute. Such Wahabi scholars used to train the religious police members who consisted of local scholars among the imams of the Bedouins living in the colonies, and their mission was checking that everyone is performing prayers regularly, forcibly doing good deeds and avoiding bad ones. There was one religious police officer for each group of 50 Najd Brothers fighters, and each officer had a disciple who was being trained to take his place temporarily anytime until he was trained enough to be a full-fledged religious police officer (14).

Gifts of money:

Despite rumors of teaching the Bedouins agriculture in the colonies, the fact that Abdul-Aziz gave them regular gifts of money indicates that there was no economical or agricultural activities whatsoever in the colonies; hence, the rumor of their being taught agriculture was a façade or a cover-up for their being trained as fighters and Wahabi soldiers, who would fight to death based on their creed notions. The Najd Brothers used to receive money gifts that were of four types, within intricate systems of their distributions among the worthy persons who deserved them (15). The life of the Najd Brothers inside the immigration colonies/camps was very serious and strict in nature, comprising performance of prayers and other acts of worship for long hours and attentive listening to religious sermons preached to inculcate Wahabism and to train them spiritually and militarily, to drive the idea home that their fighting is a sacred holy mission to convert others in Arabia (i.e., infidels) into what they deemed as the only ''true'' Islam: Wahabism. Fighting outside the colonies was the only activity that urged them to bear with the tedium of living inside the colonies within certain restrictions, as they were looking forward either to martyrdom or to gain more loot after conquering other regions, thus obeying God's commands as per teachings if their Wahabi sheikhs and scholars.

Footnotes:

1- Muhammad Al-Assad, ''The Way to Islam'', page 216, Beirut, translated by Afeef Al-Baalbaky.

Hafiz Wahba, ''Wahabism in Arabia'', the Royal Magazine for Middle Asian Societies, 1924/10/16, page 465.

Amin Al-Rihany, ''Najd and its Annexes'', Beirut, 3^rd edition, 1964, page 26.

Salah Eddine Al-Mukhtar, ''History of the KSA'', Beirut, 143/2.

2-Dickson, ''Forty Years in Kuwait'', London, 1970, pages 149:150.

3- John Habeeb, ''The Saudi Brothers in Two Decades'', translated by Dr. Sabry Hassan, pages 55:60, edition of Riyadh, 1998.

4- Jalal Kishk, ''The Saudis and the Islamic Solution'', pages 694-695 and 556, 574, 4^th edition, Cairo, 1984.

5- Sheehab Eddine Al-Nuweiry (677:733 A.H.) ''Nihayet Al-Ereb'', 228/25, 236, 243, Cairo, 1984.

6- Lughat Al-Arab newspaper, May-June 1913, 1331 A.H.

Kishk, ditto, page 557.

Habeeb, ditto, page 93.

Al-Mukhtar, ditto, 145/2.

7- Kishk, ditto, pages 560, 6969, and 701.

8- Habeeb, ditto, pages 64:68.

9- Kishk, ditto, pages 55, 701.

Habeeb, ditto, pages 53:58.

10- Habeeb, ditto, pages 96:105.

Philip Hitti, ''History of Najd'', page 305, Beirut, 1946.

Lughat Al-Arab Magazine, Vol. 483, 11^th May, 1913, 8^th year.

Hamza, ''Heart of Arabia'' page 379, edition of Mecca, 1933.

Herwitz, ''Middle East Politics'', London, 1969, page 245.

Armstrong, ''Lord of Arabia'', Beirut, 1954, pages 85.

11- Al-Rihany, "History of Najd", page 262, Beirut, 1928.

12- Habeeb, ditto, pages 105:108.

13- Habeeb, ditto, pages 108:111.

14- Habeeb, ditto, pages 113:115.

Al-Mukhtar, ditto, 144/2.

15- Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, number 291, sixth year, 1930/7/4.

Secondly: the Najd Brothers as a military force:

Abdul-Aziz exaggerated rightly in the military formation and organization of the Najd Brothers, as regarding the conditions of political powers at the time in Arabia. In fact, Abdul-Aziz followed closely the example of the Middle-Ages feudal system, as in the Mameluke Era in Egypt. Mameluke leaders used to distribute agricultural lands among other Mameluke knights to mobilize and train soldiers and fighters within a hierarchal system, and Abdul-Aziz revived this system in Arabia, with the exception of the fact that idea of agriculture was a cover-up or a façade as we have written above. Another difference was that Abdul-Aziz prepared the Najd Brothers in terms of creed, manipulating their belligerent nature to convert them into the violent creed of Wahabism to redirect and re-channel their love for loot, enslavement, and raids into a religious and political cause of uniting Arabia into one rule to convert others forcibly to Wahabism, as a form of jihad bringing riches in this life and Paradise in the Hereafter. Let us give an overview of the features of the military aspect of the Najd Brothers.

Mobilization:

The mosque of every colony/camp was the center of mobilization, as per the application of the creed of Wahabi jihad that links attacking and conquering others to religion, symbolized in the mosque and the daily five prayers performed inside it. Every colony had its mosque with a list of male performers of prayers, checking who came in and who did not perform prayers inside it, to check the fidelity of the new Najd Brothers five times a day. Such lists of all colonies were used to mobilize the Brothers to fight in their aggressive Wahabi jihad by raiding other areas, making each soldier responsible for his own outfits, food, beverages, arms, and horse until he would reach the assembly point in that colony or the other. Males would be allowed to join the Najd Brothers at the age of 15. When the orders of Wahabi jihad fighting came, a banner would be hoisted within the yard of the mosque, near the square of the colony, where soldiers would gather with their victuals, arms, and horses, with no one allowed to be absent unless he would be ill. Even women, wives of the soldiers in the colony, would trace the absent ones with no reason of ailment and would either punish or kill them (16).

Types of Wahabi Jihad:

Wahabi jihad comprises three types: daily jihad, double jihad, and thrice jihad. The daily one is simply to be on the defensive and never letting off one's guard, being always ready to fight at a moment's notice. The double jihad is to fight fiercely when needed anytime on any mission. the thrice jihad is to generally mobilize all the Najd Brothers in all colonies at one location in critical cases. The first and second types of jihad was called for only by Abdul-Aziz himself personally whenever the occasion for them arose, whereas the third type of Wahabi jihad was decided only by Wahabi scholars and clergymen when requested by Abdul-Aziz in a written form of request (17). This means that all military authority was at the hands of Abdul-Aziz; he was the one to decide when, where, and how any war was waged and who are the targeted tribes, in which cities and regions, etc. let us bear in mind that the view or endorsement of the Wahabi clergymen and scholars was the same: to obey the orders of the ruler, i.e., Abdul-Aziz, within the time-honored Sunnite Wahabi traditions and concepts that make such blind obedience akin to the obedience of Prophet Muhammad and God. We remind readers that this contradicts the Quran of course; we find in the Quran that obedience, not the blind type, for experts in a certain field as pertaining to the welfare of society within the concept of Quranic Shura (consultation), which is akin to direct democracy in the terms of our modern age. Such Quranic democracy turned into tyranny once Muhammad died, and ''experts'' was a term used falsely to designate rulers in general who owned lands and its inhabitants, and the Sunnite jurisprudence makes any conquering ruler/tyrant/sultan as the one to be obeyed blindly. Hence, such Middle-Ages culture accumulated until it was revived by the Sunnite Wahabism, as applied by Abdul-Aziz in the 20^th century.

Methods of fighting:

The Wahabi fighters had four methods of fighting:

1- Morning fights when to attack the enemies by dawn while they were asleep.

2- Pre-noon fights when raids would involve fierce fighting.

3- Afternoon fights which would last between the afternoon and sunset.

4- Night fights were the most difficult type of fighting, and survival rates were low as one could not differentiate friends and foes in the dark, unless soldiers are led by clever, shrewd leaders. It is noteworthy that the Najd Brothers used to prefer this fourth type of fighting to terrorize their foes and to sap their energy and ammunition (18). Remarkably, the raids of the Najd Brothers would never take place during winters and springs; they would begin only during summers and autumns, and this was due to geographical and weather factors. During winters and springs rain would fall, allowing for grazing of cattle, filling of water wells, and growing few crops, whereas during summers and autumns, no grazing areas would be found and wells would be empty of water (19). Thus, many conquering battles occurred during summers and autumns; for instance, conquering Al-Ahsa region in June 1918, Al-Kharama region in 1919, Al-Jahra in October 1920, Aseer in May 1921, Ha'il un August 1921, reconquering Aseer in June 1922, and attacking the eastern area of Jordan in July 1922 and the fortress of Boseih in November 1927. Thus, the raids of the Najd Brothers were directly linked to their old habits of Bedouins raiding other tribes in times of dryness and arid nature of deserts. The only added item here was a religious aspect to justify such aggression as a form of Wahabi jihad.

Arms of the Najd Brothers:

Their arms were simple indeed: 1) camels trained for battles divided into three types: Al-Omaniyya, Al-Omaniyya Al-Batiniyaa, and Al-Haraaer, 2) horses trained for battles divided into five types in their turn: Al-Kuhayl, Hadiyya, Al-Hamdaniyya, Al-Aqlaweiyya, and Al-Rahma, 3) swords, and famous types among them were called Al-Saud swords and Al-Mushtary swords, as well as various types got from spoils of battles, and finally 4) guns, rifles, and machine guns (20).

Number of fighters:

There was no exact count or statistics that mention the number of Wahabi fighters among the Najd Brothers; some estimates tell us that they were somewhere between 25 thousand to 76 thousand fighters in some narratives. Abdul-Aziz is reported to have declared that he fully controlled 400 thousand fighters all over Arabia who obey his commands blindly and promptly and imitate him in stances of grief and joy, and he called them as ''Monotheism Soldiers'', who obey ''God's orders'' (21). Of course, such a declaration is exaggerated, but it indicates how Abdul-Aziz viewed the blind obedience of desert-Arabs and Bedouins after their conversion to Wahabism by Abdul-Aziz, linking their entire lives to his verbal commands of fighting all non-Wahabis.

Military tactics:

The army of the Najd Brothers was based on a system of fighting units which were able to acquire self-sufficiency on all levels in their readiness to fight anytime anywhere. They were specially trained to sap the energies of the foes using the tactics of guerilla war fighting, used for the very first time in the Arab world by the Najd Brothers. Nonetheless, the army of the Najd Brothers was not a regular army as was the case with the Ottomans and other Arab countries at the time. Moreover, their military tactics included the creed of the ardent desire to be martyred; many of the Najd Brothers fought fiercely and recklessly, heeding no risks or dangers, in order to get killed presumably to enter Paradise after death. They were known for their ardent desire to annihilate all persons deemed as foes; they would kill even the elderly peaceful men, females of all age-groups, and children (22). Such unprecedented brutality was a direct outcome of the Wahabi notions that declare all those who reject Wahabism as infidels and apostates who deny Islam, and thus, their blood can be shed with impunity, and such heinous murders were assumed to be rewarded in Paradise in the Hereafter, regardless if the victims include elderly peaceful men, females of all age-groups, and children.

Espionage:

The main feature that ensured the success of the Najd Brothers in their military endeavors was their network of spies who spied on their enemies for a sufficient duration, before raiding and attacking them, by planting a fifth column inside the location of the foes. A good example of this was how Abdul-Aziz applied this strategy successfully to win to his forces Khaled Ibn Louaï, leading him to betray his tribe. Of course, such traits were chief among ideological movements that spread and propagate their tenets and principles to win over more followers before military conquest of enemies. During battles, the Najd Brothers used to receive full support and aid from such spies who infiltrated the bastions and fortresses of the enemies, and in many cases, such spies would flee the enemies' camps to pass invaluable information and secrets to the Najd Brothers shortly before they attack (23).

Hierarchical order of the Saudi leaderships:

Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud was the supreme leader of all, and his followers viewed him as the supreme guide and absolute ruler. Next to him was Feisal Al-Daweesh, Sultan Ibn Bajad, Muhsin Al-Faram, with Didaan Ibn Heithlein, with the two latter names as the leaders who played major roles within the tribesmen of Al-Ajman. At certain times, those leaders would act independently, as when Ibn Bajad fought in Ta'if region and Al-Daweesh in Iraq (24).

The role of women in fighting along with the Najd Brothers:

Besides punishing and/or murdering those reluctant to fight without proper acceptable excuses, some Wahabi women actually participated in fighting in battlefields, and some other women used to play on tambours during battle to incite their husbands' enthusiasm to fight (25).

The renowned military prowess of the Najd Brothers:

Some British periodicals and records of the time describe the Najd Brothers as invincible, and they likened them to the tanks of Rommel and to Sturmabteilung of the German forces, spreading terror all over Arabia and its neighboring countries (26).

Establishing security and stability:

The Wahabi military organization had yet another target to achieve eventually; i.e., to establish security and stability in conquered areas by preventing looting and other activities that Bedouins used to enjoy ensuing a victory, especially attacking other caravans coming to Arabia from far and near countries, either for trade or for performing pilgrimage to Mecca. Establishing security and stability has been indeed a priority for the Saudi regime, especially thanks to the firmness of applying the punishment for theft, by cutting the culprit's hand off. Gradually, Bedouins had to forget their habits and history of looting and raiding of their forefathers. John Philby mentions that the Najd Brothers were fanatics and bigots, who never cared for the pleasures of life and never feared death, and after spreading terror all over Arabia, they willingly re-established peace among troubled regions, and John Philby calls this Wahabi Peace (27). Hafiz Wahba writes a comparison of how the Bedouins used to take pride in raids and looting in the past and how they converted to Wahabism, and being among the Najd Brothers, instead of attacking and looting, they would protect and secure routes, travellers, caravans, and impose peace (28). The renowned literary Lebanese figure Shakib Arslan had once written how hos cloak flew away from him in the wind on his way from Ta'if and Mecca, and how it remained in the route without passers-by snatching it, until the emir of Ta'if ordered his men to find it and send it back to its owner (29). Hence, the Bedouins made profits to make up for the loss of their traditional looting and raiding of tribes or caravans, by adopting Wahabi jihad, once they converted to Wahabism to join the Najd Brothers, as unprecedented loot of such jihad urged them never to desire returning to their old habits and ways.

Footnotes:

16- Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, number 287, sixth year, 1930/6/6.

17- Al-Rihany, "History of Najd", page 164.

18- Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, number 292, sixth year, 1930/7/11.

19- Abou Al-Ela, Mahmoud Taha, "Geography of Arabia", pages 97-98, Cairo, 1930.

Dickson, op. cit. page 345.

20- Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, number 303, sixth year, 1930/9/16.

21- Al-Rihany, ditto, page 414.

Habeeb, ditto, pages: 132:137 and 252.

22- Habeeb, ditto, pages: 123:125.

Kishk, ditto, page 577.

23- Habeeb, ditto, pages: 117 and 128

24- Habeeb, ditto, pages: 128-129.

25- Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, number 289, sixth year, 1930/22.

Dickson, op. cit., page 315.

26- Habeeb, ditto, pages: 32 and 57.

27- John Philby, ''Arabia 1926:1927, Three Years of Wahabi Rule'', Modern Magazine, Volume No. 1937, January-June 1929, page 715.

28- Hafiz Wahba, "The Twentieth Century Arabia'', page 295, third edition, Cairo, 1956.

29- Shakib Arslan, '''Funny Stories from History'', 1350 A.H., Cairo, page 122.

Thirdly: the Wahabi Najd Brothers and the establishment of the monarchy (later on known as the KSA) of Abdul-Aziz:

Introduction:

Almost all of the current known borders of the KSA now were drawn and marked by the Najd Brothers' swords, during both stages of 1) conquering regions of Arabia and 2) delineating borders with neighboring countries like Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait. We tackle here the stage of conquering regions of Arabia. The Najd Brothers emerged as a military force in the scene or arena in the battle of Jirab, in 1914, and their emergence led to a radical change in the power balance in the region, as they had defeated Al-Sharif Hussein, ruler of Hejaz region and later on ruler of Jordan, despite his having a modern regular troops and armies. The Wahabi Najd Brothers defeated as well the armies of Al-Rasheed family, which consisted of tribesmen of the Shamar tribe, and eventually, the Najd Brothers emerged supreme and victorious as they excelled in military tactics and movements, guerilla wars, desert battles, as well as their Wahabi upbringing and teachings that drove them to be eager to die to win victory in this life and Paradise in the Hereafter, as per the Wahabi creed. In the following lines, we trace briefly the role of the Najd Brothers in establishing the third current KSA:

Conquering Al-Ahsa region (the eastern oil-rich region of the KSA):

Abdul-Aziz found himself in the Najd region surrounded by enemies from all directions; he had to move his Najd Brothers outside to protect himself and to test their burgeoning power and strength. He had to begin by conquering Al-Ahsa region, the weakest point beside Najd, which has a strategic location beside the Persian Gulf as well. Al-Ahsa region was an important one in terms of economy even before the discovery of its oil-rich areas; it had rainy grazing areas and trade ports. Al-Saud family captured Al-Ahsa region before, but the Ottoman Empire regained it soon enough. When Abdul-Aziz was looking forward to recapturing it, the Ottomans were licking their wounds as they were defeated in the Balkan War in 1913, and they were hated by the Najd tribes and by Europeans in general. Hence, Abdul-Aziz seized this opportunity to recapture Al-Ahsa easily, under the pretext that its population was mostly Shiites, deemed by the Wahabis as ''infidels''. Abdul-Aziz and his troops moved toward Al-Ahsa in March, 1913, and the city of Al-Hufuf fell easily using only a troop of 600 Wahabi fighters on May 8^th, and the Turkish garrison had to retreat from Al-Ahsa, and tried later on to recapture it by military means and later on by diplomatic channels and negotiations, in vain. Once he captured Al-Ahsa, Abdul-Aziz was intensely feared by alarmed tribesmen all over Arabia, and revenues and wealth of the nascent monarchy increased. Thus, the Najd Brothers passed the very first military test outside Najd. Abdul-Aziz chose Abdullah Ibn Jalawy, his paternal uncle's son, as the new governor of Al-Ahsa and a deputy for Abdul-Aziz there, and Abdul-Aziz directly contacted the British within the Persian Gulf, where their influence was great, as the Gulf was their passage to India, the jewel of the British crown at the time. The pact between GB and Abdul-Aziz began officially with the treaty of Al-Akeer in 1915, as the British acknowledged his sovereignty over Najd and Al-Ahsa, and granted him a large sum of money in return for his solemn oath not to attack its regions in the Persian Gulf (30).

The first stage of fighting against Al-Rasheed family in 1915:

Abdul-Aziz seized the opportunity of the enmity existing between Al-Rasheed family, rulers of Hael region, and the British, and between that family and the Al-Sharif family, rulers of Hejaz, to readily conquer Hael. Abdul-Aziz felt that the economic needs pressed him to conquer Hael. However, his Najd Brothers urged him to begin with conquering Hejaz first, especially that its ruler, Al-Sharif Hussein, was a chief ally to the British. This might have destroyed the treaty of Abdul-Aziz with GB; Abdul-Aziz had to reject their ardent desire of conquering Hejaz at the time and to direct their zeal to fight toward capturing Hael. Simultaneously, Abdul-Aziz had to make the British promise him never to allow Al-Sharif Hussein to stab him in the back by attacking Najd while he was busy fighting Al-Rasheed family in the battle of Jirab in 1915. Abdul-Aziz was about to win victory, but the tribesmen of Al-Ajman turned against him suddenly and attacked his troops instead of helping them fight the troops of Al-Rasheed family. Thus, the battle ended with no decisive victory for any of the warring parties. Abdul-Aziz decided to punish Al-Ajman tribesmen, once he made a treaty with the ruler of Kuwait never to attack militarily the Najd Brothers and never to aid the tribesmen of Al-Ajman. In November 1915, the Najd Brothers were led by Abdul-Aziz to fight them near Al-Ahsa, and after fierce battles that lasted for several days, the tribesmen of Al-Ajman fled to Kuwait, as its ruler was on their side even during battles (31).

Turba and Al-Kharama 1919:

Abdul-Aziz had inherited the deep-seated historical enmity and hatred existing between Al-Saud and Al-Sharif families, since Al-Saud captured Hejaz during the establishment of the very first Saudi state. Later on, Al-Sharif family recaptured Hejaz as its rightful rulers, but in fact, Hejaz was controlled by Egypt while the Ottomans held nominal control only over the region, after Muhammad Ali Pacha, ruler of Egypt at the time, destroyed the very first KSA in 1818 and razed to the ground its capital, Dariyya. Such historical enmity was augmented by the foolish policies adopted by Al-Sharif Hussein, ruler of Hejaz, as once he entered Mecca in 1909, he promptly began to send troops to raid Najd to spite Abdul-Aziz. Such conflict intensified the hot dispute over the control over the two cities of Turba and Al-Kharama, leading soon enough to the military attack longed for by the Najd Brothers. The cities of Turba and Al-Kharama have a strategic location and economic affluence, and their ruler, who was Al-Sharif family member, Khaled Ibn Al-Mansour Ibn Louaï, joined the Wahabi call, becoming a leader under Abdul-Aziz. This increased grudges between Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud and Al-Sharif Hussein. As both cities are located in the borders between Najd and Hejaz, dwellers of both cities fluctuated between loyalties to Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud and Al-Sharif Hussein. Disputes ensued between their respective families. Al-Sharif Hussein proclaimed himself as the king of all Arabs in 1916, and Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud hated him more for such insult. Both families began military operations against each other in the summer of 1918, as the Najd Brothers crushed the troops led by Hammoud Ibn Yazeed, who was Al-Sharif family member, during the battle of Hawqaan in May, 1918. Soon enough, the Najd Brothers, led by Khaled Ibn Louaï who rebelled against his family, crushed the troops led by Hammoud Ibn Yazeed for the second time during the battle of Jabbar in June, 1918. The troops of Al-Sharif family were defeated once more when they were led by Shakir Ibn Zeid at Al-Hinnow Wells in September, 1918. Such repeated and successive defeats led eventually to a decisive battle between the armies of the two families in the city of Turba. The emir Abdullah Ibn Al-Hussein led the armies of Al-Sharif family, and this man later on was given, by GB, the land of Jordan to rule as king. He was the son of Al-Sharif Hussein, while Khaled Ibn Louaï the rebel led the armies of the Najd Brothers. Night fights were started by the Najd Brothers in May, 1919, as they rushed into the military camps of Al-Sharif, killing, destroying, and looting. Al-Sharif family armies were crushed again, and all their men were killed except few ones who fled the camp along with Abdullah Ibn Al-Hussein, and thus, finally, Turba and Al-Kharama fell into the hands of Abdul-Aziz, who was urged relentlessly by the Najd Brothers to conquer Hejaz very soon as Al-Sharif armies were crushed. Yet, Abdul-Aziz could not conquer Hejaz at the time and he had to ignore this rather rare opportunity of easy invasion because of his treaty with the British, advising his Najd Brothers to withdraw so that they would not lose ground. Abdul-Aziz waited eagerly to meet with his allies, the British, to convince them of allowing him to conquer Hejaz later on. Such stance of Abdul-Aziz led some of his Najd Brothers to express their discontent, which marked the early beginnings of their forming an opposition movement against him later on. Fear of the Najd Brothers was spread all over Arabia, as news of such land-sliding victory came along with news of utter brutality of the Najd Brothers who savagely killed all captured men (i.e., POWs) to wipe out all traces of the enemies' troops (32).

The conquest of Hael:

After capturing the two cities of Turba and Al-Kharama, conquering Hael seemed to have to be done soon inevitably, to prepare later on for the imminent conquest of Hejaz, after reaching an agreement with the British. Another factor that led Abdul-Aziz to hasten with such a conquest was the fact that Al-Sharif Hussein allied himself with Al-Rasheed family, foes of Abdul-Aziz, to militarily face the danger of the Najd Brothers. Thus, they joined forces to try to defeat Abdul-Aziz who threatened their rule and even their very existence. Typical of him, Abdul-Aziz had planted his spies and agents soon enough in Hael, while spreading his Wahabi preachers all over the region. Most of the dwellers of Hael converted to Wahabism, turning themselves as a fifth column serving Abdul-Aziz. Such new converts were persecuted by the rulers of Hael, a fact that incited the Najd Brothers to capture Hael as soon as possible. Typically, Abdul-Aziz seized well-timed chances to make his conquest of Hael a great victory; Al-Rasheed family grew weaker as their powerful and shrewd leader, Met'eib Al-Rasheed, was killed. His successor and son, Abdul-Malik, was weak and inexperienced young man, and his being appointed suddenly the new leader caused a rift among the ruling family members. Seizing the chance of such rift, the leader of Al-Roula tribe in Syria conquered Al-Jouf region which was ruled by Al-Rasheed family. Simultaneously, the ruler of Kuwait, who was a foe to Abdul-Aziz, died. Al-Sharif Hussein was busy facing internal unrest and external hardships that drove him to ignore his allies the Al-Rasheed family. The British hated Al-Rasheed family because they allied themselves to the Ottomans during World War I, and they wanted to take revenge on this ruling family using Abdul-Aziz and his Najd Brothers; the latter's enthusiasm reached the top as they wanted ardently to avenge the persecuted Wahabis in Hael by conquering the region and killing its rulers. In the summer of 1921, the Wahabi armies of Al-Saud moved into three directions: 1) an army led by the emir M. Ibn Abdul-Rahman (brother of Abdul-Aziz) to conquer the north region of the tribe of Shamar and to stop supplied coming to the enemies from Syria, 2) an army led by Feisal Al-Daweesh, who was a Najd Brother and at the same time the leader of Mateer tribe, heading to the south, and 3) an army led by Abdul-Aziz himself that remained near and ready to join the first or second army or both when necessary. The army led by Al-Daweesh camped near Hael, and tried later on to infiltrate into the region. The shrewd emir of Hael pretended to be a new convert to Wahabism in order to deceive Al-Daweesh, who let off his guard along with his Wahabi fighters, until they were overtaken suddenly by the huge defending armies coming from Hael, causing disorganization within lines of the Wahabi armies. Al-Daweesh sought the immediate help of the troops gathered with Abdul-Aziz, who came swiftly to attack and siege Hael. Ibn Talal, the emir of Hael, requested the interference of GB, but his request had fallen into deaf ears. Ibn Talal had to surrender on 20^th of November, 1921, especially as the Wahabi armies managed to infiltrate into Hael and their fighters poured into it, capturing it for their supreme leader, Abdul-Aziz, who ordered his Najd Brother never to loot Hael and never to kill its non-Wahabi population, in order to avoid further troubles. The shrewd and cunning Abdul-Aziz treated the people of Hael leniently, married the widow of their leader, and made the affluent ones in Hael among his retinue. Eventually, with Hael and the tribe of Shamar lands captured by Abdul-Aziz, he controlled the entire Najd region and its neighboring lands, making the balance of power tipped in his favor all over Arabia. His nascent kingdom reached the borders of the Hashemites in the north and the west of the Arabian Peninsula, accelerating the timing of the final confrontation between them and the Najd Brothers of Al-Saud. Capturing the tribe of Shamar lands abetted the appetite of the Najd Brothers to conquer Al-Jouf area as well as Sarhan Valley, which would open their route to Syria and Palestine one day, by sending both the Wahabi troops to raid the south of the Levant and the Wahabi sheikhs and preacher to spread and propagate Wahabism there. Thus, capturing Hael led to cutting off the route and all communication between Hejaz and Jordan (33).

Conquering Aseer:

Having captured Shamar tribe lands, Abdul-Aziz bestowed on himself the formal title of ''The Sultan of Najd and its Neighboring Regions'', and he felt that it was high time to conquer the region of Aseer, located in the south of his nascent kingdom; he knew that he could not possibly conquer Kuwait, Hejaz, or the Eastern Jordan province, as GB adamantly refused any threat to such regions under its control. Aseer was filled with Wahabi converts since the establishing of the first KSA, and Abdul-Aziz had established near it a Wahabi immigration colonies named Al-Rahba, located in the north-eastern area of Najran, causing political troubles and unrest between Wahabis of the region of Aseer and the ruling family of Al-Aa'es that used to rule Najran, as they feared that Abdul-Aziz would soon capture Aseer and be a source of threat to them. Typical of them, the Wahabis of Aseer sought the aid of Abdul-Aziz against their enemies, and he seized the chance to capture Aseer to gain a lot from its resources and wealth. Abdul-Aziz prepared two successive armies to conquer Aseer: one army consisted of 2000 Wahabi fighters led by the son of his paternal uncle, Abdul-Aziz Ibn Musaaid, in May, 1921, and this army defeated the army of Al-Aa'es family in the city of Hijla, arresting the leader of the army, Hassan Ibn Al-Aa'es, and his paternal uncle's son, Muhammad Ibn Al-Aa'es, sending them both to Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud in Najd as captives. Abdul-Aziz appointed Muhammad Ibn Al-Aa'es as the ruler of the city of Abha, in Aseer, and he ignored Hassan Ibn Al-Aa'es, and the latter fled to the city of Heireimla, capturing it, and he declared war on Abdul-Aziz, who was busy conquering Hael. Thus, Muhammad Ibn Al-Aa'es recaptured Aseer from Abdul-Aziz, who had to send a second huge army to recapture Aseer after he secured Hael as his property. This second army was led by his son, the emir Feisal Ibn Abdul-Aziz, in June, 1921, who conquered the main cities of Aseer: Beisha, Khamees, Nasheet, and its capital Abha. The family members of Al-Aa'es had to flee to Heireimla. The Najd Brothers destroyed all fortifications of Abha so that its dwellers would not rebel against Al-Saud rule again. When Aseer fell to the Saudi family, Imam Yahiya, ruler of Yemen, fell into a fit of rage, and he seized the chance of seeing Abdul-Aziz busy with fighting Al-Sharif Hussein in Hejaz, by conquering the region of Tihamah. Thus, war broke out between Imam Yahiya and Abdul-Aziz in 1926. Periods of political unrest and turmoil went on in Aseer, while military conflicts remained between Yemen and Al-Saud family until Abdul-Aziz signed an agreement with Al-Idreessi to allow the Saudi control of Aseer. Yemen ruler Imam Yahiya never acknowledged such an agreement, and the Saudis had to fight Yemen until the treaty of Ta'if was signed between the two parties in 1934, which marked a start of good relations and rapprochement between both of them (34).

Conquering Hejaz:

Once Abdul-Aziz secured his borders in the north and in the east, it was high time for him to capture Hejaz region, as his forefathers had done before in the very first Saudi kingdom crushed by Muhammad Ali Pacha, ruler of Egypt, in 1818. The foolishness of the policies adopted by Al-Sharif Hussein, ruler of Hejaz, and the shrewd ones applied by Abdul-Aziz drove GB to remain neutral at first, as the British felt weary of the foolish ways of Al-Sharif Hussein and his demands from them. Other factors emerged to hasten the final confrontation between Al-Sharif Hussein and Abdul-Aziz; as the former prevented the Najd Brothers from performing pilgrimage in Mecca, and he committed aggressions against some groups of the Najd Brothers in the middle of the year 1923. Some skirmishes and frictions occurred repeatedly between both parties, driving the Najd Brothers to urge Abdul-Aziz to conquer Hejaz as soon as possible. The military confrontation seemed inevitable between the Saudi overambitious sultan and Al-Sharif Hussein, as the latter insisted that Arabia could not include both figures as neighbors, as they vie for leadership all over Arabia. There was another stronger reason for the inevitable war: both men considered the other as ''infidel'' who followed another religion other than Islam. The Najd Brothers considered Al-Sharif Hussein as an infidel/polytheist as per the Wahabi creed, as he represented the Sufi and Shiite religions as well as submission to the Western powers, especially GB. Hence, such conflict means that one party would annihilate the other. Abdul-Aziz seized the chance of suitable conditions at the time to militarily face Al-Sharif Hussein, stripping him off the protection of the British and the sympathy of Muslims who came to perform pilgrimage and want Hejaz to remain under its ruler. Abdul-Aziz did his best to appease and to satisfy the British, whereas Al-Sharif Hussein was foolish enough to pest and annoy the British politicians to the extent that they let him down. In order to appease Al-Sharif Hussein, GB had to interfere to put an end to the conflict over the borders between the two ambitious and rival families by holding a conference in the city of Aqeer, on the Persian Gulf, to define the borders between Najd and Iraq in 1922, to assert an earlier Al-Muhamarah agreement that went unheeded by all parties, when a free zone was to be set between the two regions of Najd and Iraqi territories, while allowing tribes of both sided to cross borders freely as before. The fears of Al-Sharif Hussein were allayed for a while, as he felt wary of the threat posed by the Najd Brothers to the Hejaz railways controlled by him. Later on, however, the conference held in Kuwait by GB to discuss borders between Najd and the Hashemites in Jordan, Iraq, and Hejaz failed miserably, and it was postponed twice and ended in nothing when it was held eventually in 1924. Al-Sharif Hussein became a cumbersome burden to GB because of his bad policies and his adamant refusal to sign a peace treaty in 1919 earlier, but his folly was embodied in his declaring himself a caliph of all Muslims in 1924. Al-Sharif Hussein became adamant and stubborn as a mule within conferences held in Kuwait to settle matters. Meanwhile, Abdul-Aziz used his preachers, spies, and agents to increase the propaganda against Al-Sharif Hussein all over Arabia. Muslims of India supported Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud because they hated Al-Sharif Hussein who used to mistreat the Indian pilgrims at the time. Such conditions led to further support to Abdul-Aziz on the international level, and having gained more support from GB, he was keen to support and fortify his internal front; he held a conference in Riyadh, his capital, during Al-Adha feast in 1342 A.H (5-7-1924 A.D.), which was presided by Abdul-Rahman Al-Feisal Al-Saud, the father of Abdul-Aziz. This conference was attended by all leaders of all tribes of Najd and all Wahabi clergymen and scholars of high stature, who urged Abdul-Aziz to conquer Hejaz since five years had passed after the battle of Turba and Al-Kharama, and Wahabis were not permitted by Al-Sharif Hussein to perform pilgrimage so far. They insisted on conquering mecca by force if Al-Sharif Hussein prevented them from entering the holy city. The conference ended by issuing a statement addressed to the Islamic world denouncing and attacking Al-Sharif Hussein, exposing his role in monopolizing pilgrimage activities and Hejaz trade and how he exploited and manipulated pilgrims. The conference took a unanimous decision to fight Al-Sharif Hussein. Soon enough, the following year, Abdul-Aziz prepared three huge armies to fight Al-Sharif Hussein: two armies were sent to the direction of the borders at Iraq and Jordan to prevent any aid, provision, or reinforcement to ever reach Al-Sharif Hussein. The third, and biggest, army was led under ten banners in September 1924 to Hejaz by the military leaders Khaled Ibn Louaï, who betrayed his Al-Sharif family long ago and became a Wahabi, and Sultan Ibn Bajad. On the route to Hejaz, the army passed by Ta'if city, occupying the two stations/posts named Kallakh and Al-Oukhaydar. Strange enough, Al-Sharif Hussein never paid enough heed to the coming army or to measuring its strength, but his army engaged in battle with that of Abdul-Aziz at the walls of Ta'if city. The canons of the Hashemites managed to deter the Najd Brothers fighters to a great extent for a while, but battles went on for three days relentlessly, until the army of Al-Sharif Hussein had to retreat. The Wahabi army sieged Ta'if city, and it conquered it by Friday, the 7^th of September 1924. As a result, the Massacre of Ta'if was perpetrated, and it has remained until now a stigma in the personal history of Abdul-Aziz, because of the unprecedented brutality of the savage Najd Brother in their mass-killings of most of the dwellers of Ta'if. Some newspapers abroad had published news of such a heinous massacre, to the consternation and fear of Abdul-Aziz, as he felt that GB might interfere. Abdul-Aziz ordered the immediate stop of such massacre, denouncing it and threatening to kill any of Najd Brothers who might kill the remainder of the dwellers of Ta'if. Reluctantly, the Wahabi Brothers had to obey their leader; however, because such order coming from Abdul-Aziz contradicted the Wahabi jihad tenets learnt by heart by all Wahabi youths in the immigration colonies who were tutored by Wahabi preachers of Abdul-Aziz, many of the Najd Brothers began to look down on him and verbally abusing him as his image was shaken inside their mindsets; how dare he threaten to kill them while they apply the Wahabi jihad learnt by heart previously?! Such contradiction marked the beginning of the first rift between the Najd Brothers and Abdul-Aziz, leading later on to their turning against him. When Ta'if, the very first city in Hejaz region, fell into the hands of Abdul-Aziz, the rest of Hejaz was a like a ripe fruit about to fall into the hands of the Saudis as well, soon enough. To enable his conquering the rest of Hejaz, especially Yathreb and Mecca, Abdul-Aziz had to prevent at any cost his Najd Brothers from perpetrating any massacres within civilians among inhabitants of the other Hejaz cities, so as to avoid media coverage done before in the case of the Massacre of Ta'if. News of the brutal savagery of the Wahabi massacring dwellers of Ta'if frightened the rest of Hejaz cities, leading them to surrender easily without fighting. Thus, Abdul-Aziz conquered Mecca without shooting a single bullet. Meanwhile, Al-Sharif Hussein stepped down and left the crown to his son and heir, Ali. Abdul-Aziz entered Mecca on 18-10-11924, wearing pilgrimage cloth, accompanied by some Wahabi scholars and some soldiers. By conquering Mecca peacefully without fighting, Abdul-Aziz rested assured that the international community would be silenced. In general, Europe and GB at the time remained neutral and indifferent vis-à-vis such events in Arabia. Abdul-Aziz captured Jeddah and Yathreb so easily by sending his troops there, as he felt sure that his stance was approved or condoned by the international community and the Islamic world. The troops heading toward Yathreb was led by the Najd Brothers leader Feisal Al-Daweesh, who later on became the leader of the Wahabi opposition movement against Abdul-Aziz. Al-Daweesh wanted eagerly to massacre dwellers of Yathreb and thus defying the order of Abdul-Aziz who urged them to be lenient with all peaceful inhabitants of all cities. When Abdul-Aziz head of the intentions of Al-Daweesh, he dismissed Al-Daweesh from his post as a military leader. Thus, Al-Daweesh left the place immediately and went to the immigration colonies/colony of Al-Artaweiyya, along with some of the Najd Brothers; hence, the very first sign of declared, actual opposition to Abdul-Aziz emerged. Abdul-Aziz appointed his eldest son, Muhammad, as the new leader of the troops. Dwellers of Yathreb surrendered easily with no fighting at all, especially that the emir M. Ibn Abdul-Aziz promised them never to allow any Najd Brother to enter their city. Troops of the emir M. Ibn Abdul-Aziz entered Yathreb on 5-12-1925. Yanbu was another city surrendered as well soon enough in the same manner. Jeddah was sieged at first, as Ali Ibn Al-Sharif Hussein resided there, but he had eventually to surrender when GB posed as a mediator to bring peace, and Ali Ibn Al-Sharif Hussein stipulated that no Najd Brothers were to enter the city so as to ensure the safety of the dwellers of Jeddah. Ali Ibn Al-Sharif Hussein had to step down and surrender all Hejaz to Abdul-Aziz, and he left Jeddah to join his brother, Feisal, the king of Iraq, on 3-1-1926. Thus, eventually, Abdul-Aziz became officially the king of Najd, Hejaz, and the neighboring areas on 8-1-1926 (35), and such territories came to be known later on as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.

Footnotes:

Firstly: about conquering Al-Ahsa (N.B.: references are mentioned as possible according to the sequence of historical events):

30- Qassim (Jamal Zachariah), ''The Stance of Kuwait vis-à-vis the Saudi Expansion in Al-Ahsa and Najd'', an article in the History Magazine, number 17, 1970, pages 109 and 310.

Lughat Al-Arab Magazine, Vol. 5, 3^rd year, Nov. 1914, page 273, and volume 12, 2^nd year, June 1913, page 576.

Al-Manar Magazine, Vol. 7, part 1: ''How Saudis conquered Al-Ahsa'', 4/7/1913, pages 559:560.

Al-Ansari (M. Ibn Abdullah Ibn Abdul-Muhsin), ''Tuhfat Al-Mustafeed in the Ancient and Modern History'', editions of Riyadh, 1960, pages 208-209.

Khazaal (Hassan Khalaf), ''Political History of Kuwait'', Aliya editions, 1962, pages 194-197.

Wahba, ''Arabia in the 20^th Century'', page 234.

Kelly (J. B.) ''Eastern Arabian Frontiers'', London, 1963, pages 123 and 125.

Burkharat (John Lewis), ''Travels in Arabia'', London, 1829, pages 403, 406, and 505.

Armstrong, op. cit., pages 77 and 123.

Sangar (Richard H.) ''Arabian Peninsula'', Washington, 1963, pages 29 and 30.

Bell (Gertrude), ''The Arab War'', London. 1940, page 29.

Secondly: about wars with Al-Rasheed family:

31- Lughat Al-Arab Magazine, Vol. 1, 3^rd year, 3^rd of July, 1913 and March 1914.

Al-Mukhtar, ''History of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia'', pages 169:171.

Qassim (Jamal Zachariah), "The Arabian Gulf", 1945, pages 2, 52, and 54.

Khazaal (Hassan Khalaf), ditto, page 186.

Herwitz, ''Diplomacy in near and Middle East Record'', Volume 1, London, 1960, pages 17 and 18.

Armstrong, op. cit., page 94.

Lawrence (T. E.), ''Seven Pillars of Wisdom'', London, 1962, page 266.

About Turba an Al-Kharama:

32- Al-Attar (M. Abdul-Ghafur), ''The Hawk of Arabia'', Mecca editions, pages 183, 289, and 301.

Al-Zarkeley (Kheir Eddine), ''Arabia in the Reign of Abdul-Aziz'', Beirut, 1970, pages 312, 317, and 323.

''Memoirs of King Abdulla'', published by Amin Abou-El-Shaar, Oman, 1965, pages 145,146, and 148.

Al-Manar Magazine, Vol. 8, part 25, article titled ''Special Reasons for Conquering Hejaz'', 27-11-1924.

Al-Ansari, ditto, page 40.

Philby, ''History of Najd'' translated by Omar Al-Didrawy, Beirut, 1952, pages 325 and 326.

Armstrong, op. cit., page 126.

Bullard, ''The British and the Middle East'', London, 1952, pages 75, 76, and 78.

Howarth, ''The Desert King'', London, 1964, page 109.

Thirdly: about conquering Hael:

33- Mikosh (Dakbort von), ''Abdul-Aziz'', translated by Amin Rueiha, Damascus, undated, page 162.

Al-Rihany, ''History of Najd'', pages: 279:282.

Hamza (Fouad), '''Heart of Arabia", pages 382 and 383.

John Habeeb, ditto, pages 183 and 184.

Armstrong, op. cit., pages 149:159

Philby, ''Arabian Jubilee'', Mecca, 1951, page 57.

Meullen, ''The Wells of Ibn Saud'', London, 1958, page 158.

Twitchell, ''Saudi Arabia'', London, 1958, page 158.

Warth, ''The Arabs and the West'', London, 1964, page 8.

Bullard, ditto, page 76.

Fourthly: conquering Aseer:

34- Al-Batatouni (M. Labeeb) ''A Journey to Hejaz'', Cairo, 1910, page 91.

Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, number 57, second year, 19-2-1926.

Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, number 352, 8^th year, Oct. 1931.

Al-Munjid (Salah Eddine), ''Feisal Ibn Abdul-Aziz'', Beirut, 1972, page 22.

Al-Zahraa Magazine, volume 8, part 18, page 544, 15-2-1925.

Al-Shura Magazine, number 69, second year, 18-2-1926.

Al-Muqattam Magazine, number 11246, 38^th year, 26-2-1926.

Abonti (Salvatore), ''The Kingdom of Imam Yahiya'', translated by Taha Fawzy, Cairo, 1947, page 91 and 94.

Fifthly: Conquering Hejaz:

35- John Habeeb, ditto, pages 188-189.

Al-Manar Magazine, Vol. 8, part 25, article titled ''The Wahabis and Hejaz'', page 605, 27-11-1924

Al-Manar Magazine, Vol. 7, part 25, pages 256, 549, and 555, 28-10-1924.

Al-Qibla Magazine, number 453, 5^th year, 26-7-1921.

Al-Ahram Newspaper, number 14500, article titled "Wars in Arabia", 15-10-1924.

Al-Manar Magazine, Vol. 8, part 35, article titled ''The Wahabis and Hejaz'', page 605, 27-11-1924

Qassim, ditto, 1945, page 85

Al-Farhan (Rashid Abdullah), ''A Short History of Kuwait'', Cairo, 1960, page 134.

Wahba, ditto, page 215.

Al-Manar Magazine, Vol. 8, part 25, page 625

Al-Muqattam Magazine, number 11029, 1925.

Al-Zarkeley, ditto, page 329.

Al-Ahram Newspaper, number 14502, ''The Wahabis and Hejaz'', 7-10-1924.

Al-Manar Magazine, Vol. 8, part 25, article titled ''The Wahabis and Hejaz'', page 615:618, Nov. 1924

Al-Rihany, ditto, pages 236 and 237.

Al-Mukhtar, ditto, pages 289 and 290.

Nuamishan, ''Abdul-Aziz", translated by Abdul-Fattah Yaseen, Beirut, 1965, page 170.

Al-Muqattam Magazine, number 1077, 37^th year, 19-8-1925

Al-Qibla Magazine, number 492, 3^rd year, Ramadan 1343 A.H., and number 454, 5^th year, 31-1-1925.

Al-Ahram Newspaper, number 14512, article titled ''The Wahabis and Hejaz'' in 29-10-1924, and number 14058, article titled ''Wahabis in Hejaz'' in 24-10-1924.

Al-Attar, ditto, pages 386 and 387.

Al-Rihany, ditto, page 332.

Al-Zarkeley, ditto, pages 330 and 331.

Shakib Arslan, ditto, page 140.

Al-Manar Magazine, Vol. 26, an article titled ''Hejaz and Arabs'', page 666.

Al-Ahram Newspaper, number 14501, 16-10-1924.

Al-Muqattam Magazine, number 1074, 37^th year, 16-10-1925

Philby (John), ''History of Najd'', page 339.

Al-Khamees (Abdul-Rahman), ''Lions of Al-Saud'', Beirut, 1972, pages 157 and 158.

Umm Al-Qura, number 51, 2^nd year, 18-12-1925.

Stitt (George), ''A Prince of Arabia'', London, 1957, pages 276:280.

Sanger, op. cit., page 32.

Fourthly: the Wahabi Najd Brothers and defining the borders of the Saudi kingdom:

Introduction:

1- Almost all of the KSA borders today have been defined earlier by the swords of the Najd Brothers, within the stage of conquering the neighboring regions and cities to the nascent third KSA and also within the stage of defining borders with neighboring countries like Kuwait, Jordan, and Iraq. We tackle in the following lines this state of defining borders with neighboring countries, after we have summarized above the stage of conquering the neighboring regions and cities.

2- Abdul-Aziz established his theocratic monarchy on the basis of Wahabi jihad that manipulated the name of Islam, and his kingdom was formed beside other counties established long ago by the Persian Gulf, within the Levant, and within Yemen and Iraq. The nascent Saudi kingdom of Abdul-Aziz began soon enough to face the problem of defining borders with such countries within complicated disputes on the regional and international levels, and such disputes had their impact on the relation between Abdul-Aziz and his Najd Brothers who helped him establish the KSA.

3- Abdul-Aziz and his Najd Brothers agreed on preaching, spreading, and propagating the Salafist, Wahabi call outside the borders of the nascent KSA, especially in the north, eastern-north and western-north; i.e., in Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, the whole of the Levant and Egypt. Yet, the means to do this in each country differed a great deal. Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud preferred the peaceful infiltration of Wahabi preachers in such countries, hoping that once Wahabism spread all over such areas, with the least possible cost, the regimes of these countries would be orbits revolving around Abdul-Aziz and his kingdom. The Najd Brothers, as usual, viewed things differently; they believed only in military invasions as the only means to do so, as such means was compatible with their belligerent nature hunting for more locations for looting and massacring. Thus, the Najd Brothers could never perceive 1) the changes in circumstances and conditions, and 2) the fact that GB fully controlled these countries and it would never allow any Bedouin raids, either within Wahabi jihad or not. Anyway, raids of the Bedouin Wahabi Najd Brothers against such countries would have led GB to interfere to stop the expansionist ambitions of Abdul-Aziz, if he would dream of such invasions. Thus, the fissure between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers grew deeper; he was the one to understand the political conditions around him locally, regionally, and on the international level, more than the Najd Brothers could ever have imagined themselves to have understood all. Abdul-Aziz had already at this point achieved the main ambition of his family: to regain the lands he thought that they belonged to his ancestors within the Al-Saud family, as he managed to emerge victorious above all types of fanaticisms ruling all over Arabia. Let us remember that Arabia had witnessed the rise and fall of several ruling dynasties and temporary states that collapsed. The Saudi family was distinguished from such ruling families only by using a religious call (i.e., Wahabism) to unify people around the Saudi family and to establish their monarchy on firm bases. Even the first and second KSA collapsed for different reasons. Abdul-Aziz managed to re-establish the KSA for the third time; he had not to take the risk to fight endlessly outside Arabia and to collide against a great colonial power like Great Britain (henceforth in this chapter: GB); otherwise, he would have lost everything he achieved so far. Thus, this ''Saudi-focused'' view of matters adopted by Abdul-Aziz made the Najd Brothers discern that he contradicted the Wahabi teachings taught to them by the Wahabi preachers for years. Abdul-Aziz was the one to appoint such clergymen for them in the immigration colonies/camps. Such Wahabi teachings stipulated that Wahabi jihad must go on all over the world to convert people by force into Wahabism. The Wahabi Sunnite view of the world has remained the same until now; dividing the world into two camps as per Sunnite Middle-Ages traditions and heritage books that passed on from the ancestors: the camp of believers and the camp of the infidels, with both engaging in endless wars until Doomsday. Of course, such erroneous view has been declared now recently by terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the international organization of the terrorist MB. Abdul-Aziz realized earlier that the 20^th culture rejects such illogical view of things and that GB that controlled India and its Muslims would oppose to such expansionist ambitions of the Najd Brothers. Thus, Abdul-Aziz confined his efforts and military jihad within what was possible: Arabia and its deserts, without engaging into a hopeless struggle against colonial powers like GB and France. This was the background of the conflict that had occurred between the Najd Brothers and their master Abdul-Aziz, and this conflict was reflected on the topic of defining desert borderlines with the neighboring countries. Problems and troubles would have been bound to occur between the KSA and the neighboring countries, as the borders were drawn by the swords. Eventually, more troubles had arisen because of the different views: jihad of Abdul-Aziz was for the retrieval of the lands of his forefathers, whereas the Najd Brothers knew no bounds for endless jihad against all non-Wahabis all over the world. The dispute led finally to the inevitable confrontation between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers. We give more details below.

The KSA and Kuwait:

The relations between Abdul-Aziz and the ruler of Kuwait at the time, king Mubarak Al-Sabah, were troubled once Al-Ahsa fell into the hands of the Wahabis, especially when Mubarak supported Al-Ajman tribesmen against Abdul-Aziz, and the latter insisted at first to conquer Kuwait seeking revenge. Yet, Mubarak died and was succeeded by king Jabir Al-Sabah in Nov. 1915, who kept good relations with Abdul-Aziz, but Jabir died in Feb. 1917, and he was succeeded by king Salem Al-Sabah that adopted policies that showed animosity and enmity toward Abdul-Aziz. Salem attacked an immigration colony on the borders with Kuwait, claiming it was located within his lands. Abdul-Aziz and Kuwait disputed over water wells in a village named Hamad, where another immigration colony of the Wahabi Brothers was situated. Another ruler of Kuwait, king Al-Sabah, led a military campaign to drive out all the Najd Brothers from what he deemed as Kuwaiti territories. As a result, Feisal Al-Daweesh led troops of the Najd Brothers to attack the Kuwaiti troops, killing them off in the village of Hamad. Abdul-Aziz had to interfere and to make amends with Kuwait and ordered Al-Daweesh to stop his aggression. Yet, the raids of the Najd Brothers went on, leading the Kuwait ruler to make a pact with the tribesmen of Shamar, to build a wall around the Kuwaiti capital, and to prepare another army to attack the Wahabis within the borders. Yet, his army returned home without fighting at all. Abdul-Aziz felt threatened and affronted by the Kuwaiti military action and had to send Al-Daweesh leading a huge army in Sept. 1920 near Kuwait at the village of Al-Subeiha, and 4000 soldiers joined this army as reinforcement. Salem Al-Sabah led the defensive Kuwaiti army himself. Both troops met in battlefield in Oct. 1920. Salem was defeated, and he had to flee to his Red Palace in the Kuwaiti capital. Al-Daweesh followed him and sieged the Red Palace. Negotiations between the Wahabis and the Kuwaitis went on and GB interfered to urge both parties to reach a settlement. Salem died in March, 1921, and he was succeeded by king Ahmed Al-Jabir, who went on with the negotiations. With GB as mediator, borders with defined between Kuwait and Najd in the conference held in Aqeer in Dec. 1922. When relations between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers got complicated and strained, the Wahabi Brothers seized the chance to spite and embarrass him by repeatedly raiding once more over Kuwait. Abdul-Aziz declared that such aggression was committed without his permission. The Wahabi Brothers raided over Kuwait in 1927, 1928, and 1929 during their rebellious fights against Abdul-Aziz, and he, aided by GB, had to militarily face them. Once the Najd Brothers were wiped out, Abdul-Aziz proclaimed a new era of respecting the borderlines endorsed by international treaties (36).

The KSA and Iraq:

The southern of Iraq is a desert area which was the natural extent where raids of the Najd tribes used to occur, especially when such raids turned into Wahabi jihad later on. During the establishment of the very first KSA, which was destroyed in 1818, Wahabis destroyed all holy sites, mosques, and mausoleums of Shiite Iraqis. The third KSA repeated the same woes suffered by Iraqi people, especially when the enemies of the Wahabis, i.e., tribesmen of Shamar, immigrated to Iraq and the Wahabi conquest of Hael. Elements from the tribes of Shamar, Al-Muntafaq, and Al-Dufeir were gathered and agreed on deep-seated hatred toward the Saudis and the Najd Brothers, and Iraqis' old traditional disputes with Najd were revived. Thus, Iraqi forces and those of the tribes of immigrants to Iraq raided over Najd several times and the Wahabis raided the south of Iraq several times in their turn. Both parties leveled accusations against each other of being the aggressive party, especially as borders were not defined between Najd and Iraq. GB had to interfere with her might in favor of Iraq and its king Feisal Ibn Al-Sharif Hussein. British warplanes struck the troops of the Najd Brothers, and Abdul-Aziz protested in fury. After some negotiations, all parties concerned agreed to hold a conference in the city of Al-Mahjarah on 5^th of May, 1922, to settle the dispute between Najd and Iraq about borders and securing the pilgrimage routes. Yet, the conference failed eventually, though it was agreed that the original location of the tribes of Al-Dufeir, Al-Muntafaq, and Al-Emarat within Iraqi soil, whereas Shamar tribesmen were to return to Najd peacefully. Defining borders had to be postponed until later on to be done by geographical experts. Negotiations and talks went on until borders were finally defined between Najd and Iraq, with the dwellers of Najd permitted to use water wells on the borders with Iraq and never to build fortresses there. Abdul-Aziz had to agree on never to raid on tribes of this area, and to define customs and taxes between both countries. The Iraqi side had to acknowledge the Saudi control over Hael and Al-Jouf. The British had to pay Abdul-Aziz 200 thousand pounds in return for retaining such protocols. Yet, the Najd Brothers at one point attacked the tribe of Al-Dufeir, and the British warplanes had to strike them. Abdul-Aziz apologized to the British because of the folly of Feisal Al-Daweesh and his Brothers. Abdul-Aziz was pressurized by the Najd Brothers who stirred troubles as the Iraq side was reluctant to execute the protocols agreed upon in the conference. Meanwhile, relations were growing worse between Abdul-Aziz and Al-Sharif Hussein who ruled Hejaz at the time, and that was why the Kuwait conference sessions failed, as the Hashemites and Al-Sharif Hussein were adamant in refusing to deal with and acknowledge the monarchy of Abdul-Aziz. Later on, Hejaz was conquered by Abdul-Aziz who drove out the Hashemites. The ruler of Iraq, king Feisal Ibn Al-Sharif Hussein, felt frightened of Abdul-Aziz as the latter might think of invading Iraq with his Najd Brothers, especially that Ali, the brother of Feisal and former ruler of Hejaz, fled to Iraq. Feisal had to build the fortress of Bassiyya to defend the southern area of Iraq against the Wahabi Brothers. Building such a fortress was against the Aqeer agreement signed in 1922, and Abdul-Aziz protested outspokenly. The Iraqi side tried to justify building the fortress, but the Wahabi Brothers considered it an affront and a defiant act against them and their freedom in movement, preaching, and grazing their animals. The Wahabi Brothers felt indignant as Abdul-Aziz became soft and protested peacefully against this fortress. Acting on his own, Feisal Al-Daweesh sent Nayef, the son of his paternal uncle, as a leader of troops of the Najd Brothers on 11-5-1927 to demolish this fortress, and the troops killed all people, workers and soldiers, inside it, except one man. Such massacre deepened the rift between Abdul-Aziz and the Wahabi Brothers. Dwellers of Najd were divided into two parties: one supporting the peaceful policies of Abdul-Aziz, and the other supported the view of the Najd Brothers in using force with all non-Wahabis. The Najd Brother declared their opposition to Abdul-Aziz and embarrassed him on several occasions to spite him, especially by raiding over southern of Iraq (37). The British at first tried to manipulate the Najd Brothers against Abdul-Aziz, but eventually, the British had to side with Abdul-Aziz as we will explain later on in a coming chapter

The KSA and Jordan:

The British has to appease and satisfy Al-Sharif Hussein by giving to his son, emir Abdullah, the rule of the Eastern Jordan province, after settlement agreements in 1919, and this territory included the whole of today's Jordan plus parts of Palestine, Aqaba area, Ma'an area, as well as other desert areas. This never appealed to Abdul-Aziz, as he coveted the desert areas of 100 Km annexed to Jordan by the British, who insisted to give that stretch of desert areas to Jordan to link the Hashemites reign in Jordan and Iraq and to link the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea. When Abdul-Aziz controlled Hael, he controlled the family of Al-Shaalan, the leaders of the tribe of Al-Roula tribe who lived in the areas of Al-Jouf and Sarhan Valley, making the Wahabi Brothers near Palestine and Syria. After the death of Nouri Al-Shaalan, he was succeeded in the leadership by his son, Sultan. The deputy of Abdul-Aziz in Al-Jouf and Sarhan Valley drove out Sultan Ibn Nouri Al-Shaalan to make the two areas under the full control of Abdul-Aziz. Thus, the Najd Brothers controlled fully the two areas and advanced with their troops until Amman, capital of Jordan, in July 1922. The Wahabi troops committed massacres within the civilians of this area, leading to the Jordanian forces trying to defend people and to deter the Wahabis. The Jordanian troops were joined soon enough by some British troops, who killed all the Najd Brothers' troops there, except eight soldiers who were chased until Sarhan Valley. Abdul-Aziz punished these eight soldiers who survived as they tried to conquer and invade without his prior written permission. The Jordanian side wanted to fortify its defense lines, and consequently, it had to take over the village of Al-Malh in the two areas of Al-Jouf and Sarhan Valley, resulting in on-going raids of the Najd Brothers, especially their raids over the Hejaz railways between the two stations of Al-Zarqa and Al-Samra. Of course, Abdul-Aziz protested against the Jordanian side's taking over the village of Al-Malh, and the above-mentioned Kuwait conference was held, whose sessions failed miserably. Hence, Abdul-Aziz sent his troops that conquered areas of Kaff, Al-Omary, and Al-Mashta Palace. On 12-8-1924, his troops invaded the villages of Al-Laban, Al-Tunayb, Al-Qaystal, and Umm Al-Amad, until they reached the village of Thureib near the British garrison in Amman, and the British had to interfere using their warplanes and armored vehicles. The Wahabi Brothers' troops had to retreat as they were chased by warplanes. Such piece of news made the king Abdullah Ibn Al-Sharif Hussein happy, especially that most Wahabi fighters were killed and survivors were few. When the Najd Brothers' troops were massacred near the village of Thureib, it was asserted that the arms and weapons of the Wahabi Brothers were useless facing the British airplanes and armored vehicles. Abdul-Aziz felt more animosity and aversion toward the Najd Brothers, as they frequently disobeyed him and raided other places without his prior permission. An example of this was when they went beyond Kaff, their original target as per orders of Abdul-Aziz, and thus, they embarrassed Abdul-Aziz by their disobedience, recklessness, and defeat. Abdul-Aziz felt the urgent, immediate need to control them full as he used to do before. GB had to interfere to define the desert borders between the KSA and Jordan, within the Hedda treaty in 20-11-1925. Within such a treaty, Abdul-Aziz managed to conquer the village of Al-Malh and the two areas of Al-Jouf and Sarhan Valley to his kingdom. Such a treaty widened the gap between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers, as they resented the fact that Abdul-Aziz would maintain political relations with the ''infidels'' (i.e. the British), and thus, troubles over the borders went on for some time after signing the treaty. Another Hedda treaty was signed in 1927 between GB and Abdul-Aziz, with more precise planning of the borders, and Abdul-Aziz had to relinquish his desire to annex Amman and Al-Aqaba as the British insisted that they were two Jordanian regions (38).

Thus, we have traced so far, briefly, the formation of the Wahabi Najd Brothers and the historical role they had played in establishing the kingdom of Abdul-Aziz, and how such a role came to an end via rifts and a widened gap between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers. This topic will be further tackled in the coming chapter.

Footnotes:

About relations with Kuwait:

36- Qassim, ditto, pages, 2, 54, 56, 67, 70, 74, 75, 76, 77, and 78.

Mahmoud (Hassan Suleiman), ''Kuwait Past and Present'', Cairo, undated, page 222.

Najat Abdul-Kadir, ''Political and Economic Development in Kuwait'', Cairo, 1973, pages 56, 61, 62, 66, 67, and 69.

Al-Rashid (Abdul-Aziz), "History of Kuwait", Beirut, undated, pages 208, 209, 239, 218, 219, 220, and 222.

Al-Farhan, ditto, pages 91 and 124.

Al-Mukhtar, ditto, page 8.

Al-Rihany, ditto, pages 272:276.

Al-Zarkeley, ditto, page 239.

Al-Shamlan (Seif Marzouk), ''On the History of Kuwait'', Cairo, undated, page 207.

Al-Shura Magazine, number 169, 4^th year, 16-2-1928

Lughat Al-Arab Magazine, Vol.10, 5^th year, number 637, and 8^th year, Vol. 1, Aug., 1912, page 74.

Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, number 169, 4^th year, 9-3-1928.

Dickson, ''Kuwait and her Neighbor'', pages 257:259.

Kelly, op. cit., page 113.

About relations with Iraq:

37- Lughat Al-Arab Magazine, 2^nd year, Vol. 1, Aug. 1912, page 74.

Al-Hosni (Abdul-Razik), ''History of Ministries in Iraq'', Baghdad, 1934, pages 30, 31, 32, and 140.

Al-Rossan (Mamdouh Arif), "Iraq and Arab Politics 1921:1941'', an unpublished M.A. thesis, Faculty of Arts, Cairo University, 1972, pages 147, 148, 153, and 156.

Documents in the Iraqi National Library and Archive, 15-5-1922, Baghdad.

Al-Alawy (Abdulla Hassan Ibn Feisal), ''Sidq Al-Khabar in Al-Khawarij of the 12^th Century'', Latikia, 1927, page 246.

Al-Rihany, ditto, page 306.

Al-Hosni, ditto, pages 35, 38, and 57.

Al-Rossan, ditto, page 165

Documents in the Iraqi National Library and Archive, Baghdad, December, 28-10-1922, 30-11-1926, No. 619, No. 4 page 709, and No. 197, 1-11-1927.

Al-Zahraa Magazine, volume 4, part 1, pages 284 and 286.

Al-Rihany, ''Kings of Arabs'', 2/326, Beirut, 1967.

Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, number 167, 4^th year, 24-2-1928.

''Memoirs of King Abdulla'', published by Amin Abou-El-Shaar, Oman, 1965, pages 166 and 167.

Nuamishan, ditto, pages 165 and 166.

Mikosh (Dakbort von), ditto, page 167.

Armstrong, ditto, pages 154 and 155.

Philby, ditto, page 73.

Bullard, ditto, pages 122:131.

CHAPTER II: Historical Account of the Najd Brother Opposition Movement

CHAPTER II: Historical Account of the Najd Brother Opposition Movement

Introduction:

Within the previous Chapter I, we have tackled the formation of the Wahabi Najd Brothers and their role played in the establishment of the Saudi state with its current borders. By the end of Chapter I, we have referred to the widened gap and the disputes between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers. Such disputes had their political impact on the relations of Abdul-Aziz with Iraq, Jordan, and GB. In this Chapter II, we tackle the opposition movement of the Najd Brothers against Abdul-Aziz, giving a historical account that will trace the beginnings of the religious dispute between the Najd Brothers and Abdul-Aziz that was turned into a political opposition movement and later on into a military opposition movement and military rebellion, resulting eventually in the Najd Brothers becoming history as they were annihilated entirely. Before we enter into the details of Chapter II, we feel bound to refer to the piece of advice of Ibn Jalawy, among others, addressed to warn Abdul-Aziz against the extremism and fanaticism of the Najd Brothers, but Abdul-Aziz at first used to condone and overlook their misconduct. On that subject, we quote here Hafiz Wahba, the consultant of Abdul-Aziz, from his book titled ''Arabia in the 20^th Century'': "…We have heard the emir Abdullah Ibn Jalawy and others among Al-Saud family members and other notables from Al-Sheikh family members advise Abdul-Aziz concerning reconsideration of the extremism of the Najd Brothers as they had transgressed all limits, but king Abdul-Aziz used to reply that they were just like his sons and his duty was to bear with them, to overlook their transgresses and mistakes, and to advise them by revealing certain facts to them, as he could not forget their aid to him for years, and he affirmed his belief in their good-natured characters…" (1). Yet, no facts were ever revealed to them and no pieces of advice either. Their political and religious opposition against him reached the level that they fought him after he bore with them a lot in many instances. We will trace below the historical stages of the disputes between the Najd Brothers and Abdul-Aziz.

The first stage of the opposition movement of the Najd Brothers against Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud:

Firstly: the dispute over the conquest of Hael (1915):

The very first dispute ever to emerge between the Najd Brothers and Abdul-Aziz was over the conquest of Hael. The Najd Brothers saw that they must fight Al-Sharif Hussein who re-captured the city of Al-Kharama, and its Wahabi ruler Khaled Ibn Louaï sought the immediate help of Abdul-Aziz, but the latter saw that this was not a suitable time to engage into wars against Al-Sharif Hussein, as his priority was to conquer Hael, as his foes, the Shamar tribe and Al-Rasheed, resided there and defied him. Abdul-Aziz held a general meeting in the city of Shaqra to discuss the situation, giving the leader of the opposition, Feisal Al-Daweesh, the chance to deliver his speech first. Al-Daweesh demanded the immediate attack on the British and Al-Sharif Hussein, who was provided with arms and weapons by the British, thus threatening the Najd Wahabi Brothers, giving the chance to Al-Sharif Hussein to raid into the Wahabi lands under the protection of the British, looting spoils and returning unpunished, and this ''infidel'' was an enemy of faith that must be fought. Despite the strong argument, Abdul-Aziz managed to convince them to attack and invade Hael instead, as its dwellers posed a real threat; they could not conquer Hejaz in the south while leaving their backs unprotected as Hael in the north might send troops to fight them. Eventually, those who opposed conquering Hael first before Hejaz changed their stance into overwhelming support of the views held by Abdul-Aziz. Even if Abdul-Aziz bent before this storm and passed it with no damages at all, he realized that the Najd Brothers had become a powerful group whose strength and influence had to be put into consideration. In their turn, the Najd Brothers had realized that they are a winning card into the hands of Abdul-Aziz and they must make the best use of such a situation. Abdul-Aziz understood them well enough, and he had to be patient with their arrogance and haughtiness as they had accused him of being lenient with the infidels: the British (2).

Secondly: the dispute over employment and unemployment and the conference of religious scholars in 1919:

Many question marks gathered in the horizon showing the widened gap between what the Najd Brothers learnt in the books of M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab, the founder of Wahabism, and real-world situations that rarely allowed the application of Wahabi teachings. Such contradiction was bound to cause several religious and political disputes later on, summarized in unemployment and the lack of desire to work on the one hand, and calling others as infidels as they refused to wear the turban used to be worn by M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab instead of the headband/headwear commonly used by most Arabian men on the other hand. As for unemployment, the Najd Brothers had their own dominant culture that despised working; Bedouins used to look down upon working with one's hands, especially in agriculture. They used to raising cattle, raiding, and looting instead. Even agriculture as an activity was merely a façade to cover up for their real motives in staying in the immigration colonies/camps to become Wahabi Brothers. Their real mission there was, of course, to learn Wahabism books and rituals of worship and to get military training to prepare for their Wahabi jihad. Within the Middle-Ages culture and mentality of the Najd Brothers, it was common that soldiers would carry weapons and never to engage into agricultural activities, whereas Sufis in such dominant culture of Sufism in the Middle Ages would devote their time to worship in certain houses specially built for that purpose and they would find others to spend money on their living. On the contrary, the Najd Brothers combine between long times for acts of worship and longer times for jihad. Thus, when the Wahabi fighters were not engaged into wars, they would spent times in acts of worship, leaving agriculture for women. Even some Wahabis embraced the notion that money-collecting contradicts their devoting their time to acts of worship. Some Wahabi clergymen convinced some of the Najd Brothers that working to earn money is never against religion, as per history of rich tradesmen among the so-called companions of Prophet Muhammad. Thus, the problem of unemployment seemed apparently solved. As for the issue of the Wahabi immigration, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab considered it as an obligatory duty; thus, the Najd Brothers considered those who never immigrated to colonies like them as of little faith. The same attitude included those who did not wear the turbans of M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab and preferred the traditional headwear common in Arabia at the time. Hence, the Najd Brothers deemed other non-Wahabis as targets of raids and attacks as a duty as per their Wahabi teachings. In fact, the Najd Brothers looked down upon all non-Wahabis; as Wahabism consider Wahabis as the only true Muslims, while all non-Wahabis are infidels who deserve to be fought, killed, enslaved, and robbed. This was their attitude as well toward all those who refused to immigrate into the colonies/camps and never stick to the dress-code of the Wahabi Najd Brothers. This course of actions was a natural result of a theocracy which was based on excluding others who differ in religion, doctrine, and theological views as well inside that doctrine. Hence, Wahabism advocates the murdering and fighting of all non-Wahabis: non-Muslims first and then all Shiites and Sufis and generally all Sunnite non-Wahabis in general. Such extremism led to more fanatic attitudes; the Najd Brothers considered themselves as the only Muslims on earth (i.e., the only group who gained salvation in this world and in the Hereafter), and they wanted ardently to exclude even Wahabis who did not join their circle. Hence, Abdul-Aziz realized the imminent danger of such theological questionings and attitudes spread among the lines of the Najd Brothers, wearing the garb of politics. Abdul-Aziz ordered the gathering of many theologians and religious scholars, including Suleiman Ibn Samhan, within a conference in 1919 to allow the Najd Brothers the chance to pose their major five questions/problems that entailed religious edicts (i.e., fatwas). These questions were as follows: 1) can Muslim Bedouins (i.e., Wahabis who did not belong to the Najd Brothers) be called infidels even if they stick to Wahabism and divine commands? 2) Is there a difference between those Wahabis who wear traditional headwear and those wearing Najd Brothers' turban? 3) Is there a difference between ordinary Wahabis living in cities and the Najd Brothers living in immigration colonies? 4) Is there a difference between slaughtered cattle of ordinary Wahabis in cities and cattle slaughtered by the Najd Brothers in the colonies? And the last and most important question: 5) are the Najd Brothers in colonies permitted religiously to attack those ordinary Wahabis in cities to force them to live in the Najd Brothers' colonies?

As for the turban, the religious scholar Suleiman Ibn Samhan refuted dress codes as part of Wahabism, as Prophet Muhammad never changed his attire or headwear after and before the Quranic revelation; and thus, wearing a turban or not is never part of religious duties or sins at all. As for those who refused to leave their cities to immigrate to the colonies, they were not infidels at all; as infidels were only those who refuse to embrace and apply Wahabi teachings, not those who live in villages or cities. As for slaughtered cattle, one can eat them legally even if they were slaughtered by anyone, anywhere in colonies, cities, and villages. By the end of this conference, a general fatwa was issued to prevent raising such queries on trivial matters in the future, deeming anyone who would raise similar arguments again as deserving severe rebuke and if he would not repent, he will be disciple and punished. The fatwa added that any type of enmity should be created only within endorsement of clergymen and rulers who understood religion best; otherwise, the sinner who would waste more time on such trivialities and unneeded enmities will be declared as an infidel or a non-Muslim (3). Hence, the religious scholars agreed with Abdul-Aziz that his supreme political authority as king and the religious authorities of scholars (under him alone) are the only authorities used as a yard stick to judge whether someone is a Muslim (i.e., a Wahabi) or an infidel (i.e., a non-Wahabi), and those who seek to declare others as apostates for no reason or based on trivial matters would be deemed as infidels who forsook Islam an Muslims.

Thirdly: Al-Artaweiyya conference 1924:

After direct contacts between Feisal Al-Daweesh and Khaled Ibn Louaï, the Najd Brothers held a conference in Al-Artaweiyya colony in 1924 in order to discuss jihad against ''infidels'' in the cities of Turba and Al-Kharama to end the control of Al-Sharif Hussein and his family over Hejaz. Al-Daweesh delivered a speech during the conference, asserting that ''it is their duty to drive Al-Sharif Hussein from the Holy Land in Hejaz so that God's Word will be the highest; conditions of Mecca and Yathreb are despicable, and swords must be used and all sacrifices, money, and lives be spent to put an end to prevalent chaos and dilapidation'' (4). Of course, this conference was part of the episodes to pressurize Abdul-Aziz to order them to conquer Hejaz as soon as possible. This conference asserted their previous stance vis-à-vis conquering Hael first.

Fourthly: the dispute between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers during the conquest of Hejaz:

1- Abdul-Aziz knew very well the belligerent and bellicose nature of the Najd Brothers in their military Wahabi jihad; the Wahabi preachers under Abdul-Aziz taught the Najd Brothers for years that they have every right to kill all non-Wahabis, fighters or civil peaceful ones, even women and children. The massacres committed by the Najd Brothers inside Najd deserts were not known at the time all over the world; the exact opposite was true in the case of Hejaz, an area open to the outside world at large. That was why the international community knew very fast about the massacre of Ta'if, where the Najd Brothers typically and routinely murdered all civilians. When international newspapers made this massacre of Ta'if their headlines, Abdul-Aziz felt embarrassed and had to apologize for such heinous crime committed without him knowing, and he claimed that he went into a fit of fury once he heard of such savagery and delivered orders to the Najd Brothers to stop it at once. When newspapers all over Egypt, Syria, and Iran published news about how the Najd Brothers murdered all women and children in the city of Ta'if, Abdul-Aziz sent telegrams to these newspapers to condemn publishing such pieces of news, and such telegrams were signed in the name of his son, Feisal, and Abdul-Aziz sent a letter to his consultant, Hafiz Wahba, asserting that he guaranteed the safety of civilians and their possessions (5). But it was all too late and in vain: the massacre had been committed! Abdul-Aziz realized that Hejaz is a region open to the world, unlike Najd which is a closed area rarely visited by outsiders, and even newspapers never reached it. Abdul-Aziz had to make sure that such massacres would never occur ever again; he opted to siege Jeddah, Mecca and Yathreb to negotiate surrender instead of attacking both cities to conquer them militarily. A dispute between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers started because of this during the siege of Jeddah and Yathreb.

2- Jeddah:

Abdul-Aziz headed a military council on 30^th Dec. 1924 (1343 A.H.) attended by the leaders of the Najd Brothers and other military leaders to discuss the best way to force Jeddah and its people to surrender. Ibn Bajad, the second leader of the Najd Brothers demanded to attack Jeddah immediately, promising Abdul-Aziz never to kill civilians. Khaled Ibn Louaï spoke in his turn, accusing Abdul-Aziz of being a coward, asserting that the Najd Brothers were more pious and courageous than he was. The Najd Brothers used a pretext that by wasting time and never attacking, the British forces might have the chance to control Jeddah and the Red Sea coast to negotiate with Abdul-Aziz later on by their terms. Of course, this happened when the British forced Abdul-Aziz to give up his claims to annex Al-Aqaba and Ma'an regions to his kingdom, as the two regions were to be annexed to Jordan later on. Abdul-Aziz reminded the Najd Brothers in the council that attacking Jeddah will result in a similar massacre as committed in Ta'if, and this would exacerbate matters, as Jeddah had foreign consulates that would stir the West and the Islamic world against him if the Najd Brothers attacked Jeddah. Finally, Abdul-Aziz insisted on going on with peaceful negotiation to annex Jeddah peacefully to his kingdom (6).

3- Yathreb:

During the siege of Yathreb, its dwellers opted for surrender, but its garrison, consisted of Hashemites loyal to Al-Sharif Hussein, insisted on resistance and pressed for supplies and reinforcement to be sent to them, but no supplies came at all. Ruler of Yathreb, Al-Sharif Shahat, proposed surrender under the condition of securing the lives and possessions of all dwellers and officials. Abdul-Aziz readily accepted the proposal, hastily sending his son, Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Aziz, to supervise negotiations and to end the siege gradually. Yet, the garrison vowed never to surrender, and M. Ibn Abdul-Aziz had to go on with the siege. When the garrison leader felt despair as no reinforcement and supplies reached him, he met with M. Ibn Abdul-Aziz who readily promised safety and general pardon to all soldiers, officers, and civilians upon surrender. Thus, after a 10-month siege, the garrison surrendered Yathreb on 5^th Dec. 1925, as well as all villages and ports between Yathreb and Jeddah. Feisal Al-Daweesh, leader No. 1 of the Najd Brothers who was sieging Yathreb before the coming of M. Ibn Abdul-Aziz, was furious: he ardently desired to massacre all dwellers of Yathreb as punishment for such a long siege, just as what he did to dwellers of Ta'if. Thus, Al-Daweesh did just that with the village of Al-Awaly, near Yathreb, massacring its entire population and looting the village. Al-Daweesh insisted on bombing Yathreb with the cannons without telling Abdul-Aziz, but the latter got wind of such decision and dismissed Al-Daweesh from his post as the leader of the Wahabi troops. Al-Daweesh left the immediately along with some of his followers to settle in Al-Artaweiyya, feeling furious with Abdul-Aziz (7). After annexing Hejaz to his kingdom, Abdul-Aziz made the Najd Brothers return to Najd, as he feared they might commit any more massacres or cause more trouble to embarrass him. Thus, conquering Hejaz marked a new phase of the relation between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers: they formed political opposition movement against him using conferences before resorting to military revolt later on.

Footnotes:

1- Wahba, ''Arabia in the 20^th Century", page 289.

2- Habeeb, ditto, pages 150:153.

3- Al-Mukhtar, ditto, pages 142, 144, and 145.

Al-Rihany, ''History of Najd'', pages 265 and 266.

Habeeb, ditto, pages 145:148.

4- Wahba, ''Arabian Days'', London, 1964, pages 132 and 133.

5- Wahba, "Fifty Years in Arabia", 1960 edition, pages 243:245.

6- Jalal Kishk, ''The Saudis and the Islamic Solution", pages 619:621.

7- Al-Mukhtar, ditto, pages 380:383.

Al-Zarkeley, ''Arabia in the Reign of Abdul-Aziz'', page 471.

Historical conditions of the second stage of the Wahabi opposition movement against Abdul-Aziz (opposition movement conferences).

We can briefly mention them within the following points.

Firstly: between Abdul-Aziz and the Qarmatians:

1- Within the Abbasid Era, we know the difference between Bedouin and desert-Arabs ''ordinary'' ''secular'' raids for loot and other raids by them that raised banners and mottoes of religion. Within Shiite banners and mottoes, the raids of the Zanj movement or the Qarmatians were never confined to looting, as they systematically committed massacres and enslaved women, conquering areas and regions from lands of other people. Such other people formally declared themselves as ''Muslims'' who were Shiite, Sunnite, or Sufis – it did not matter, as such criminals used to justify massacring them under banners and mottoes of creed. Ordinary Bedouin raids for looting used to be directed at caravans, especially those of pilgrims, and in many cases, such raiders used to accept tributes of large money sums, instead of killing caravan members (i.e., such raids were mostly ''peaceful'', if we may say so!), thus victims' lives were spared and they would enjoy some of their money.

2- Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers revived such brutal massacres, conquests, and looting habits of the Qarmatians, but with the addition of a new dangerous element: raids were under the Sunnite banners and mottoes, not Shiite ones. The neighbors of Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers were Sunnites as well, but Wahabism allowed room for the false notion that only Wahabis were deemed as ''Muslims'', while non-Wahabis were deemed as infidels and polytheists whose lives, possessions, money, women, houses, and homelands were allowed to be confiscated and taken by Wahabis. The Najd Brothers widened such terrorist notion to include killing and looting countries of Wahabis who were not among the Najd Brothers in the colonies, but Abdul-Aziz stood strongly against such new notion forged by the Najd Brothers to avoid civil strife inside his kingdom that might jeopardize his victories and make him lose his newly formed kingdom forever by annihilating its dwellers. Another new element introduced by Abdul-Aziz, and never by the Qarmatians, was extremism and fanaticism that led to bloodshed untypical of the 20^th century culture that differed a lot from the Middle-Ages culture of violence, fit for the Qarmatians and their contemporaries.

Secondly: between Najd and Hejaz:

1- The Najd region, and its dwellers at the time, was living and reviving the Middle-Ages culture due to its isolation away from the outside world. That was why Abdul-Aziz easily could form the Najd Brothers and train them to commit massacres and looting to conquer other regions as per the Najd culture known to its dwellers for centuries, without the international community knowing anything at all at the time. Thus, concordance and agreement were prevalent at the time between Abdul-Aziz and his Najd Brothers. Disputes at that stage revolved around the best means to reach the goal, not around the goal of conquering and annexing areas to the kingdom. Yet, disputes and rifts widened during the conquest of Hejaz. Unlike the isolated Najd, region, the Hejaz region (that included Mecca, Yathreb, and Jeddah port on the Red Sea) was open to the outside world and was visited by thousands annually for the purposes of trade and performing pilgrimage. Let us remember that Jeddah housed many European consulates. The Hejaz area got an international interest as a location when its ruler, Al-Sharif Hussein, engaged in World War I against the Ottomans and Germany and siding with GB and France. Moreover, the Hejaz region has its own traditional and religious heritage and history, with connections to the outside world, making its conditions differing a vast deal in comparison to Najd. In sum, Hejaz could never have been conquered by military force. What could be easily done in Najd was impossible in Hejaz.

2- Abdul-Aziz never realized such facts until the Najd Brothers committed their routine massacres upon the conquest of Ta'if, murdering most of its dwellers. Of course, such massacres committed even before Ta'if, were within mutual agreement between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers; if he had realized earlier the difference between Hejaz and Najd, he would have sent other soldiers apart from the Najd Brothers, as he had other troops among non-Brothers, whom he used to fight the Najd Brothers later on when they revolted against him, and with the help of GB, he managed to kill off all the Najd Brothers soon enough. Hence, Abdul-Aziz was greatly surprised when the international community, including GB, condemned severely the massacres committed by the Najd Brothers. Soon enough, Abdul-Aziz realized the difference between Najd and Hejaz and the fact that the Najd Brothers threatened his kingdom by their brutal savage habits and bovine stupidity. Abdul-Aziz realized that he might risk losing his kingdom by engaging in conflicts against the international community because of the Najd Brothers, whom must be stopped at once by him. Thus, Abdul-Aziz had unwittingly turned the Najd Brothers into an opposition movement against him.

3- We are to remember that after annexing Hejaz to the burgeoning Saudi kingdom, Abdul-Aziz must be open to the world outside Arabia and had to hold good relations with international powers whose dominant culture differed a lot from the Middle-Ages culture of the Najd Brothers. Abdul-Aziz felt the urgent need to cope with the 20^th century culture; otherwise, he would lose his kingdom and maybe his life as well. That was why he stopped his conquests, and declared that he conquered enough lands and territories in Arabia. He felt no longer in need for the Najd Brothers, and he could not bear any more with their problems. Moreover, Abdul-Aziz wanted to introduce modern communications, wireless and otherwise, and means of transportations, like motorcycles for instance, to cope with the modern world around him, but the Najd Brothers saw that such items of modernity as diabolical and satanic and against Wahabism, as per their pre-modern culture of the Middle Ages. ''The protection of the vast regions of his kingdom entailed modernization in desert wars and in arms and weapons, and the Najd Brothers could never be compatible with all this.'' (8). Abdul-Aziz made the Najd Brothers return to Najd after having received large rewards, pensions, extensions of arable lands, and spoils. Yet, the Najd Brothers refused to retire: this was against the Wahabi teachings inculcated into their minds by Abdul-Aziz and his Wahabi clergymen and sheikhs. The Najd Brothers wanted ardently to go on with their Wahabi jihad using their primitive arms and weapons to invade other lands of the realm of the infidels, Home of Wars as per the Sunnite sharia of the Middle Ages, revived and resuscitated by Wahabism in the modern era. Of course, the Najd Brothers did not realize, as Abdul-Aziz did, the differences in situation, circumstances, and conditions and the fact that they had reached the furthest limits permitted by the international powers, especially GB.

4- The Najd Brothers were furious to see their leader Abdul-Aziz, after conquering Hejaz, treating the infidels (i.e., the British) kindly and holding talks with them. That was a grave sin as per the Wahabi teachings imbibed by them. The Najd Brothers asked themselves how come their leader Abdul-Aziz would hold negotiations with polytheists (i.e., Muslim non-Wahabis) who ruled Jordan, Iraq, Hejaz, and Egypt (9). They were pained to see their leader Abdul-Aziz rewarding them, after the victories they brought to him, by sending them away to retire forcibly when they were still in the zenith of their strength, power, and military ambition. They knew quite well that their expansionist dreams can never be realized after defining borders with Kuwait, Jordan, and Iraq, and thus, they thought to exercise their military power and energy against their leader Abdul-Aziz, who turned out to be their enemy. Such a target was very difficult at first; it entailed several conferences to express their political opposition and gather more momentum and more followers of course.

Thirdly: between Hejaz and Egypt:

1- Hejaz was in fact and indeed under Egyptian control, even during the period in which Egypt was an Ottoman province. This Egyptian control of and supervision over Hejaz began in the middle of the Abbasid Era and went on during the Fatimid, Ayyubid, and Mameluke eras. When the Ottomans conquered Egypt, such control and supervision never abated; rather, Egypt had the right to interfere in and to settle the disputes among Al-Sharif family members concerning ruling Mecca and Yathreb, in order to decide who the winner among them was and to acknowledge him as ruler of Hejaz.

2- The ''Kiswah'' (expensive, embroidered cloth covering) of the Kaaba in Mecca was brought by the Egyptian caravan annually, for centuries, along with money donations, as part of the signs of Egyptian control over Hejaz, and the Egyptian Ministry of Religious Endowments used to spend money to care for Mecca and Yathreb and dwellers and pilgrims of both cities. When the very first Saudi kingdom was established and subsequently conquered Hejaz, Egypt had to face such burgeoning monarchy, resulting later on in the fall of this first Saudi state in 1818, as Muhammad Ali Pacha, the Egyptian ruler at the time, sent the Egyptian army led by his son to raze to the ground their capital, Al-Deireiya.

3- When Abdul-Aziz conquered Hejaz, it was inevitable that he must face Egypt. Such confrontation was hastened by the Najd Brothers, as they considered the Egyptians, as all non-Wahabis, as infidels and polytheists. Moreover, the Najd Brothers considered the festive procession of the annual Kiswah caravan as it entered Mecca as a sinful action that must be stopped by force. That was why a group of the Najd Brothers attacked the Egyptian Kiswah caravan in 1926, and Egyptian soldiers of the caravan had to defend themselves by firing at their attackers, killing all of them. Prince Feisal had to interfere to stop any further escalations (10). This incident made Abdul-Aziz order the Najd Brothers to return to Najd immediately, as he did not want to collide with the Egyptians whose grandfathers destroyed the very first Saudi state. Abdul-Aziz felt the urge to make preaching Wahabism in Egypt his priority. A Wahabi Egypt would be a strategic depth to support his monarchy, instead of leaving Egypt to pose as a deadly danger against his burgeoning monarchy. Abdul-Aziz readily and speedily contained the crisis of the caravan with Egyptian authorities, and never cared about the death of the attackers of the caravan among the Najd Brothers. His revenge waited enough time to be wreaked in the best manner: he exercised all power and might possible for him to spread and propagate Wahabism in Egypt via his agents sent there for that purpose: sheikhs Al-Sobky, Rasheed Reda, Hamid Al-Fiqi, and Moheb-Eddine Al-Khateeb. These agents managed to convert the Egyptian ''Sharia Society'' into Wahabism. This religious body in Egypt used to be the biggest intellectual fortress of Sunnite Sufism, which used to oppose Wahabism. These agents helped to establish a Wahabi body inside Egypt, with the main headquarters in its capital Cairo and branches in the governorates, called "Supporters of Al-Sunna Society", aiming at spreading and propagating Wahabism all over Egypt, as well as ''The Muslim Youth Society'', which aimed at spreading Wahabism among Egyptian youths and to train its members in military actions. Among the youths of this society was Hassan Al-Banna, who was chosen to form the MB terrorist organization in Egypt in 1928 to be an alternative to the terrorists of the Najd Brothers. The Najd Brothers developed their opposition movement against Abdul-Aziz as their call to revolt against him gained more support and momentum. Before his imminent military combat with them, Abdul-Aziz readily and hastily established the terrorist MB organization in Egypt to replace the Najd Brothers, aiming to spread branches of the MB all over the Islamic world later on. Yet, Abdul-Aziz forbade the MB members from ever working inside his kingdom, so as not to have the troubles caused by the Najd Brothers repeated. It is noteworthy that what Abdul-Aziz feared occurred actually after his death; when the terrorist MB members collided with the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel-Nasser in the 1960s, most of them fled to the KSA, where they had established the very last opposition movement against the KSA in the 20^th century, the movement that produced Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda recently. This was the main reason for the animosity and hatred of Saudis to the terrorist MB organization now. Eventually, Abdul-Aziz saw that the Najd Brothers had caused him enough troubles already in Hejaz; the region included a mix of cultures and races, with deep-seated centuries-old enmity toward Najd and its people. Even the dealings of the Najd Brothers with dwellers of Hejaz were a manifestation of such enmity that dated back to the Middle Ages. Thus, it was inevitable that Abdul-Aziz would order the Najd Brothers to return to Najd, their natural habitat, to enjoy the pensions, possession, lands, money, and rest. Yet, what they had learnt from Abdul-Aziz and his Wahabi sheikhs drove them to make use of their retirement in order to form the very first opposition movement against the KSA and its king, their previous leader Abdul-Aziz, using conferences at first, as we will discuss this next stage of the Najd Brothers' opposition against Abdul-Aziz in the next lines.

Footnotes:

8- Hopwood (Dereck), ''The Arabian Peninsula Society and Politics'', London, 1972, paged 64.

9- Habeeb, ditto, pages 196, 197, 198, and 202.

10- Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, Number 78, 2^nd year, 29-6-1926.

The first conference of the Wahabi opposition movement against Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud: Al-Artaweiyya conference Dec. 1926:

Firstly: shortly before Al-Artaweiyya conference

1- Hafiz Wahba was among the disciples of (the reformist head of Al-Azhar) Muhammad Abdou, who died in 1905, but Wahba deserted his route to work as a consultant to Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud. He became his nearest consultant, and Abdul-Aziz sent him specially to Egypt to form with Rasheed Reda the two main pillars of spreading and propagating Wahabism in Egypt in the name of ''Sunna'' (traditions ascribed to Prophet Muhammad centuries after his death) and ''Salaf'' (i.e., ancestral traditions of ancient theological scholars), and both men avoided the name of Wahabism as it was most hated in Egypt at the time, where Sunnite Sufism was the prevalent religion. Wahba wrote two books of history about the third KSA and about Abdul-Aziz, based on his participation, as a consultant to Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, in decision-making processes and on his being a contemporary witness to major events of that era.

2- Because of the closeness of Wahba to Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, Feisal Al-Daweesh (leader of the Najd Brothers and their opposition movement against Abdul-Aziz) seized the chance of the presence of Wahba inside the house of Khaled Ibn Louaï and delivered a speech against Abdul-Aziz, threatening him, assured that Wahba will convey it to him at once. Wahba mentions in his book that during the feast after Ramadan in Mecca in 1343 A.H. (25-4-1925 A.D.), he visited Khaled Ibn Louaï, to find at his house Al-Daweesh and some of the Najd Brothers. Al-Daweesh delivered a speech, saying: "We praise God, O Khaled and our Brothers, for His bounty, as we conquered Mecca and drove out Al-Sharif from it; we are soldiers of God and servants of His religion, and we want nothing but to make God's Word the supreme one and His religion the dominant one. We want nothing but to remove injustices, sinful acts, and falsehoods; this is the mission of our swords, brandished against all people like All-Sharif who follow his footsteps" (he meant, of course, Abdul-Aziz), and Wahba mentions that the Najd Brothers agreed to his speech, and Wahba affirms in his book that he told his king that this was their first ultimatum to him (11).

3- Al-Daweesh apparently planned and connived earlier his plot; he held in Al-Artaweiyya colony the very first conference joined by the opposition movement members against Abdul-Aziz without telling him beforehand and without desiring his presence, to allow the chance of verbal attacks against the king.

Secondly: Al-Artaweiyya conference: Dec. 1926:

This conference was attended by sheikhs of the tribes of Mateer, Otaybah, and Ajman, and all of the attendees criticized Abdul-Aziz within the following points that need to be answered:

1- Abdul-Aziz sent his son, Saud, to Egypt and his son, Feisal, to London to study, and both GB and Egypt are countries of the infidels and polytheists

2- The Egyptian Kiswah caravan entered Mecca with armed men

3- Using phones, cars, and telegraph cables was akin to witchcraft

4- Asking for explanation for stopping trade with Kuwait; if its dwellers were Muslims, trade can be practiced with them, if not, they were infidels that ought to be fought

5- Tributes and taxes in Najd and man-made laws

6- The reason behind leaving the Shiites of Al-Ahsa and Al-Qatif regions to keep their faiths without forcing them to convert to Wahabism

7- The reason behind allowing the Iraqi and Jordanian Bedouins to use freely the grazing areas of Wahabis for their cattle.

8- Finally, the reason why Abdul-Aziz did not go on demolishing tombs and mausoleums (12).

Thirdly: analysis of the above Wahabi criticisms mentioned by the Najd Brothers:

1- The theological tone of these criticisms and demands of the Najd Brothers shows clearly that those forming them were Wahabi sheikhs who were bearing grudges against Abdul-Aziz and supporting the opposition movement of the Najd Brothers. Hence, Al-Daweesh and heads of tribes in this conference were representatives of the military force, whereas theological phrasing was not their forte of course, and this shows that attendees included Wahabi clergymen living in the colonies and inciting opposition movement members.

2- The Wahabi creed notion of exclusion of all non-Wahabis (murdering them and waging wars against them until they convert) was the main factor behind such criticisms: there was no room here for tolerance, grey areas, or compromises here, as politics would entail idealistically speaking. The reason: Wahabis at the time thought of nothing but creed notions and issues that imposed themselves over politics. This is a main feature of any theocracy with its extremist fanatical stances that assume that the State owns the absolute truth about religion and about everything else and holds the right to impose its ideology on its dealings in internal and external affairs, especially with others who do not share its ideology. Any theocratic rule deems itself as absolutely right in all actions, as if the theocracy were the center of earthly existence. This is the policy of the zero equation: the inevitability of the choice between two items: either…or…. This is the essence of Wahabism adhered to until now by staunch, steadfast Wahabis: they deem themselves as the only true ''Muslims'' on earth and think of others as polytheistic infidels. This was shown clearly in the grudges and bitterness the Najd Brothers bore toward Abdul-Aziz regarding the points of criticism. In all Wahabi discourses, the word ''Muslims'' is synonymous with the word ''Wahabis'', with the exclusion of all others: secular persons, laymen and ordinary people of all denominations, believers in the Quran with no doctrines at all, as well as Shiites, Sufis, and even non-Wahabi Sunnites. In their creed notions, all non-Wahabis must be fought if they refuse to convert to Wahabism. The Najd Brothers forgot that it was ordinary that all pilgrims' caravans were usually accompanied with armed fighters to defend pilgrims against the Bedouins' raids, and the Kiswah caravan was no exception to this rule, as in many instances, dwellers of Mecca and its ruler among the Al-Sharif family would lead such raids! This is a historical facts chronicled in several accounts. Caravans of Kiswah and of pilgrims were filled with alms-money and other valuables coveted by all as spoils for Wahabis, and armed fighters had to accompany them to prevent looting and murder of pilgrims. Yet, Wahabis think that all non-Wahabis should be fought and killed because they were deemed as ''infidels'' and ''non-Muslims'' even if they came to perform pilgrimage! Thus, the Najd Brothers denounced that the caravans were accompanied with armed fighters; they wanted an easy task of raiding caravans and looting of spoils! Hence, Wahabis until now confiscate Islam, wrongly assuming that Wahabism is the only true representation of it. This is the reason why Abdul-Aziz chose the name of the terrorist MB in Egypt in 1928: to assert that Wahabis confiscate the name of Islam to themselves and deny it to others: they are alone the ''Muslim brethren'' or Brothers, and all people outside such circle deserve to be fought and killed in accordance with Wahabi jihad and sharia laws.

3- This notion of exclusion extends to denying and negating all man-made laws and constitutions even if they apply justice; justice is the supreme value and the basis of Islamic sharia in the Quran as we know. Wahabi sharia means all views of ancient imams, especially Ibn Taymiyya and his school of thought in the Mameluke era in Egypt. Let us remember that M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab copies his doctrines, Wahabism, from the letters and epistles of Ibn Taymiyya, and he groups all his writings under the title ''Epistles'', to imitate his favorite theological scholar Ibn Taymiyya. Ibn Taymiyya wrote countless theological epistles or letters, and so did another imam important to Wahabis: Ibn Al-Qayyim. Moreover, Ibn Abdul-Wahab confined his copying from them both to matters of faith theological tenets. He refused to copy their ideas of innovation and thinking for oneself as per human conditions. Thus, Wahabi theology and jurisprudence have no room for innovations in ideas to cope with changing conditions; rather, they consist of imitation of views of imams in the Mameluke era and if a topic was not tackled by them, Wahabi sheikhs would refuse to discuss it as it is deemed heretic and forbidden! Thus, all new modern items were forbidden by them as such items never existed in the Mameluke era of ''Salaf'' (i.e., holy ancestors or forefathers). This including taxes and tributes and all man-made laws in Najd; forbidding and prohibiting were easier routes adopted by the Salafist, Wahabi scholars and sheikhs of theology and jurisprudence. This was why they invented a jurisdiction rule concerning to nib chances of committing sins in the bud by never allowing certain courses of actions and using certain items.

4- This exclusion by Wahabis extended to forbid and prohibit the usage of new inventions and modern items of technology (e.g., cars, telephones, the wireless, etc.); that was why Abdul-Aziz was blamed for using them. According to the Wahabi mindset or mentality, there were two reasons to blame the king: 1) such items were the products of the infidels in the West, and 2) such items were never known to the ''Salaf'' in the Middle Ages, and thus deemed as products of witchcraft! Until now, the KSA condemns witches, sorceresses, and sorcerers to death, and its authorities deem anything or any unacceptable acts as witchcraft. This has been the mentality of all Wahabis until now.

5- Wahabi extremism extended to the ardent desire to destroy all tombs, made holy or not, ordinary ones in cemeteries and the ones attributed to the so-called Sufi saints. This is wrong as per the Quranic teachings; God in the Quran commands us to avoid idols and tombs made holy. This avoidance means to keep away from them, and NOT to destroy them. Such tombs are merely harmless building materials. The only wrong here is to worship, idolize, sanctify, and deify such materials and stones. The remedy is not to destroy them, but to destroy the belief in their being divine or holy within hearts and minds of believers. The thing needed is raising the awareness that enable the ignorant ones to see them as mere stone never to be worshipped and sanctified, as worshipping them as holy relics is against Islam (the Quran alone) and the reasonable mind. Even in the past, so many statues and idols were being worshipped centuries ago, and they are now relics and ancient items for tourists and archeologists to admire in museums and monuments. Thus, the problem does not lie in the existence of tombs and mausoleums, but in the wrong mentality that needs more religious awareness that appeals to the mind, found only in the Quran. Let us remember that the Quranic message alone convinced 7^th century Arab's of the foolishness of worshipping stones and idols. Thus, Wahabis in their extremist, foolish calls to destroy all tombs surpassed Ibn Taymiyya who never called for such destruction.

Lastly:

The inevitable outcome of such Wahabi faith is embodied in the following historical fact: the vast majority of victims of Wahabism are non-Wahabi civilian Muslims, who are being indiscriminately killed, murdered, butchered, raped, robbed, invaded, and conquered; and such victims include the elderly males and females as well as women and children in general. As long as Wahabism exists, its widespread propagation using oil revenues of the KSA leads to more victims among Muslims all over the planet. The one to blame for such massacres and other heinous crimes is the very first Saudi king of the third current KSA: Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud. In the next section, after the following annex, we will tackle what Abdul-Aziz had done in response to Al-Artaweiyya conference.

Footnotes:

11- Wahba, ditto, pages 290:291.

12- Wahba, ditto, page 291.

Nasser Al-Saeed, ''History of Al-Saud Family'', pages 306:307, editions of Shaab Al-Jazeera.

Armstrong, op. cit., page 205.

ANNEX: A Contemporary Commentary on the Above-Mentioned Issues under the Topic of ''Wahabi Opposition Movement"

INTRODCUTION:

Within the previous lines, of this book, we have analyzed the points of criticism addressed by the Wahabi opposition movement to Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud in the conference of Al-Artaweiyya, 1926, and we have mentioned that Wahabism and Abdul-Aziz are to blame for the present heinous crimes committed against Muslims all over the planet. This book that you are reading was first written in June, 2000 A.D., i.e., before 9/11 attacks of 2001, and before the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, a horribly wrong decision to be regretted, and before the so-called Arab Spring revolts in the Arab world, turned by Wahabis into massacres and civil wars all over many of the Arab countries, with the exception of our beloved Egypt. Thus, what we have written here in 2000 A.D. materializes and continues to exist! We feel pained that during publishing this book in serialized articles, before grouping its articles into a book form, we have read the following newsletter sent to our email address, on Iraq and Gaza Strip. We have decided to add such newsletter here along our commentary on it, in this part of the book, to assert the last paragraph above titled ''Lastly'', written in 2000 to prove that the vast majority of the victims of Wahabi terrorism are among the non-Wahabi Muslims all over the globe.

Firstly: this is the newsletter:

(Newsletter No. 193 summarizing events and incidents of the Iraqi popular revolt, Thursday, 22-5-2014, events of that day:

Baghdad: militia groups and members roam streets of Baghdad around the court area in 4X4 cars to receive the files of the city. Other opposition militia bombarded the previous one with mortar shells in northern Baghdad. Al-Maliki armies caused the death of one civilian and kidnap three others at night, leading them to an unknown location. An armored vehicle is destroyed along with three cars in severe battles in southern Baghdad. Members of Battalion No. 55, Group 17, fled an area that they were supposed to guard in southern Baghdad. Al-Maliki armies decided never to allow entrance to university students unless with ID cards and no one was allowed to enter into a district if they could not prove they are residents in it; please watch this link:youtube.com/watch?v=3W3EdzOCkZE. Government-sponsored militias distribute threats to certain families in a certain district in Baghdad to order them to leave their homes and get out of the city. A canister blew up killing a director of a police station and injuring some other policemen in northern Baghdad. 15 persons were killed in Al-Maliki militia, and others injured, following a bombardment of 14 mortar shells. Al-Maliki government raised salaries of newly appointed police officers in Baghdad, because most of the older ones resigned from their posts. Revolutionaries threw 4 mortar shells at the house of a high official in Iraqi police, in northern Baghdad.

Al-Anbar: revolutionaries used RPJs to shoot at helicopters of Al-Maliki armies. Explosion of a pedestrian bridge by militia: please watch this link: youtube.com/watch?v=QIHmEKYNFV8. A leaked video showing Al-Maliki army soldiers dancing over three corpses of dead men, presumed to be ISIS members: please watch this link:youtube.com/watch?v=M2JZnWxHF2o. Random bombardment by Al-Maliki armies caused the destruction of civilians' houses in Al-Fallujah, and 400 families are rendered homeless. A water station was destroyed by bombardment by Al-Maliki armies, causing water curs in two villages.

Nineveh: tribal militias kill off Al-Maliki army soldiers and set fire to their armored vehicle. A police officer is killed by a sniper shot. A tank is set on fire and five Al-Maliki army soldiers killed among patrol roaming the street of the city. Severe battles between tribal militias and Al-Maliki army troops. Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device was exploded in a street where the police station is located, killing some civilians. 15 mortar shells are bombarded at a location linked with the Maliki armies. A canister exploded killing one man and injuring another. The Maliki soldiers arrest some citizens in a nearby village. Some of the Maliki soldiers were ambushed and fired at by unknown armed men, and some of them were seriously injured.

Please follow us on the following links:

www.iraqispring.com

www.youtube.com/user/iraqispring

www.facebook.com/iraqispringmc

On Twitter:

@iraqispringMCC

And you can contact us via the following email addresses:

[email protected]

Secondly: our commentary on this newsletter:

1- This is a newsletter of a full-fledged civil war; massacres committed frequently have become ordinary daily news, to which the world is accustomed. The international community no longer cares for the disfigured and dismembered bodies of civilians, women, and children in Iraq. The query posed here is this: who is to blame and to bear responsibility for such atrocities? The answer is simple in our view: Wahabis and their Wahabism. Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud and his Wahabi preachers had spread and propagated Wahabism in Iraq, and the Najd Brothers used to engage into individual and military raids to attack Iraqi people. After killing off all the Najd Brothers, as we will tackle in the next segment of this book, Wahabi preachers multiplied in number in Iraq, and many Iraqis converted to Wahabism and imitated the savagery and brutality of the Najd Brothers in killing and butchering non-Wahabi Iraqis. After toppling the Saddam Hussein regime, the Americans disbanded the Iraqi army, thus preparing the scene for civil strife. Arms and weapons of the disbanded Iraqi army appeared in the hands of Wahabi terrorists in Iraq to kill non-Wahabis, such as Shiite Iraqis, as part of holy Wahabi jihad that goes on until now. Shiites of course defend themselves, resulting in civil wars all over Iraq. Even the Syrian revolution began as a peaceful one for human rights but turned into a civil war that will destroy Syria and the Syrians. Wahabism and the KSA are the factors behind that deterioration. Sadly, Wahabi jihad threatens to engulf Lebanon very soon. In Egypt, however, if it had not been for the Egyptian national armed forces of the Egyptian Military under the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, Egypt would have been turned into a hot spot of civil strife just like Syria. Libya is sinking into the quagmire of civil strife, despite efforts of Libyans to save their country. We hope Tunisia would never face such horrors of civil war. All such calamities in the Arab world have one cause and one root: Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud who wanted to restore and conquer what he deemed as property of his ancestors and their kingdom. His ambition led him to train savage Bedouins to be the Najd Brothers who mercilessly murder and massacre in the name of Islam, and when they revolted against him, he added more momentum to accelerate turning Egypt into a Wahabi country by spreading more and more Wahabi preachers and sheikhs all over Egypt, as well as the Levant, Iraq, and North Africa. He intentionally threw the seeds of corruption, massacres, and strife that have impeded the progress of Muslims in the name of religion. Shame on him!

2- Do the transient-world possessions, riches, and wealth deserve such grave sins leading to Hell in the Hereafter? We pose this question not in terms of politics and its language, rather, in terms of the Islamic faith in the Quran and the moralistic, ethical point of view.

Thirdly: the following newsletter deserves one of two reactions: either to laugh loudly until we weep and cry, or to cry and weep until we burst out laughing:

(…Hizbo Attahrir party organizes human chains, marches, and sit-ins within the activities of the 93th memorial day of the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate. These activities were done by the party members in Palestine, Gaza, and they included paying a number of visits, distributing copies of the book titled "The Steps of the Muslim Nation toward the Caliphate", forming human chains, and preaching some sermons. The last activity was announcing a conference to be held in May, 2014. The marches and sit-ins were organized in the camp of Jabalya in northern Gaza Strip, Deir Al-Balah, in the middle of Gaza strip, among other two locations, besides the cities of Rafah and Khan Yunis in southern Gaza Strip. Dwellers of the Strip paid attention to the marches and sit-ins that passed by them and expressed their interest in them and in the remembered caliphate. Demonstrators in marches and sit-ins chanted slogans and raised banners such as the following: "No legitimacy to those ruling without Islamic sharia", "Our battle with the Jews is about existence, not borders and security", ''Secular despotism is withering away, caliphate will be restored'', ''Palestine is Islamic, not national'', "Palestine is liberated by armed military forces, not weak negotiators", "Revolts are not full without applying Islamic sharia laws", and ''Negotiations lead to nothing and will not liberate Palestine'', and a member of the media office of the party briefed that the youth of the party paid visits to most dwellers of the Gaza Strip to explain to them the concept of caliphate, in relation to Palestine and the Night-Journey of Prophet Muhammad, and Al-Aqsa Mosque being attacked by some Jews, and how Jerusalem asks to be liberated by the armies of a strong caliphate, asserting that the party is vociferous in conveying this message from Palestine to the Islamic nation at large to establish hastily the caliphate that will save Al-Aqsa Mosque and liberate Palestine…)

Our commentary:

1- Wahabis of the Gaza Strip never achieved any victory except in tearing Gaza city away from the Palestinian unity of the Strip and the West Bank. It is funny to see photos of them demonstrating to revive the caliphate to unify all Muslims all over the globe: from china to Indonesia, from Morocco to Spain! The Wahabis of Gaza tend to forget that they managed to destroy and smash any peaceful solution, confining their vociferous endeavor to impossible, false mottoes. Their shame and failure lie in the fact that they throw weak rockets into Israel, and then take up weak people of Gaza as human shields against Israeli bombardments! After the Israelis taught them a hard lesson, they chant false slogans in marches about reviving caliphate, and soon afterwards kill some Egyptians, Syrians, and Lebanese! That is because they are like all Wahabis on earth: they know nothing but to kill, slaughter, and murder and to wage wars relentlessly against ''the infidels'': all non-Wahabi Arabs and Muslims!

2- We have omitted photos of the march and the demonstrators in it; it is laughter-inducing to see such people who are ''respectable only in terms of appearance'', but brainless and thoughtless: how come they call for the revival of the Ottoman caliphate rule?! These ignoramuses knew nothing about the Ottomans and their crimes, injustices, and regressive stances. They do not ask themselves how such Wahabi caliphate could be realized to combine all Arabs and non-Arab Muslims within all nationalities in the modern world now! They know nothing about the Wahabis and their history of rifts and disputes turned into armed rebellions and civil wars. They know nothing of different types of Wahabi armed fighters in Palestine and elsewhere, nor about the internecine fighting among Iraqis and Syrians, after the emergence of ISIS to exacerbate and aggravate the situation, within other terrorist organizations, like Hamas. Why do not they unify themselves in Gaza Strip first before their voicing their demands about unification of all Muslims from China to Argentina?!

3- The certain thing is the fact that the worst and most dangerous type of mental, addictive opium is notions covered using one of the earthly, man-made, fabricated religions. This is what we have said to ourselves as we were watching those people who are ''respectable only in terms of appearance'' participating in this march: good shapes and bodies with fresh faces yet without any brain or mind.

Lastly:

God says the following in the Quran: "We have destined for Hell multitudes of jinn and humans. They have hearts with which they do not understand. They have eyes with which they do not see. They have ears with which they do not hear. These are like cattle. In fact, they are further astray. These are the heedless." (7:179), "Or do you assume that most of them hear or understand? They are just like cattle, but even more errant in their way." (25:44), and "When you see them, their bodies and appearance impresses you. And when they speak, you listen to what they say. They are like propped-up timber. They think every shout is aimed at them. They are the enemy, so beware of them. God condemns them; how deluded they are!" (63:4). God says nothing but the Truth.

The remaining segment of Chapter II:

How Abdul-Aziz responded to the Al-Artaweiyya conference and the beginning of the rift:

Firstly: response in the Riyadh conference held in Jan. 1927:

1- Abdul-Aziz moved fast from Hejaz to Najd to respond to Al-Artaweiyya conference; he held a conference with leaders of tribes and leaders of the Najd Brothers, attended by about 3000 persons. The sessions of this conference went on from 25^th of Rajab to 8^th of Shabaan 1345 A.H. Abdul-Aziz asserted in this conference his loyalty to the Wahabi sharia and that he never changed. The conferenced ended with fatwas issued by Wahabi scholars who attended the sessions to refute and respond to criticisms of the Najd Brothers directed at Abdul-Aziz, and these fatwas were signed by 15 Wahabi clergymen in one statement.

2- The statement of the fatwas contained phrases like the following: (…As for the wireless, it is a recent modern invention that we do not know about and we cannot prohibit things that God and His Messenger did not tell us anything about. As for the two mosques mentioned, the imam Abdul-Aziz – may God preserve him – ordered us to demolish them. As for laws applied before in Hejaz, they are to be abrogated and abolished, to be replaced with Wahabi sharia laws. As for the Egyptian Kiswah caravan coming to Mecca, it is not to enter ever again with armed men and with force, while our mission is to prevent anyone kissing or touching the Kiswah cloth and to stop any dancing and music around the caravan, but we cannot stop the Kiswah caravan from coming annually as it is needed for the Kaaba. As for the Shiites, our imam Abdul-Aziz told us to make them swear fealty and to convert to Islam and never to practice their Shiite rites in public and the governor of Al-Ahsa should bring them to swear loyalty and allegiance to out imam Abdul-Aziz, while ordering them to stop their rituals and worship of tombs, while praying in Wahabi mosques of the Sunnites, and any tombs worshipped by them will be destroyed. Those who object to this will be banished from the lands. As for the Shiites within the dwellers of Al-Qatif, our imam Abdul-Aziz – may God protect him – will send to them sheikh Ibn Bishr to order them to follow what we have just mentioned here. As for villages and Bedouin areas annexed to the Wahabi lands of Muslims, our imam Abdul-Aziz – may God protect him – will send Wahabi preachers to them to help governors and princes to apply Islamic sharia laws and prevent them from committing prohibitions. As for Shiites of Iraq who roam Bedouin areas inside the kingdom, they are to be prevented from entering these areas again. As for tributes and taxes, they might be removed by our imam Abdul-Aziz – may God protect him – but if not, no one is to rebel against our imam because of that, as jihad is to be ordered by him alone as he sees fit for the sake of Islam and Muslims as per sharia laws…).

3- Based on such fatwas, Abdul-Aziz had to refuse accepting the Kiswah caravan and to prevent its ever coming again to Mecca from Egypt, and he demolished mosques that contain tombs made as holy shrines to the Shiites, and stopped the project of the wireless in the kingdom for a while, in order to prevent rebellion or to postpone it, as per writings of Wahba. The kingdom issued a law asserting that taxes were the only source of revenues to the Treasury. As for the Shiites, the Wahabi ruler Ibn Jalawy used his troops to protect the Shiites of Al-Ahsa by preventing the Wahabi Brothers from practicing any activities there, and he forced any Wahabi entering Al-Ahsa to remove his turban first, as it is a Wahabi symbol (13).

Secondly: analysis of the Riyadh conference held in Jan. 1927:

Such fatwas were issued by Wahabi clergymen loyal to Abdul-Aziz and they offered their services eagerly to please him and to aid him against the discontent of both the Najd Brothers and their leader Feisal Al-Daweesh who presided over Al-Artaweiyya conference. We analyze the mentality of the Wahabi scholars who issued such fatwas, tracing the features of their mindset in the following lines:

Their ignorance of the Sunnite sharia laws:

1- Their ignorance was exemplified in their lack of innovative thinking and their admitting to being ignorant as far as the topic of the wireless is concerned; they knew nothing of the primary rules of the Sunnite theology and jurisprudence: among them the chief rule that things are allowed and not prohibited unless by virtue of a Quranic verse or the so-called hadith of their so-called Sunna. They did not know that Sunnite sharia rules include serving the interests of the general public, thus asserting that new inventions are allowed as per Sunnite sharia laws. For instance, a knife is a mere tool, not prevented or prohibited just because it might be used in killing: it is the killing that is prohibited, whereas using it inside the kitchen is OK. Thus, no one would dare to say knives are prohibited by sharia laws.

2- Another indication of their ignorance is to refer to Abdul-Aziz in issuing fatwas (religious views or edicts), as he sought and enlisted their aid; how come they would refer to him to endorse anything. What was their role then? What was their use in the first place? This was shown as well by their views about the Egyptian Kiswah caravan and the taxes; it was Abdul-Aziz who decided everything, not the scholars. Abdul-Aziz was the one to decide what was best for the Wahabi sharia! The scholars were to apply his orders as they were a group of ignoramuses who never understood fully Sunnite Wahabism. They just adhered to the meaningless, empty motto of applying sharia to abrogate modern laws applied in Hejaz, which was a more modern, civilized area than Najd.

Compulsion in religion as per the Wahabi creed:

About this notion, their loquaciousness appeared in empty pompous words about sticking to Wahabi sharia laws in urging Abdul-Aziz to demolish all mosques that contained tombs or mausoleums. As per the motto of Ibn Abdul-Wahab to change what is wrong by sheer force, they issued the fatwa of prevention of the Egyptian Kiswah caravan, and it was funny to mention the Shiites of southern Iraq and to prevent them from using their own lands; thus, the Saudis claim that this part of Iraq was theirs, while declaring the original native people of it as infidels. They wanted to prevent them from entering lands of Muslims; i.e.; the Wahabis. Of course, GB never liked such decision; it established the fortress of Boseih to defend Iraqi soil against the raids and attacks of the Najd Brothers, and the latter protested against building such a fortress as it was an obstacle against their Wahabi jihad. Fatwas of the sheikhs regarding Iraq supported claims of Feisal Al-Daweesh and embarrassed Abdul-Aziz, as we will explain later in this chapter. Thus, the Wahabi sheikhs, despite their loyalty to Abdul-Aziz, were biased toward the Najd Brothers in their ''right'' to raid Iraq and kill its dwellers for loot, while regarding them as infidels whose lands should be confiscated by Wahabis. It is funny and laughter-inducing till one is on the verge of weeping that the Wahabi sheikhs considered Shiites of regions conquered by Wahabi swords as possessions of Abdul-Aziz like the lands; as if he owned the people themselves and can prevent them from performing Shiite rituals by force. The Quran says that there is no compulsion in religion, while Wahabism says that converting of Shiites to Wahabism by force is a religious duty! Sadly, this state of affairs is still applied now (this has been written by us in 2000 A.D.) as far as we know.

Thirdly: between two Riyadh conferences 1927-1928: Al-Daweesh defied Abdul-Aziz and makes GB interfere in the dispute to embarrass Abdul-Aziz:

1- Because of the ongoing Wahabi massacres and raids on Iraq, GB had to build the fortress of Boseih to lawfully defend Iraqi lands and people as they had the right to be defended against invaders. Yet, such defense was protested against by sheikhs of Abdul-Aziz, as they urged him to prevent Iraqis from entering the Bedouin areas in Iraqi deserts on the borders. That was how they embarrassed Abdul-Aziz: Feisal Al-Daweesh attacked the fortress of Boseih in Oct. 1927/1346 A.H., and milled off all people inside it to embarrass Abdul-Aziz before the British, accusing Abdul-Aziz of being an infidel/apostate because he had relations with the infidel British people.

2- Al-Daweesh succeeded in his plan; the British forces had to send its warplanes and warned tribes on the borders to move away, thus driving delegations of such tribes to resort to Abdul-Aziz to urge him to attack Iraq to respond to such affront by the British infidels. Abdul-Aziz adamantly refused to be manipulated by Al-Daweesh and his followers and flatly refused to send a military campaign to Iraq. Abdul-Aziz sent orders to the governor of Hael to watch over borders, and he temporarily stopped sending wages to the Najd Brothers to punish them for insubordination. Abdul-Aziz ordered Al-Daweesh to remain inside the colony of Al-Artaweiyya until a decision could be made concerning him. The Iraqi government was formally notified of all this, especially that Al-Daweesh will be severely punished and agreements and treaties will be respected by all parties.

3- Yet, GB had to interfere, telling Abdul-Aziz that it will punish people of the tribe of Al-Daweesh as they massacred people inside the fortress of Boseih to force the British to obey them. As a result, Abdul-Aziz protested, in writing, and urged the British not to take measures that will cause violent reactions on the part of the Najd Brothers. The British ignored the protest of Abdul-Aziz, and after three months, British warplanes attacked and shelled the location of the tribe of Shamar, and the fortress of Boseih was speedily rebuilt.

4- Negotiations began between Abdul-Aziz, or rather his consultants, especially Hafiz Wahba, and the British officials such as Clayton and Globe on the 7^th of May, 1928. Negotiations failed as the Saudis insisted on demolishing the fortress of Boseih and on handing over any Saudi seeking political asylum in GB, for Abdul-Aziz feared that Al-Daweesh might seek asylum when the military confrontation between him and Abdul-Aziz would occur.

Fourthly: the beginning of the revolt and disobedience of the Najd Brothers against Abdul-Aziz:

1- Al-Daweesh invested the success of his devilish plan; he created a huge propaganda against Abdul-Aziz, accusing him of selling his soul to the British by making pacts and agreements with the infidels while compromising or neglecting his religious duties. Abdul-Aziz had to send for Al-Daweesh immediately to come to him in Riyadh, but Al-Daweesh flatly refused to come to him there.

2- Abdul-Aziz tried to urge the Najd Brothers to convene within a conference in the city of Brida in April, 1928, to appease them and allay their fears, but they refused to attend, fearing that Abdul-Aziz might kill them off once and for all. Both parties began to cast doubts on each other's intentions. It was seen clearly that the conference must be postponed until after negotiations between Abdul-Aziz and GB in Jeddah concerning the Najd Brothers. When negotiations failed, the Najd Brothers began to vociferously threaten Abdul-Aziz and to call everyone everywhere to revolt against him, and it became clear that the main motive of the leaders of the Najd Brothers (i.e., Al-Daweesh, Ibn Bajad, and others) was to remove him from power to take his place.

3- The Najd Brothers began their massacres and raids of looting whimsically as they see fit on their own terms, without reference to Abdul-Aziz and in order to embarrass him more. Abdul-Aziz could not admit to their rebelling against him, and the international powers held him in account for such crimes. Abdul-Aziz realized how the leaders of the Najd Brothers managed to mobilize people against him and to stir animosity toward him, and he had to call for a general conference in Riyadh, in May, 1928 (14).

Footnotes:

13- Wahba, ditto, pages 292:293.

Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, issue No. 126, 10-5-1927.

Al-Saeed, ditto, pages 308 and 311.

14- Wahba, ditto, page 293.

Al-Assad, ditto, page 261.

Habeeb, ditto, pages 205:213.

Riyadh general conference shortly before the military confrontation between Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud and the Wahabi Najd Brothers:

Firstly: Riyadh general conference in May, 1928:

1- Of course, the real threat posed by the Najd Brothers against Abdul-Aziz was the real motive and topic of such conference, and doubts were thickened during its sessions, and it failed and ended up in a solid estrangement and enmity between both parties.

2- About 16 thousand men, including villagers, dwellers of cities, religious scholars, sheikhs, leaders of tribes, Bedouins, and members of the Najd Brothers, reached Riyadh to attend the conference, and Abdul-Aziz put a system to house them in Riyadh. Bedouins chose to dwell in tents outside Riyadh, and dwellers of other cities resided in houses inside Riyadh. All attendees were given arms to protect walls of the city, whose gates closed by dusk daily, and armed men guarded the walls until dawn. Abdul-Aziz had to urge major leaders and sheikhs of the Najd Brothers in Riyadh for a little more time to wait for the results of correspondences between him and representatives of Al-Daweesh and Ibn Bajad, who refused to attend the conference.

3- It was clear that Abdul-Aziz doubted the loyalty of the Bedouins in light of the animosity propagated by the Najd Brothers against him, and based on previous knowledge of Bedouins who change loyalties at a glance without prior notice. That was why he had to convince Bedouins to reside in tents outside the city, while keeping his supporters, dwellers of cities, inside Riyadh. This allowed no room for frictions and needless quarrels. Dwellers of cities lost a great deal because of the rebellion of the Najd Brothers; they hated the savagery of Bedouins and rashness of the Najd Brothers that troubled their peaceful life and trade routes. Yet, Abdul-Aziz shrewdly kept some leaders of the Najd Brothers inside the city as captives under the pretext of rules of hospitality that urged him to make them reside inside his palace, heavily guarded. Thus, Abdul-Aziz separated the Najd Brothers and their rebellious leaders.

4- The situation resembled the time before establishing the movement of the Najd Brothers itself; disputes, competitiveness, and shifting tribal loyalties. Dwellers of cities wanted a strong ruler to control the Bedouins, and some of the Najd Brothers showed loyalty to Abdul-Aziz while others vowed to keep fighting against him under the leadership of the rebellious leaders. Yet, most of the Najd Brothers felt that their loyalty should remain to Abdul-Aziz, but they wavered in their declaration of such loyalty, waiting cautiously to see which side would win and emerge stronger than ever. Of course, Abdul-Aziz was the stronger side as they would see soon enough.

5- Of course, not every attendee could have time to deliver a speech; representatives had to be chosen by organizers of the conference, who chose about 800 representatives in a list submitted to Abdul-Aziz to endorse it. A grand veranda of the royal palace was chosen to hold the sessions, beginning on 5^th of Nov. 1928, at 2:00AM. There were waiting lounges specified for each group: one for dwellers of cities, one for religious scholars and sheikhs, and one for the Najd Brothers, as representatives of each group would be allowed to meet with Abdul-Aziz individually.

6- A half hour before the beginning of the sessions of the conference, Abdul-Aziz sat on the place specified for him, surrounded by his family members, and he called for representatives to sit before him as per their ranks and stature: sheikhs in the front row, left and right, and then dwellers of cities and villagers in the next rows, and finally the Najd Brothers and tribal leaders in order of who immigrated in colonies first. This process took about 15 minutes.

7- Abdul-Aziz delivered his speech first, beginning with talking about how God helped him to conquer Riyadh, with just 40 soldiers, and how he gathered and formed the Najd Brothers and glory was achieved to them by him. Abdul-Aziz declared to them that he would resign as long as they did not want him to be their king, and that he would dedicate his life to acts of worship. He asserted to them that he would not like to be arrogant; he would let the attendees choose a ruler instead of him from among the Al-Saud family members, promising to agree on their choice. Of course, he knew quite well that his sudden decision would not be agreeable to them, as they did not trust one another, and old disputes would be revived. They categorically refused to let go of Abdul-Aziz as their king, and shouted slogans of support to him, asserting that he should not cede his throne. Abdul-Aziz asked the attendees to deliver their speeches in turn, with complete freedom and frankness, promising never to punish anyone for any offensive talks (15).

8- Jalal Kishk analyzes in his book titled ''the Saudis and the Islamic Solution'' the political shrewdness of Abdul-Aziz, saying that his proposal to resign made the attendees forgot the requests of the Najd Brothers and to declare loyalty to the king. If he would have allowed any sort of discussion to the requests and criticisms, his awe would have been lost as an accused king that might be guilty or innocent, and such a situation might give a chance to opportunists to threaten him and to declare him an apostate. That was why the ploy here was to urge the attendees to declare their unanimous loyalty to him vociferously. This was a test of trust: was he trusted as their king or not? Once they agree to let him be king, he would discuss and listen to the opposition movement figures, but would never allow any sort of accusations. By this ploy, Abdul-Aziz asserted that monarchy will remain within the house of Al-Saud family exclusively, as an inevitable fact that will be stressed for good. Thus, they felt that a king might err, but monarchy should remain within the present royal family (16). Thus, with fealty reasserted to Abdul-Aziz, he ordered them to deliver their speeches and talk about their requests.

9- At first, representatives of scholars and sheikhs talked first, swearing by God that Abdul-Aziz never relented in his zeal for religion, and even if he erred, this was natural as no one is immune to committing errors and mistakes, and such mistakes would not justify a rift between a king and his subjects, and finally, they asserted that their speech was for the sake of guidance and advice, based on their role and duty as scholars.

10- Representatives of tribes and the Najd Brothers asserted the merit and respect of Abdul-Aziz and the fact that their jihad, swords, and blood brought victory to him, and thus, they feel bound to pose questions to understand certain matters and to make them follow him unconditionally. They asserted that they fear the wrath of God more than the wrath of Abdul-Aziz, and his previous answers to their queries were unsatisfactory and unconvincing, and such queries must be posed again before Al-Saud family members and the Wahabi sheikhs and scholars. They swore by God that they will follow the fatwas of the sheikhs present. These queries were as follows:

A- The wireless and telegrams were witchcraft or not? Would their usage be harmful to religion?

B- It is known that the Quran commands everyone to preach for goodness and against evil deeds; did Abdul-Aziz send preachers to the Shiites who claim to be Muslims or was he lenient toward them?

C- About the fortresses built by the British on the borders between Najd an Iraq, to the consternation of the Najd Brothers, does Islam gives Abdul-Aziz the right to define borders within lands owned previously by Najd tribes in former years? Was it against Islam to make treaties with the British infidels, especially concerning building fortresses within areas of water wells? The Najd Brothers decided to accept the existence of fortresses if the scholars would allow them to disown the notion before Almighty God if such fortresses would harm Muslims and Islam, and if Abdul-Aziz would guarantee that no harm would happen to them because of such fortresses. If nothing was done, they vowed never to allow the existence of such fortresses, as they are an affront to them.

D- The last query posed was as follows: why did Abdul-Aziz stop people from going on with their jihad to spread the Word of God?

11- As each attendee delivered his speech, Abdul-Aziz asked many times if anyone wanted to add something, and they answered him that they poured their hearts to him entirely. Abdul-Aziz asked the views of the sheikhs about the queries raised, and they told him and the attendees that as long as modern inventions were not mentioned in Sunna, in traditions of ancient imams, and in Quran, one can use them as long as nothing is mentioned to affirm their being prohibited, thus clearing themselves and easing their conscience before Almighty God. Thus, there is not sufficient evidence to suggest their being impermissible in Islam. As for deviant Shiites, Abdul-Aziz asserted that he sent preachers everywhere in all cities and villages, and recently to the tribe of Bani Malik, and if preachers did not perform their duties, he should be notified in person to try and solve the problem. As for fortresses, Abdul-Aziz asserted that the British built them because of the Najd Brothers raids on Iraq, as they accused Al-Daweesh of killing police forces, and were afraid of more massacres to come. The attendees among the Najd Brothers asserted they were innocent of acts done by Al-Daweesh, and they were ready to fight against him with two conditions: Abdul-Aziz must himself demolish the fortresses built recently by the British, as this was an unbearable effrontery to the Najd Brothers: a matter of life and death. The infidel British should not interfere in the desire of the Najd Brothers who wanted to punish the Iraqi leader Youssef Al-Saadoun, and such fortresses endanger the Muslims and Islam, as the evil British began to interfere in their affairs. The sheikhs supported the view of the Najd Brothers concerning these fortresses because of the danger and threat they posed, asserting that demolishing them was an act of jihad to defend 'Islam' (i.e., Wahabism, in their view). The Najd Brothers were glad to hear such support from the scholars, and asked Abdul-Aziz to utter his opinion on the subject. He said that he agreed to their view, but as for jihad, he wanted them to choose 50 men among them to discuss the question of jihad with him in a later session to reach some decisions. By the end of the conference, Abdul-Aziz delivered his speech to the attendees, asserting that life would never be complete to Saudi citizens without peace that guarantees full rights in self-defense and in defending the rights of all Saudis, so that they would be winners or be martyred in defense of their holy creed, sacrificing all for God's sake. Saud, the eldest son and heir to Abdul-Aziz, introduced everyone by their names to his father, making them swear fealty and loyalty to him once more as their king, and the dinner was consumed by all attendees together. Abdul-Aziz met with the 50 representatives chosen to discuss jihad concept, for four hours, and this private meeting had no recorded minutes to be shown, but they reached final decisions about the concept of jihad.

12- Eventually, Abdul-Aziz gained the support of both the sheikhs and the Najd Brothers facing Al-Daweesh and Ibn Bajad, releasing them from obligatory residence in a certain location within conditions accepted by him personally: to demolish fortresses either by successful negotiations with the British or by military force within jihad of the Najd Brothers (17).

Secondly: analysis:

1- Wahabi sheikhs understood sharia as a military jihad by killing non-Wahabis or coercing them to convert to Wahabism and to apply punishments ordained by the Sunnite sharia laws especially cutting off hands of thieves, stoning to death of adulterer and adulteresses, and killing apostates. Another Wahabi rule is to shun and reject all man-made laws of trade and modern laws of all sorts; the sheikhs were the sole representatives of sharia and did not need any man-made laws.

2- Imams, clergymen, and scholars of Sunna, jurisprudence, and hadiths in the Abbasid Era created the notion of innovation and measuring cases to issue religious edicts about new unprecedented issues, and they never dared to re-christen their views as ''holy sharia laws'' that indicated the views of God. On the contrary, the Wahabi sheikhs committed the sin of ascribing their views to God as His views and as ''holy sharia laws'', and this was the reason they rejected man-made laws about anything in modern life, especially about trade, as applied in Hejaz that received pilgrims and traders from all over the world.

3- What concern us here in the topic of the Wahabi opposition to Abdul-Aziz are the closed minds and mentalities of the Najd Brothers and the Wahabi sheikhs in local colonies, villages, cities, whether of those supporting Abdul-Aziz and those supporting the side of the Najd Brothers. We write this point and stress it to understand the events resulting from the conference failure, as the last chance to establish peace between the Najd Brothers and Abdul-Aziz was lost.

4- All conferences of that type were inevitably doomed to fail despite what had occurred and what had been said, and the reason for that was the failure of Wahabi sheikhs to deal with modern innovations in terms of technology and in terms of politics.

5- We write the following to understand the dimensions of the problem. Muslims were divided essentially into three groups: Sufis, Shiites, and Sunnites. The Sunnites remain to be the more extremist and fanatical, whereas the Sufis remain to be the most tolerant, but the three groups share the belief in falsehoods called hadiths and some other types of myths. Within the fanatical, extremist Sunnite creed, there are four main doctrines, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafei, and Hanbali, with the latter of Ibn Hanbal as the most extremist and bigoted doctrine, expanded, revived, propagated, and stressed in a later era by Ibn Taymiyya and his school of theological thought within the Mameluke era in Egypt, and then by the Wahabis within the modern age of democracy, openness, and human rights. Wahabism is more extremist, fanatical, and bigoted creed in comparison to Ibn Taymiyya and his school of theological thought in the Middle Ages. The extremist fanatical scholar Ibn Taymiyya at the time was persecuted, tried, incarcerated, and declared as an apostate and an infidel, despite his high stature and rank. Let us be reminded that views of Ibn Taymiyya remained ink in paper in lines of his writings, never applied at the time. The very first application of them was made by M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab and the Saudis, with iron and fire in the very first Saudi state destroyed in 1818. Conditions and circumstances of the third, current KSA established by Abdul-Aziz and swords of the Wahabi Brothers differed a lot in comparison to the first and second KSA states. The third KSA ha to cope with and adopt the modern international culture and its innovations to go on, but the Najd Brothers were raised in colonies of Abdul-Aziz as savage animals imbibed with Wahabi blood-thirsty, belligerent notions that urged them to commit massacres to enter Paradise. Abdul-Aziz realized that after the massacre of Ta'if committed by them, they must return to Najd to retire; he could not possibly face the international forces by such crimes that would endanger the existence of his newly formed kingdom. But he could not realize that the Najd Brothers would never accept retirement as they were addicted to committing massacres and looting. Abdul-Aziz did not see that if they stopped their jihad, they would have to attack him personally, as per Wahabi teachings imbued in their brains and inculcated by Wahabi preachers brought by Abdul-Aziz. The Wahabi sharia laws supported their view to revolt against Abdul-Aziz who stopped jihad and made peace with infidels. Even sheikhs of Wahabism could not forsake their creed for the sake of Abdul-Aziz. Maybe Abdul-Aziz later on regretted not being able to modernize Wahabism to make it partially cope with the modern age of new politics and technology.

6- Such crisis went on to be inherited by heirs and sons of Abdul-Aziz; they made peace with modern technology and declared it permissible within Islam (that included motorcycles, wireless, cars, and planes), and today's Wahabis use state-of-the-art hi-tech means to propagate and spread Wahabism all over the globe. Successors of Abdul-Aziz allowed ample room for man-made laws to deal peacefully and easily with the rest of the world to market oil and cope with modern items entering with the age of oil-rich Saudis. Yet, the essence of Wahabi jihad and sharia was deep-rooted even when the Najd Brothers were killed off. That is why the Wahabi opposition movements against the KSA and the royal family go on until now; chief among them was the MB terrorist organization now, established earlier in 1928 in Egypt by Abdul-Aziz. As long as Wahabism is not modernized to cope with modern-age culture, it will remain a thorn on the side of any political system or regime based on Wahabism and on the side of any secular system of regime in any Islamic country. The reason: because Wahabism allows for armed opposition movements that kill, murder, and destroy relentlessly the non-Wahabis and confine to such movements the talking in the name of Islam by hijacking it to serve their purposes and to claim falsely that they represent Islam.

7- Abdul-Aziz paid a heavy price when he forged the mindset of the Najd Brothers based on such savage, murderous mentality without any sort of restraint and logical reasoning to make them know their limits; the Najd Brothers rebelled against him soon enough. The son and heir of Abdul-Aziz, Feisal, paid a heavy price for spreading and propagating Wahabism all over the world especially in the West, using oil revenues. Feisal should have modernized and sifted Wahabism to reform it before exporting it. Feisal later on was killed by his nephew the fanatical Wahabi bigot. Wahabi terrorism reached all over the world, and sadly, no one is ascribing such terror to Wahabism and Sunna as it should be, but to Islam per se. Islam is now accused of terrorism because of Wahabis, and everyone forgot that God has sent Muhammad, the seal of prophets, as a mercy to the humankind, not as a tool to terrorize and murder the humankind. It is laughter-inducing that the Najd Brothers in their speeches with Abdul-Aziz made themselves responsible before the eyes of God if they forsake jihad; their Wahabi jihad was to massacre the innocent and peaceful people, especially non-Wahabi Muslims. They feared that God will ask them in the Hereafter why they stopped massacring people?! Their religion was definitely NOT Islam (literally, Islam means peace and submission to God) which is a mercy to the humankind; rather, their religion was Wahabism that urges massacring people everywhere: this is the root of evil and ordeal going on until now all over the world.

Footnotes:

15- Wahba, ditto, page 294.

Al-Mukhtar, ditto, page 2/439.

Al-Assad, ditto, page 263.

Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, issue No. 198, 4^th year, 10-10-1928.

Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, issue No. 224, 5^th year, 12-4-1929.

Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, issue No. 208, 5^th year, 18-12-1928.

Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, issue No. 212, 5^th year, 18-10-1929.

Al-Zarkeley, ditto, page 485.

16- Kishk, ditto, page 649.

17- Wahba, ditto, page 294.

Al-Mukhtar, ditto, page 2/440:242.

Al-Assad, ditto, page 263.

Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, issue No. 208, 5^th year, 18-12-1928.

Kishk, ditto, page 650.

Habeeb, ditto, pages 213:222.

The first military confrontation between Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud and the Wahabi Najd Brothers:

Before the battle of Sabilla:

1- Most of the Najd Brothers and Wahabi scholars kept calm, akin to the calm before the coming storm; everyone felt a conflict was brewing that will lead to armed revolt. Despite their being convinced and content with gains they got via Abdul-Aziz, they never bought his religious point of view. Numerous Najd Brothers accused Abdul-Aziz of befriending the infidels, as he sought to keep the throne, not to serve the "true" religious as they did. Their ''true'' religion meant to them Wahabi jihad and massacres from which they were prevented by Abdul-Aziz after defining borders with Iraq and when the British built fortresses there. Al-Daweesh continued and expanded his anti-Abdul-Aziz propaganda by holding meetings in mosques off colonies. Ibn Bajad joined him in Al-Artaweiyya colony, as he left Al-Ghatghat colony, which was located near Riyadh. Al-Artaweiyya became the center of the Najd Brothers opposition and a haven to house tribes of Mateer and Otaybah. Messenger of this colony rode fast camels to join gatherings of Najd Brothers in mosques, near water wells, and in tents, as such messengers carried the anti-Abdul-Aziz propaganda.

2- Al-Daweesh sent a message to Abdul-Aziz, and here is a quote from it: "…you have prevented us from raiding on other Bedouins, thus rendering us no longer Muslims fighting infidels and no longer Bedouins raiding one another for to live on spoils. Thus, you have separated us from both worldly and religious interests; it is true you made a lot for me and my tribe, but what about the rest of my tribe now and in the future? They will surely die of hunger, and how could I bear it? You used to forgive us our mistakes and faults; and now, you threaten to use your sword against us, and yet, you befriend the British infidels who will destroy your kingdom with their fortresses…" We can see clearly from this quotation that Bedouins stuck to the notion of raiding for loot that turned via Wahabis into religious jihad: all it would take to raid, kill, rob, murder, massacre, destroy, and enslave the others was to declare them as infidels or apostates. When Abdul-Aziz wanted to regulate this jihad as per political rules, the Najd Brothers called him an apostate who rejected Wahabi jihad and denied the true religion, and he must be fought as per Wahabi teachings.

3- Meanwhile, Al-Daweesh was gathering more supporters to prepare for a military confrontation soon enough. Abdul-Aziz proposed to Al-Daweesh to plead their case before a special court, asking for arbitration and judgment, but Al-Daweesh refused of course. This indicated the very first sign of military rebellion on the part of the Najd Brothers.

4- Al-Daweesh managed to gather 5000 fighters from the Najd Brothers to attack and raid the Wahabi Najd villages to force its dwellers to pay tributes to him. Wahba writes that they engaged into limitless Wahabi jihad without the usual restrictions imposed by Abdul-Aziz: "…they attacked Sabilla and indiscriminately killed everyone, Wahabis and non-Wahabis, by their swords, declaring everyone as infidel or apostate…" Al-Daweesh attacked all trade caravans in Najd, killing all Wahabis in these caravans, and at one point, he and his fighters attacked camel traders in Najd in the village of Al-Jeimeima in Dec. 1928, and slaughtered all of them in one day.

5- Having committed such atrocities, the Najd Brothers could no longer claim that they were attacking infidels among non-Wahabis. Abdul-Aziz could no longer remain silent before such defiance for his leadership and aggression against his subjects. What exacerbated matters was the fact that other tribes ardently wished to release themselves from the authority of Abdul-Aziz to join the Najd Brothers. Ibn Jalawy, the Wahabi ruler of Al-Ahsa region, tried as much as he could to prevent tribes raiding and attacking caravans to join the Najd Brothers. Everyone felt that if such armed rebellion was not faced soon by Abdul-Aziz, rebels would escalate and grew more stubborn and aggressive.

6- Sultan Ibn Bajad, companion and friend of Al-Daweesh, declared holy war against Iraq. By Jan. 1929, Ibn Bajad led his troops toward Iraq with fighters from the Najd Brothers of Al-Daweesh, coming from the tribes of Mateer and Al-Ajman. They attacked some Iraqi tribes within the defined borders in order to defy Abdul-Aziz and his Riyadh conference supporters. Of course, Abdul-Aziz had to respond fast to save his kingdom.

Shortly before the military confrontation in the battle of Sabilla:

1- Abdul-Aziz requested from the British side not to protect and shelter the Najd Brothers when they flee after their defeat to Iraq and Jordan.

2- Abdul-Aziz moved to the region of Qassim to prepare huge armies that consisted of dwellers of cities and oases who hate the Najd Brothers because they suffered a lot from their aggression and to ensure their future safety. Such forces formed later on the regular armies of Abdul-Aziz, with elements of the men from the tribes of Mateer, Haytham, Shamar, Al-Zhafir, and Onayza joining late on this burgeoning army. Such tribes kept their allegiance to Abdul-Aziz, and the tribe of Otaybah finally supported him, and this ensured a landslide victory in the battle of Sabilla. The armies of Abdul-Aziz comprised 12000 soldiers, moved in March 1929 eastward, to face the armies of Ibn Bajad and Al-Daweesh, near Al-Artaweiyya. Didaan Ibn Heithlein (the third important leader of the Najd Brothers after Al-Daweesh and Ibn Bajad) remained with tribesmen of Al-Ajman tribe in Al-Ahsa region, declaring their rebellion and revolt against Abdul-Aziz without actually participating in battle to fight him.

3- Both adversaries met in Sabilla in a vast plain area with no mountains, located between Al-Artaweiyya and Al-Zalfa colonies. One of the rebels, named Al-Jiaan, suggested to Al-Daweesh and Ibn Bajad moving at night fast to undertake armies of Abdul-Aziz in an ambush on the route between Qassim and Riyadh, but his suggestion was rejected.

4- Shortly before engaging into battle, both Abdul-Aziz and the rebels desired to avoid military action. Rebels saw that the army of Abdul-Aziz was huge and might defeat them, and it was better to defer fighting until they grew stronger and gain more supporters, and Abdul-Aziz felt as well that fighting should be avoided at any cost, and he sent a sheikh, Abdullah Al-Ankary, to try to convince the rebels to submit to arbitration based on sharia laws. Of course, this attempt failed. Ibn Bajad sent his trusted man, Majid Ibn Kheitheila, as a messenger to Abdul-Aziz with a letter from Ibn Bajad. As this envoy considered Abdul-Aziz an infidel, he followed the Wahabi sharia and never responded to his greetings of peace. Abdul-Aziz was furious at such an attitude, and he sent this envoy back to Ibn Bajad and Al-Daweesh with one message: the rebels must unconditionally surrender and submit to sharia laws as per Abdul-Aziz or they will be fought to their death. Majid as a consultant to Ibn Bajad advised him to surrender before it was too late as armies of Abdul-Aziz were huge and strong enough to achieve victory for him. Yet, Al-Daweesh rejected such piece of advice and asked them to allow him to see for himself what the situation was. He told them that if he did not return that evening, they should know that Abdul-Aziz took him as captive and thus they should begin fighting at once. Al-Daweesh reached the tent of Abdul-Aziz and flattered him with exaggerated praise, trying to convince him that rebels might consider surrender and that he did not like the view of Ibn Bajad to fight at once, and he asked Abdul-Aziz for a permission to sleep over at their camp. Yet, Abdul-Aziz found out his scheme and ordered him to go away to his camp and negotiations of surrender would begin at dawn. Abdul-Aziz told him that if he was truthful, he should leave the rebels, and if he was untruthful, he will be severely punished.

5- Al-Daweesh returned to his camp, bringing glad tidings to his fellow rebels that they will victory over the weak Abdul-Aziz, telling them that he became soft like dwellers of rich cities, surrounded by riches, dainty food, cooks, and servants. He told them that rich spoils were waiting for them after they defeat this unjust infidel of a king. Of course, we notice here the core creed of the Wahabi Brothers: to allow themselves to loot, massacre, and enslave the others as infidels. Once they considered Abdul-Aziz as an infidel, they were looking forward to confiscate his possessions as their spoils. Thus, the Najd Brothers, and all Wahabis in general, can declare anyone else as apostate or an infidel to commit massacres and scramble for loot. Of course, Al-Daweesh was trying to incite the rebels to fight Abdul-Aziz as a cowardly, soft, rich man who did not deserve to be a king. This is the creed of Wahabi jihad inculcated into the Najd Brothers in the colonies, under orders of Abdul-Aziz and his Wahabi clergymen, and such creed was threatening his life and monarchy.

The military confrontation during the battle of Sabilla:

Next day, on 30^th of March, 1929, the army of Abdul-Aziz attacked the rebels, and within a half hour of severe fighting, some of the rebels surrendered and some others fled the battlefield. Ibn Bajad fled and so did Al-Daweesh who was seriously injured. Next morning, Al-Daweesh sent a delegation of women to ask pardon and forgiveness from Abdul-Aziz while they were crying and weeping. Abdul-Aziz wept along with is retinue, and he promised the delegation of women to spare the lives of Ibn Bajad and Al-Daweesh if they surrender and accept sharia laws as applied by Abdul-Aziz their lawful king. The injured Al-Daweesh was carried on a litter to the king, and he pledged and swore allegiance to Abdul-Aziz, and the latter forgave him. Three days later, Ibn Bajad surrendered himself in the village of Al-Shaqra, and Abdul-Aziz imprisoned him temporarily until danger was over. Abdul-Aziz later on ordered that rebels held in captivity after their surrender would be disciple as per their ranks, and ordered the Shiite leader Ibn Jalawy to discipline rebels within the tribe of Al-Ajman.

After the battle of Sabilla:

After the battle, Abdul-Aziz decided not to chase the fleeing rebels, and he held a meeting with some Wahabi sheikhs who supported him along with leaders of tribes, about 2000 men, to deliver his speech to them. He put to them certain well-defined principles as follows:

A- Quran and Sunna are the two bases for religious edicts and fatwas related to religious issues, and one was not to resort to personal interpretation.

B- Kings must be always obeyed as per Wahabi sharia laws.

C- No meetings or councils would be held to discuss worldly or religious matters without the consent of the king.

D- All Muslims must be respected and protected by their fellow Muslims.

Abdul-Aziz went on to explain firmly to them that the Najd Brothers violated such principles and deserve to be duly punished, and anyone following their footsteps in violating such principles will be severely punished (18). With such ultimatum for Wahabi sheikhs, a new era began: all Wahabi clergymen must submit to the Saudi authorities to support it against any Wahabi opposition movement or foe that would defy Al-Saud royal family by declaring its kings not fir for rule as infidels.

Footnotes:

18- Wahba, ditto, pages 294:296.

Al-Zarkeley, "Arabia in the Reign of King Abdul-Aziz", Beirut, pages 486:488.

Al-Zarkeley, "A Short History of King Abdul-Aziz", Beirut, pages 107:109 and 117:118.

Habeeb, ditto, pages 225:227.

Al-Ahram Newspaper, issue No. 16216, 26-2-1930.

Al-Mukhtar, ditto, pages 442:445.

Al-Assad, ditto, pages 264:265.

Al-Saeed, ditto, page 312.

Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, issue No. 224, 12-4-1929.

Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, issue No. 239, 31-7-1929.

Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, issue No. 302, 19-9-1930.

Al-Attar, ditto, page 421.

Al-Khamees, ditto, pages 170:174 and 180:183.

Arslan, ditto, page 141.

Philby, ditto, page 362.

Wahba, ''Arabian Days'', page 141.

The last military confrontation and the end of the Wahabi Najd Brothers during the reign of Abdul-Aziz:

Renewing revolt against Abdul-Aziz:

Unexpectedly, Al-Daweesh got healthy again, and fearing that Abdul-Aziz might imprison him like Ibn Bajad, Al-Daweesh left Al-Artaweiyya and moved to the area between Al-Ahsa and Kuwait. Al-Daweesh got a chance to begin rebellion again after he was joined by the tribe of Al-Ajman because of an unexpected incident related to the family of Ibn Heithlein. Let us remember that Ibn Heithlein was in a state of negative rebellion, as he never participated in fighting in the battle of Sabilla. Abdul-Aziz managed to divine the tribe of Al-Ajman as done with Otaybah tribe. As sheikh Al-Rubayaan, leader of Otaybah made most of its men subservient to Abdul-Aziz in his army, Nayef Ibn Heithlein did the same with part of men of Al-Ajman tribe. This weakened the position of Didaan Ibn Heithlein, and when the Najd Brothers were defeated in the battle of Sabilla, he fled to Kuwait, where he was warmly welcomed. Soon enough, he returned to Al-Ahsa, whose governor Abdullah Ibn Jalawy was ordered by Abdul-Aziz to discipline all fleeing rebels. Ibn Jalawy sent his son, Fahd, to capture Ibn Heithlein, with troops from Ajman led by Nayef Ibn Heithlein and troops from dwellers of near cities. Fahd sent a message to Didaan Ibn Heithlein to propose a meeting on the subject of keeping off rebels from Al-Ahsa, and Didaan called him to become a Najd Brother, but Fahd refused and asked again for a meeting at his camp. Consultants of Didaan Ibn Heithlein, who were rebellious Al-Ajman tribesmen, advised him to refuse to attend such a meeting, but he rejected their advice. Accordingly, Fahd captured him and tied him with iron chains. When Didaan Ibn Heithlein never returned, Al-Ajman tribesmen attacked troops of Fahd and Nayef. Fahd promptly ordered the killing of Didaan. When Nayef saw the corpse of his paternal uncle's son, he joined the rebellious Al-Ajman tribesmen and attacked Fahd and his troops with them, seeking revenge. Fahd was killed and most of his men were slaughtered, with their victuals and possessions becoming spoils. Thus, Al-Ajman troops were unified and marched northward to join the followers of Feisal Al-Daweesh. Later on, troops from tribes of Otaybah and Mateer as well as fighters from Al-Ghatghat and Al-Artaweiyya colonies joined the rebels. They were joined by Farhan Ibn Mashhoor, a well-known cavalier that served the British and the French before. Knowing about his son's death, Ibn Jalawy went ill and people felt he would not recover. Abdul-Aziz promptly dismissed him from his post as governor of Al-Ahsa, appointing his son Saud instead. Rebels wreaked havoc in the north and south, not only looting, but also massacring women, children, and old men indiscriminately. Their revolt caused a separation between Najd and Hejaz as routes were cut. Routes were cut between Mecca and Riyadh and the Gulf region in general. Only dwellers of cities in Najd remained loyal to Abdul-Aziz, as they hated the violence of the Wahabi Brothers and felt that Abdul-Aziz was too lenient with them and could not get rid of them once and for all. The king was sure that Al-Daweesh shall not live long enough as his injuries were serious, as he was told by doctor who saved the life of Al-Daweesh. Abdul-Aziz was surprised to know that Al-Daweesh was alive and that he fled from Al-Artaweiyya. Abdul-Aziz got news of the death of Didaan and Fahd, and how Al-Ajman tribe gave momentum to the rebels with their pact with Al-Daweesh. Abdul-Aziz decided that it was high time to get rid of the Najd Brothers forever, using all his military power and diplomatic ties. Abdul-Aziz negotiated with the British in Jeddah and made them promise him never to let Kuwait, Jordan, and Iraq help the Najd Brothers or to give them political asylum. On their part, the British urged Abdul-Aziz never to kill any of the Najd Brothers if handed over to him by the British, and Abdul-Aziz had to agree reluctantly on such a condition, but he told him that in that case, they will be tried based on Wahabi sharia, with their lives spared. Abdul-Aziz reserved the right to chase the rest of the Najd Brothers if they took to flight. Let us remember that the Hashemites ruling in Iraq and Jordan as well as rulers of Kuwait ardently wished to weaken and topple Abdul-Aziz to make Al-Daweesh ruler of a neutral buffer zone on the borders. Kuwaiti king gave Al-Daweesh large sums of money. Abdul-Aziz sent his friend, the Austrian journalist converted to Islam Muhammad Al-Assad, into a secret journey to gather information about rumors of Al-Daweesh receiving large sums of money. Al-Assad verified the fact, as we read in his book titled ''The Way to Mecca". Abdul-Aziz disbanded his troops after the battle of Sabilla, keeping only some battalions here and there, as he never imagined that a second revolt would occur. He had to form his army again from scratch, gathering all needed money and arms, especially as loans from GB, and the British aided him. Abdul-Aziz sent for leaders of tribes to meet with them in the city of Al-Dawdamy (19).

After the crushing defeat of the Wahabi Najd Brothers:

Conference of Al-Dawdamy on 9^th of July, 1929:

In this conference, about 2000 men from the tribe of Otaybah, Al-Rawdan, and Al-Asmah gathered, led by their leaders like Ibn Rubayaan sultan Abou-Al-Ela. The king discussed with them his plans to attack Al-Ajman tribe, asking for their help or at least their remaining neutral, as Otaybah tribe starched over strategic points in the kingdom from the east of Hejaz to the west of Najd,, and if they to revolt against him during his attack on Al-Ajman tribe in Al-Ahsa, they would pose a grave threat to his controlling Hejaz. He delivered a speech to them that they comprise three groups: one of devoted people to religion and to their king, one of opportunists, and one of rebels. He talked to them about his critical situation after disbanding is troops after the battle of Sabilla: he cannot fight the Najd Brothers and not attend the pilgrimage season as the imam of all Muslims, and he could not open the pilgrimage season while leaving rebellion to spread all over the kingdom. He decided to open the pilgrimage season first and then to attack Al-Ajman tribe on the 7^th of Aug. 1929, in the Hijri month of Rabei Awwal. He swore never to pardon those rebels who were pardoned after the battle of Sabilla and threatened to kill those who would not join his troops without a proper acceptable excuse as per Wahabi sharia laws, and to take arms and horses of those giving him excuse for not fighting with him. Within this conference, he pardoned former rebels from Otaybah tribe among attendees and those absent provided that they repent and never to rebel again, and if the pardoned ones refused to swear fealty to the king, they would be tried in court as per Wahabi sharia laws. Abdul-Aziz vowed to kill all those who raid and attack caravans on trade routes and those reluctant to fight with him without proper excuse permissible per Wahabi sharia laws, asserting that punishments would be exacted before getting ready to face his enemies (20). Conference of Al-Dawdamy failed to end the rebellion of the Otaybah tribe, and Abdul-Aziz had to organize another conference in Al-Shuaraa, a city between Mecca and Riyadh.

Conference of Al-Shuaraa on 6^th of September 1929:

This conference was attended by leaders of all tribes loyal to Abdul-Aziz in addition to his supporters and allies from the Otaybah tribe, and the king told them that he pardoned rebels of Otaybah several times, yet, they insisted on rebelling against him after swearing allegiance and fealty to him. After long negotiations all day long, the following decisions were taken next morning:

A- Rebels of Otaybah and Mateer tribes must be defeated once and for all.

B- All arms, camels, and horses of supporters of rebels must be confiscated.

C- All arms and possessions of rebels must be confiscated and they must be tried in court as per sharia laws.

D- Fighters with Abdul-Aziz will keep all spoils to themselves.

E- Troops must be sent to Al-Shaqra – the hub of all rebels – to remedy all effects of corruption as per the general good and sharia laws.

F- All Wahabi colonies of rebels must be destroyed and its dwellers must be distributed among other tribes and cities so as not to allow them to gather in one place ever again.

G- The above-mentioned decisions are missions that must be executed by force using the king's troops during his stay in Al-Shuaraa within 10 days.

H- Having executed all the missions, the king's forces and troops must gather within borders to face rebels of Al-Daweesh and AL-Ajman tribe (21).

On 25^th of Nov., 1929, a caravan of thirty cars carried Abdul-Aziz and his family members and leading allies and supporters, heading to Al-Khafs, a city located 115 kilometers from Riyadh, to meet the king's eldest son, Muhammad, and having spent a night there, the caravan left for Al-Shawky, a city located 30 kilometers away from Al-Khafs (22). Hafiz Wahba writes that Abdul-Aziz crushed rebels of Otaybah tribe in a decisive battle that was a victory, confiscating their camels and arms, and most of their possessions, leaving to them only things necessary for their survival. The governor/emir of Hael killed the son of Feisal Al-Daweesh during the battle of Ibn Al-Radma, and most of the crushed troops were killed, who were the best fighters of the tribe of Mateer. Hearing of all this, Al-Daweesh despaired of winning. The tents of Al-Daweesh were attacked on 30^th of Dec. 1929 suddenly by Iraqi Bedouins who joined forces with former Najd Brothers who left their group to join Abdul-Aziz, and the tents were burned to the ground after looting all things inside them. The attackers never knew that Abdul-Aziz resided near them. Wahba writes that he himself was in Kuwait, as representative of the king, when he knew that Abdul-Aziz was in another city and not in Riyadh. Wahba spread the news of the attack and how Abdul-Aziz was the winner. Al-Daweesh spread news of how Abdul-Aziz lied and that Al-Daweesh was the winner, so that his supporters would not leave him and attack his tents. Yet, his supporters knew that Abdul-Aziz was saying the truth and Al-Daweesh lied to them to hide his shame and defeat, and thus, they deserted Al-Daweesh and some of them sought refuge near Iraqi borders. Al-Daweesh sent a message to the king asking for pardon and safety, and Abdul-Aziz insisted on his unconditional surrender and on his submission to sharia laws and to his king, promising to spare his life (23). Messages went back and forth between Abdul-Aziz and Al-Daweesh. The king once wrote to him the following: (… your motives was either one or all of the coming points: 1- you ask our pardon after you despaired and lost everything, and we understand your weaknesses and feel sorry for your sake, as you cannot rebel against us anymore, 2- you might be using a ploy to deceive us, by asserting to people that you can defy us and then join our allies to ask for whatever you wish for, 3- you might want to appeal to your supporters to win their favor and to convince those who did not help you that you will make amends and reconcile with us, 4- you want us to spare your life to convince those who fought for you and lost their family members to forgive you, or 5- you might wish that your messages would never reach us, but since your envoys came to us, we guarantee our royal pardon and protection to the and to you; we will spare your life…). When Al-Daweesh read this, he wrote the following reply (…I feel thankful to your majesty, but I never despair; several governments offered me asylum to become citizen in their countries, but I refused such offers because my religion forbids me from seeking asylum in countries ruled by infidels, for I prefer to live in my country ruled by your majesty, the imam of all Muslims…) (24). When rebels in Al-Ahsa heard of such correspondences, they scattered and fled to protect themselves and their families. GB urged Kuwait not to offer help to rebels, and that was why the Najd Brothers could not flee to Kuwait along with their families. Al-Daweesh could not meet the king of Kuwait despite several attempts to arrange such meetings. At one point, British warplanes chased the Wahabi Brothers, killing them if they tried to cross Kuwaiti borders to seek political asylum. They had to gather in a neutral zone, and Al-Daweesh gave them the permission to return to Abdul-Aziz and ask his pardon, if they liked. Most of them did just that. Al-Daweesh had no choices left but to flee as he could not fight with the remaining men. In Jan. 1930, Nayef Ibn Heithlein, Feisal Al-Daweesh, among others, surrendered themselves to the British forces, which had to keep their promise and hand them over to Abdul-Aziz, by conveying them first by airplanes into Basra, Iraq, then to Shatt Al-Arab port on the Persian Gulf to convey them with a British battleship. The rest of the rebels were collected by the British forces about 15 kilometers near the borders of Kuwait, guarded by armored vehicles until they were handed over to Abdul-Aziz. (25)

GB handed over Al-Daweesh to Abdul-Aziz:

On the 17^th of Jan. 1930, the British Foreign Office sent three high officials, including Dickson, to discuss with Abdul-Aziz the fate of rebels' leaders captured by the British forces, based on the following conditions: 1) Abdul-Aziz must spare their lives and the lives of their families, 2) punishments should not be severe, and 3) putting an end to the suffering of Iraqis and Kuwaitis who feared more attacks by the Najd Brothers. Dickson met with Abdul-Aziz and reminded him of the role of GB in helping him against the rebels. Abdul-Aziz had to guarantee that he would spare their lives, and the leaders of rebels captured by the British were allowed to meet Abdul-Aziz in his tent, and they wept and felt grateful, and Abdul-Aziz wept in sympathy and allowed them to kiss his nose, as per Bedouin traditions (26). This situation was recorded by Wahba in his book as he compared between the stature, rank, and riches of Al-Daweesh when he was an ally of Abdul-Aziz and his feeling humbled and reduced to poverty waiting to be pardoned and feeling grateful for sparing his life, humiliated before the king's retinue who were lower in rank in comparison to him in former days. Wahba writes these words of Abdul-Aziz addressed to Al-Daweesh: "…You know quite well what we have done to you in previous days, and how we have been generous to you, fighting Najd people for your sake. We do not deserve to be betrayed by you. Did you want to be the king instead of us? You have been truly a king in your stature and rank in Najd under us and because of us. All our possessions, after all, are God's bounty, and we have used swords to spread the rule of our religion. We have been busy all the time granting you and your people every wish, to keep you happy, satisfied, and content and you have spared no enemies' blood for the cause of our religion, and yet, you did not fear God when you defied your king. Did you think that if you have immigrated to any other country, you would have been in a higher rank than you reached here in our kingdom? This is strange indeed..." Al-Daweesh replied: "…I bear witness to God that your majesty never let us down, and I responded to your goodness with evil and insult on my part, and we were duly punished by seeking help of the infidels who brought me to you in their planes, and I feel humiliated before my fellow Brothers, after losing my stature and rank. May God fight Satan that guided us in his evil ways to defy our king and do evil deeds…" The king ordered that Al-Daweesh and the rest of the leaders of the rebels would be heavily guarded in a nearby tent, to be imprisoned three days later in Riyadh (27). The British feared that Abdul-Aziz might renege on his promise and kill them, but in fact, they were never tortured in their prison cells. When Al-Daweesh fell terminally ill, and was dying, Abdul-Aziz released him and sent him to Al-Artaweiyya to die amidst his family and tribe (28). The British allies helped Abdul-Aziz to chase and capture the rest of the fleeing rebels who were wanted to get punished by imprisonment and by confiscating their possessions and money. All horses and camels of Al-Daweesh were confiscated, and nearly half of horses and camels of the tribes of Mateer, Al-Doshaan, and Al-Ajman, and the rebels of Al-Ajman were severely punished. After getting rid of the Najd Wahabi Brothers forever, Abdul-Aziz uttered his famous words: ''We will live from now on a new life''. By putting an end to the era of the Wahabi Najd Brothers, the KSA began its strides into the modern age. The remnants of the Brothers became like the rest of the Saudi subjects and were pardoned by the king who appointed them in many posts later on. One of them, from Mater tribe, became so trust-worthy that Abdul-Aziz let him be responsible for all camels of the royal family. Many former Brothers were gathered to form a new organization loyal to the king, named ''National Guards''. Until now, family members and descendants of Al-Daweesh rule Al-Artaweiyya city, and so do some family members and descendants of some other rebels in other areas like Al-Jouf and other Saudi governorates. Abdul-Aziz gained their support by his wise policies and by his general pardon and generous nature that led him not to seek revenge and this made his former old enemies lick their wounds and become his staunch supporters (29). Thus ended the opposition movement of the Wahabi Najd Brothers.

Footnotes:

19- Al-Mukhtar, ditto, pages 2/446, 449, and 50.

Muhammad Al-Assad, ''The Path to Mecca", pages 265, 266, and 289.

Abou Aliyya (Abdel-Fattah Hassan), "Development of the Saudi Society", an unpublished Ph.D. thesis, pages 136 and 137, Faculty of Arts, Cairo University, 1972, Cairo.

Dickson, op. cit., page 305.

20- Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, issue No. 239, 31-7-1929.

Habeeb, ditto, pages 234, 235, and 236.

21- Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, issue No. 252, 18-10-1929.

22- Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, issue No. 293, 18-7-1930.

23- Wahba, ''Arabia in the 29^th Century'', pages 297 and 298.

24- Al-Khateeb, ''Abdul-Aziz the Just Imam'', Cairo, 1951, pages 180 and 181.

25- Dickson, ''Kuwait and her Neighbors'', London, 1956, page 320.

26- Habeeb, ditto, pages 240:243.

27: Wahba, ditto, pages 298:300.

28: Al-Assad, ditto, page 292.

29: Wahba, ditto, page 301.

Habeeb, ditto, pages 244:249.

Dickson, op. cit., pages 325:329.

CHAPTER III: The Ideological Formation of the Najd Brothers Is the Basis of the Saudi Opposition Mov

CHAPTER III: The Ideological Formation of the Najd Brothers Is the Basis of the Saudi Opposition Movement during the Reign of Abdul-Aziz

Introduction: about corrupt education:

1- Wahabism, as the ideological formation of the Najd Brothers, is the factor that had turned the desert Arabs (i.e., Bedouins) into savage terrorists. Such ideological formation of the Najd Brothers was inculcated to them by Wahabi sheikhs and scholars in the colonies established to them by Abdul-Aziz. In general, previously, ordinary Bedouins were illiterate, but once they entered the Wahabi colonies, they were transformed into learned ones who retained the Bedouin practice of raids and looting, under the pretext of 'Islamic' jihad, with the addition of committing heinous massacres for all non-Wahabis, including mass killings of women, children, and old people.

2- In such case, education played a destructive role; originally, education is supposed to be an active element to spread modernization and civilization, especially if such education is linked to Islam: the religion based on peace, justice, political and religious freedom, tolerance, mercy, and all values that have come later on to be called human rights. The ideological formation of the Najd Brothers was a betrayal to the civilizational role of education and a betrayal of Islam and its higher values found in the Quran. This Wahabi education had caused the Bedouins to be transformed into human savages that committed several massacres in Arabia and in its neighboring countries. These human savages tried to attack Abdul-Aziz himself, but he killed them off before they would devour him.

3- Within societies dominated by religiosity and religiousness, corrupt and bad religious education exists and produces ignoramuses of clergymen who specialize in spreading and propagating ignorance within schools, institutes, universities, media, and houses of worship. Within such societies, no one would dare to criticize the clergymen; as the dominated religiosity lends them sanctity and awe, allowing them to say whatever falsehoods they desire to spread, especially if they are typically copying those falsehoods written by the ancient forefathers and scholars. Thus, when a certain society tried to catch up with the train of modernization and of the civilized world to cope with the modern age, such clergymen would endeavor to thwart such plans to force people to re-live the past of the ancestors, as if this were 'real' Islam. Of course, the above applies to Egypt and its Cairo-based Sunnite Vatican-like Al-Azhar institution, especially at the time when myths of Sunnite Sufism dominated Al-Azhar. Soon enough, with the Saudi influence and money since the 1970s in Egypt under the rule of Sadat (1971-1981), Al-Azhar has turned gradually into a fortress of Wahabism. Wahabism has infiltrated into religious books of the curricula of Egyptian non-Azharite public education, thus aiding the spread of the culture of fanaticism, extremism, bigotry, and permission of killing the innocent, peaceful ones. This volatile, dangerous situation is on the increase in Egypt: to allow education to spread the Wahabi culture that permits massacring all non-Wahabis around the globe.

4- In Egypt, all educational institutions and media propagate Wahabism and protect it from being questions and criticized, as it is being presented as if it were the only 'true' Islam. Yet, at the same time, the Egyptian State chases and imprisons whoever embraces the Wahabi ideology and wants to apply it by force and terror. Thus, the Egyptian State wants the youth to be an ever-silent passive Wahabi group. Of course, this is impossible; Wahabism urges its followers to commit massacres and loot under the motto of jihad and ''the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice''. Hence, if Wahabis remained silent and passive, this is temporary; when the chance comes, they will practice their ''jihad''.

5- Accordingly, the Egyptian State managed to create a silent, passive, Mubarak-supporting Salafist/Wahabi trend. Yet, history tells us that this seemingly passive and apparently silent trend consists of a punch of deceitful hypocrites; once the chance comes near, such trend will be worse than Moghuls and other barbarians in history. This Salafist/Wahabi trend is gradually infiltrating slowing but steadily all over Egyptian aspects of life, using the State apparatuses in media and mosques, and eventually, such terrorist trend will make pacts with those accused by the State as being terrorists who seek to confiscate rule and to topple the Mubarak regime. Salafists will never forsake their fellow Wahabis (i.e., the terrorist MB group members) for the sake of the Mubarak regime; rather, both will join forces to destroy this regime. Yet, later on, inevitably Wahabis will be divided and will fight one another for power and authority, with as much momentum as in the case of the Najd Brothers fighting and rebelling against Abdul-Aziz, or maybe in a more violent manner; as Egypt would never have a character like Abdul-Aziz and his geopolitical circumstances and conditions. Sadly, the Egyptian State now (i.e., 2001 A.D.) rear and bring up all Salafist/Wahabi trends inside the country and help them spread to counter and face the spread of the terrorist MB group members and all extremist trends that has sprung out of the MB. Yet, this is an extremely dangerous and volatile situation that might lead to the destruction of Egypt.

6- The root of this tragedy of harboring Salafist/Wahabi trends inside Egypt is the fact that the Egyptian State sponsors the Sunnite thought, the basis of Wahabism, and protects by law its being criticized; as the Egyptian authorities of the Mubarak regime persecutes whoever put the Sunnite religion to question to discuss and refute it from within Islam; i.e. the Quran alone, and we personally have suffered such persecution for years in Cairo.

7- In 1982, we have finished our book titled "Al-Sayed Al-Badawi between Truth and Myths", and we have written in its conclusion an urgent call for sifting and modifying all curricula in school and universities textbooks, especially heritage traditional ones of history, theology, and religion, in order to eradicate all signs of terrorist and extremist culture that ascribe itself forcibly to Islam, so as not to let Egyptian education be a means to produce generations of fanatics and extremists. We have warned against possible bloodshed between the youth and the Egyptian State Security Apparatuses, but no one paid heed to our warnings. Ten years later, in 1992, confrontations occurred between the Egyptian State and the terrorist, extremist groups of religious fanaticism, and the authorities contained the situation with the greatest difficulty. As usual, security solutions and confrontations do nothing but to exacerbate the problem and to aggravate matters; even if all religious terrorists got killed, as their thought and theories are never put to question to be refuted, more generations of terrorists will soon emerge.

8- In 1998 and 1999, we have been the leader of a team that adopted the project of educational reform in Egypt in Ibn Khaldoun Center. This project began as an idea within an article published by us in 1997 in the Cairo-based leftist Rose Al-Youssef Magazine, calling for the reform of both Al-Azhar and the curricula of religious education within public schools in Egypt. Within the Ibn Khaldoun forums, we have discussed such a topic, and related issues, at length; we have discussed and rejected the project of establishing a Coptic Christian university in Egypt, as such project will increase divisions within the Egyptian society by turning it into two warring camps. We have urged the idea that the better notion is to reform the current Egyptian public education to make it a means to reinforce the culture of tolerance and religious freedom. Ibn Khaldoun Center received at the time a European grant to implement the project of reforming Egyptian education to spread the culture of tolerance instead of bigotry. We have set alternatives for the curricula of the subjects of history, religious studies, and Arabic reading textbooks. We have called all parties concerned to discuss our suggestions; yet, to our surprise, the Egyptian parliament, cabinet, media and Al-Azhar institution under the Mubarak regime attacked the project severely and accused our person of being a spy/agent who betrayed Egypt and Islam! Thus, the project was nipped in the bud, and as a punishment, the Ibn Khaldoun Center was closed down by the Egyptian authorities in 2000 A.D. since that date, we expect to be arrested anytime to pay the price of our reformation project proposed by us, as we are now writing this book (2000-2001), expecting policemen or the State Security Apparatus men to arrest us every time the door of our Cairo apartment was knocking.

9- Before the Ibn Khaldoun Center was closed down, several Quranists were arrested among those who used to attend the weekly forums of the Center, forums that were presided by us on Tuesdays at night to host thinkers, politicians, and the cultural elite among Egyptians, Arabs, and foreigners from all trends. Within each weekly forum, a certain prepared-in-advance topic was discussed. With such forums, some Shiite Egyptians were given the chance for the very first time to express themselves freely. Among famous attendees of the forums was the Sudanese political figure Sadiq Al-Mahdi, apart from the secretary council members of the Ibn Khaldoun Center. Within such forums, topics discussed included the following: the Arab-Israeli struggle, the future of the Islamist movements in Egypt, transparency, the means to apply democracy, elections between legislations and actual reality, and projects to reform and modify the Egyptian Constitution. Such forums used to be a headache for the Egyptian State Security Apparatus men, especially because they were attended by foreign correspondents and journalists as well as some people working in foreign, Western embassies in Egypt to measure the cultural trends of public opinion in Egypt. As a leader and coordinator of such forums, naturally, some of our fellow Quranists attended the forums to voice their Quranist views about topics being discussed. Such forums brought forth some projects that provoked the ire of the Egyptian State Security Apparatus men, especially the projects of transparency, educational reform, and teaching Egyptians their political rights. We personally led the previous two projects. Later on, some Quranists who used to attend the forums were arrested, and the owner of the Center, Dr. Saad Eddine Ibrahim, was arrested after the closure of the Center in June 2000. As we write this now (Dec. 2000), we expect to be arrested anytime. We hear news of some of the arrested Quranists being tortured to extort certain confessions from them, and such confessions might justify our being arrested later on. May God come to the aid of all of us!

10- As we write this book now, we cannot be sure if we would finish it or not; we keenly write these lines to register, for the sake of history, the persecution we suffer and for another reason: to use it as an introduction to this chapter of the book about the ideological formation of the Wahabi Najd Brothers, to record our views about what is going on in Egypt now; the culture of the terrorist MB group members dominates Egypt and such corrupt culture is a replica of the Wahabi education in colonies in Najd established by Abdul-Aziz. We fear that the coming generations in Egypt will not differ a great deal from the Wahabi Najd Brothers, about whom we write this book of the Wahabi opposition movements. The Wahabi Najd Brothers rebelled against their master Abdul-Aziz using Wahabism taught to them by his Wahabi scholars. What about the Wahabi generations being prepared in Egypt now within both public education and the Azharite one?!

The problems of the ideological formation of the Wahabi Najd Brothers:

1- The main basis of the issue of the opposition of the Najd Brothers is their ideological formation, which is rooted in the sharia of Middle Ages in its very extremist and fanatical forms. Such ideological formation and mindset had to face the modern age that would never be compatible with the Middle-Ages culture. Abdul-Aziz was the one that taught them such culture and shared it with them; yet, the difference was that he realized the changes of the modern age around him and tried to cope with modernity. Thus, this stance brought about the disputes and then the rift and the struggle between him and the Najd Brothers. If hypothesis is ever allowed in historical research, we may safely say that even if the Najd Brothers had managed to defeat and kill Abdul-Aziz, their inevitable fate was to be history; they would have been extinct by now anyway, because they did not belong the same age of ours. The dinosaurs with their might dominated the face of the earth for long eras, and when their age ended, the age of mammals began and dinosaurs went extinct. We see similar examples in many cases in human history, especially history of Muslims.

2- In fact, even the Yathreb city-state established by Prophet Muhammad was in direct contrast to its era, when tyrant rulers and clergymen were deified and sanctified within empires of the Persians and Byzantines. Muhammad had established a city-state that followed and applied the Quran; we can call such a city-state in our modern-age terms as the city-state of direct democracy, peace, social justice, human rights, freedom of speech, expression, thought, and religion, a city-state actually based on both power and justice for all. This city-state applied the true Islamic sharia in the Quran within the very best possible human application. The divine revelation corrected and directed Muhammad, allowing for the establishing of a real Islamic rule within applicable sharia found in the Quran. Yet, such a city-state created in real life, or utopia sung and advocated by philosophers for centuries, did not last after Muhammad's death. The reason: the Qorayish Umayyads as well as Bedouins/ dessert Arabs who converted to Islam shortly before Muhammad's death never left the Yathreb city-state to thrive and go on. Both the Qorayish Umayyads and Bedouins represented the tyrannical and violent culture dominant during the Middle Ages that contradicted Islam in the Quran. Within the struggle between Qorayish Umayyads and Bedouins for loot and rule, the gradual, slow change occurred within the State of Muslims: from Al-Thaqeefa pact to Arab conquests to civil wars until the establishment of the tyrannical military Umayyad caliphate and empire and then the Abbasid theocracy. Such empires carried inside the Middle-Ages culture and its tyrannical traits, including forged and carefully tailored religiosity and religious life that suited the dominant corruption and oppression of the Middle Ages. The contrast is clear between the Yathreb city-state of Muhammad and the Abbasid caliphate, when writing down of man-made fabricated religions of Muslims began, embodying the Middle-Ages culture. Hence, the Yathreb city-state never lasted but ten years, despite its being a utopia dreamt of for long by the weak and the oppressed who wished to see a human paradise on earth. In contrast, the Abbasid caliphate lasted for five centuries. The reason is obvious, of course; the Yathreb city-state contradicted the dominant Middle-Ages culture, whereas the Abbasid caliphate embodies such culture so honestly. The Abbasid caliphate went on, even after the downfall of Baghdad, within the Mameluke Era in Egypt to lend legitimacy to the rule of Mameluke sultans who were previously slaves who received military training and their rule lasted from 1250 to 1517 A.D. In Egypt and the Levant, people had no qualms accepting the rule of the unjust Mameluke sultans as long as such rulers enjoyed legitimacy and acceptance of the Abbasid caliphs who used to acknowledge the Mameluke sultans that reached the throne of Egypt using their ruse, power, might, and conspiracies. After the Ottomans had put an end to the Mameluke Era in Egypt, the Ottoman caliph Selim I had to carry off the last Abbasid caliph from Cairo to Istanbul to declare himself as his caliph, in order to rule with the same Abbasid sharia formulated centuries ago. The Ottoman caliphate had many successors until it was finally abolished by Mustapha Kemal Atatürk in 1924 A.D., within about the middle of the era of the Najd Brothers (1910:1930).

3- Abdul-Aziz began establishing his kingdom within the period from 1902 to 1930, on the basis of the religion of Wahabism, which was in its turn based on the Sunnite extremist Ibn Hanbal doctrine and the sharia of Ibn Taymiyya, revived by Ibn Abdul-Wahab. Abdul-Aziz struggled against the Shiite and Sufi religions dominated the areas around him, and he realized the need to transform the ever-changing and the loot-driven military power of the Bedouins into a creed-based unified force solidified by Wahabism. That was why he formed the Najd Brothers and inculcated into them Sunnite extremist Ibn Hanbal doctrine and the sharia of Ibn Taymiyya revived by Wahabism, and such creeds belong actually to the Middle Ages and never fit the modern age of the 20^th century. Of course, euripi, especially GB, spread and imposed the modernization and its culture within their colonies and areas of influence. Thus, as the Sunnite fundamentalist culture of the Najd Brothers contradicted the modern age in the 20^th century, the might and power of the Najd Brothers was bound to vanish one day. Even if Abdul-Aziz had retained the Najd Brothers and kept their culture alive, he would have ended with his KSA soon enough such as previous mobile Bedouin states and their owners (i.e., the Zanj movement and the Qarmatians) who excelled in destruction and massacres and ended as mere history and came to nothing at the end even during the Middle Ages to which they belonged. Hence, we can say that the Yathreb city-state of Muhammad, despite its higher values, was stranger to the Middle-Ages culture surrounding it in the 7^th century A.D., and thus, it ended soon as if it were a parentheses and a prominent exception contradicting what was familiar at the time. Within the same logic, the Najd Brothers was a movement that belonged to the Middle-Ages culture, but revived in the modern age that contradicts with it for a certain purpose, and it had to end soon enough despite its might and power as well as brutality, savagery, and massacres and finally its bigots who thought themselves as loyal servants of a creed they thought of as 'Islam'. The same fate is expected for all Wahabi political movements, or the so-called political Islam or Islamism, such as the terrorist MB group and their secret and known societies and organizations subservient to it.

4- The problem of Abdul-Aziz was that he had to change Bedouins into Wahabi fierce fighters to make sure that under his disposal a group of creed-based soldiers directly linked and related to him as one might be linked and related to one's creed, in order to make Bedouins shed their opportunist vein and tribal fanaticism. Accordingly, he would use such fighters to recapture lands and regions invaded before by his great-grandfather Saud. Thus, the problem was that he prepared and educated the Najd Brothers within a religion that belonged to the Middle-Ages culture and logic, in its extremist, most fanatical, and bigoted traits, fit only for fighting zeal and never for building a stable State, and such culture always holds within itself its seeds of self-destruction; if such creed-based fighters would not fight a certain foe, they will fight one another until they go instinct. When GB (the representative at the time of the international community and the modern age) forced Abdul-Aziz to cope with the modern age and to stop his conquests and ''jihad'' in order to live as king within a stable kingdom, disputes and rifts occurred between him and the Najd Brothers who turned against him instead of fighting for his sake as they used to do before, and he was patient with them until he thought that this situation was no longer bearable; inevitably either of the two parties had to annihilate the other, and thus, Abdul-Aziz had to eradicate and kill off the Najd Brothers before they destroy him and his burgeoning kingdom.

5- The problem of the Najd Brothers was that they were Bedouins isolated in the deserts away from the outside world, and the Salafist/Wahabi call came to them as an ideology in the colonies that suited their mentalities and mindset at the time, to justify using that creed their centuries-old oral and written Najd traditions of looting and raiding, from rejecting Islam once Muhammad died, passing periods of Al-Zanj movement and the Qarmatians, until the Ibn Abdul-Wahab movement. Such historical events always began in Najd and its surrounding areas. Thus, the Bedouins lived a phase when past and present mixed and temporal and local aspects intertwined. Thus, at one point, these Bedouins turned into the Najd Brothers; fierce fighters who wanted ardently to re-established the Yathreb city-state of Muhammad, NOT as we read about it in the Quran, but rather like the one written by historians in the historical accounts about the Abbasid caliphate. When the Najd Brothers emerged into the world with such ideology, they found the whole world against them, not only the Christian infidels represented by GB that controlled the region, but also by non-Wahabi Muslims in Iraq and the Levant described by Wahabis as polytheists. Wahabis the time thought that such infidels and polytheists would never allow the chance for the Najd Brothers to conquer Iraq and the Levant and other countries as was the case in the Arab conquests of the 7^th century. The Najd Brothers felt furious because of fortresses built at the borders to ward off raids! It was strange enough for Wahabis that Abdul-Aziz agreed with such infidels and polytheists and held talks with them; this contradicted what they had learned in the colonies by Wahabi scholars brought to them by Abdul-Aziz himself.

6- Another problem was the Wahabi scholars themselves; as the Islamic/political solution to the disputes between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers entailed innovative, creative thinking that would assert facts of Islam and its higher values like absolute religious freedom, political freedom, justice, peace, charity, and tolerance. Of course, they are the same higher values reached by humanity in the 20^th century and recorded in international agreements and documents; hence, human rights documents are the nearest human writing to Islamic sharia in the Quran applied by Muhammad. Thus, it was no longer reasonable or acceptable that a state would be established raising the motto of Islam apparently while actually applying extremist sharia contradicting the Quran and the modern-age culture. The basis of the problem of the Wahabi scholars of Najd was that the stale, stable, and unchangeable geography and atmosphere of Najd allowed no room for innovative, creative thinking in religious thought; Najd was an isolated by its very nature, and there was no sense of the passage of time among its inhabitants, as they felt the monotony of time without any noticeable change. Outsiders and strangers who passed by Najd, on their way to perform pilgrimage or for the sake of trade, were merely victims and preys to inhabitants of Najd who specialized in raiding, looting, and embezzlement. Wahabi scholars of Najd held the same mentality and the same ultra-conservative mindset. Historians call the Mameluke and the Ottoman eras in Egypt, Iraq, and the Levant as eras of thoughtless, blind imitation of the traditions of forefathers and ancestors in theology and religious thought, but such status turned into staleness and stagnation within deserts of Najd, and Wahabi scholars felt they must be guardians and stalwarts of such stagnation. When M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab imbibed the writings of Ibn Taymiyya, left Najd, and returned to it later on as a preacher, he never came with something novel in his call which might differ from the school of thought of Ibn Taymiyya, and he never went deeper in research like Ibn Taymiyya in his many writings in terms of theology, jurisprudence, or in any other aspect. Thus, the Najdi Ibn Abdul-Wahab differed with Ibn Taymiyya in that respect: the former did not add anything new and the latter came with many new unprecedented items or ideas (even if we, Quranists, do not agree with them) in theology and jurisprudence. Yet, both were better in the field of knowledge they specialized in, more than the scholars in their times and scholars that emerged in later eras and followed the same schools of thought.

7- The problem did not confine itself to the geographical location and the environment of the Najd region and to its Wahabi ultra-conservative scholars hostile to innovation; the most problematic element was the temporal aspect, not just the spatial aspect and location. Both the spatial and temporal aspects were frozen in the Najd region within one point in time within the Middle-Ages culture. When Abdul-Aziz tried to move Najd into the modern age, the problem aggravated and exacerbated; the Najdi Middle-Ages raids and revolts were extremist even in terms of the Middle Ages, what about the same traditions facing and challenging the modern, contemporary world? The worst problem of all was to ascribe their thought and crimes to Islam (the Quran alone), as the Quran clearly contradicts bloodshed, bigotry, fanaticism, and extremism. The problem might have confined itself to the Najdi deserts if Abdul-Aziz strove against his foes inside Najd among its tribes alone. Yet, because of the location of Najd within borders with the Persian Gulf, the Levant, and Iraq, and because of the history and traditions of the inhabitants of Najd, Abdul-Aziz had to spread his conquering culture outside the borders of Najd and had to deal with the neighboring countries, where the British influence was great, as GB was the most powerful nation in the world at the time. Hence, collision and confrontation were inevitable with the European powers, modern-age culture, as well as regional powers of Sufi and Shiite Arabs and Turks. Since Abdul-Aziz had but one clear goal, to establish a Saudi state, and the means by which to achieve this goal was the Najd Brothers, it was expected that he must get rid of the Najd Brothers, as they posed a veritable threat to his burgeoning, nascent kingdom. Besides, he could not possibly be expected to 'rectify' and 'reform' the Najd Brothers by simply inculcating into them the higher values of Islam and its Quranic facts which fit the contemporary modern age and cope with it, unlike the case with the obscurantist Wahabi teachings. First of all, Abdul-Aziz was never aware of such higher values of Islam and its Quranic facts; secondly, these Quranic facts and values contradict his political aims. It is against Islam to use is name as a means to attain worldly, transient possessions and glory. Let us remember that he spent countless hours teaching those Bedouins Wahabi teachings; it was too late to forsake and/or refute such teachings later on, even if he wished to. Lastly, the Wahabi scholars and sheikhs were far from innovative, creative thinking as far as jurisprudence and theology were concerned; as they had nothing to do with modern, contemporary age. Despite the influence and power of the Wahabi clergymen and their subservience and obsequiousness to the Al-Saud ruling family, they were the root of the problem of disputes arising between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers. The reason: they were the stalwarts, guardians, and keepers of the religious thought of Wahabism, imbibed and imbued by them within chronological and historical accumulation that fit their closed, ultra-conservative environment and lifestyle. Hence, it was impossible for Faisal Al-Daweesh to stop raiding, looting, and massacring; similarly, it was impossible for Wahabi clergymen and sheikhs to describe such crimes by any other words except ''jihad'' against the infidels and the polytheists, regardless of the fact that such non-Wahabis were peaceful or warring groups. Thus, the Najd Brothers as faithful students of such Wahabi clergymen, they learnt Wahabism as the only 'true' form of Islam, and such clergymen had a mindset that stopped at the age of Ibn Abdul-Wahab, who in his turn had a mindset that stopped at the age of Ibn Taymiyya. In his turn, Ibn Taymiyya had a mindset that stopped at the age of Ibn Hanbal, who in turn lived through a series of ordeals that was reflected in his extremist school of thought in his writings. The same goes for Ibn Taymiyya whose trials and tribulations were reflected in his extremist school of thought in his writings. Likewise, Ibn Abdul-Wahab found no other way to face his foes in creed except by using such school of thought that negates the other and calls for its annihilation. Clergymen of Abdul-Aziz imbibed such traditions and heritage and faced their age with it, and their age rejected them more than they rejected it. They found in such religious traditions what would justify their turning rejection of their Wahabi faith by others into a pretext to allow massacres, looting, and raiding of innocent peaceful people. Hence, the Najd Brothers had ready fatwas (religious edits or views) in messages written by Ibn Abdul-Wahab to use violence whenever possible, and they applied it without taking permissions from Abdul-Aziz, making him bear with its negative or positive results, which influenced his position as a king and his future as well as the rights of other neighboring countries, urging GB to interfere; thus, Abdul-Aziz had to interfere against the creed of the Najd Brothers. As per Wahabi teachings, Abdul-Aziz himself was accused of befriending infidels and polytheists, and when such accusations were leveled by the Najd Brothers against the king and posed as queries to the Wahabi scholars, the latter felt helpless and could not reform or modulate Wahabism to fit into modern age. This led them unawares to agree with the Najd Brothers in essentials of Wahabism and in accusing the king implicitly if not vociferously. Thus, such disputes between the king and the Najd Brothers turned from theological disputes into a full-fledged political opposition movement which was, in its turn, turned into armed rebellion and civil strife. It was as if history repeats itself, a bad habit that reoccurred a lot, especially in the region of Najd.

The problem of "the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice" within the Wahabi Najd religion:

Firstly: the cultural background of the disputes over "the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice" between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers:

1- The ideological and theological formation of the Najd Brothers was based on the principle of "the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice", and this prevention did not mean denying or rejection, but it rather meant introducing change by sheer force: by the sword, mass-killings, massacres, coercion, and compulsion, as per the Wahabi religion. In Islam found only and exclusively in the Quran, the principle of "the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice" means simply and merely pieces of advice said among Muslims to one another, without specifying a certain committee or group to preach to people without being preached to by people. Thus, this principle differs a lot in the Quran in comparison to Wahabism. Within Wahabism, this principle means to kill off non-Wahabis who rejected 'true' faith of Wahabis! Of course, moderate Sunnite doctrines do not endorse such barbaric savagery and violence under the pretext of change or "the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice". Apart from the Sunnite religion, Sufism and Sufis believe in the tenet of non-protest: to let everybody be, leave everybody alone to live as they wish, and never to deny anyone the right/freedom to commit sins or to embrace different ideas concerning doctrinal views or in religious stances and opinions. Such a Sufi stance dominated for three centuries before the emergence of Ibn Abdul-Wahab. Wahabism came with a bloody, jihadist vision in changing what is deemed as ''vice'' using violence, compulsion, and coercion to impose by force what is deemed by Wahabis as ''virtue''; hence, Wahabis committed massacres under the motto of jihad and changing ''vice'' by sheer force. This violent trend began within the very first Saudi kingdom destroyed in 1818. When Abdul-Aziz established the third current KSA, disputes emerged between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers in how to apply jihad in order to go on with "the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice". Such theological dispute turned into military rebellion and confrontations between two parties who shared the same creed of Wahabism. In ordinary situation, religious and political disputes could be settled peacefully; yet, within the circumstances and conditions of Najd during the reign of Abdul-Aziz, the Najd Brothers held a certain view about applying the principle of "the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice" that ran contrary to the view held by Abdul-Aziz who cared about the political aspect of his being king. Thus, the basis on which the KSA was established – "the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice" – was the basis of the opposition movement that led to military rebellion which was about to end the KSA.

2- The historical experience of the Najd dwellers in their geographical isolation, xenophobia, and belligerent nature led them to resort to arms to settle all theological and political disputes. This tendency began in the Arab civil war in the first Hijri century in Arabia. This was shown clearly in the stance of the Najd dwellers vis-à-vis the caliphs Othman and Ali, and how they revolted against the latter in the battle of Siffein. Despite the fact that Al-Khawarij died out and that the Najd tribes scattered and changed and in many cases were replaced by other tribes, the nature of Najd stamped its dwellers with the same traits, especially because of the isolated geographical location and historical isolation, plus their habit of raiding over other tribes and over caravans, thus retaining bad pre-Islamic nature despite the emergence of Islam.

3- When Wahabism emerged, it relied on arms and violence, making use of certain hadiths, falsely ascribed to Muhammad, and the views within the books of the Ibn Hanbal doctrine and of Ibn Taymiyya to support all sorts of violence theoretically and practically. Within the years of the very first KSA, collapsed in 1818, the cities within the Islamic world were dominated by Sufism, and Sufis everywhere rejected and condemned the strict, extremist Sunnite Ibn Hanbal doctrine. Thus, Wahabism was an intellectual coup that dazzled and horrified everyone, despite that it never came with something new in the theological history of Muslims. The only thing new with Wahabism was that it made Sunnite traditions – within Ibn Hanbal extremist fanatical doctrine – to replace the Sufi traditions that dominated before. The Ottoman Empire was dominated by Sufism, and it had to face the Wahabi movement in the very first KSA with the help of the governor of Egypt at the time, Muhammad Ali Pacha, who fought with the Egyptian army led by his eldest son to crush the KSA in 1818. Yet, the Wahabi call was by no means defeated or crushed; rather, it spread more all over Arabia and outside it, unifying all its adherents everywhere without doctrinal disputes. Even during military disputes and rebellions among Saudis within the second KSA which collapsed soon enough, Wahabism was not influenced at all by the downfall of the royal family and the collapse of the second KSA. On the contrary, the Wahabi/Salafist call led somehow to more qualitative intellectual awakening within the milieu of the Sufis who lived within three centuries of intellectual stagnation; many thinkers began to discuss and refute Wahabism in many books. Yet, Sufis failed miserably to defend their myths especially sanctifying and worshipping mausoleums/tombs, thus leading to more propagation of Wahabism that gained more ground with the passage of time disguised as a 'reformist' movement, a falsehood of course; any reformist movement should be based on peaceful call, mental reasoning, and discussions to appeal to people to gain their approval by persuasion, NOT by massacres, swords, invasions, conquests, and coercion in religious matters and faith. Let us bear in mind that the French Expedition in Egypt had drawn the attentions of Egyptians toward a reformist alternative that contradict he Wahabi one based on violence to change ''vice'' by force: this alternative was to learn from the West to join the modern world. This alternative was adopted by the governor of Egypt at the time, Muhammad Ali Pacha, who took a reformist view or stance regarding all ancient traditions (Al-Azhar, Mameluke knights, and the Ottoman armies) as he made military reforms and created a powerful modernized Egyptian army based on Egyptian men instead of foreign mercenaries. Within the margin of such reforms, the governor-later-made-king Muhammad Ali Pacha made other reforms within the civil educational system, built factories, and created the very first Egyptian fleet. His successor, Khedive Ismail, continued such reforms and made Cairo similar to European cities, and he ordered the formation of the very first Egyptian parliament and political parties later on. Yet, Muhammad Ali Pacha failed and despaired as far as reforming Al-Azhar was concerned; its sheikhs and clergymen adamantly refused to accept or introduce even the slightest reform. The cultural awakening or renaissance initiated by Muhammad Ali Pacha and developed by Khedive Ismail had its influence over Al-Azhar gradually. Typically, Al-Azhar heads and clergymen would wake up after it is too late and after they would fiercely resist change at first, and then endorse it later after society would approve of it. Such renaissance in Egypt was influenced by the western models, theories, and views, resulting in the establishment of a secular trend and in the emergence of the very first school of reformist thought in Al-Azhar by its head at the time: Muhammad Abdou, the imam who tried to introduce radical reforms in Al-Azhar institution and managed to defend Islam against erroneous and fanatical orientalists' and atheists' views and accusations leveled against it. The imam Muhammad Abdou tried to reform Muslims by refuting of both the Sufi myths and the extremist fanatical Ibn Hanbal doctrine, as clearly seen in his writings, especially in his unfinished interpretation of the Quran published by Al-Manar publishing house, the first of its kind to produce books on theology at the time, apart from Al-Azhar, and which was later on specializing in publishing Wahabi/Salafist books. The Egyptian tendency to imitate the West to achieve modernization increased in its pace after the British occupation of Egypt and after the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate, after the Turks were defeated, who were the major patrons of ancient traditions, Sufism, and stagnation.

4- Hence, within the circumstances and conditions that accompanies the rise of the third current KSA (1902-1932), there were three dominant intellectual trends: 1) the Wahabi thought of Ibn Abdul-Wahab taught to the Najd Brothers in the colonies, urging its adherents to kill and destroy anything and anyone rejecting or defying 'Salaf'; i.e., ancestral Sunnite Ibn Hanbal doctrine sheikhs and clergymen, 2) the secular trend that aimed to separate religion and the State and to rely on the West and its models in all aspects of life, and 3) in medial position the school of thought established by Muhammad Abdou that tried to use creative, innovative thinking to make Islam cope with new things and unprecedented items and to understand the holy text (i.e., the Quran alone) in light of sharia general aims and higher values without literal interpretations of the Quran authored centuries ago by forefathers, whose eras differed from the present, as every age needed its own innovative thinking regarding Islam. Within the backdrop, the majority of the Islamic world was dominated by Sufism and its myths, like a type of opium, with a Shiite minority in the margin that bewailed and bemoaned historical events of murdering Ali and his offspring and of certain battles, waiting for the supreme Shiite god, Ali, to come back in the form of one of his descendants as their imam.

5- Hence, circumstances and conditions of Abdul-Aziz when he established the third current KSA differed from the first and second ones; he had to deal with a different age that harbored totally new politics and intellectual trends in the 20^th century, which had nothing to do with the life, mechanisms, and logic of 18^th and 19^th centuries at all in Arabia. The biography of Abdul-Aziz shows that he was flexible in his policies, and such policies entailed moderate theology and jurisprudence, away from extremism. He needed more open Wahabi line of thought to support his policies and to control the Najd Brothers to obey him and use force for his sake alone. Hafiz Wahba was the one writing the most authentic biography of Abdul-Aziz, as he was his formal consultant, but he exerted no control or influence over the Najd Brothers of course. Yet, Wahba had great influence on the way of thinking of Abdul-Aziz. Wahba was one of the students of Muhammad Abdou, reformist head of Al-Azhar who died in 1905, but Wahba rejected reformatory thought of Abdou, as he worked for Abdul-Aziz and served Wahabism instead. Thus, Wahba knew all enlightened anti-Wahabism ideas of Abdou but consciously overlooked most of them. Reading carefully what Wahba wrote, we discern that he still remained a dim flicker of the reformist spirit of Abdou. This is shown in the lines where Wahba criticized the Najd Brothers. Pieces of advice presented by Wahba to Abdul-Aziz were mostly convincing to him; he told the king that he was right to stand against the Najd Brothers and their Wahabi zeal. Wahba told the king that his interests lied in coping with modernized life items and inventions and in peaceful dealing with the British and the Egyptians. Though the Wahabi king never rejected Wahabism, but he was ready to accept novel items, and found in Wahba, the Egyptian man, a good supportive consultant. Thus, the king faced the Najd Brothers and the Wahabi clergymen and sheikhs thinking he was more knowledgeable than they were. This was the cultural background on which disputes and conflicting visions went on between the king and the Najd Brothers over the topic of ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice''.

The political influence of the hadith of changing vice by force:

1- The so-called hadith of changing vice by one's hands, i.e., by force, was fabricated and forged by the Ibn Hanbal doctrine theologians during their struggle against the Abbasid caliphate, as Ibn Hanbal was severely persecuted by the Abbasid caliph Al-Mamoun and his successor, Al-Mutasim, and even the scholar-cum-activist Ahmed Ibn Nasr Al-Khuzaay, was killed for political reasons during the reign of the caliph Al-Wathiq. This silly hadith had launched a new Sunnite sharia law to allow room for forcing change by individuals who forbid and permit as they saw fit. Hence, any persons, as per this silly hadith, could undertake the initiative to change by force what they deem to be vice or sin. Sultans and caliphs or any rulers at the time would perceive this as bypassing their authority and interfering in their power to govern and rule their subjects. Within such conditions and circumstances, havoc wreaked in Iraq in the Second Abbasid Era, when thousands of the Ibn Hanbal doctrine adherents joined forces with hundreds of thousands of men among the masses to control streets of all Iraqi cities, especially Baghdad. Such rabble rooted out two Sunnite groups: Al-Mu'tazala thinkers as well as followers of Al-Ashaary doctrine. During such chaos caused by the rabble, Baghdad fell easily as prey to the Moghuls. Later on, one theologian among the Ibn Hanbal doctrine scholars became prominent within the 8^th century A.H.; his name was Ibn Taymiyya. He raised high such silly hadith, which contradicts the Quranic command of non-violence and not to commit acts of aggression, as motto or banner in the Mameluke Era in Egypt against Shiites and Sufis, at the time when Sufism dominated the religious life of most Muslims. Ibn Taymiyya and his followers in his school of thought were persecuted; moreover, a latecomer brilliant adherent and scholar of this school of thought, named Al-Biqaay, suffered persecution in the 9^th century A.H.

2- As for Najd and its belligerent tribes and strict atmosphere, it was easy for any persons to claim themselves as deserving authority that they must recover using brandished swords, especially using religious ideology, like the silly above-mentioned hadith, to change vices, sins, and wrongs by sheer force. This led inevitably into disputes between such persons and the rulers, especially when such persons had enough influence and power inside the State they helped in its establishment. This is the crux of the matter and the essence of the crisis; the above-mentioned hadith was certainly forged to incite rebellion or revolt against rulers/sultans using religious pretext from the Sunnite sharia. If the existing ruler was a Wahabi one, other ambitious Wahabis who want authority and rule would claim ruler as infidel or apostate and declare themselves as more religious than he was. Thus, Wahabis, inside and outside the ruling circle, create disputes, struggles, and rifts among one another for the sake of more power and authority. Disputes, struggles, and rifts are traits always carried within any political project adopted by any Wahabi movement, within stages of revolt, rebellion, opposition, or establishment of a state. We discern this clearly in the relation between the Najd Brothers and their king, Abdul-Aziz, and now in Egypt within the terrorist MB group and how it has been divided as some of its members rejected it to form themselves into other smaller secret and overt groups that all of them embrace Wahabism and the same mottoes, references, and goals, but they declare others as infidels and themselves as more loyal to Wahabism as a religion, even before they would reach power and authority. If such Wahabi terrorists would ever reach the throne to rule in any country, they will certainly compete with one another for more power, turning the struggle into political disputes and later military confrontation. Each group would claim itself as more Wahabi than the others and would eradicate the other groups as 'vice' or 'wrong' that must be eliminated by force as per the Sunnite sharia!

3- Focusing on the Najd Brothers, they learned in the Wahabi colonies that the principle of ''the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice'' had but one traditional meaning fit for the age of Ibn Abdul-Wahab and his extremist fanatical doctrine and for the belligerent nature of the Najd tribes. Once Abdul-Aziz settled in his throne of the KSA, he felt the urgent need to reconsider such principle when applied within real life and everyday politics; new Sunnite innovative sharia or legislation was needed to get rid of Wahabi bigotry and the Ibn Hanbal doctrine fanaticism and to apply more moderate Sunnite doctrines that forged other hadiths that require blind obedience to the ruler/monarch. Thus, Abdul-Aziz aimed to alleviate the Wahabi bigotry and zeal to allow absolute political authority for his sake as a Wahabi king. Yet, such innovative thinking in sharia matters did not manage to exist; thus, disputes lingered over what was the exact definition of ''the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice'' between Abdul-Aziz and his Najd Brothers in political and theologian issues. Such disputes led later on to armed rebellion, as weapons and swords impose what was deemed 'right' regardless of reasonable thinking in all issues, as military might grants political legitimacy as per Wahabi teachings. Thus, as in the case of any past theocracy in the history of the Middle East, disputes would never cease, fueled by the above-mentioned silly hadith of changing vice and wrong by sheer force.

4- The abyss grew deeper between both parties as priorities of each of them were different; Abdul-Aziz had a political vision to settle his kingdom, whereas the Najd Brothers had one theological vision of applying literally, or to the letter, ''the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice'', as a motto to destroy and eliminate everything and everyone they deemed as non-Wahabi, including all things they did not know of and would never approve of. They began by declaring the British as infidels with whom Abdul-Aziz made pacts and agreements. Even when John Philby, the British consultant to the king, converted to Wahabism, the Najd Brothers hated him so much because he was different in race and color from them. This reflected the notion that people of Najd never trusted outsiders and strangers, especially those coming from the West. Their animosity toward the West included all modern inventions coming from it like motorcycles, cars, wireless, and phones. Their desire to eliminate all non-Wahabis led them to harbor the ardent desire to kill off all Shiite people in Al-Ahsa region, as this fit into their vision of applying the principle of ''the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice'' by killing off Shiites or coercing them to convert to Wahabism. Such hatred extended to even Wahabis outside the Najd Brothers, who must be forced to immigrate into the colonies and wear their headdress instead of their traditional headwear. Hence, this was a series of exclusion and negation of others: the West people and even some Wahabis who did not obey the orders of the Najd Brothers in their view of the principle of ''the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice''. As for the king, he adopted a real-life vision to use the principle of ''the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice'' in light of his political interests and in service of his kingdom. Abdul-Aziz would never have allowed any authority to rise above his own; he was a king that has his own consultants, with known-to-all information and top-secret information as well that was not to be divulged except to him alone. He was a king that must take into consideration the framework of internal, external, regional, and international political facts to act wisely. Thus, such royal vision would never go hand in hand with the vision of the Najd Brothers in applying the principle of ''the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice'', in dealing with Shiites in Al-Ahsa and subjugating Wahabis living in cities and in dealing with the British as infidels and all Muslims in Egypt, Hejaz, Iraq, and the Levant as polytheists. The priority of the Najd Brothers was to invade and conquer more lands and to apply Wahabi teachings to the letter, whereas the priority of the king was to preserve his burgeoning, nascent kingdom as a success and how to ward off intrigues of the enemies of the kingdom. Thus, conflicting visions led inevitably to disputes and military confrontation.

5- The principle of ''the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice'' means for them that the different other must be militarily faced inside and outside the kingdom within Wahabi jihad. Of course, Abdul-Aziz made use of such zeal of the Najd Brothers to annex lands to his kingdom by their swords to 'retrieve' what he thought to be lands of his ancestors of the Al-Saud family. Such was the priority of the king, whereas that of the Wahabi Brothers was the absolute necessity for incessant jihad to conquer more lands to convert the whole world into Wahabi rule and creed. Of course, the Saudi family members in the first and second KSA tried to annex Iraq and the Levant, in an era when borders were not defined. The ideological formation of the Najd Brothers was Wahabism: the teachings of M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab written within historical stage of the rise of the very first KSA. The Najd Brothers of the 20^th century never understood the difference of new development in the modern era in comparison to the 'glorious' past, as international powers imposed a certain balance after World War I. GB and France controlled the Levant, Iraq, Egypt, and the Gulf coast, especially GB that had the upper word in the whole region of the Middle East, defining borders and establishing states, or destroy them as in the case of the Ottoman caliphate. GB used to interfere in all major and minor matters where the British interests lied. This was understood very well by Abdul-Aziz as per his reading of the facts of the political status quo around him; he had to deal with the British (deemed infidels by Wahabis) for the sake of preserving his own interests. He had to stop the Wahabi jihad at certain borders defined by GB within negotiations with him as a Saudi king. The Najd Brothers deemed such negotiations as vice and violation of Wahabism that must be eliminated, among their priorities.

6- Such disputes and differences in visions between both parties did not impede the existence of some mutual agreements or concessions, within certain conditions; for instance, Abdul-Aziz momentarily agreed to their request to stop including wireless in the kingdom, to stop the Egyptian Kiswah caravan from ever coming to Hejaz, and to establish the committee of ''the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice'' after the conquest of Hejaz, to the consternation of its people. As a historian, we can safely say that the king tried hard to avoid confrontations and collisions with the Najd Brothers and their opposition movement as much as he could, as he realized that the ideological formation of them was done under his orders and led them to adopt extremist stances. The fact that most scholars agreed with the Wahabi Brothers led Abdul-Aziz to realize his urgent need for different type of scholars who would obey him blindly especially in formulating fatwas to serve his political ends. We give below some analytical details about the opposition movement of the Najd Brothers against the king, based on the ideological formation of the Wahabi Brothers.

The school of thought of M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab is the source of the ideological information of the Najd Brothers:

Introductory overview:

1- We have written in previous sections how Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud established the Najd Brothers in colonies, under strict system and lifestyle, and how he made them to imbibe Wahabi teachings, etc. and how this description provokes the interests of any historian. But for researchers in matters of creed, like us, they care chiefly for the ideological formation that governed the acts of the Wahabi Brothers in their dealing with one another and with their king, as well as the other or non-Wahabis in general (the British infidels + Muslim polytheists). Abdul-Aziz created the Najd Brothers within a certain strict system in colonies with certain new hierarchies that made all Brothers imbued the Wahabi teachings as 'holy' ones.

2- Within the margin of establishing the third current KSA, Abdul-Aziz was the most influential figure in spreading and propagating Wahabism worldwide, while confiscating the name of Islam as if Wahabism were the 'true' form of Islam. Abdul-Aziz was the one responsible for aborting the reformist school of thought adopted by the enlightened imam and head of the Cairo-based Al-Azhar institution, Muhammad Abdou, because such school opposed Wahabism and if it had thrived and flourished, it would have certainly exposed Wahabism as a creed contradictory with the Quran. Muhammad Abdou emerged as a major religious reformist in Egypt, a country with its great political and civilizational weight as a pioneer in the Arab world and the Islamic one, in the last decades of the 19^th century, but he died in 1905; five years before the establishment of the Najd Brothers. After his death, his disciple, the Syrian Rasheed Reda, allied himself to Abdul-Aziz, to achieve the dream of the king to convert Egyptians from moderate Sunnite Sufism to Wahabism, in the name of Salafism, in order to avoid any sort of danger coming from Egypt if its people stood with his enemies one day against him. Rasheed Reda was the Wahabi mastermind behind the establishment of the Salafist societies and organizations all over the Egyptian soil, and he was the one to form the terrorist MB group that Abdul-Aziz relied on to replace the Wahabi Najd Brothers. Abdul-Aziz realized after the conquest of Hejaz that the Najd Brothers began to pose a threat to him. Once he controlled the pilgrimage season, he felt the immediate, urgent need to spread Wahabism all over Egypt and to establish the terrorist MB to make use of them in propagating Wahabism in Egypt and later on in the Islamic countries, without their being a threat to the KSA. Hence, Wahabism spread in Egypt disguised in the name of Sunnite Salafism (as the term 'Wahabism' was so much hated in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world), by bodies like the Cairo-based headquarters of the Sunnite Sharia Society, with its branches all over Egyptian governorates, and the Muslim Youths Society, with its branches all over Egyptian governorates, as well as the Sunna Supporters Society, with its branches all over Egyptian governorates. When the right moment came, Rasheed Reda established the terrorist MB group and made its leader one of the ambitious youths within Salafism/Wahabism: Hassan Al-Banna. The terrorist MB is a political Wahabi movement seeking to reach full control, power, and authority in all countries in the name of Islam, manipulating its name to refute endeavors and ambitions of all secular parties in Egypt, despite their different ideologies. The terrorist MB, and its overt and secret groups branching from it, managed to deceive the whole world that their Wahabi political movement is re-christened as an Islamist movement, until now. The terms ''Islamism'' and ''political Islam'' are tricks to fool the gullible masses and are a grave insult to Islam (the Quran). Nobody in Egypt now (in 2000 A.D.) seems to remember the Wahabi origin of the terrorist MB group, despite their Wahabi ideology and terminology in all the secret and overt bodies linked to them. The same ideology and terminology of the terrorist MB are exact replicas of what the Najd Brothers learned in the colonies by the Wahabi scholars under the supervision of Abdul-Aziz, including the racist animosity toward the other: be it non-Wahabi Muslims or foreign infidels of others denominations and creeds or atheists. Oil revenues of the KSA helped to finance branches of the terrorist MB group all over the world in order to spread Wahabism in the West and the East, using the same Ibn Abdul-Wahab teachings that misuse the name of Islam and no one could dare to declare that they obviously contradict the Quran.

3- We, Dr. Ahmed Subhy Mansour, consider ourselves to be perhaps the only scholar refuting Sunnite Wahabism, and all Sunnite denominations, and proving that they contradict Islam (the Quran alone), beginning with five books we have authored to teach to Azharite students in 1985. We end up leaving Al-Azhar University after two years of Inquisition-like trials and persecution inside it. In the same year, 1987, we have been incarcerated along with many of our fellow Quranists among the very first generation of them. This incarceration was because of Saudi/Wahabi influence and commands within Egypt and the Egyptian authorities. The second wave of incarceration of Quranists began in 2000 A.D., as tens of them got arrested for no reason, and we expect to get arrested anytime now. Our 'crime' has been the ability to revive the school of thought of Muhammad Abdou, named later on Quranism, which was aborted before by the endeavors of Abdul-Aziz in Egypt and elsewhere. We are still on the same mission of spreading true Islam (i.e., Quranism) to correct, reform, and rectify Muslims from within Islam itself (the Quran per se), using the Quran as a measure stick. This poses a veritable danger to the very existence of the KSA and Wahabism.

4- Let us re-focus on Wahabism and the role of the Wahabi king Abdul-Aziz in teaching the Najd Brothers the Wahabi terrorist teachings. What are the fundamentals of the Wahabi thought imbibed by the Najd Brothers and held great influence over their movement initially with, and later on against, Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud? Such fundamentals are briefed as follows: hatred of the other, declaring others as infidels/polytheists, and massacring and looting such non-Wahabis. In the following section, we will research such fundamentals and compare them to Islam (i.e., the Quran alone) to show the contradiction between Wahabism and Islam.

Firstly: hatred of the other between Islam and Wahabism:

Within Islam: in dealing with others as outsiders:

1- The Quran tells us about the hatred of polytheists toward peaceful believers: "How? Whenever they overcome you, they respect neither kinship nor treaty with you. They satisfy you with lip service, but their hearts refuse, and most of them are immoral…Towards a believer they respect neither kinship nor treaty. These are the transgressors." (9:8-10).

2- In contrast, peaceful believers are not ordered to face hatred with more hatred; rather, they are commanded in the Quran not to befriend the aggressors: "You will not find a people who believe in God and the Last Day, loving those who oppose God and His Messenger, even if they were their parents, or their children, or their siblings, or their close relatives…" (58:22). This Quranic command is repeated as believers are not to befriend aggressors who fought peaceful ones because of their choice of creed and drove them out of their homes and those supporting such aggression: "But God prohibits you from befriending those who fought against you over your religion, and expelled you from your homes, and aided in your expulsion. Whoever takes them for friends-these are the wrongdoers." (60:9).

3- As for polytheists and disbelievers who never committed aggression against peaceful believers and never drove them out of their homes, they were to be treated justly, kindly, fairly, and charitably: "As for those who have not fought against you for your religion, nor expelled you from your homes, God does not prohibit you from dealing with them kindly and equitably. God loves the equitable." (60:8)

4- Believers in the Quran are commanded to deal fairly with foes and enemies: "O you who believe! Be upright to God, witnessing with justice; and let not the hatred of a certain people prevent you from acting justly. Adhere to justice, for that is nearer to piety; and fear God. God is informed of what you do." (5:8).

5- Believers in the Quran are commanded to compete in goodness and righties acts with peaceful "people of the book" (i.e., the Quranic terms for Jews and Christians) and to wait for God's judgment on the followers of the three Abrahamic faiths in the Last Day: "...For each of you We have assigned a law and a method. Had God willed, He could have made you a single nation, but He tests you through what He has given you. So compete in righteousness. To God is your return, all of you; then He will inform you of what you had disputed." (5:48). As for aggressors among ''People of the Book'', believers in the Quran are ordered not to support or befriend them in such aggression against peaceful believers so as not to be unjust ones like the aggressors: "O you who believe! Do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies; some of them are allies of one another. Whoever of you allies himself with them is one of them. God does not guide the wrongdoing people." (5:51).

Within Islam: in dealing with others as citizens inside an Islamic country:

1- When dealing with citizens within an Islamic country, all peaceful, law-abiding citizens are equal and they are not to be divided on terms of beliefs and faiths but as per their social and economic rank and position: "Worship God, and ascribe no partners to Him, and be good to the parents, and the relatives, and the orphans, and the poor, and the neighbor next door, and the distant neighbor, and the close associate, and the traveler, and your servants. God does not love the arrogant showoff." (4:36). Being good to such categories here does NOT include a condition that those deserving goodness, charity, or aid be believers in terms of faith. There is no denominational or sectarian classification in Islam; rather, social and economic classification for the sake of charity and the general good of the society, as the poor, the impecunious, the impoverished, the traveller, the orphaned…etc. need financial help from affluent citizens. The same principle applies to the notion of distribution of alms and zakat: "Charities are for the poor, and the destitute, and those who administer them, and for reconciling hearts, and for freeing slaves, and for those in debt, and in the path of God, and for the traveler in need-an obligation from God. God is All-Knowing, Most Wise." (9:60) as well as distribution of spoils: "And know that whatever spoils you gain, to God belongs its fifth, and to the Messenger, and the relatives, and the orphans, and the poor, and to the wayfarer, provided you believe in God and in what We revealed to Our servant…" (8:41) "Whatever God restored to His Messenger from the inhabitants of the villages belongs to God, and to the Messenger, and to the relatives, and to the orphans, and to the poor, and to the wayfarer; so that it may not circulate solely between the wealthy among you…" (59:7). Traits of the righteous ones include spending money for charity: "…who gives money, though dear, to near relatives, and orphans, and the needy, and the homeless, and the beggars, and for the freeing of slaves…" (2:177).

2- Another indicator of equality among citizens regardless of one's faith is greetings: "When you are greeted with a greeting, respond with a better greeting, or return it. God keeps count of everything. " (4:86). It does not matter if such greetings are in any tongue, language, or dialect, verbal or non-verbal, we have to reply to it as it is or in a better manner, even if a Jew says to us ''Shalom'', as God will reward us when we obey this command, as the case in all Quranic commands.

3- Believers in the Quran are commanded to pardon and tolerate those who follow other creeds apart from Islam and to wait for God's judgment on all humanity in the Day of Resurrection: "...The Hour is coming, so forgive with gracious forgiveness." (15:85), "As for the statement: "My Lord, these are a people who do not believe."Pardon them, and say, "Peace." They will come to know." (43:88-89), "Tell those who believe to forgive those who do not hope for the Days of God. He will fully recompense people for whatever they have earned. Whoever does a good deed, it is for his soul; and whoever commits evil, it is against it; then to your Lord you will be returned." (45:14-15). Believers in the Quran are commanded to reply with peace to those who verbally attack them: "The servants of the Merciful are those who walk the earth in humility, and when the ignorant address them, they say, "Peace."" (25:63), "And when they hear vain talk, they avoid it, and say, "We have our deeds, and you have your deeds; peace be upon you; we do not desire the ignorant."" (28:55).

4- This was the real life of Prophet Muhammad who followed nothing but the Quran, and God describes him in the Quran as mercy to the humankind, as people followed him because they loved him: "It is by of grace from God that you were gentle with them. Had you been harsh, hardhearted, they would have dispersed from around you…" (3:159), "…He believes in God, and trusts the believers, and is mercy for those of you who believe…" (9:61), "There has come to you a messenger from among yourselves, concerned over your suffering, anxious over you. Towards the believers, he is compassionate and merciful." (9:128), "We did not send you except as mercy to the humankind." (21:107).

Within Wahabism: hatred of others:

1- In contrast to real Islam, Ibn Abdul-Wahab made hatred of others as a basic tenet in the Wahabi creed; as he confiscated the name of Islam to himself and made it confined to his views that came to be later on known as Wahabism. Ibn Abdul-Wahab commanded that those denying or refusing his notions are to be declared infidels and apostates that must be fought, massacred, and robbed and their women enslaved. Ibn Abdul-Wahab urged hatred of all non-Wahabis within all religious denominations on earth and even among non-Wahabi Muslims, called by him as polytheists, who followed other doctrines inside and outside Arabia. This includes Sufis and Shiites in particular. Of course, this harkened back to the struggle of the Sunnite Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya against Sufism. Upon such bases came the false, erroneous understanding of Ibn Abdul-Wahab of the Quranic verses that mention polytheists. Thus, for Ibn Abdul-Wahab, polytheists included all peaceful and non-peaceful Shiites, Sufis, and non-Wahabi Sunnites. Wahabis were taught to hate all non-Wahabis as part and parcel of the Wahabi creed notions. Ibn Abdul-Wahab writes: (…a man is not deemed Muslims if he just acknowledged God's monotheism and forsook polytheism, as he must hate from the bottom of his heart all polytheists and declare such hatred in public…) (1). Hence, those Wahabis who did not hate the other non-Wahabis were not deemed as believers!

2- Ibn Abdul-Wahab links closely in his writings between such hatred of non-Wahabis and declaring them as infidels, polytheists, and apostates. (…For God's sake, O brethren! Adhere lovingly to the roots and fundamentals of your faith: there is no God but Allah, and then love your brethren in faith, and hate with all your might all infidels and polytheists and hate those love or defended them or refuse to declare them as infidels and polytheists, as such liars lie to God, and we must disown them to obey God's commands, even if such persons are our brothers or progeny! May God receive our souls as monotheistic Muslims…) (2). Ibn Abdul-Wahab asserts in his writings linking hatred with declaring others as apostates, infidels, and polytheists: (…If anyone would ask you, O brethren, what is your faith? You should say it is Islam, which has two fundamentals: the belief in Allah with no other gods or associates and urging others to adopt the same belief, and warning against polytheism and hatred of those who reject or attack our faith and to declare them as infidels and polytheists…) (3). (…Those believing in One God should never treat those rejecting faith kindly, even if they are their own fathers…) (4). Ibn Abdul-Wahab writes about denying Taghut that (…one is to declare the worship of other gods apart from Allah as nullity and should hate infidels and apostates and polytheists from the bottom of his heart…). Ibn Abdul-Wahab writes the following about the meaning of belief: (…all acts of worship must be dedicated to Allah alone, without other idols and false gods, while loving the faithful ones with all your heart as your brethren and friends, and hating polytheists with full animosity…) (5). Of course, these Wahabi commands contradict the Quranic teachings that warn against befriending only those aggressors who are committing violence against peaceful innocent ones. The Quran contains no command related to fighting those peaceful ones who hold differ faith. Fighting in Islam is only for the sake of self-defense and especially to stop being persecuted by warring enemies. Ibn Abdul-Wahab called for hatred of all non-Wahabis on earth, even if they were peaceful, innocent, non-violent ones. Of course, Wahabis later on applied such teachings so faithfully and minutely; they never greeted any non-Wahabi at all, and we have written in a previous chapter how leaders of the Najd Brothers' rebellion refused to greet Abdul-Aziz in their negotiations when they militarily fought against him.

Secondly: declaring others as infidels and accordingly permitting their massacring and looting and invading their countries: between Islam and Wahabism:

1- Among the frequently repeated words in the Quranic text are ''Kufr'' (literally: disbelief) and ''Shirk'' (literally: polytheism), within contexts of injustice, inequity immorality, and aggression. This means that the Quran declares some acts, behaviors, notions, and descriptions as part of disbelief; but such declaration does NOT mean any punishment in this life applied by a human being on others/disbelievers; rather, such Quranic declarations mean giving people a chance to reform themselves by knowing and avoiding acts, behaviors, notions, and descriptions which are part of the disbelief in the Quran. Besides, the Quran describes all acts, notions, tenets, and traits of belief and believers (e.g., piety, charity, justice, peace, good deeds…etc.) for everyone to follow. Hence, the Quran paves the way and shows the righteous path and warns against misguidance and the wrong path, leaving for human beings the freedom of choice between the two paths and postponing judgment until the Last Day: the Day of Resurrection. Accordingly, within Quranic stories of prophets and their peoples and about the time when the Quran was revealed, we find descriptions of ''Kufr'' and ''Shirk'' in terms of acts, tenets, notions, and demeanors in order to rectify and correct ourselves and to guide oneself to the righteous path, along with the Quranic command to avoid the religious route, or lack of it, of disbelievers and polytheists, waiting for judgment of all humanity in the Day of Judgment.

2- Hence, the Quran as the last divine message to humanity until the Last Day had to contain descriptions of ''Kufr'' and ''Shirk'' to indicate and demark them clearly for us to avoid and for another reason: to make us discern how such descriptions will be repeated after the Quranic revelation, in later eras, as it were repeated during the revelation in Arabia, and were repeated by other disbelievers and polytheists in the eras before the Quranic revelation. This is part of the miraculous predictions of the Quran; descriptions of ''Kufr'' and ''Shirk'' have been indeed repeated within Wahabis and Wahabi teachings concocted and formulated by Ibn Abdul-Wahab. Such hatred, inculcated by Ibn Abdul-Wahab as part and parcel of Wahabism, was shown within feelings and sensibilities of the aggressive polytheists who hated Prophet Muhammad during his lifetime, and God describes such people in the Quran as aggressors: "How? Whenever they overcome you, they respect neither kinship nor treaty with you. They satisfy you with lip service, but their hearts refuse, and most of them are immoral…Towards a believer they respect neither kinship nor treaty. These are the transgressors." (9:8-10). The same description applies to hypocrites and their feelings of animosity and fear that drove them to retain such hatred in their hearts for ear of fighting early Muslims, but God exposes them in the Quran to warn true believers against them: "O you who believe! Do not befriend outsiders who never cease to wish you harm. They love to see you suffer. Hatred has already appeared from their mouths, but what their hearts conceal is worse. We have made the messages clear for you, if you understand. There you are, you love them, but they do not love you, and you believe in the entire scripture. And when they meet you, they say, "We believe;" but when they are alone, they bite their fingers in rage at you. Say, "Die in your rage; God knows what is within the hearts." If something good happens to you, it upsets them; but if something bad befalls you, they rejoice at it. But if you persevere and maintain righteousness, their schemes will not harm you at all. God comprehends what they do." (3:118-120).

3- In contrast to the above-mentioned Quranic facts, declaring persons as infidels within Wahabism is never a step for reform; rather, a leap for committing grave injustices, violence, massacres, and aggressions. Thus, Wahabis in Arabia at the time have repeated to the letter all bad acts and crimes of the disbelievers of Qorayish during the lifetime of Muhammad; at the time, they accused Muhammad and believers with him as apostates who rejected the 'true' faith of the forefathers. The same accusations were leveled at the same persons by desert-Arabs (i.e., Bedouins) at the time, whom the Quran describes as those adamant in hypocrisy and disbelief. After the death of Muhammad, a movement of rejecters of Islam was led by a false prophet named Museilama the Liar in Najd, where centuries later Ibn Abdul-Wahab was born and brought up. The Najd region, throughout history of Arabia, remained the source of all movements of rebellion, looting, destruction, and massacres that used religious mottoes and declared others as infidels or disbelievers: such as Al-Zanj movement and the Qarmatians. Their massacres were perpetrated within Middle-Ages Muslims communities in Arabia, the Levant, and Iraq. When Ibn Abdul-Wahab emerged in Najd, he allied himself to the family of Al-Saud using the same motto: ''Blood for blood and destruction for all enemies!'', and declaring non-Wahabis as infidels or polytheists was the pretext to justify crimes such as committing aggressions, fighting innocent ones, massacring them, invading their lands, and confiscating their possessions. Within such faulty notions, the very first KSA was established and collapsed in 1818 by the Egyptian army whose aid was enlisted by the Ottomans. Using the same Wahabi teachings of Ibn Abdul-Wahab, Abdul-Aziz prepared, trained, and educated desert-Arabs and Bedouins to become the Najd Brothers who declare all non-Wahabis as infidels to fight, massacre, and rob them and invade their lands to confiscate all wealth and possessions. Thus, there is a vast difference between the Quranic style of showing certain notions and acts as signs of lack of faith for us avoid and correct ourselves, and declaring others as infidels to commit crimes of aggressions and violence against them.

Wahabism and declaring others as infidels:

Ibn Abdul-Wahab declared in his writings that all Shiites are infidels and must be fought: (…all Shiites testify that there is no God but Allah and that Muhammad is His Messenger and perform congregational prayers daily, and on Fridays, but because they violate sharia in things we deem vital, all scholars agreed unanimously to declare them as infidels and polytheists who must be fought, and their lands are a camp of war that must be conquered to convert them to Islam…) (6). Ibn Abdul-Wahab used to declare others as infidels for merely just uttering one word, which was the stance of Ibn Taymiyya: (…a man might turn into an infidel when he would utter a word, ignorant of its impact, and thinking it would draw him nearer to God, as some polytheists think now…) (7). Within the same writings, Ibn Abdul-Wahab quoted views of ancient scholars of Sunnite jurisprudence on the subject of apostates, who must got killed and their possessions and lands be confiscated by Muslims, and turning into an apostate might be done simply when a person unawares utters a word even jestingly or as a joke. Thus, Ibn Abdul-Wahab declared all people around him in Najd as infidels and apostates whose ''Kufr'' and ''Shirk'' were worse than those who lived during Prophet Muhammad's lifetime: (…polytheism of ancient infidels and disbelievers was lighter in comparison to that of people in our times, because of two things: firstly, the ancients never invoked and worshipped angels and saints and idols alongside with God except in prosperous times and in times of calamities, they invoke and worship God alone, unlike polytheists of our times; secondly, the ancients invoked persons, creatures, or things near to God, whereas polytheists of our times invoke beside God the most immoral infidels…) (8). Ibn Abdul-Wahab protested against the views of scholars of his time about calling Bedouins as Muslims who should not be fought or killed off, as Ibn Abdul-Wahab saw that Bedouins forsook Islam and denied resurrection and mocked believers in resurrection. Ibn Abdul-Wahab compares in his writings between scholars of his age and those renegades and apostates during the era of the very first caliph, Abou Bakr, and declaring Bedouins of his age as more dissolving group in comparison to renegades during the time of the caliph Abou Bakr: (… the devilish ignoramuses of scholars claim that Bedouins had converted to Islam merely because they testify that there is no God but Allah… their erroneous edict propose that such Bedouins are Muslims just because they testify that there is no God but Allah! This is a scandalous falsehood!)(9). Ibn Abdul-Wahab concluded his argument that once a Bedouin came to him to hear about Islam, but eventually adamantly refused to convert and declared himself as a disbeliever.

Wahabism and permitting the massacring, looting, and enslaving of women of others:

1- We have asserted above how declaring others as infidels, disbelievers, or apostates within Wahabi teachings was enough to commit massacres, destruction, and looting, as Ibn Abdul-Wahab links in his writings between infidels and disbelievers on the one hand and those who fought Prophet Muhammad and he had to fight them back on the other hand, thus permitting massacres against apostates and infidels as per the Sunnite creed and to propose that battles fought by Prophet Muhammad were for the purpose of coercing others to convert by force; of course, such falsehoods contradict the story of Muhammad in the Quran and the Quranic facts we will detail later on in this chapter.

2- We give here examples of lines written by Ibn Abdul-Wahab on the topic of linking between infidels and the religious permission of massacring them. The following are among rules set by Ibn Abdul-Wahab to differentiate believers from polytheists: (…Polytheists fought by Prophet Muhammad used to know Almighty God very well, and this was not the reason they converted to Islam…Prophet Muhammad emerged within people who worship God in so many different ways, and he fought them without setting them apart…) (10). Ibn Abdul-Wahab distorted the meaning of part of the following verse: "Fight them until there is no more persecution, and religion becomes exclusively for God…" (8:39), by deliberately misinterpreting it in order to justify prevention of revolts and wars in the political sense as per Muslim history; he deliberately ignored the meaning of the Arabic term ''fitna'' in the context of this Quranic verse, it means religious persecution. This is repeated about polytheists in Mecca in the 7^th century A.D. who persecuted early Muslims to coerce them to return to their earlier polytheistic creed: "…And persecution is more serious than killing. They will not cease to fight you until they turn you back from your religion, if they can …" (2:217). This is repeated about the powerful disbelievers who ordered a trench to be dug to burn believers alive in it if they did not get back to their former polytheistic creed: "Those who persecute the believers, men and women, then do not repent; for them is the punishment of Hell…" (85:10). This is repeated within the context of temptation of sin; when some hypocrites asked Muhammad for permission not to participate in fighting: "Among them is he who says, "Excuse me, and do not trouble me." In fact, they sunk into trouble…" (9:49), as they accused Muhammad of forcing them to join forces of self-defense in Yathreb. ''Trouble'' in the last verse here in Arabic is the term ''fitna'', which means in that context, in the relation between God and human beings, a test for their fortitude and faith. Thus, the hypocrites in that situation failed the test of faith. Even the term ''fitna'' is used in the context of God testing human beings: "…We burden you with adversity and prosperity as a test. And to Us you will be returned." (21:35). Accordingly, Ibn Abdul-Wahab intentional distorts meanings of Quranic verses. Let us quote him here writing about one issue or the other: (…it is clear in God's Quran that polytheists fought by Prophet Muhammad worshipped almighty God along with other gods in their times of prosperity …Yet, such polytheists were less guilty than infidels of our times…) (11). Ibn Abdul-Wahab writes the following falsehood about monotheism and Prophet Muhammad: (…polytheists were fought by Prophet Muhammad, and he killed them, confiscated their property and possessions as spoils, and enslaved their women, though they were worshipping God the Almighty, but they ascribed to Him associates of the saints in their tombs…) (12). We discern here that Ibn Abdul-Wahab slyly writes the expression "fought by Prophet Muhammad…" repeatedly to concoct a notion foreign to Muhammad as he is described in the Quran; the Quran tells us that he was a mercy to the humankind, not sent by God to declare war and terror to the world and all human beings as Ibn Abdul-Wahab tried to convince his contemporaries. Ibn Abdul-Wahab asserts his false views by citing as evidence the renegades' wars during the caliphate of Abou Bakr, as its battles were mostly in Najd. Ibn Abdul-Wahab likens in his writings these renegades to Bedouins in Najd at the time when he wrote his venomous writings, asserting that such Bedouins were more infidels than polytheists of Mecca in the 7^th century (13) who deserved to die! Ibn Abdul-Wahab declared as infidel who deserved to die anyone who rejects the so-called hadiths ascribed to the Prophet, and those denying the Quranic verses partially or wholly, as well those rejecting prayers and denied or verbally abused the Prophet…etc. even if he prayed and uttered the testimony of Islam (14). Thus, Ibn Abdul-Wahab in all his writings repeats the expressions ''deserved to die'' and ''money looted as spoils'', and such expressions reflect the creed of assassins and highwaymen, NOT the true Islam as the religion of Almighty God the Compassionate. Hence, the application of such fatwas entails massacring and looting and raping indiscriminately every non-Wahabi, with Wahabis as exceptions, except when they differ and fight one another within civil strife. Of course, such fatwas appealed to belligerent, loot-seeking Najd people within the very first and second Saudi states, by turning raids into 'Islamic' jihad after declaring all people in neighboring countries as infidels to be massacred, their lands conquered, their women enslaved, and their possessions and money looted. In the early 20^th century, such notions were revived by Abdul-Aziz who gave momentum to Wahabism and established the colonies of the Najd Brothers to teach them Wahabism and to train them militarily, amidst long hours of continuous worship. Yet, Wahabi scholars who taught them were illiterate sheikhs unknown outside Najd, but they established the ideological formation of the Najd Brothers. Such scholars turned fatwas of Ibn Abdul-Wahab into real-life hell and bloodbaths within the 2^nd and 3^rd decades of the 20^th century. Such atrocities contradict Islam, a religion based on peace, freedom, justice, charity, and warning against injustice, unfairness, inequity, compulsion, and coercion.

Lastly: an overview about the Islamic/Quranic legislations on self-defense fighting:

Several verses of the Quran record and comment on the aggressions committed by the polytheistic Qorayish tribesmen in the 7^th century during Muhammad's lifetime against early Muslims, as early believers were driven out of their homes and possessions by force because they converted to the new religion and left the one of their forefathers. The very first Quranic permission for early Muslims to engage into self-defense fighting had a reason: peaceful weak ones were expelled from their homes and cities and then were fought in Yathreb and could not defend themselves because no divine permission reached them yet, and it did eventually come at last: "Permission is given to those who are fought against, and God is Able to give them victory. Those who were unjustly evicted from their homes, merely for saying, "Our Lord is God", were it not that God repels people by means of others: monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques-where the name of God is mentioned much-would have been demolished. God supports whoever supports Him. God is Strong and Mighty." (22:39-40). And because they were a peaceful group of people who used to bear patiently with harm and did not defend themselves before, some of them refused self-defensive fighting and stuck to the earlier divine command of non-violence: "Have you not considered those who were told, "Restrain your hands, and perform your prayers, and spend in regular charity"? But when fighting was ordained for them, a faction of them feared the people as God is ought to be feared, or even more. And they said, "Our Lord, why did You ordain fighting for us? If only You would postpone it for us for a short while." Say, "The enjoyments of this life are brief, but the Hereafter is better for the righteous, and you will not be wronged one bit."" (4:77). This means that they hated to engage in self-defense fighting that would prevent their annihilation by an archenemy fighting them and making use of their being weak and defenseless. That is why God tells them the following in the Quran about self-defense fighting: "Fighting is ordained for you, even though you dislike it. But it may be that you dislike something while it is good for you, and it may be that you like something while it is bad for you. God knows, and you do not know." (2:216). Aggressive polytheists went on with their aggression against early Muslims in Yathreb even during the four sacred months of pilgrimage and non-violence, and some believers felt awkward for having to fight within such months and asked Muhammad about that, and he and they waited for the reply that came eventually in the following verse: "They ask you about fighting during the Holy Month. Say, "Fighting during it is deplorable; but to bar others from God's path, and to disbelieve in Him, and to prevent access to the Holy Mosque, and to expel its people from it, are more deplorable with God. And persecution is more serious than killing. They will not cease to fight you until they turn you back from your religion, if they can. Whoever among you turns back from his religion, and dies a disbeliever-those are they whose works will come to nothing, in this life, and in the Hereafter. Those are the inmates of the Fire, abiding in it forever." (2:217). Within the same Quranic Chapter, God says clearly that fighting is for the purpose of self-defense only, as He does not like aggressors: "And fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not commit aggression; God does not love the aggressors." (2:190). Thus, if polytheists stopped their aggression, Muslims can no longer fight them: "And kill them wherever you overtake them, and expel them from where they had expelled you. Oppression is more serious than murder. But do not fight them at the Sacred Mosque, unless they fight you there. If they fight you, then kill them. Such is the retribution of the disbelievers. But if they cease, then God is Forgiving and Merciful." (2:191-192). Hence, the higher aim of self-defensive fighting is to prevent religious persecution and compulsion in religious matters or affairs, so that religious freedom is established and everyone would choose his/her creed freely to be held responsible for that choice before Almighty God in the Day of Judgment: "And fight them until there is no persecution, and religion becomes exclusively for God alone. But if they cease, then let there be no fighting except against those persecutors." (2:193). Thus, if persecution ends, no fighting is allowed: "Fight them until there is no more persecution, and religion becomes exclusively for God. But if they desist-God is Seeing of what they do." (8:39). Hence, within real Islam, found exclusively inside the Quran, hatred and animosity toward enemies or foes are never justifications to commit aggressions against them, even if such foes stopped Muslims entering the Kaaba Mosque in Mecca: "…And let not the hatred of people who barred you from the Sacred Mosque incite you to aggression. And cooperate with one another in virtuous conduct and conscience, and do not cooperate with one another in sin and hostility. And fear God. God is severe in punishment." (5:2). Thus, cooperation in Islam is for righteousness, piety, and goodness, whereas in Wahabism, cooperation is for aggressions, massacres, and scramble for loot. We thank Almighty God for preserving for us the Holy Quran so as to remain forever the means to refute views of enemies of Islam who use its name to commit acts of violence and aggression.

Footnotes:

1- Ibn Abdul-Wahab (Muhammad), "Kashf Al-Shubuhat" + 13 Messages, 4^th edition, Cairo, 1399 A.H., edited and published by Moheb Eddine Al-Khateeb, from the message on six events from Prophet Muhammad's history, page 28.

2- From the message on monotheism, page 35.

3- From the message on fundamentals of faith for the general public, page 41.

4- From the message on three issues, page 42

5- From the message on the meaning of Taghut, page 43.

6- Kashf Al-Shubuhat, page 12.

7- Kashf Al-Shubuhat, pages 5 and 12.

8- Kashf Al-Shubuhat, page 10, from the message on monotheism, page 35, and from the message on fundamentals of faith for the general public, page 39.

9- From the message on six events from Prophet Muhammad's history, pages 31 and 32.

10- From the message on faith rules to differentiate believers from infidels, pages 37 and 38.

11- Kashf Al-Shubuhat, pages 3, 4, 6, 10, and 11.

12- From the message on monotheism, page 34.

13- From the message on six events from Prophet Muhammad's history, pages 31 and 32.

14- Kashf Al-Shubuhat, pages 11 and 12.

The reflection of the thought school of Ibn Abdul-Wahab on the disputes between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers:

The pact between the Wahabi scholars and the Najd Brothers against Abdul-Aziz:

An overview:

1- The principles of the real Islamic city-state established in Yathreb by prophet Muhammad are retained in the Quran; it was akin to the direct-democracy secular state, with its dwellers as the only source of authority and power, with experts in many fields to be consulted in their fields of expertise, and all responsible persons in it will be judged by God in the Last Day, and for more details, please refer to our research on Islamic Shura consultation, published in 1990 in print and later on within our website here. Within another research of ours published by Ibn Khaldoun Center on the judicial system and the civil society, where we have explained that the role of the state within Islam is NOT to guide people in religious matters to make them enter Paradise, because guidance is a personal matter and individual responsibility in Islam. The role of the State is confined to providing rights of citizens in relation to absolute religious freedom and political freedom in political participation, as well as providing justice, security, safety, and social solidarity for the needy.

2- The Quran was revealed as a vociferous and vehement opposition against clergymen who confiscate, wrongly and unjustly, the right to speak in the name of God as His spokespersons. Such self-deifying clergymen are made holy and worshipped and sanctified, though sanctity, worship, and holiness are God's exclusively. Secular despots and tyrants enlist the aid of clergymen to control and 'ride' them in order to control and 'ride' citizens. In many cases in history, clergymen had reached the throne in many instances after deposing previous tyrants; we read several examples of this in the Pharaonic history in Ancient Egypt. This occurred recently in 1978 in Iran when Al-Khomeini ruled. Once clergymen reach the throne to rule a country, theocracy is established; the worst ruling régime ever, as it commits injustices toward God and people. Theocracies are known to commit injustices, murders, mass-killings, rapes, and coercion and compulsion in religion, using God's name and raising religious banners and mottoes. In fact, a theocratic ruler practices and applies man-made whimsical views that forcibly present themselves as the 'true' religion of God. All theocracies are based, as far as we know, on certain denomination, sect, or doctrine: Shiite, Sunnite, Catholic, Protestant, etc. and theocrats persecute others who do not belong to the same sect or denomination. Later on, theocracies get fissured and cracked as they carry seeds or factors of its collapse and downfall inside them; disputes arise and warring factions fight one another and declaring one another as apostates.

3- Theocracies carry seeds or factors of its collapse and downfall inside them because of the interference of such states in religions to manipulate them to serve their purposes, instead of the State serving religious freedom. Thus, religious mottoes of theocracies are mere banners and slogans chanted every now and then, but never applied to the letter by people within power and authority circles, who know this fact very well. Yet, clergymen of all ranks insist on applying all religious teachings regardless of consequences; it is easy to declare oneself more religious and righteous with slogans and mottoes, whereas people in power and authority know they can hardly apply every motto literally or to the letter and the suffer for it.

4- For instance, Al-Khomeini in Iran believed in the theocratic rule and that clergymen must apply their views and edicts thoroughly – regardless of catastrophes that would result from that vision. For no reason, Al-Khomeini raised the motto of holy enmity toward the USA, calling it the Greater Satan, and disregarded all international treaties and agreements, and disregarded Islam in the Quran, when he invaded the American embassy in in Tehran on 4^th Nov. 1979, holding people inside the embassy as hostages, who were later on set free on 20^th Jan. 1980, and the USA too revenge by involving Iran in a war against Iraq in Sept. 1980 that lasted until Aug. 1988. This futile war lasted that long because of long borderlines between Iraq and Iran. Thus, the USA wreaked its revenge on Al-Khomeini's Iran. Successors of Al-Khomeini learnt the lesson; they kept photos of him as holy relics after his death in June 1989, but they disregarded his policies by keeping the Shiite religion in service of their State and not the vice-versa to cause gratuitous troubles.

5- The same problem faced the Wahabi king, Abdul-Aziz, in the KSA, as he could not possibly apply all views of Ibn Abdul-Wahab literally or to the letter, though he taught them to the Najd Brothers in the colonies as 'real' Islam. Yet, the Najd Brothers as a military force and the Wahabi scholars could declare themselves as more pious and religious than the king in application of 'true' faith in order to embarrass him in public. Abdul-Aziz wanted Wahabism to be in service of his nascent kingdom, whereas scholars and the Najd Brothers wanted the Saudi state in service of Wahabism.

6- The same problem emerged more often than not within all Wahabi opposition movements after the decease of Abdul-Aziz; all opposition figures wanted the Saudi state in service of Wahabism, whereas successors of Abdul-Aziz wanted Wahabism to be in service of their authority within the kingdom. Of course, the real motive of opposition figures was not to serve religion; rather, to share in authority and power and to increase their might and supremacy over people, whereas any Saudi king wanted all Wahabis in his service alone.

7- Hence, the real motive and ultimate goal of all men in Arabia has been more wealth and power, as in the case of any clergymen caste or category outside or inside ruling authority circles. This fact is never understood by the delusional masses who are deceived by mottoes and slogans, and later on pay a dear price or pay their life for their folly in following blindly any clergymen; thus, they lose both this life in this world and the next world, as they will be in Hell for eternity with their religious leaders, cursing one another. "The Day when their faces are flipped into the Fire, they will say, "If only we had obeyed God and obeyed the message." And they will say, "Lord, we have obeyed our superiors and our dignitaries, but they led us away from the way. Lord, give them double the punishment, and curse them with a great curse."" (33:66-68).

8- Finally, let us in the following segment invoke some basic issues and topics that caused disputes between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers, to see how the Wahabi thought of Ibn Abdul-Wahab was ever-present within utterances, letters, and speeches of the Najd Brothers.

Firstly: within the conference of Wahabi scholars:

Within the conference of Wahabi scholars held by the king, five issues or disputes were discussed, which reflected the dominant mentality and mindset at the time. Let us recall two issues of them here. 1) Can adherent practicing Muslims who obey God within cities dwellers and Bedouins be declared infidels? This question reflects how the Najd Brothers declare other Wahabis as infidels just because they never desired to live in colonies, and thus, even Wahabis could declare one another as apostates, based on their understanding of writings of Ibn Abdul-Wahab, as he misused and distorted verses of the Quran about immigration to avoid religious persecution: "…"Our Lord, deliver us from this town whose people are oppressive…" (4:75). As God orders immigration for those who can to avoid religious persecution, but God will pardon those who could not immigrate as well; see 5:98. But as for immigrants who do so without being persecuted and for the purpose of getting trained to kill, fight, invade, rape, and hate others, this is not Islamic demeanor at all. Yet, Ibn Abdul-Wahab and later Wahabi scholars declared those who did not immigrate to the colonies as infidels, even if they adhere to Wahabism! This posed a serious trouble and dispute. 2) The second problem was headwear of the Najd Brothers that imitated Ibn Abdul-Wahab instead of the traditional headdress in Arabia, if those who did not wear the Wahabi headwear might be called infidels that believers may never eat with them from their cattle? What about non-Wahabis, then? As this query posed a veritable danger as it allowed room for civil wars, scholars at the conference were firm in their answering it, especially when most of these scholars live in cities and never in colonies. Scholars declared that those who declare Wahabis as infidels were themselves infidels to do so; the king was the one to have the right of such declaration along with his panel of scholars to decide who were infidels that will be fought and conquered and enter Hell! Scholars, naturally, took sides with the king, in all sharia issues and queries, as he was the one giving them their salaries. By the end of that conference, the Najd Brothers in colonies were supposed not able to dare to declare other Wahabis in cities and villages as infidels or apostates.

Secondly:

The Najd Brothers returned to Najd with feelings of despair after conquest of Hejaz, and their leader Feisal Al-Daweesh threatened to raise the sword against Abdul-Aziz if he followed the footsteps of Al-Sharif Hussein, former ruler of Hejaz, in dealing peacefully with foreigners and non-Wahabis. In 1927, the Najd Brothers leveled eight criticisms against the king that carry features of Wahabi extremism. Such criticism points include sending his son to London to study and his other son to Egypt to study, i.e., into lands of the infidels and polytheists. This contradicted Wahabi teachings of showing enmity and hatred toward all non-Wahabis. Another point was reception of Kiswah caravan from Egypt, a caravan that contained musical instruments and singers. Another point was the introduction of modern inventions from the west like cars, motorcycles, telephones, etc. another point was forbidding trade with Kuwaitis and not fighting them if they were infidels. Of course, such points were the direct result of the notion of declaring anyone as apostate for trivial reasons. Another point was that the Najd Brothers rejected modern taxes system and wanted to apply another one related to the Abbasid era. Another point was the king's leniency toward Shiites in Al-Ahsa, not fighting them and not coercing them to convert to Wahabism. Another point was allowing cattle of Bedouins of Iraq and Jordan in the borders to graze within Saudi lands of believers (i.e., Wahabis alone!) as a tradition going on for centuries ago must be stopped because such people were infidels. Another point was the reason behind the king's reluctance to demolish tombs and mausoleums in the kingdom. Such criticism points were leveled at the king and his policies, unlike the previous ones linked to Wahabi scholars. Scholars found an opportunity then to revive words of Ibn Abdul-Wahab after his death, especially that about 15 scholars were from the family of Ibn Abdul-Wahab who strove to defend and preserve his traditions and teachings. We demonstrate their fatwas and responses in the coming lines. The Wahabi scholars felt bewildered at issuing a view over modern inventions, as such things were never mentioned in books of Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyya, or Ibn Abdul-Wahab, and this showed their inability to use innovative thinking in religious issues. They urged the king to destroy all tombs and mausoleums as per Wahabi teachings cherished by the Najd Brothers, and to apply Abbasid laws of taxes instead of modern laws, as the ancient laws were not denied by Ibn Hanbal. Scholars agreed with the Najd Brothers about preventing Egyptian Kiswah caravan from ever entering Mecca again carrying arms and singers and musical instruments, as acts of blasphemy and polytheism must be prevented in public. Scholars supported the aggression of the Najd Brothers against this Egyptian caravan, deemed as changing vice by force as per Wahabi and Sunnite teachings. It seems that scholars agreed with the Najd Brothers beforehand to raise such questions and disputes, as both parties were livid with anger because of the king's leniency with Shiites in Al-Ahsa and Al-Qatif by leaving them alone and not forcing them to convert to Wahabism. The fatwas of scholars regarding such issue was very fanatical and extremist in addressing the king as for what was best to be done: Shiites must be forced by the king to convert to Islam (i.e., Wahabism, in their views) and be prevented from performing all their rituals. This was coercion in religion of course. It is noteworthy that Shiites in Arabia, in their turn, at the time declared Wahabis as infidels and apostates who gained more strength and power in the land and thus became more outspoken and vociferous. Such fatwa urged the king to promptly do so if he were a real believer; this is an overt threat to Abdul-Aziz that he might be declared as an infidel. Their fatwa about Shiites included Shiites declaring their new faith, along with their Wahabi ruler Abdullah Ibn Jalawy who helped the king to establish his kingdom, before the supreme Wahabi scholar Ibn Bishr, to assert the supreme power of Wahabi scholars over governors of regions. The scholars lamented the fact that the Wahabi ruler Ibn Jalawy was lenient with Shiites in Al-Ahsa, as this governor was strict with the Najd Brothers and the Ajman tribesmen who were inclined to revolt against the king, and prevented them from performing any inquisition in Al-Ahsa. Thus, Shiites lived in peace and felt grateful and loyal to their Wahabi ruler Ibn Jalawy. Hence, this governor was much hated by both scholars and the Najd Brothers, who declare Shiites as polytheists who rejected 'true' faith. Shiites of Iraq and Arabia paid a heavy price for this in the very first KSA; they were massacred and persecuted for years in inquisition-like efforts typical of the Middle Ages. The Wahabi opposition movement of the Najd Brothers wanted ardently to revive such inquisition and persecution as religious duties to wipe out Shiite creed altogether from Arabia gradually by forcing Shiites to pray five daily prayers in Sunnite Wahabi mosques and never to perform Shiite rituals at homes and in public, and to demolish all mausoleums held as holy sites by them. The fatwa urged the demolishing of all Shiite mosques as well, while banishing those who reject such orders to locations outside Arabia. Hence, this fatwa urged the king to re-locate Shiite people of Al-Qatif and Al-Ahsa away from their homelands. Ibn Bishr volunteered to rule Al-Qatif to force its population to stick to such fatwa, while leaving Al-Ahsa to the king. This made the king feel that some Wahabi scholars grew presumptuous as to ask to assume royal missions on his behalf. This reminds us of Shiite scholars in Iran as having more power and authority than political leaders and presidents. This fatwa about Shiites included an item never requested by the Najd Brothers; namely, that the king should send scholars to inhabitants of all villages and Bedouin areas to watch over them to see if they stick to Wahabi teachings and avoid vices and prohibited things in their daily life or not. This was plainly asking for more political power and authority for Wahabi scholars all over the KSA, more than governors of cities and regions. The fatwa included that the king must prevent Iraqi Shiites from ever coming near the Saudi borders again in grazing areas and to annul modern taxes system. Scholars had to confess that jihad must not be declared or be mobilized for unless with royal decree as per sharia laws and the general benefit. It is noteworthy that the fatwa did not include any reference to the king's sons who study in Egypt and GB, so as not to embarrass the king any further, supposedly. The fatwa ignored as well trade or fight with Kuwait, as jihad must be initiated by the king alone with consultancy with the panel of scholars. This maneuver made them wish to gain more power and authority from the king as much as they could. Scholars in this fatwa had to appeal to the Najd Brothers, their allies, and the king reluctantly had to feign agreeing with them to gain more time to think how to get rid of them. Hafiz Wahba writes: (…After issuing such fatwa, the king had to stop receiving the Egyptian caravan of the Kiswah, to demolish the Hamza mosque, and to stop the wireless, in order to ward off, or rather postpone, the final confrontation with the Najd Brothers…) (15). We notice here that Wahba is alluding to the fact that the king had done this reluctantly and most unwillingly to have time enough to prepare for a final, decisive victory over the Najd Brothers. It is most likely that the king acted in accordance with the advice of Wahba in this matter. Sure enough, the king never forgot or forgave the scholars for embarrassing him that way in order to restrict him; he realized that they were manipulating him and wanted to deceive him by allying themselves to the Najd Brothers, especially that after this conference, Feisal Al-Daweesh attacked with his troops the fortress of Boseih as per fatwas of the scholars who wanted to prevent Iraqi Shiites from entering grazing areas within Saudi borders. Al-Daweesh revolted against his king to the extent that he refused adamantly to come to the king as he called him into his palace, urging the Najd Brothers to increase their anti-Abdul-Aziz propaganda. It is probably that the Najd Brothers in colonies who attacked the fortress were joined by some fighters/scholars as they accused the king of being an apostate because he allied himself to the British, thus forsaking Wahabi teachings.

Thirdly:

Within the conference of Riyadh in Nov. 1928, Abdul-Aziz managed to control his panel of scholars to urge them to take his side, as the dangerous situation escalated. Scholars, clergymen, and sheikhs felt that this was a matter of life and death for their king; he might kill them off if they would not comply with his wishes. Hence, they had to take his view of things. Their resulting speeches and fatwas seemed like offering an apology for their previous stance of accusing him of being an infidel. They unanimously agreed that the king never relented in his support for the only true religion in Arabia; his faults can be redeemed and pardoned, and later on rectified, and such faults could not possibly justify the Najd Brothers' revolting against him. Scholars were afraid that the Najd Brothers might accuse them of being frightened by the king, and thus, they asserted in their fatwa that they were not afraid of him, but they stance was driven by the desire to offer pieces of advice and guidance for all parties concerned. Representatives of the Najd Brothers in this conference realized that scholars backed off and withdrew their previous support for the Najd Brothers; they had to embarrass the scholars by posing the same previous queries to force them to say Wahabi views that differed from the stance of the king. The posed their questions within theological terms and stances to embarrass the king more than the embarrassment they caused to him during pervious conferences in 1926 and 1927. They accused the king of being lenient and indecisive with Shiite infidels and their Wahabi ruler Ibn Jalawy in Al-Ahsa who tolerated the Shiites. They accused the king of violating the agreements between M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab and M. Al-Saud, the forefather of Abdul-Aziz, during the rise of the very first Saudi state. Among such agreements was the one about allowing scholars to practice their inquisition-like notion of ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'' within committees formed by them to watch over all city dwellers and villagers and to share authority with the king that way. The king reneged on his promise to allow them to form such committees, especially in Al-Ahsa region of the Shiite population. In the Riyadh conference, however, scholars allowed modern inventions to be introduced to the kingdom, such as telephones and the wireless, under the pretext that Ibn Abdul-Wahab and Ibn Taymiyya never mentioned them as prohibited, and they could not find any evidence from theological ancient views to prohibit such inventions. Thus, scholars offering such fatwa embarrassed the Najd Brothers to force them to allow modern inventions into the Saudi state. The king, on his part, asserted in this conference that he sent preachers and scholars to watch over people and engage into ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'', and that he must be notified if they were lax in their mission. The king asserted as well that fortresses on the borders were erected because of the raids organized by Al-Daweesh and the Najd Brothers without his royal permission. Yet, the Najd Brothers insisted on their stance against such fortresses and scholars had to agree this time with the Najd Brothers. The king had to acquiesce this time, but he announced to hold a meeting with 50 representatives of hem to discuss later on the notion of conquering neighboring countries. In such meeting, the Najd Brothers feigned being convinced by the king's views; in fact, this was the last straw that caused the emergence of the military revolt of the Najd Brothers leading to the battle of Sabilla. To transform the political opposition of the Najd Brothers into such rebellion was an endeavor done by scholars in the colonies to incite everyone with anti-Abdul-Aziz propaganda to mobilize more supporters. Thus, Al-Daweesh insisted on discussing the notion of jihad and conquest before to embarrass the king and to accuse him of apostasy because he allied himself to the British Christian infidels.

Fourthly:

After the victory won by the king in the battle of Sabilla, Abdul-Aziz bared his fangs to both the scholars and all leaders of all tribes, threatening them to meet such a fate of the Najd Brothers: being killed off with is forces and the British forces f they dared to disobey of disagree with him. Hence, in the next two conferences, scholars remained silent out of fear, and no one asked for their stance of views at all about topics related to the state or to the king. Abdul-Aziz became the one controlling sharia laws and threatening potential foes outspokenly. Thus, authority of scholars diminished and the king had leeway in all political policies and maneuvers away from Wahabi restrictions of scholars and the annihilated Najd Brothers. Thus, finally, Abdul-Aziz put an end to the system that he established, the Najd Brothers, and forced Wahabism to be in service of his kingdom.

Footnotes:

15- Wahba, "Arabia in the 20^th Century", pages 291:293.

Inculcating the Bedouins to turn them into the Najd Brothers to kill women and children:

Firstly: the mechanism of inculcating the Bedouins to turn them into the Najd Brothers to kill women and children:

1- This mechanism was based on two aspects: leaders of tribes were brought to be told harshly that they were infidels who must get to know Islam and were forced to enroll in Riyadh Wahabi schools run by scholars, while six scholars were sent, heavily guarded, to each tribe to teach tribesmen Wahabi teachings. When leaders of tribes became a learned scholar, they would reside in a house in Riyadh to be under the control of Abdul-Aziz.

2- Persons working with the committee of ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'' spread all over cities and villages to preach and convince people in all tribes to adhere more to Wahabism and apply its teachings in daily life, and such persons of this committee used the art of personation in their talks very well and they used to fight in times of Wahabi jihad with the Najd Brothers, before the latter were killed off, and they used to wear ascetic clothes and to lead Spartan life; they acted as mediators between the king and his subjects as well as his governors.

3- The cultural content of the Bedouin mentality, who turned into the Najd Brothers, was a group of brief letters written within a simple style by sheikh Abdullah Ibn M. Abdul-Latif, and such letters were distributed among all tribesmen, and were taught by all scholars to leaders of tribes and all tribesmen. Such letters contained severe warnings against unjust and forbidden practices and rituals especially Shiite ones and the urgent need to 'guide' and 'enlighten' the errant misguided ones even by force and by disciplining them if necessary, with severe punishment to those opposing Wahabism and Wahabis in public to cause harm to Muslims…etc.

Secondly: threatening others to massacre their families and robbing their money and possessions:

1- We quote below models of letters that preach and call people to convert to Wahabism and warning those who shun or oppose the call to 'righteousness' that they will be murdered along with their families and their possessions will be confiscated.

2- (…In the Name of God the Compassionate, from Al-Dahasi to Al-Abboud the tribal leader, peace be upon those who follow God's guidance, we guarantee you and your tribe peace and security, provided that all of you will join us to gain God's satisfaction and all your families and possessions will be safe, as those joining us will be submitting themselves to God and enjoy the condescension and protection of Sultan Ibn Bajad and the Wahabi brethren…). (…In the Name of God the Compassionate, from Al-Dahasi to Ibn Samran, above all and before anything else, we guarantee all of your tribe, males and females, all peace and security, if you will join us to enjoy safety of yourselves and your property and families, by submitting yourselves to us, you will be submitting to God Himself, and you will enjoy the protection of the Wahabi brethren, and the peace of God as well as protection for you possessions, houses, and camels, and so, convert all of you to Islam very soon…). (…In the Name of God the Compassionate, from Al-Dahasi to Al-Dahasa tribe, we call of your tribesmen to convert to Islam; those joining us will enjoy the protection of God and the protection of Sultan Ibn Bajad and the Wahabi brethren …). (…In the Name of God the Compassionate, from Assaf Ibn Hussein Al-Mansour to Rasheed Ibn Sameer, greetings, you know quite well that the Imam and Sovereign of all Arabs is King Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdul-Rahman Al-Feisal Ibn Al-Saud and he ordered me to stay in Al-Jouf and to write this letter to you to inquire about your following the path of Islam led by the Imam Abdul-Aziz or not; peace will be granted only to the reasonable ones! The King and all Muslims in Arabia are posing this question to you; thus, we have warned you and you cannot blame anyone but yourself. That is all, greetings to all of you from your Wahabi brethren, 1340 A.H., Assaf Ibn Hussein…).

3- We conclude from these letters that Wahabis assume that they have confiscated Islam and speaking in its name as well as in the name of God, as if they were His representatives on earth. Their Wahabi call was based on coercion and compulsion in religion by sheer force and by threatening people to massacre them and to loot their possessions and money and lands. The Najd Brothers did this along with their leaders like Sultan Ibn Bajad, sending letters with ultimatums using the name of Abdul-Aziz with or without his consent and talking in his name within verbal orders. As for people outside Arabia, threatening letters used to be received and they were written in a way to enable Abdul-Aziz to deny his being linked to them.

4- To convince Bedouins to massacre women and children, Wahabis told them falsehoods about Paradise pleasures in the Afterlife to those following their orders blindly; such images appealed to Bedouins who suffered within their life of scarce water in desert environment, and thus, Wahabi jihad meant to Bedouins the ''salvation'' in this life and in the Afterlife, with permitted looting and spoils to be enjoyed in this life and Paradise as prize for massacring ''infidels''. Thus, massacring all non-Wahabis and all those whose faith is doubted for the slightest reason became a pleasure for Wahabi fighters. Abdul-Aziz and his Wahabi scholars played very well the game of declaring others as infidels, a game manipulated to serve their own purposes anytime (16).

5- Within such mechanism, the ideology of the Najd Brothers and Wahabi scholars was one reinforced with theologians in times of fighting and non-fighting. Yet, the scholars' share of supremacy and authority was gone forever when the Najd Brothers were killed off by GB and Abdul-Aziz, and their fighting style that reflected the Wahabi culture was gone forever.

Thirdly: waging wars embodies the ideological formation of the Najd Brothers:

1- The religious education of the Najd Brothers was distributed among performing long prayers and daily readings of Sirah (i.e., false sanctified accounts and biography of Prophet Muhammad) and Wahabi letters of jihad as well as listening to sermons delivered by Wahabi preachers. The notion of Wahabi jihad wars was the enactment of such teachings and religious inculcation: within battles, fighters felt that they were crossing the boundaries between this life and the Afterlife in Paradise, to get rid of the monotony of life in the Wahabi colonies. Such wars were tests for their fortitude and how they would apply the Wahabi teachings, and their chants during battle reflected this ideology of martyrdom: (The winds of Paradise draw near! Who wants to enter Paradise now? We are the monotheists! We are obedient servants of God! You will lose your head, O enemies of God!) And when they began the battle they chant a certain Quranic verse of Al-Fatiha (i.e., the Opening) Chapter; namely, 1:5.

2- Such chants reflect their longing to enter Paradise once they die, and their notion that war was the bridge on which they will step into that Paradise by committing massacres and declaring themselves as the only monotheists on earth who had the right to kill off all polytheists (17).

3- The fact that they began battle by reciting 1:5 from the Quran reflected their notion of launching wars as akin to performing prayers to them; this showed that prayers overlapped with jihad. In mosques of Wahabi colonies, a list of men's name was there to call out names before performing prayers, and before mobilizing men for jihad in any battle any day. Those absent ones from prayers or battles were punished by being put to violent death. They even performed prayers in mosques while carrying guns and swords, as if they were within a military act behind the imam of prayers who would be their military leader (18).

4- To exemplify the above-mentioned notions, let us quote the words of Abdul-Aziz, commenting on the battle of Turba when the huge troops of Al-Sharif Hussein were defeated: (…Al-Sharif Hussein had 10000 soldiers in Yathreb and 7000 soldiers in Hejaz, plus 20 cannons, 40 machine guns, and ammunitions and victuals carried over 10000 camels, whereas the Wahabi brothers were just 2000 fighters, from which unarmed 500 fighters except with swords and daggers…Al-Sharif Hussein had dug trenches deep enough to bury men standing, while placing cannons and machine guns in every corner. The Wahabi Brothers crept to the battle after performing dawn prayers and chanting ''there is no God but Allah'' when faced with cannons of Al-Sharif Hussein, and the battle went on for the whole day and night and then the following day…) (19). A Hashemite man of the other side, named Awn Ibn Hashem, was an eyewitness of this battle when he was but 15 years old, and he said to Al-Rihany: (…Bloodbaths in Turba was horrifyingly too much and rivulets of blood went through palm trees into water pools and brooks, coloring them in red for a long time, and corpses piled up in fortresses…As a child, I wondered at the scene when the Wahabi Brothers would stop massacring people suddenly to enter the mosque to pray and then get out of it to continue massacring people!).

5- Linking prayers to Wahabi jihad wars was not signaled only by reciting 1:5, but also by firing bullets in times of calling for prayers and by setting timings of battles to begin after performing prayers of Dawn, Noon, Afternoon, and Sunset, to distinguish their battles from Bedouin raids of looting, and the battle of Turba began after the Sunset prayers (20).

Fourthly: turning Wahabi jihad into massacres of women and children:

1- Such linking between prayers and Wahabi jihad fighting (i.e., Wahabi atrocities and massacres) was a horrid and wicked trick to urge the Najd Brothers to commit their crimes with zeal; they spared no women and children. Their tactic was to raid, massacre, and run or got martyred (i.e., got killed to enter Paradise, as per their erroneous creed), and they massacred everyone without sparing anyone: men, women, children, and the elderly people of both genders. Such massacres filled people of other regions with fright; they feared the Wahabi fighters very much and felt it was no use to resist them. The British representative in Kuwait once wrote that the Kuwaiti Bedouins had for a while to keep the Wahabi headwear as they feared to be murdered by the Najd Brothers, and they had to smoke hookah and cigarettes in doors, fearing Wahabi corporal punishments for the 'sin' of smoking. Such terror allowed Abdul-Aziz to conquer Mecca, Yathreb, and Jeddah with no fight at all, as their people surrendered at once to avoid being massacred.

2- We can assert here that the Najd Brothers were also victims of such massacres; they used to seek 'martyrdom', and that was why they were reckless in all their fighting methods, as they thought they would enter Paradise, to enjoy carnal pleasures and 'houris', once their souls were set free out of their bodies. Thus, death was the only barrier between them and such 'eternal bliss', as per traditional books they learned in colonies, and that was why they chanted such slogans during their raids. They used to attack and charge at random with primitive arms even when faced with British machine gun, cannons, and armored vehicles on southern Iraq and Jordan when they fought outside Arabia. Crossing Jordanian borders, 1500 Wahabi fighter attacked the region shortly after the conquest of Hael, coming from the midst of Najd speedily, and committed massacres within cities near the Jordanian capital Amman, while razing such cities to the ground. News of such massacres reached GB, as it sent its warplanes that killed off the 1500 men, except 8 of them who had narrow escape. Because of the fact that such news embarrassed Abdul-Aziz and because of the crushing defeat that made him lose many fighters, he punished the 8 survivors, saying that he never authorized such raids into Jordan.

3- There are long stories of massacres committed by the Najd Brothers against their foes and opponents, as we have written earlier about the battle of Turba. In fact, the Najd Brothers used to attack their targets within a random mixture of soldiers, horses, and camels that destroyed locations of the foes and slaughter every human being there mercilessly of all genders and age groups. When the Najd Brothers attacked Kuwait in 1920, they killed all women and children, and so did they when they attacked Jordan in 1924 and Ta'if in 1921.

4- Foreign observers recorded that the Najd Brothers never kept any POWs or captives; they killed everyone off sparing no one at all, terrorizing all people of all genders and age groups, as done in Jordan, and such savagery and brutality led GB to build the fortress of Boseih near the borders, which caused the political opposition and military rebellion of the Najd Brothers against their king later on.

5- Two surviving men who were among the Najd Brothers before their annihilation had confessed to John Habeeb that they joined the raid into Iraq, for ten days of relentless fighting day and night, and that both of them killed about 1000 persons, never sleeping but 3 hours daily, eating nothing but dates, bread, and coffee. Imagine such atrocity: if only two men killed 1000 Iraqi persons in ten days, calling their heinous crime jihad, what about the rest of victims and what was their number. Such massacres are ignored and never mentioned in history books, as they were unheard of raids that were repeated a lot at the time, to terrorize and massacre peaceful civilians, in cities and villages, for loot. Such unrecorded and unregistered Wahabi atrocities and massacres ware worse than the Zionist crimes and massacres in Palestine, as the latter were registered and made known to the international community that condemned them, whereas Wahabi crimes are never mentioned or criticized and they are still falsely ascribed to Islam as jihad; hence, such massacres might be repeated in the future as long as Wahabism remains and spreads as if it were Islam.

6- When the international community got news of Ta'if massacre, Abdul-Aziz had to stop the Najd Brothers from committing more massacres to avoid being embarrassed outside his kingdom. This was among the reasons of the disputes and rift between them and the king. We have written about how Feisal Al-Daweesh and his Wahabi fighters ardently wanted to massacre dwellers of Yathreb and Jeddah, and when the king adamantly refused, Al-Daweesh left the place in fury, as he felt humiliated when residents of Yathreb and Jeddah stipulated that the Najd Brothers would never enter their cities, as part of items of surrender agreement. The king had to send the Najd Brothers back to Najd, and act that marked the beginning of the Najd Brothers' opposition, and the Najd Brothers attacked their fellow Wahabis among those who agreed to the policies and decisions of Abdul-Aziz, killing off all women, children, and elderly men among them, as per their habit typical of them, of course!

Footnotes:

16- Al-Mukhtar, ditto, pages 142:147.

Al-Rihany, "History of Najd", pages 68, 87, 88, and 212:216.

Philip Hitti, ''History of Najd'', page 305.

Habeeb, ditto, pages 68, 69, 85, 86, 93, 112, and 115.

Hopwood, op. cit., page 64.

Howarth, op. cit., page 71.

Meullen, op. cit., pages 78 and 79.

Dickson, op. cit., page 152.

17- Wahba, ditto, page 295.

Al-Rihany, ''Kings of Arabs" page 82 and ''History of Najd'', page 222.

Habeeb, ditto, pages 126 and 127.

18- Dickson, op. cit., pages 126 and 156.

19- Al-Rihany, ''History of Najd'', page 256.

Habeeb, ditto, pages 126 and 165.

20- Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, No. 302, 19-9-1930 and No. 292, 11-7-1930.

Al-Rihany, ditto, pages 406 and 307.

Habeeb, ditto, page 165.

21- Khila (Mahmoud Kamel), an MA thesis, in the Faculty of Arts, Cairo University, titled "The Political Development of Jordan", 1969, pages 317 and 318.

Glubb, ''War in the Desert", pages 193 and 194.

Habeeb, ditto, pages 83:86, 123:125, 163:165, 185:186, 191:193, and 207:208.

The Bedouins/desert Arabs and massacring women and children:

Firstly: the attempt of Hafiz Wahba to defend the murderers:

1- Wahba writes, under the title ''The Brothers", the following excerpt we quote here: (…Terror would seize the hearts of dwellers within borders of Iraq and Jordan an Kuwait if the words ''the Najd Brothers'' were uttered, and even non-Wahabi Bedouins of such regions would leave their desert areas to be near cities to keep themselves safe within its walls and fortresses, as the Najd Brothers were like messengers of earth and terror in all Arabia and its neighboring countries...). Wahba went on recording episodes of their history, and he writes: (…The military might and prowess of the Najd Brothers were asserted in defeating the Kuwaitis as they were crushed within the battle of Hamdh in 1919 and siege of the Kuwaiti ruler within the battle of Jahra in 1920… The Najd Brothers crushed and killed of the troops of Al-Sharif Abdullah within the battle of Turba in 1919…and in their repeated raids into Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and Jordanian lands…). We find in the writings of Wahba an acknowledgement of their aggressions against non-Wahabis and their brutality and savagery that they called Wahabi jihad.

2- Wahba ignores deliberately in his writings to mention the fact that his master and king, Abdul-Aziz, was the one who inculcated such savagery into them as it was urged as 'Islamic' jihad to apply the falsehoods and lies found in the Sirah (i.e., biography of Prophet Muhammad that contains nothing but lies ascribed to him within one century after his death). Such Sirah was written in the early years of the Abbasid caliphate and which contradicts the real life-story of Muhammad as narrated in the Quran. Yet, such falsehoods of Sirah are still that main source of Wahabi legislation and sharia. Wahba tries in his writings to defend his master and king by saying that most aggressive raids outside Arabia were perpetrated without the prior written permission of the king: (…Imam Abdul-Aziz used to urge them to stop such raids and used to order them to adhere to self-restraint and leniency and to stop massacring others, but in vain, and the Wahabi scholars used to urge them not to kill captives or POWs, but they never listened…).

3- Murdering POWs or captives is against Quranic sharia of Islam; even Prophet Muhammad and early Muslims have been rebuked in the Quran for setting captives free in return for ransom after the battle of Badr: "It is not for a prophet to take prisoners before he has subdued the land. You desire the materials of this world, but God desires the Hereafter. God is Strong and Wise. Were it not for a predetermined decree from God, an awful punishment would have afflicted you for what you have taken." (8:67-68). "O prophet! Say to those you hold prisoners, "If God finds any good in your hearts, He will give you better than what was taken from you, and He will forgive you. God is Forgiving and Merciful."" (8:70). God has ordained in the Quran that captives should be set free in return for getting back captives held by the enemies or to be set free in return for nothing as a kind of charity: "…Then, either release them by grace, or in return for your captives, until war lays down its burdens…" (47:4). The Quran makes captives or POWs as a category deserving zakat and charity as they are in Muslims lands and should be treated as impecunious travellers: "And they feed, for the love of Him, the poor, and the orphan, and the captive. "We only feed you for the sake of God. We want from you neither compensation, nor gratitude." (76:8-9). Even fighters who stop fighting believers in battlefield should be treated kindly: "And if anyone of the aggressive polytheists asks you for protection, give him protection so that he may hear the Word of God; then escort him to his place of safety. That is because they are a people who do not know." (9:6). Likewise, if such fighter utters the word of peace, safety is guaranteed to him: "O you who believe! When you journey in the way of God, investigate, and do not say to him who offers you peace, "You are not a believer," aspiring for the goods of this world. With God are abundant riches. You yourselves were like this before, and God bestowed favor on you; so investigate. God is well aware of what you do." (4:94), as Islam is based on peace and on the fact that fighting is allowed ONLY in cases of self-defense: "And fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not commit aggression; God does not love the aggressors." (2-190).

4- Wahab writes: (…Those who will read letters of scholars who condemned the crimes of the Najd Brothers and the ignoramuses who poisoned their heads would find easily that the scholars of Najd are never to blame as they had done their duty in advising them, but the Najd Brothers violated the Islamic sharia laws and the king and the scholars are not to be blamed for it…) (22). Wahba is trying here to defend his king and the Wahabi scholars, and this contradicts the asserted history of the Najd Brothers and their allies the scholars in all savagery and brutality within atrocities committed on several occasions. Of course, Wahba has written such defense after the Najd Brothers were killed off by GB and the king after their military rebellion against the king as they asked for more power and authority. It was natural that when the king defeated them, with the aid of GB, he would disown and condemn their heinous, savage crimes and he would urge Wahba to clear his name as well as that of his subservient, obsequious scholars of such atrocities. Wahba was the historian and eye-witness of the relation between the king and the Najd Brothers, of their rebellion and revolt, and of their declaring Abdul-Aziz as an infidel. Wahabi scholars of Najd took the side of the Najd Brothers until the king bared his fangs to them, forcing them to take his side.

Secondly: the savagery of the Najd Brothers in massacring women and children has a historical root within their ancestors:

1- Wahba criticizes in his writings some of the Najd Brothers, and not all of them, after all of them were killed off: (…Some of the heinous acts of the Wahabi Brothers contradicted traits of Arabian men and the Islamic sharia…). Of course, Quranic sharia forbids killings of civilians and aggressions; it allows fighting only in the case of self-defense against warring enemies that begin committing aggressions first. Yet, history of Bedouins and desert-Arab in Najd and its neighboring regions in the Abbasid Era is filled with massacres of women and children during the Middle Ages; Abdul-Aziz and his Wahabi Najd Brothers were just repeating such bloody past in the 20^th century.

2- Al-Tabari, the most famous Arab historian, had witnessed the beginning of the emergence of the Qarmatians who wreaked havoc and destroyed Iraq and the Levant. Al-Tabari feared for his life as preachers of the Qarmatians spread in Iraq, and that is why he writes in brief about the Qarmatians, in his last years, not in detail as in his previous typical style. He writes briefly on the Qarmatians: (…in 286 A.H., a Qarmatian man, named Abou Saeed Al-Janaby, emerged in Bahrain, he preached and mobilized Arabs to join the Qarmatians, and they raided with such troops all neighboring villages, massacring all people in them, sparing no one …).

3- Al-Tabari writes the following bout the raids of the Qarmatian leader Ibn Zakraweih in the Levant in 290 A.H. and how dwellers of cities had to obey him, giving him full power and authority: (…He moved with his troops toward Damascus, and its dwellers made peace with him on the condition of a heavy annual tribute paid to him, and he left then in peace, but he massacred all residents in nearby villages and other Levantine cities, like Baalbek, who defied him, sparing no children and women, and killing especially children who were learning the Quran by heart in madrassas, slaughtering all cattle, and burning the cities and villages down when its dwellers defied him by trying to protect themselves, causing terror to all caravans of travellers who passed by the Levant as he held them captives…) (23). Of course, readers would pardon Al-Tabari for not writing in detail, as he feared for his life; we have quoted him here to prove that the heinous crimes of the Qarmatians in the Abbasid Era did not differ from those committed by the Najd Brothers in the 20^th century.

4- Bedouins and desert-Arabs, for centuries, used to commit their crimes of murder and looting under any motto ascribed falsely to Islam; this began with Al-Khawarij group who massacred women, children, and elderly civilians. We know his from the writings of the Sunnite theologian and historian Abou Al-Hussein Al-Malti, who died in 377 A.H., in his book titled "Al-Tanbeeh Wa Al-Rad", as he writes about the emergence of the very first Al-Khawarij group: (…The very first Al-Khawarij group raided souks and markets with their brandished sword, chanting the slogan ''judgment is God's alone'', murdering as much men as possible, terrorizing people in several cities, but later on, all members of such group were killed off by the troops of the caliph, thank God…). This statement was written in the 4^th century A.H.; desert-Arabs and Bedouins used to massacre people of all age groups and genders indiscriminately using religious mottoes to justify their crimes under the notion of 'jihad' and asking for 'martyrdom', just like suicide bombers now. The Najd Brothers had repeated and revived all this in the 20^th century, and such notions spread until now, with thousands of innocent peaceful victims all over the world.

5- Even without religious slogans and mottoes, all Bedouins and desert-Arabs in the Middle Ages used to loot and massacre people caravans loaded with goods and possessions without any religious justification. Such victims who were killed in these (trade or pilgrimage) caravans always included women and children brutally murdered, despite the divine order in the Quran to ensure safety of pilgrims and their possessions and cattle: "O you who believe! Do not violate God's sacraments, nor the Sacred Month, nor the offerings, nor the garlanded, nor those heading for the Sacred House seeking blessings from their Lord and approval. When you have left the pilgrim sanctity, you may hunt. And let not the hatred of people who barred you from the Sacred Mosque incites you to aggression. And cooperate with one another in virtuous conduct and conscience, and do not cooperate with one another in sin and hostility. And fear God. God is severe in punishment." (5:2). Hence, God prohibits all sorts of aggressions during the sacred months and against caravans of pilgrims and even cattle dedicated to the Kaaba; yet, Bedouins looted and massacred all and violated such divine orders. Desecration of the four sacred months was a grave sin committed by Arabs of the Arab conquests and in their civil wars few decades after Muhammad's death, and following their footsteps were the Wahabis.

Thirdly: the difference between Bedouin raids and Bedouin jihad: the ideological formation of the Najd Brothers made tem differ from ordinary Bedouins/desert Arabs:

1- It is noteworthy that 'secular' raids of Bedouins were essentially for robbing and looting, and killings were not an options except when necessary and they were avoided as much as they could by avoiding attacking strong heavily armed caravans, and by caravan travellers buying their safety with money to avoid being killed and then to go on with their route under the protection of Bedouin raiders themselves, whereas raids for loot carrying slogans and banners of 'Islamic' jihad spared no one even if caravan travellers surrendered peacefully without resistance. Bedouin 'jihad' aimed for both looting and massacring as many infidels as possible! We have exemplified this by the above excerpts from Al-Tabari and Al-Malti. Let us remember that Ibn Zakraweih the leader of the Qarmatians called himself Al-Mahdi, a Shiite religious epithet meaning ''the guided one'', and his jihad for loot was not different from the one by the Najd Brothers under Abdul-Aziz, recorded by Wahba and other contemporary eye-witnesses and historians.

2- let us quote excerpts about 'secular' Bedouin raids in the 5^th century A.H., mentioned by another famous Arab historian, Ibn Al-Jawziyya, who died in 597 A.H. and he writes about this raid that occurred in 545 A.H., when he was 35 years old, in his book of historical accounts titled ''Al-Muntazim'': this even could be summed up in few lines; some Bedouins sent a messenger to a caravan of pilgrims asking for tributes, and the pilgrims refused to pay (…Bedouins attacked the caravan consequently, in the sacred month of Muharram, brandishing their swords to force pilgrims to surrender their valuables, clothes, camels, large sums of money, and previous stones, and men and women of the caravan were forced to walk barefooted and almost naked into the desert, and some died of hunger and thirst, and some women put mud on their bodies out of bashfulness…) (24). Despite the horrid description, but at least this Bedouin raids focused on looting and not on massacring others within jihad of any type under any motto.

3- Hence, the Wahabi teachings taught o the Bedouins by Abdul-Aziz and his scholars transformed Bedouins from raiders seeking loot and spoils into Wahabi Brothers: seekers of loot and spoils as well as annihilation and martyrdom, hating life. This was the major difference between Bedouins and the Najd Brothers. Islam is innocent of both secular and Wahabi crimes of raiding, conquering, and aggression.

Footnotes:

22- Wahba, ditto, pages 285, 288, and 297.

Al-Zarkeley, ''Arabia in the Reign of Abdul-Aziz'', page 332.

Habeeb, ditto, pages 84, 85, 137, 191:207, and 123:125.

Dickson, ditto, page 128.

23- Al-Tabari, ''History of Al-Tabari'', 10/100, 71.

Al-Malti (Abou Al-Hussein), "Al-Tanbeeh Wa Al-Rad", page 47.

24- Ibn Al-Jawziyya, "Al-Muntazim", 78/18.

The influence of the Wahabi culture and the zero equation: to negate and kill the other:

Firstly: within political disputes:

-A-

Hafiz Wahba, as historian contemporary to the Najd Brothers, bears witness to the difference between the Bedouins and the Wahabi Najd Brothers:

1- Wahba writes the following about Bedouins who imbibed and imbued the Wahabi ideological to be transformed into the Najd Brothers: (…I knew the desert-Arabs in their Bedouin life and in their wars and raids, and I knew them very well when they inhabited the colonies, and befriended many of their leaders before and after they converted to Wahabism. I could not help but notice that religion had transformed their life completely; previously, they used to care only for robbing and looting caravans, and taking pride in such acts, raising the banner that money on earth was God's and persons might get rich or poor by chance, as trade caravans were under their mercy and had to pay tributes to go in safety, as Bedouins would not risk their own lives anyway; in times of danger, they would flee, especially if the caravans were heavily armed and guarded with soldiers. Bedouins never knew loyalty for anyone, and they resorted to hypocrisy in all times; they could not be governed unless with strictness mixed with justice… they never feel loyal even to their allies and friends, and no ruler or tribe leader could trust them, as when such leaders or rulers were defeated, they would raid and rob them anyway, under the claim of deserving such honor away from other outsiders…).

2- Wahba writes the following about the conditions and circumstances of the Bedouins after they were transformed into the Najd Brothers: (…The Wahabi Brothers were no longer afraid of death; rather, they used to hurl into it as they sought martyrdom and meeting God in the Hereafter…mothers would see their sons off by saying that they wish them to die in battle to meet with them in Heaven, and by this way, soldiers would hurl into the embrace of death most willingly as I have seen in many battles, never thinking about anything but to kill off the infidels and foes mercilessly, without sparing anyone, as they consider themselves the messengers of death wherever they fight… ) (25).

-B-

Our commentary:

1- We conclude then that the Bedouins used to specialize in looting, embezzlement, and theft as far as their safety and their lives were not jeopardized, and they would willingly stay away from caravans heavily guarded with armed soldiers; and they would act hypocritically with strong people in power until they would be weak and defeated, ripe for being looted, as Bedouins would not be governed unless with strictness and justice, or as per Quranic expression: "And prepare against them all the power you can muster…" (8:60).

2- The transformation that occurred to those Bedouins after they had imbibed the Wahabi culture was the fact that they were convinced by their Wahabi teachers and preachers that Paradise is waiting for them after their being martyred, and if they remained alive after battle, they would enjoy spoils of loot. This was way they hurled themselves into death and reckless acts, and they massacred as many non-Wahabis as they could, mercilessly and relentlessly, thinking that their path to Heaven would be paved that way. Their enemies were all non-Wahabis, unlike Islamic teachings - found exclusively in the Quran - stating clearly that foes and enemies are any aggressors who begin to fight the peaceful ones. The other non-Wahabis for them were all peaceful Shiites and Sunnites who did not commit aggressions against Wahabis at all; yet, Wahabis looted and massacred them for no reason at all and invaded their lands within villagers and cities, and their foes included even Wahabis who did not live in colonies and retained the Wahabi headwear. After the conference of Abdul-Aziz and the scholars in 1919, the king himself was declared as an apostate or infidel by the Najd Brothers, who desired to kill him, despite his being their master and imam, and within their revolt against him, they massacred women, children, and the elderly people.

3- Thus, the Wahabi Brothers differed from ordinary Bedouins and a shift in the Bedouin mentality and mindset was so big after such transformation; desert-Arabs would have run and avoided Abdul-Aziz in cases when fighting would grow fierce, as they knew no loyalty and were adamant in hypocrisy, and they might have revolted against him if they would have made sure of achieving victory and would be able to loot him with impunity. Bedouins forgot all such traits once they turned into the Najd Brothers who adopted the Wahabi ideology that led them to desire massacring and getting themselves killed to enter into Heaven in the Hereafter. Accordingly, their opposition knew no compromise or negotiations or grey areas. They always negated the other; this is the zero-equation imbibed by them via Abdul-Aziz and his Wahabi scholars: either all or nothing, black or white, to kill or get killed, me or you. Abdul-Aziz paid a heavy price for such education. "...But evil scheming overwhelms none but its authors…" (35:43). This heavy price paid as the political scene or arena would not be fit for the king and the Najd Brothers together after such disputes. No party was willing to be convinced with the arguments of the other party, and political opposition turned into military revolt and rebellion, and events had to end with the extermination of one party. Abdul-Aziz could have reached a compromise with Bedouins, but never with the Najd Brothers; but he failed miserably to satisfy them in all held conferences, and they grew adamant and more savage and brutal. When the king pardoned some of their leaders they revolted twice again with their troops against him and declared him as an infidel, and the king had to enlist the help of GB to get rid of them once and for all out of political life of the Saudi state.

Secondly: the Bedouin tribal fanaticism and the Bedouin Najd Brothers' fanaticism:

1- Bedouins were known for their tribal fanaticism, as desert tribes were akin to mobile states as long as there was no strong State controlling the desert; thus, tribal fanaticism linked Bedouins to their tribes that protect them and needed their protection as well in return in shared interests. Such tribal fanaticism carried inside it the negation of other tribes, as fights were endless for water, grazing areas, looting, revenge, etc., making Bedouins seeing in all other tribes as potential enemies in the present and in the future.

2- When Abdul-Aziz established the Najd Brothers, he mixed both tribal loyalty and loyalty for the Wahabi call, and he made sure to urge whole tribes to join him and to befriend their brethren from other tribes as all of them got a new identity: the Najd Brothers in colonies. Thus, tribes of Mateer and Otaybah, among others, became friends and allies under one banner, in all colonies, to overlap tribal belonging with religious unification factors.

3- Yet, such mixture never weakened tribal fanaticism; rather, it reinforced it more by merging it with religious bigotry and fanaticism. Tribal fanaticism cared for looting, grazing areas, and water wells, whereas religious bigotry and fanaticism cared for more universal level, as such animosity and deep-seated hatred would be directed to all circles widened or narrowed as per present conditions: against heathen, pagan infidels, the Jews and Christians, Muslims of other denominations (Sunnites, Shiites, and Sufis), all non-Wahabis in general, and then Non-Brothers Wahabis who did not use the Wahabi headwear and never joined the Najd Brothers in the colonies, and finally Abdul-Aziz and his allies, and so on. Thus, those outside the circle of Wahabism would be negated and massacred as infidels, polytheists, or apostates.

4- Ordinary tribal fanaticism resulted in temporary disputes, skirmishes, quarrels, and fights, even if they lasted for years, and they eventually end up in mutual agreements, tributes paid to wronged parties, and rarely by retribution. In contrast, Wahabi fanaticism and bigotry resulted in ongoing incessant wars until parties involved would be exterminated. At first, the winning stronger party would annihilate the weaker party, but the winners would be split and divided and its members would engage into wars and declare one another as infidels and renegades, and opposition movements and rebellions would thrive. This is part of the zero-equation: extermination and/or divisions within all parties involved eventually.

Thirdly: no theocracy can ever thrive or settle:

1- According to the above-mentioned facts, no fanatical religious movements can establish a state with firm stability and viability; it will certainly be a temporary and/or mobile state with changing borders however successful it appears to be. Al-Zanj and the Qarmatians established mobile states that spread massacres and wreaked havoc in many regions and vanished eventually. Let us bear in mind that the first KSA (1745:1818) and the second one (1819:1891) were destroyed. The former was destroyed by Muhammad Ali Pacha governor of Egypt, and the latter was established, with Egyptian aid, by Turki Ibn Abdulla Ibn Saud in 1819, and destroyed by Abdullah Ibn Rasheed, the ruler of Hael, in 1891. Hence, two Wahabi Saudi states collapsed and the same fate is expected for the third current KSA established by Abdul-Aziz with the swords of the Najd Brothers, whose rebellion and military revolt against the founder of the third KSA was the very first sign of such downfall. Other Wahabi opposition movements emerged as we will discuss in the coming chapters of this book. Rifts and disputes will go one to create more opposition movements until the third current KSA will collapse, unless it would collapse because of interference by international or regional powers. In any case, sooner or later, the third, current KSA will collapse like the first and second ones. A theocracy grows stronger and expands as long as there are weak countries around it, but once faced by a stronger state, it falls. Even if a theocracy is left alone in peace, it will eat itself up because of the curse of the zero-equation that negates the other and raises the motto of ''to kill all of you or to get killed by you''.

2- In some cases, fanatical religious movements of bigots could not establish a state in the first place; Al-Khawarij spread their terror in Persia, Iraq, and the Levant, and never established a kingdom despite hundreds of thousands of military and civilian victims who were killed. Al-Khawarij group was later on divided into groups and they sapped the energies and the treasury of the Umayyad caliphate, which hastened its collapse. Al-Khawarij ended as a people shortly after the rise of the Abbasid caliphate, with only some of them living until their descendants, the Ibadi sect of Muslims, survive now, because their forefathers were more tolerant with differences in creeds, despite their Bedouin origin.

3- Had Abdul-Aziz linked himself to the Najd Brothers, he would have been finished with them; he had to get rid of them quickly so that the KSA would thrive as a viable state. Even during the Middle Ages, with religious (doctrinal and denominational) fanaticism as its main feature, never allowed room for the Shiite Hassan Al-Sabah, leader of the Assassins group, to form a real, viable state; he kept threatening Sunnites and Shiites as well as crusaders and Saladin, with his suicidal assassins who were messengers of death that terrorized all preachers, sultans, leaders, and caliphs at the time. Such assassins were called in Arabic ''Hashasheen'' (i.e., hookah or hash addicts), and the word is the root of the terms ''assassin'' and ''assassination'' in English and other European languages. Hence, in fact, Hassan Al-Sabah was merely the head of a group of gangsters and hit-men who used to reside most of their time in Alamut Castle, which was a very strong fortress, spreading terror until Hulago destroyed their castle. Hence, the idea of reviving religious fanaticism and bigotry by sheer force, terrorism, destruction, and wreaking havoc within regional areas is no longer a good one to establish any state within our modern age.

4- We address the previous point as a piece of advice to the terrorist MB group, in Egypt and elsewhere, and its overt and covert Wahabi organizations that sprang out of it, bearing and spreading the same Wahabi terrorist ideology.

Footnotes:

25- Wahba, ditto, pages 285 and 286.

Al-Khawarij as the real forefathers of the Wahabi Najd Brothers:

Firstly: between Bedouin extremism and the Najd Brothers' extremism:

1- The above-mentioned words of Hafiz Wahba assert that the ordinary Bedouins were extremists as far as staying alive and survival are concerned in desert environment with scarce water and difficult weather that led them to loot and raid, always on the run in all directions to gain something to survive with. Such extremism was linked to strong enthusiasm and the desire to survive; the Bedouins used to loot and raid in order to live, eat, and drink, not to get killed or martyred. Thus, Bedouins used to ally themselves to some military leaders and if such leaders were about to get defeated, they would forsake them and flee with the spoils or booty before anyone else. Such contradictions, fickleness, and lack of loyalty tell us that Bedouins thought only of immediate interests and gains, even if this meant to turn against one's friends or allies to rob them, as long as those friends or allies would be killed or robbed anyway, a justification to loot those allies with clear conscience.

2- The worst justification ever for any crimes is a religious one; it turns ordinary Bedouin raids into 'jihad' to massacre peaceful people, including women, children, and elderly people, under the pretexts of merely differences in opinions or views. Thus, swords would be used to settle disputes about intellectual notions, and disputes escalate and increase, qualitatively and quantitatively, to divide all warring parties, with extremist stances and attitudes wavering and changing without prior notice and at a glance, with armed rebellions murdering the peaceful innocent ones. This was reflected in the terror caused by Al-Khawarij, the spiritual forefathers (or Godfathers) of the Najd Brothers, despite the centuries between the era of the so-called companions of Prophet Muhammad, when Al-Khawarij emerged within civil wars, and the early 20^th century when the Najd Brothers were formed by Abdul-Aziz. It seems that the Najd environment is the cause of terrorists to appear in both eras! Below, we give a historical overview of the emergence of Al-Khawarij.

Secondly: the emergence of Al-Khawarij in the history of Muslims:

1- Desert-Arabs, i.e., Bedouins, before the advent of Islam, used to fight on another incessantly within ongoing raids, but they left caravans of the Qorayish tribe untouched every summer and winter, as this tribe guaranteed such security by keeping the stone idol of every tribe within the Kaaba shrine, and this tribe controlled pilgrimage of all Arabs coming from all over Arabia to Mecca. Thus, Bedouins lived in hunger and lack of security, unlike the Qorayish tribe that enjoyed security and prosperity; see the Quranic Chapter 106, 29:67, and 28:57.

2- The Qorayish tribe, led by the Umayyads, felt the urgent need to fight Islam once it emerged, and within the margin of the struggle between early Muslims and the Qorayish tribe, some desert-Arabs or Bedouins converted to Islam. Debates began about idolatry and worship of gods made of stone, and how Qorayish earned huge wealth because of such myths by manipulating Arabs within the pilgrimage season. Thus, both early Muslims and disbelievers alike realized how Qorayish had deceived Arabs for a long time, and how gods and idols of Qorayish failed to protect Mecca. People began to realize that their interests lied in liberating themselves from the Qorayish influence and control. Of course, as always in all human history, clergymen live off ignorance of people and they had enlightenment and discussions of any stable notions inherited as ancestral traditions. The advent of Islam and is spread peacefully exposed Qorayish and destroyed its authority and power it used to enjoy over Arabs to control them to serve its purposes. Desert-Arabs threatened the trade caravans of Qorayish every summer and winter. Eventually, the majority of Qorayish saw that their interests that dictated before their fighting Islam to nip it in the bud drove them to a sudden, swift mass conversions to Islam; hence, Mecca was conquered by early Muslims peacefully without battle after a period of truce. As per the Quranic Chapter 9, the Qorayish leaders of disbelief revolted at first, but hastily succumbed to the status quo of Mecca that fell into the hands of the state and troops of Prophet Muhammad, shortly before his death. Within short months before his death, Qorayish enjoyed self-rule, and so did all tribes everywhere in Arabia and Bedouins as well. Zakat (alms) money was taken from them willingly to be given to the poorer ones, without coercion; as zakat sharia laws prevent taking it by force. God has prevented Muhammad from taking zakat, to distribute it among the poor, from hypocrites who gave it reluctantly and not piously; see 9:54. The new change enjoyed by Arabs and Bedouins in general was equality and justice, with no superiority for any tribes, especially Qorayish, as per the Quranic rule of equality of all human beings because they descended from one father and one mother, urged to know one another, not to fight one another; see 39:13.

3- Renegades' Wars: Muhammad fell ill and died, and Abou Bakr became the ruler, or caliph, allowing ample room for the Qorayish power and authority to emerge again, with a vengeance. Bedouins felt apprehension and animosity vis-à-vis the union between immigrants to Yathreb who converted earlier to Islam and the Qorayish tribesmen who converted recently to Islam. The reason for that was they understood that such unity among Qorayish tribesmen in Mecca and Yathreb would mean that the desert-Arabs would be excluded from the new state of affairs. During the final illness period of Muhammad, desert-Arabs of Najd wanted ardently to assert their status after his imminent death. They thought wrongly that since Prophet Muhammad was from Qorayish, this prophethood might bring the tribe some merit to go ahead of all tribes to lead them once more as it used before. Thus, the political opposition of the Bedouins transformed and evolved into the laughter-inducing call of a new religion that caused the renegades wars, as political rebellion was linked with a man who claimed to be a prophet, known as Musailama the Liar, who came from Najd in its Haneefa Valley (astonishingly, the location of the Wahabi call centuries later!), and this false prophet has sent a letter to Prophet Muhammad during his dying illness, saying: (…From Musailama, a new prophet of God, to Muhammad the prophet of God, greetings to you, we have been ordained by God to share prophethood with you, and we have the right to rule and own half of Arabia and Qorayish would rule and own the other half, but the Qorayish tribesmen are an aggressive lot …) (quoted from Al-Tabari; 3/146). Once Musailama died, other renegades; movements emerged, leading Qorayish and the Umayyads understand that such movements of Bedouins indicated resentment against Qorayish assuming back its hegemony; Qorayish tribesmen had to fight and confront such renegades. When renegades were crushed and defeated; Qorayish saw to it that Bedouins must get busy with Arab conquests of neighboring countries to remove them away from Arabia and ward off their evil and sap their military energy and urge for rebellion. Another reason for that was the fact that the Umayyads, prominent ones among the Qorayish tribe, coveted very much the immense wealth, riches, and possessions of river-side lands in Iraq, Egypt, and the Levant. Hence, the Umayyads convinced easily all desert-Arabs to spread 'Islam' with spears and swords within military force, as a form of 'jihad'. This contradicted the Quran of course. Bedouins agreed with joy as they wanted very much to return to their old ways of looting and raiding. This was the very first time in Arabia that raiding, conquering, and looting would be justified with a 'religious' motive in the name of jihad, as per their whims, as they would be winners anyway: martyrdom & paradise or spoils & victory. They fought with all their might and enthusiasm, achieving resounding victories over the two most powerful empires in the Middle Ages (the Persians and the Byzantines), and thus, Qorayish used the sword and military prowess to loot the safes and treasuries of so many countries like Persia, Egypt,…etc.

4- Disputes occurred between Qorayish and the Bedouins over spoils, and military revolts evolved into civil wars among the so-called companions of Prophet Muhammad, and within such civil strife Al-Khawarij emerged, and military battles occurred because of disputes over lands within borders between Najd and Iraq. Bedouins coveted such fertile lands for themselves as they conquered and invaded it with their swords, as they left the Levant, Egypt, Persia, and North Africa to Umayyads. Othman, the third caliph, adamantly refused to give the Bedouin such lands as Marwan Ibn Al-Hakam controlled Othman and advised him to ignore their demand. Revolt against Othman began by Bedouins among others and ended up with his assassination in Yathreb inside his house, which was sieged by desert-Arabs for a while before they burgled into it and killed him. Ali was appointed as caliph instead, and civil strife began for years, and has not ended, in our opinion, until now in the 21th century Middle East and Arab world.

5- Ali, the new caliph, had to fight Mu'aweiya, but the family of Mu'aweiya, the Umayyads, prepared a cruel surprise to Ali: they urged famous ones among the so-called companions of Muhammad to turn against him: Al-Zubayr and Talha, and both were joined by Aisha, the widow of Muhammad. With the endeavors of Marwan Ibn Al-Hakam Ibn Al-'As Ibn Umayya, war broke out by Ali against both men and Aisha, within the battle of the Camel, and Al-Zubayr and Talha got killed. Thus, at that point, the Umayyads got rid of most of the dangerous elements among the so-called companions of Muhammad, except Ali and some Bedouins with him. Ali was exhausted because of the battle of the Camel, whereas Mu'aweiya prepared for a big, decisive battle to enable his proclaiming himself as caliph; under the pretext that he was the nearest relative of Othman, the assassinated caliph, and that he was to avenge his assassination accordingly. During this decisive battle of Siffein, Ali was about to win victory, but Amr Ibn Al-'As (chief ally and military leader of Mu'aweiya) resorted to a cunning plan: he ordered soldiers and cavaliers to put copies of the Quran on spears to stop the battle and asking for arbitration using the Quran. Ali refused to accept such a device meant to deceive him and his allies, as the Umayyad armies wanted to avoid imminent defeat. Yet, Bedouins among troops of Ali forced him to accept the arbitration and to stop fighting; they threatened Ali to hold him captive to his foe, Mu'aweiya, if he did not accept the arbitration call. Of course, the ploy or trick of arbitration ended up with Amr, representative of Mu'aweiya, deceiving Abou Moussa Al-Ashaary, representative of Ali. Bedouins supporting Ali realized that they were deceived and that Ali had been right to refuse arbitration; but instead of obeying Ali, they revolted against him for accepting results of arbitration! They called themselves Al-Khawarij (i.e., literally in Arabic, those who went out), and they fought against Ali and assassinated him eventually. Al-Khawarij went on fighting Umayyads during their decades of caliphate.

6- In Sum: within one generation, Bedouins and desert-Arabs were polytheists who converted to Islam shortly before Muhammad's death, and once he died, they became renegades who forsook Islam, and then reconverted to Islam again, and later on, they became conquerors during the caliphate of Abou Bakr and Omar, revolting group during the caliphate of Othman, and became finally Al-Khawarij during the caliphate of Ali. These transformations occurred between Muhammad's death in 11 A.H. /632 A.D. to Ali's assassination in 40 A.H. /661 A.D. this is less than three decades, ending in their being rebels for some decades against the Umayyads. Such transformations were sudden and swift, unprecedented in history, as their shifts and movements were violent and used religious pretexts for looting, spoils, and conquests, as they changed loyalties and focuses suddenly and without prior notice throughout the major events between 11 and 40 A.H.

7- Using religious pretexts, Al-Khawarij began early the heinous crimes of massacring peaceful, innocent, poor ones as well as women and children, even slashing with diggers the stomachs of pregnant women, horrendous crimes that began by an Al-Khawarij sub-group named Al-Hururiyya, which turned against Ali who shunned them and ignored them, but they murdered civilians and women, and Ali had to fight them to stop their crimes. Al-Tabari narrates that when Al-Khawarij deserted Ali, a group of them named themselves Al-Hururiyya was fought by some of supporters of Ali instead of obeying him in continuing to fight against Mu'aweiya. Ali refused at first to fight Al-Hururiyya, but he had to fight them eventually as they massacred girls, pregnant women and children and innocent non-warring men. Ali killed them off with his troops within the battle of Al-Nahrawan, as per historical accounts of Al-Tabari, who writes that they used to massacre and slaughter men if they mentioned any political views different from theirs (26).

Thirdly: the difference between Al-Khawarij and the Najd Brothers:

From the very beginning, desert-Arabs and Bedouins allowed themselves to massacre peaceful innocent men, women, and children, and even pregnant women, using religious pretexts of their own fabrication as per their whims. They never did this before the advent of Islam, when they roamed the Arabian deserts. Ordinary Bedouin extremism used to be confined to deserts within tribal political and looting competitiveness in Arabia. When such crimes would be justified using religious notions or slogans later on, this made desert-Arabs and Bedouins get out of Arabia in conquests to terrorize innocent peoples of the Levant, Iraq, Egypt, Persia, North Africa, etc. who paid a heavy price of such Arab conquerors' aggression in the first century A.H. as Arab conquests were crimes perpetrated in the name of Islam and later-on revolts raised the banner and motto of ''no judgment except by God''. When the modern age has come in the 20^th century, desert-Arabs and Bedouins raised Wahabi banners as if Wahabism were Islam, and they followed the footsteps of their ancestors in looting and massacring under religious slogans. Desert-Arabs and Bedouins were infuriated because the British built the fortress of Boseih to guard Iraqis against Wahabi raids and massacres. Because the fortress of Boseih did not exist in the 1^st century A.H., it represented a barrier that prevented the Najd Brothers from repeating the history of massacres and looting of their forefathers. Hence, the fortress of Boseih was the center of the Wahabi opposition of the Najd Brothers against Abdul-Aziz, which evolved into rebellion and military revolt until they were killed off by the British and Abdul-Aziz, ironically within a battle near the fortress of Boseih. Al-Khawarij killed Ali and he was more lenient with them; thus, if Abdul-Aziz did not get rid of the Wahabi Najd Brothers, they would have killed him, and the history of Arabia and regions around it would have changed.

Footnotes:

26- History of Al-Tabari, edited by M. Abou-Al-Fadl Ibrahim, 3/146, 5/81:83.

ANNEXES:

Annex I: This is a commentary to conclude CHAPTER III of this book's PART I, an article published before on our website on 27^th of June, 2014.

A Great Step by the Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi: Reforming the School Curricula of Religious Studies

Introduction:

1- We have read the news about a good step taken by Al-Sisi, on the website mojaznews.com.

2- This piece of news tackles the intention of the Egyptian Ministry of Education, under the auspices of Al-Sisi, to formulate obligatory curricula books, on all school grades, on morals and ethics to replace curricula books of religious studies (both Coptic Orthodox and 'Islamic') in public schools; the Egyptian street has witnessed recently low levels of moralistic values, especially that rates of sexual harassment of female citizens have increased. Such new curricula would be applied in the school year 2014-2015. The Egyptian President urges the completion of this step due to the lack of moralistic values among most Egyptian youth. The new curricula would get the agreement of the Orthodox Church and Al-Azhar, and it would show the values of tolerance in the celestial religions and show their impact on civilization. We have remembered our endeavors during the era of Mubarak to propose projects of reform of education before the year 2000.

Firstly:

1- We have felt pleased to read about such a step; reform we have dreamed of is about to be realized. Some of our 30-year old endeavor would bear its fruits, especially in reform of education and Al-Azhar. Our book published here on our website titled "Tenets of Islamic Sharia and Means of Application" mentions details on such reform in schools curricula of Egyptian education, Al-Azhar, and reform of mosques.

2- One day, we would publish some personal history accounts within our intellectual battles with some personalities, which occurred because of our call for reform on all levels. Among such battles is a major one about reforming Egyptian education. Our projected have been called "Egyptian Education and Tolerance", propagated and discussed within Ibn Khaldoun Center in the period 1989:1999. The main focus of our project has been reforming school religious studies curricula for both Egyptian Sunnites and Coptic Orthodox curricula and the curricula of history and Arabic language. We have written as well teachers' guide about how to teach the new curricula proposed in the project. We have written as well a movie scenario about a famous Coptic character during the Abbasid Era, and its synopsis is published here on our website titled "A Great Copt in the Era of Treacherous Caliph". We have written a documentary movie on the Egyptian phenomenon of Egyptian Sunnites attending Christian saints, especially the Virgin Mary, festivals in churches of Cairo. This documentary movie was produced by Ibn Khaldoun Center. The owner of this center, the sociologist Dr. Saad Eddine Ibrahim, opened the forum to discuss our project and invited personalities from all Egyptian institutions: Egyptian Cabinet, Ministry of Education, the Coptic Orthodox Church, Al-Azhar, media men, some people from the cultural elite and writers. We were surprised to find vitriolic attack and criticism from all parties, especially concerning reforming the curricula of Sunnite religious studies. Our person was verbally abused. No one among these attackers read carefully what we have written; they asked Azharite men about us and attacked us verbally based on the Azharite stance against us. When criticism and verbal abuse dwindled gradually, some others read or project carefully, and discussions took place to apply it on some samples of students and teachers, with proper remuneration and rewards for them. This was never materialized; Ibn Khaldoun Center was closed down, and its owner was arrested. Several Egyptian Quranists affiliated with the center, under our direction, got arrested due to their participation in the project. Before they would get us, we fled to the USA; if we would have been arrested among criminals, we surely would have been got killed in prison!

3- Later on, we will publish all details of the project of reforming education. Here, suffice it to mentions some brief points.

Secondly: An overview of the project "Egyptian Education and Tolerance" and contents of our book Teachers' Guide on how to teach religious studies in schools:

1- from the introduction: "… we mean to offer a reform point of view to change the way religion is taught in school curricula to make them approach the facts and tenets of Islam, based on the Quranist studies over the major values and tenets of Islam that ought to be taught and applied in our lives. Eventually, we propose curricula of moralistic values and ethics to replace books of Sunnite Islam and Coptic Orthodox studies in schools, and the new curricula should have grades/points to be added to the final exams results. Such changes in methodology of teaching religion must not contain any error; otherwise, dangers concerning Egypt and its citizens would occur. A unified curriculum of ethics and morals to all Sunnite and Orthodox students is a good start to focus on avoiding divisions and discriminations among equal citizens. The unified books for all students should urge tolerance, human rights, charity, piety, justice, love, patience, peace, and chastity, values urged in Islam as we read in the Quran, and urged in the Bible. Some other values include resisting injustice, aggression, ugliness, evildoing, wrongdoing, sinning, extremism, violence, terrorism, and enmity. Such a new curriculum would be a balance to create new generations of upright citizens. If such balance would fail, obnoxious impact would be felt on creeds and the nation. For the love of Islam and Egypt, we have written this book. Signature: Dr. Ahmed Subhy Mansour 1998".

2- Contents of the book: Teachers' Guide: A Vision on Teaching Islamic Studies in Schools. PART I: Samples of errors in the public guides for teachers: Firstly: Demonizing the other. Secondly: Ignoring the other. Thirdly: Ignoring Egypt and its stature in the Quran. Fourthly: Ignoring Quranic stories about Egypt and the Egyptians. Fifthly: Ignoring piety as the Islamic uppermost value. PART II: Guiding teachers of Islamic studies in schools. Firstly: Getting to know vales of Islam in the Quran: justice – absolute religious freedom – tolerance (charity and patience) – charity and patience in the call to Islam – pardoning and forgiveness – charity in one's heart – relation between patience and charity. Fighting in Islam is only in cases of self-defense, especially to insure freedom of religion and to achieve peace. Secondly: Belonging to Egypt and allegiance to it is a duty of all Egyptian citizens. Characteristics of Egypt as we read them in the Quran. Conclusions: Concerning new curricula hat unify Sunnite and Orthodox Coptic students within one shared book for all creeds: 1- about acts of worship 2- about demeanor, moralistic values, and ethics and how to combat destructive behavior. Final notes on application mechanisms.

Lastly:

1- Any reformer talks a lot about the bad points, urging their change, and rarely praises anything or anyone; yet we sincerely laud Al-Sisi in this step of education reform, hoping he would be a torchbearer and trailblazer of reformation on all levels: especially legislative and constitutional. Terrorism cannot be fought only by policemen and military men; its roots are deep-seated in tents that claim to be part of Islam, but they are not part of it for sure. Egypt needs comprehensive reform on many aspects, based on justice and freedom.

2- We never lauded or faltered before in our life any ruler of Egypt. We remain specialized in criticizing the bad points and aspects. Yet, we see some goodness in Al-Sisi. May God help him to reform all that has been distorted and corrupted by his predecessors.

Annex II: an article published before on our website on 19^th of June, 2014, as a commentary on events taking place at the time, when ISIS terrorist group members have been wreaking havoc in Iraq and Syria and committing massacres to achieve the aims of Wahabi jihad, just as the Najd Brothers during the reign of Abdul-Aziz; this articles was published while the book of Wahabi opposition movements was serialized in article form.

Turn it into a Motto: ISIS Members Are Infidels and Sons of a Bitch!

Introduction: a contemporary comment during the publishing of our book "The Wahabi Opposition Movements in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Twentieth Century":

1- During serializing this book in article form, a book finished in June, 2001, in Cairo, we watch atrocities committed now in Syria and Iraq, and we feel bound to comment and warn again, as we have done before, but the Arab Muhammadans never listen and never understand.

2- ISIS terrorists follow the footsteps of the Najd Brothers of Abdul-Aziz. Trying to achieve what the Najd Brothers failed to make, ISIS members go one massacring to establish their own state. The Najd Brothers had disputes with Abdul-Aziz because they wanted to go on with their Sunnite Wahabi jihad by massacring men, women, and children of Iraq and the Levant. Abdul-Aziz stopped them as the modern age, with which he wanted to cope in the KSA, does not tolerate such raids anymore. Abdul-Aziz helped to establish the terrorist MB group in Egypt to fulfill the dream of unifying all Arab lands under Wahabi rule later on, when the times would be convenient, outside of and apart from his burgeoning kingdom. Sadly, these convenient times might be our sad era now; the MB terrorist organization has countless branches worldwide and several terrorist Wahabi groups branched out of it, such as ISIS. ISIS group is being financed and logistically aided by the USA, the KSA, and Qatar, as well as terrorist organizations like Al-Baath, Al-Qaeda, and the MB. Thus, ISIS is being helped by local, regional, and international circles, amidst doubted silence of the international community. Such powers aiding ISIS might differ with one another in some matters, but they are now unified in one thing: to destroy Iraq and the Levant to spite Iran.

3- ISIS terrorist group represents such diabolical, devilish pact, with the KSA, axis of evil in the world, in its center. Such evils is rooted since the very first KSA 1745:1818, and that evil has grown exponentially in the third, current KSA established by Abdul-Aziz with the swords of the Najd Brothers, who were killed off later on by GB and Abdul-Aziz, and the name of Al-Saud family was given to the burgeoning kingdom in 1932: the KSA: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

4- What we write here is not new; we have been reminding readers of it for the past 30 years in hundreds of articles, researches, and books. We summarize the whole thing in a nutshell in this article title: "ISIS Members Are Infidels and Sons of a Bitch!" of course, some readers might not like the coarse language used in this article title, but this is the least that could be said about the ISIS inhuman savages that massacre innocent people in the name of Islam, and get described in the media as ''Islamists'' of an ''Islamic movement'' or the so-called Islamism/political Islam. Such terms are extremely insulting to Islam: stop abusing and tarnishing the name of Islam, you Muhammadans!

5- Make it a motto: "ISIS Members Are Infidels and Sons of a Bitch!", and this motto must be uttered whenever a piece of news is heard, watched, or read about atrocities of ISIS committed against civilians terrorized by it. This motto must be written on all walls in the streets and on banners raised in sit-ins, marches, and demonstrations. This will certainly help in the downfall and collapse of the legend of ISIS. This is the least that could be done in defense of Islam and to notify the world of the rights of the poor victims of ISIS!

Firstly: "ISIS Members Are Infidels and Sons of a Bitch!"

1- There are two types of disbelief in Islam: 1) disbelief in terms of behavior or demeanor, which means unjustified and unjust armed aggression against innocent people, especially to coerce them in matters of religion, and 2) disbelief in terms of faith inside one's heart or mind, which is subdivide into two sorts: A) disbelief in terms of practices: such as worshipping and sanctifying mausoleums and 'holy' tombs, and B) disbelief in terms of knowledge: worshipping and sanctifying ancient theological volumes, tomes, and books of imams and worshipping and sanctifying these imams/scholars. When both types of disbelief (in terms of demeanor and faith) combine in one person/group, this is the worst type of disbelief, which leads to a worse crime: when such unjust criminals and disbelievers ascribe themselves to Islam!

2- Islam is the religion of peace, revealed to the humankind by God, the Merciful, the Compassionate, via the prophet sent as a mercy to the humankind: "We did not send you except as mercy to humankind." (21:107). Prophets of God describe Him as the Most Merciful of the merciful. This is uttered by Jacob: "He said, "Shall I trust you with him, as I trusted you with his brother before? God is the Best Guardian, and He is the Most Merciful of the merciful."" (12:64), by Joseph: "He said, "There is no blame upon you today. God will forgive you. He is the Most Merciful of the merciful."" (12:92), and by Job: "And Job, when he cried out to his Lord: "Great harm has afflicted me, and you are the Most Merciful of the merciful."" (21:83).

3- Thus, Allah, the Most Merciful of the merciful, has sent Muhammad as a mercy to humankind; yet, ISIS terrorist organization and its likes (e.g., Al-Qaeda and the MB), are worshipping a different god, not Allah/God the Merciful the Compassionate. Such infidels worship a blood-thirsty, violent, merciless god, and their ancestors, the Sunnite Ibn Hanbal doctrine followers, had invented for them an imaginary, false prophet in books of the so-called ''Muhammad's biography'', which differs 100% from the historical character of Muhammad mentioned in the Quran. Their false prophet in their books killed POWs and captives, ordered the assassination of opponents and foes, and committed aggression and atrocities against the innocent, peaceful people. In such books of falsehoods, they created a false creed in which their imaginary prophet was ordained to fight the world and its inhabitant to coerce them to convert to his creed! Of course, such madness contradicts the Quran; yet, such criminals, past and present, has had the nerve to ascribe themselves to Islam!

4- that is why we vehemently say to them this motto: "ISIS Members Are Infidels and Sons of a Bitch!"

Secondly: "ISIS Members Are Infidels and Sons of a Bitch!"

1- It is most unlucky for the region of Iraq and the Levant, rich in rivers, fertile lands, and ancient civilization, to be located in the north of Arabian Desert, especially north of the Najd region with its arid climate, and tis people desert-Arabs and Bedouins, described in the Quran as the most steeped in hypocrisy and disbelief. We have noted in our writings the relation of such raiding Bedouins with the Levant and Iraq region in history: ongoing Bedouin raids that committed aggressions against this region for the sake of loot, or for the sake of both loot alongside with 'religious' justification that endorsed massacring and enslavement of innocent civilians: peaceful men, women, and children, using a Shiite or Sunnite jihad motto, as we read in the history of Al-Khawarij, Al-Zanj, the Qarmatians, and finally, Wahabism and its recent offshoot: ISIS.

2- When such groups of history became history and no longer existed, what remains are pages with cries of millions of innocent victims, and no one cared about them. The unjust tyrannical criminals had gone, but after they looted, enslaved, and massacred thousands of poor victims within atrocities registered in history books. ISIS and its siblings, who are offshoots of the Saudi Wahabism: axis of terror and evil now in the planet, follow the footsteps of such criminals mentioned in history, and will end up by turning into mere history after they are crushed one day.

3- ISIS terrorists are repeating the crimes of its predecessors among criminals committing violence in the name of religion; not only in manipulating the name of Islam but also in committing crimes such as raping (fornication jihad!), enslaving, looting, massacring, indiscriminate, random killings, and premeditated murder.

4- Let us remember the following Quranic verse: "God commands justice, and goodness, and generosity towards relatives. And He forbids immorality, and injustice, and oppression. He advises you, so that you may take heed." (16:90). We beg readers that whenever they watch a video of ISIS murdering and butchering innocent victims, they should utter and spread this motto: "ISIS Members Are Infidels and Sons of a Bitch!"

Thirdly: "ISIS Members Are Infidels and Sons of a Bitch!"

1- We have published on our website several articles covering the topic of the emergence of the Ibn Hanbal doctrine/creed and its destructive influence over Iraq in history, and as usual, such articles are later on grouped in a book form, titled "Ibn Hanbal Doctrine as the Mother of Wahabism and the Cause of the Destruction of Iraq in the Second Abbasid Era". We have indicated in this book that the Ibn Hanbal doctrine sheikhs and scholars in Iraq in that era had turned the masses, scum of the earth, highwaymen, and thieves into leaders and soldiers in service of extremism and fanaticism. We have explained how followers of the Ibn Hanbal creed followers caused 1) the regress and the backwardness of the intellectual life of Muslims at the time, 2) the extermination of Mu'tazala imams who called for the methodology of using one's mind and intellect and mental faculties in understanding religion, and 3) the persecution and/or marginalization of other Sunnite scholars who rejected the Ibn Hanbal doctrine, such as Al-Tabari and the imams of the Ashaary doctrine. Wahabism since the establishment of the very first KSA, and until now within the third current KSA, has spread religious ignorance and myth along with the Ibn Hanbal doctrine extremism and fanatical bigotry and expansionist jihad, invasion, and conquest that led to the massacring civilian innocent and peaceful men, women, and children. By recruiting the masses using oil revenues and within the conditions of the struggle for Gulf oil, on both the regional and international levels, savage organizations of terror emerge, recruiting thousands of frustrated, revengeful youths who find in joining such terrorist groups a chance of leadership and heroism to wreak revenge on their societies' based supreme authority, power, wealth, and affluence. Such furious youths find enjoyment in killing their foes in creed, doctrine, or religion, as they by this manner vent their fury, chronic frustration, inferiority complexes, and psychological ailments.

2- It is impossible to eradicate and eliminate terrorism using security and military solutions alone; if all extremists and terrorists of the globe would be collected in one place to be killed off, this will never put an end to terrorism. Thought must be faced and refuted by thought; hence, terrorist thought would remain dominant and strong enough to murder millions of people and to spread corruption on earth as long as it associates itself to Islam, without this association being questioned and refuted. Thus, terrorist thought would produce generations of terrorists within the coming decades. We never grow tired of calling for the establishment of an intellectual reformist movement supported with laws and legislations that assert absolute and complete religious and intellectual freedom, freedom of speech, expression, and thought. Such freedoms should include Wahabis themselves. Without such liberties and freedoms, Wahabism would remain fortified against criticism, questioning, and refutation, under the pretext that it represents Islam. Wahabism always needs to link itself to some power/authority to protect itself from being put to question, because it can be easily refuted and debunked, leading to its collapse, when it is disassociated from power and authority.

3- As long as ISIS and its siblings among terrorist groups are called in the media as ''Islamist'' movements or linked to Islamism (i.e., the falsehood known as political Islam), they would remain associated wrongly with Islam, and this is injustice toward Islam and a violation of it, and thus, more bloodbaths would occur to all secular people, Christians, Shiites, Wahabis, non-Wahabis, and the rest of poor, innocent human beings all over the world.

4- Hence, we beg all readers to utter and spread this motto: "ISIS Members Are Infidels and Sons of a Bitch!"

Annex III: This article of ours was first published on 25^th of June 2014, and it concludes this CHAPTER III of PART I.

Al-Qaradawy Is the Imam of the Terrorist ISIS Group Members

Firstly: the ISIS terrorists:

1- A YouTube video is showing an ISIS terrorist walking in the streets, armed with machine gun, wearing a thick, long beard and a Middle-Ages garb. If it had not for the modern machine gun, one could easily imagine this terrorist as getting out of a Middle-Ages history books; he looks like one of the Qarmatians or Al-Khawarij. This ISIS terrorist, with his attire and appearance, asserts one fact: the power of a dominant earthly, man-made religion to change people and to revive the corrupt past in order to wreak havoc and spread massacres while shouting "Allahu akbar!" (i.e., God is the Greatest!).

2- This ISIS terrorist is, in his turn, a victim himself; he used to be an innocent child, laughing and crying, attracting the admiration and love of those seeing him in his cradle, just like any child in the world, regardless of color, gender, race, ethnicity, culture, time and place. Differences occur when the children grow up and be exposed to their surrounding environment and culture in the spot in which they are brought up in any continent. By chance, such children might be Arab, within an Arab country where the worst of the earthly, man-made religions dominates: Wahabism. Western youths live the present and the future, whereas the Salafist/Wahabi youths in Arab countries live the ancient past of the Middle-Ages eras, reviving it to re-create and impose it in the present, modern age! Within such Arab societies of such youths, corruption and tyranny dominate everyday life; a few families confiscate absolute power, authority, and wealth, persecuting and enslaving the vast majority. To divert and keep such vast majority of citizens busy, the affluent minority impose the Wahabi creed on them to urge them to use it as an alternative tool to vent, or rather vomit, their frustrations, grudges, and unfulfilled dreams. Many Wahabi youths turn themselves into criminals and killers who massacre innocent people mercilessly, thinking they do the right thing in terms of religious rewards in the Hereafter! They imagine that by virtue of such heinous crimes, especially suicide terrorist operations, they would die to directly enter Paradise and copulate with houris (i.e., heavenly maidens)!

Secondly: Al-Qaradawy as the imam of ISIS:

1- Islam has but one source, the Quran, which contradicts Wahabism and its terror, as the Quran calls for mercy, charity, justice, freedom of all kinds, tolerance, …etc. the Quranic legislations include engaging in fighting only in cases of self-defense, as well as caring for the rights of captives or POWs. This shows that the Quran cares for the right to live, with severe punishment, in this world and the next, for those who murder peaceful, innocent people.

2- Wahabism distorts Islam and tarnishes its name; such deceit done with brainwashed ISIS members and with youths from other terrorist organizations has been done by the worst type of criminals ever: Wahabi clergymen and sheikhs, including Al-Qaradawy, the biggest imam/leader of ISIS criminals and their likes among Wahabis in general.

3- ISIS terrorists massacre innocent people enthusiastically, and their victims increase with the passage of time; yet, the terrorist ISIS youths are victims, themselves, and they are made so by the likes of sheikh Al-Qaradawy: all imams, clergymen, theologians, and sheikhs of the Wahabi religion. Such Wahabi sheikhs are the most blood-thirsty, savage, and brutal human beings that ever existed; they are the real archenemies of Almighty God, of Islam, of all humanity, and all moralistic and ethical values. No one among the Wahabi sheikhs would imagine that his son(s) would join ISIS or would turn into Wahabi jihadist(s) or suicide bomber(s). Wahabi sheikhs and clergymen just fill their coffers and ban accounts with money by misguiding innocent youths who would willingly turn into suicide bombers and murderers who kill innocent persons. Such sheikhs are being sanctified, worshipped, and made holy, as adorers kneel to kiss their hands and donate large sums of money to them. Such type of clergymen intentionally hides and distorts the Quranic facts in order to gain money; God tells us the following verses about them: "Those who conceal what God revealed in the Book, and exchange it for a small price-those swallow nothing but fire into their bellies. And God will not speak to them on the Day of Resurrection, nor will He purify them, and they will have a painful punishment. It is they who exchange guidance for error, and forgiveness for punishment. But why do they insist on entering the Eternal Fire?" (2:174-175). Such corrupt clergymen intentionally overlook the Quran, the only source of guidance in Islam, to spread falsehoods instead of guidance, and if they will not repent, they will suffer eternally in Hell in the Hereafter.

4- Because of the heinous, barbaric crimes and the corruption of the leaders/clergymen of the earthly, man-made religions in Europe, Europeans revolted against the Church. Karl Marx spread the famous quotation that religion is the opium of the masses. We tend to believe that this quotation is referring to the earthly, man-made religions; as the heavenly, real religion has no influence at all at the time in Europe and elsewhere. Some extremists wished to strangle the last tyrant with the entrails of the last priest. Europeans never forgot the atrocities committed by catholic clergymen in the Middle-Ages, and they revolted against mixing religion with political life. Eventually, after long struggle, Catholicism is confined to church walls, with its clergymen specializing in charity and social events. Europe achieved its renaissance with secularism/laïcité, and its modernization and scientific advancements spread all over the world. Egypt was about to catch up with the European train of progress in the 19^th century, but all endeavors were foiled because of the emergence of Wahabism and its spread in Egypt to dominate the aspects of life in it. Egypt's gradual conversion to Wahabism in the 20^th century was done through the terrorist MB group members as well as all Salafist/Wahabi societies that spread Wahabism among most of the Muhammadans in Egypt and in all Arab countries. The Wahabi Egyptian preachers have turned into 'holy' imams adored by millions of Muhammadans. Such imams include Al-Sharaawy, Al-Ghazaly, and Al-Qaradawy.

Thirdly: two types of preachers:

1- As far as religious calls are concerned, people are divided into two categories: preachers and their audience. Preachers in their turn are divided into two types; the very first one is those preachers who peacefully preach the Quranic message, which contains the true traditions of Prophet Muhammad. God has said this verse to Muhammad about the Quran and preaching it as a form of intellectual jihad against aggressive disbelievers: "So do not obey the disbelievers, but strive against them with it, a mighty struggle." (25:52). Thus, Muhammad preached, warned and brought glad tidings using the Quran alone: "And warn with it those who fear to be gathered before their Lord-they have no protector or intercessor apart from Him-perhaps they will grow in piety." (6:51). "…So remind by the Quran whoever fears My warning" (50:45). "A Scripture was revealed to you, so let there be no anxiety in your heart because of it. You are to warn with it-and a reminder for the believers. Follow what is revealed to you from your Lord, and do not follow other masters beside Him. Little you recollect." (7:2-3). Thus, such preachers of the Truth never ask money/fees from people; rather, they dedicate their souls and their lives to Almighty God.

2- In contrast, the other type of preachers is the corrupt ones preaching falsehoods, who talk with sweet words to appeal for the emotional response from hearts of the audience. Such devilish preachers are found everywhere and in all eras, and God says the following verses about them: "Among the people is he whose speech about the worldly life impresses you, and he calls God to witness what is in his heart, while he is the most hostile of adversaries. When he gains power, he strives to spread corruption on earth, destroying properties and lives. God does not like corruption.And when he is told, "Beware of God," his pride leads him to more sin. Hell is enough for him-a dreadful abode." (2:204-206). In our opinion, these verses apply to Wahabi preachers in particular; if one tries to warn Al-Qaradawy by saying to him: ''Beware of God'', Al-Qaradawy will get mad and furious because of his hurt pride; as his job/mission is to spread corruption on earth and justify injustice using the Wahabi creed tenets in his sermons that turn innocent youths into ISIS terrorists.

3- In contrast to Al-Qaradawy and his likes among preachers of falsehoods, there are preachers of the Quranic Truth, who dedicate their souls and selves to God, seeking to please him: "And among the people is he who sells himself seeking God's approval. God is kind towards the servants." (2:207).

4- The criterion to differentiate between the two types of preachers is the call for peace. God says in the following verse, addressing believers: "O you who believe! Enter into peace wholeheartedly, and do not follow the footsteps of Satan; he is to you an outright enemy." (2:208). Hence, it is an Islamic duty to live in peace with people; it is absolutely forbidden to commit aggression against others, but only self-defense is permitted when one is being attacked, as God does not like aggressors: "…but do not commit aggression; God does not love the aggressors." (2:190). This is real Islam found exclusively in the Quran: a religion of peace, preachers of peace, justice, charity, and rights. Preachers of the Truth call for peace, whereas preachers of misguidance and falsehoods call for bloodbaths and massacres. To the latter type belongs Al-Qaradawy, the real imam/preacher of ISIS and its bloody days!

Fourthly: there are no medial in-between stances in the field of preaching; those who never utter the truth are cursed:

1- Within the field of religious preaching, there is no room for medial in-between positions or stances: a preacher is either an extremist one spreading falsehoods, disbelief, and polytheism specializing in misguiding audience with false hadiths and theology, thus denying the Quran and driving youthful listeners to engage into 'holy' massacres. In contrast, there are preachers of the Quranic Truth, i.e., the Quranists, spreading it outspokenly and vociferously, refuting views of the preachers of falsehoods, proving that their views are evidence that they are enemies of Islam and disbelievers in the Quran. Thus, the in-between preachers are those who remain silent as far as the Truth is concerned; they do not talk about the Truth and they never incite 'holy' violence and aggression and never spread falsehoods. Such 'silent' preachers are cursed in the Quran; as they never preach the Quranic truth to people, never reciting verses showing the true nature of Islam to refute Wahabi falsehoods leading to terrorism. The mere recitation is enough for those who believe that the Quran is truly he Word of God, touching their hearts and minds. Their mere silence to hide the Quranic facts incurs God's wrath and curses on them, as per the following verse: "Those who suppress the proofs and the guidance We have revealed, after We have clarified them to humanity in the Scripture-those-God curses them, and the cursers curse them." (2:159). Of course, such 'silent' preachers have the chance to repent during their lifetimes, and for sure, part of such repentance is to speak publicly to people about such grave error, declaring their repentance, and to preach the Quranic Truth clearly and outspokenly for the rest of their lives, without fearing anyone, seeking only to gratify God. This way, they will correct their grave error of silence before and correct their preaching path, and God will certainly accept their repentance: "Except those who repent, and reform, and proclaim. Those-I will accept their repentance. I am the Acceptor of Repentance, the Merciful." (2:160).

2- As for those who remain among the 'silent' frightened preachers who never declare the divine Truth of the Quranic facts and die without repentance, they deserve the curses of God, angels, and all humankind: "But as for those who reject faith, and die rejecting-those-upon them is the curse of God, and of the angels, and of all humanity. They will remain under it forever, and the torment will not be lightened for them, and they will not be reprieved." (2:161-162).

Fifthly: the position of Al-Qaradawy:

1- Al-Qaradawy is still alive as we write this article, and he was born in Sept. 1926. Al-Qaradawy has spent about 60 years of preaching falsehoods, corruption, and terrorism. As long as he remains alive, he still has the chance to repent if he wants to. Al-Qaradawy has recently declared his intention to return to delivering sermons after Ramadan. Let us imagine that someone is bold enough to stand up to him, saying: (Beware of God, O sheikh! You are an octogenarian and you still preaching lies and falsehoods to hide the Quranic Truth, fear God, O sheikh, before you die, which is most likely very soon to happen! Repent, O sheikh, and remember that your victims who have fallen prey to your sermons are millions and your victims who have become terrorists are hundreds of thousands. O sheikh, stop spreading lies and falsities, stop gaining ill-gotten money, stop supporting massacres, corruption, and tyranny. Beware of God, O sheikh! Take heed of Christian clergymen who devote their lives to charity acts, and their goodness spread to hungry poor Muslims. O sheikh! Do not you feel guilty about massacred women and children among innocent Muslims? Have not you got enough from bloodbaths occurred because of you preaching? Until when, O sheikh, would you remain an imam of ISIS and other terrorists?!). What would happen if any person would say so to Al-Qaradawy in public? Will Al-Qaradawy repent and weep for mercy and ask God's forgiveness? Or will he take pride in his sins? Why do not people preach Al-Qaradawy to discern his stance/position among preachers?!

2- Let us contemplate and reflect on the verses: "Among the people is he whose speech about the worldly life impresses you, and he calls God to witness what is in his heart, while he is the most hostile of adversaries. When he gains power, he strives to spread corruption on earth, destroying properties and lives. God does not like corruption.And when he is told, "Beware of God," his pride leads him to more sin. Hell is enough for him-a dreadful abode. And among the people is he who sells himself seeking God's approval. God is kind towards the servants." (2:204-207). It is one of the miraculous predictions of the Quran to use the phrase ''among the people…"; this means that whenever there is a human society anywhere on the globe, there will be always preachers of lies and falsehoods who spread corruption, bloodshed, and massacres. Similarly, as long as there are human beings, there will be preachers of peace who strive and struggle for the sake of God. Hence, every human society has its likes of Al-Qaradawy!

3- The Last Day, the Day of Resurrection and the Judgment Day, will come and preachers of the Truth ill bear witness against preachers of lies and falsehoods. God says the following verses about the latter type of preachers: "Who does greater wrong than he who fabricates lies about God? These will be presented before their Lord, and the witnesses will say, "These are they who lied about their Lord." Indeed, the curse of God is upon the wrongdoers. Those who hinder others from the path of God, and seek to make it crooked; and regarding the Hereafter, they are in denial. These will not escape on earth, and they have no protectors besides God. The punishment will be doubled for them. They have failed to hear, and they have failed to see. Those are the ones who lost their souls, and what they had invented has strayed away from them. Without a doubt, in the Hereafter, they will be the biggest losers." (11:18-22).

Lastly:

1- Most of the lifetime of Al-Qaradawy has gone; few years are left to him, and as an old man, he is drawing nearer to his death. God says in the Quran: "Have they not observed the government of the heavens and the earth, and all the things that God created, and that their time may have drawn near? Which discourse, besides this, will they believe in?" (7:185).

2- As always, God says nothing but the Truth.

CHAPTER IV: Features of the Ideological Formation within the Behavior of the Najd Brothers Oppositio

CHAPTER IV: Features of the Ideological Formation within the Behavior of the Najd Brothers Opposition Movement

Introduction: about features of the ideological formation within the behavior of the Najd Brothers:

Firstly: the mentality of Hafiz Wahba between his teacher Muhammad Abdou and his master Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud:

1- Wahba was the prominent consultant of Abdul-Aziz; they got to know each other in 1916, when Abdul-Aziz attended the funeral of Mubarak Al-Sabah in Kuwait. Wahba was appointed by Abdul-Aziz as his close consultant, shortly before the decisive battle between Abdul-Aziz and Al-Sharif Hussein. Wahba was among the students of the imam/head of Al-Azhar institution Muhammad Abdou, who died in 1905, but Wahba was not an independent thinker like this imam; as Wahba worked in service of the Egyptian authorities and travelled a lot aboard within political missions between Egypt, turkey, India and Kuwait, until he met with Abdul-Aziz who appointed him as his consultant. Yet, Wahba retained some influence of M. Abdou in his mind, as seen in his writings; for instance, Wahba hated the stagnation of Al-Azhar and the Middle Eastern backward tyranny and oppression, and he favored being open to the West while getting rid of colonialism, within realistic point of view in approaching such issues, like anyone playing political roles (1).

2- When Wahba began working with Abdul-Aziz, the Najd Brothers were at their apogee, and signs of their political oppositions began to emerge. Despite the fact that Wahba was taught by M. Abdou and followed his school of thought in Egypt, a school that refutes and debunks Sunnite Wahabi extremism, such intellectual background never allowed him to pursue the intellectual project to cope with the modern age to reform Islamic thought. Of course, Abdul-Aziz would never have allowed any reformist thought to be applied or advocated in the KSA, as Abdul-Aziz used Wahabism to 'restore' what he thought of as his royal family lands and reign, and thus, Wahba used his efforts and intellect only to serve the interests of Abdul-Aziz without criticizing Wahabism at all, especially by replacing the Najd Brothers by the Egyptian Wahabi/Salafist Brothers, that formed the terrorist MB group later on, all over Egyptian cities and villages to make the Wahabi-engulfed Egypt a strategic depth for the KSA that will spread and propagate Wahabism all over the Arab world to protect the nascent KSA, with little cost on the part of the KSA royal family. This has been going on for 75 years now, as we are writing these lines in 2000 A.D.

3- The contradiction within the mentality of Wahba (his being influenced partially with M. Abdou the enemy of Wahabism + his being the consultant of a Wahabi king) is traced within the writings of Wahba on the history of the Najd Brothers and their master Abdul-Aziz, and how Wahba influenced many of the royal decisions of the Wahabi king related to how he dealt with the Najd Brothers.

Secondly: some of what Wahba has written:

1- We quote Wahba in his historical tableau of the Najd Brothers: (…A great number of the Wahabi brethren from the tribe of Otaybah saw that all things related to Bedouin primitive life are linked to disbelief and that a sign of devotion to God's religion and of real faith was to get rid of any signs of disbelief; thus, they sold all their cattle and camels to immigrate to the colonies to devote their time to acts of worship, listening attentively to sermons about Prophet Muhammad's lifetime events and history of how Islam spread in Arabia at the time, and military training. They found out that their previous life was akin to pre-Islamic era, and they took comfort in learning how to read and write in order to peruse and memorize the Quranic verses and some hadiths…). Our quick comment: note well the influence of corrupt education here.

2- (…Yet, such radical change was violent and dangerous; as most of the brethren had imbued principles and teachings that lacked many things, fanatically thinking that they had owned the absolute truth about religion, disregarding anything else as they deemed it as part of disbelief and misguidance. Thus, they doubted the faith of their imam, King Abdul-Aziz, and other dwellers of cities inside the Najd region. They thought that the Wahabi headwear is part of the Sunna that must be followed, while traditional headdress was for them a novelty that must be banned, and the same applied to any sort of dress codes worn by the infidels that must be shunned. Many of the brethren began to think that there was little faith in those who did not live in the colonies and shunned desert-Arabs' lifestyle and exchanging greetings with such infidels and eating from their cattle were prohibited. Later on, the brethren thought that many sheikhs and scholars were hypocrites, obsequious and flattering to the king, eager to please him without regard to the true creed. The brethren thought that conquering and invasion must not be stopped; rather, it must include all neighboring countries to spread the creed by force on them, and they paid no heed to those scholars who called for the stopping of conquests…). Our quick comment: note well the influence of corrupt education here.

3- (…Some brethren declared their imam, King Abdul-Aziz, as an apostate because they thought him too lenient and lax as far as application of Wahabi teachings was concerned. They accused him of denying the true creed by wearing long gowns, growing a moustache, and wearing the traditional headwear of Arabs instead of the Wahabi one, among other habits of disbelief, in their opinion. The brethren used to prohibit all things that did not match their whims and views. We feel that this was because of the half-educated ignoramuses that taught Wahabism to the Bedouins in all villages and cities to gather them as the Wahabi brethren in colonies; they inculcated into them fanaticism and bigotry…). Our quick comment: note well the influence of corrupt education here.

4- (…1345 A.H. was among the most difficult years in Najd; civil strife was about to break out between the Wahabi brethren on the one hand and the (Wahabi) government and city dwellers on the other hand. The king had sent enlightened scholars to the brethren to rectify errors committed by ignorant preachers of earlier days to lessen their fanaticism and bigotry, urging the brethren to leave colonies. Yet, all this was in vain; no one could uproot such deep-seated extremism. The brethren feared only the swords and authority of the king; otherwise, they would have wreaked havoc in all Arabia soon enough…) (2). Our quick comment: corrupt education can never be corrected with education of the same category; power to impose a radical change in education is the decisive solution when corrupt education dominates.

Thirdly: analysis of this historical tableau:

1- Wahba here writes about the hatred of the Otaybah tribe, and its leader the Wahabi Brother Sultan Ibn Bajad, to all signs of pre-Islamic era of polytheism and disbelief, and how they sold everything to get rid of such 'signs', as a dangerous indication of extremism. Wahba was not in Arabia in 1910 when Abdul-Aziz established the colonies and the Najd Brothers and told them to leave their tribes, cities, or villages to follow him. Thus, Abdul-Aziz was the one responsible for such bigotry and extremism, when he collected men from the tribes of Mateer, Otaybah, Harb, etc. to make them inhabit the Wahabi colonies along with Wahabi preachers. Hence, as Wahba was a latecomer in Arabia, he knew little of the intellectual principles of the ideological formation of the Najd Brothers, set by Wahabi scholars before. Wahba blames in his writings such scholars and calls them ignoramuses that inculcated fanaticism to the Najd Brother, disregarding intentionally the role of Abdul-Aziz himself in such catastrophe.

2- It is clear that Wahba, the former student of the reformer Egyptian sheikh M. Abdou, realized the danger and enormity of the volatile situation of the Najd Brothers and their intellectual ideology and application of it, and expressed the wish that more enlightened scholars, loyal to the king of course, would have succeeded in persuading the Najd Brothers to be less fanatical and extremist. He felt that the power, authority, and might of the king would be in use to stop the corruption of the Najd Brothers by sheer military force alone. But Wahba was pessimistic in that respect, as we detect from his lines.

3- Wahba states clearly that such Wahabi education lacked many things in its principles and teachings, resulting in the Najd Brothers declaring all persons outside their circle as apostates and infidels that must be fought and massacred. This was the utmost level of fanaticism bigotry, and extremist thought leading to terror and havoc. The Najd Brothers declared infidels those who did not live in colonies and stick to the Wahabi dress codes. Such faulty notions were accompanied with the ardent desire to fight and massacre, as they thought of themselves as ''chosen ones'' by God on a mission to convert the world into the 'true' creed! They hated scholars who advocated the stopping of jihad. These were clear signs of utmost level of fanaticism, bigotry, and extremist thought.

4- A worse sign of fanaticism, bigotry, and extremist thought was to coerce others to follow any religious denomination; Islam is against compulsion in religion. Such coercion by the Najd Brothers was done to Wahabis and non-Wahabis alike inside and outside Arabia. Another bad sign is to change or remove by sheer force what was deemed to be vice or sin. Fatwas of scholars within Riyadh conference in 1927 to demolish all Shiite mosques and stop Shiite rituals in Al-Ahsa region exemplified how the Najd Brothers liked very much to change anything that did not match their lifestyle and creed; even the king was criticized for his dress and moustache, as Wahba writes. Minor matters used to provoke the ire of the Najd Brothers who were eager to sue sheer force to 'change', eliminate, or eradicate what they considered as sins among Wahabis, let alone their actions with non-Wahabis.

5- Such signs of fanaticism, bigotry, and extremist thought led to feelings of enmity, hatred, and animosity toward all non-Wahabis and all Wahabis that did not obey them by living in the colonies; they never greeted them or ate with them. Such hatred is part of Wahabi teachings advocated by Ibn Abdul-Wahab as he prohibits in his writings a great number of things permitted in Islam.

6- Hence, the opposition of the Najd Brothers to the king as linked to such ideological formation and its traits and features, as Wahba writes that they thought ill of their king and imam as he was lenient toward Shiites and befriended the infidel British forces, thus denying Wahabism, been by his dress code. When scholars took the side of the king at one point, the Najd Brothers thought of them as hypocrites who were eager to please the king instead of applying Wahabi teachings and advising the king to apply them by force.

Lastly:

What Wahba has briefed here in his writings is what we will discuss at length in this chapter about the features of the ideological formation of the Wahabi opposition of the Najd Brothers: these features are extremism, fanaticism, bigotry, and declaring themselves as more religious than rulers of a theocracy.

Footnotes:

1- Kishk (Jalal), ''The Saudis and the Islamic Solution", pages 721 and 722.

2- Wahba (Hafiz), "Arabia in the 20^th Century", pages 285:287.

Extremism: compulsion in religion by the Najd Brothers:

Firstly: extremism and compulsion in religion inside the state (removing and changing vices and sins)

1- Since the time when the scholars of the Ibn Hanbal doctrine fabricated and phrased the hadith of (anyone who sees vices must change them by his hands…), this hadith became the constitution of all fanatics who think of themselves as more pious and righteous than theocratic rulers, as removing vices and sins by force was seen as an obligatory religious duty that must be applied by any adherent, not just the rulers or the religious police. Thus, the phrasing of such hadith allows room for anything to be deemed as vice as per the brain of anyone who would use force to remove it! This was a very subjective view, linked with the ability to act and mobilize men to use force to remove or change 'vices'. If such a hadith allows room for revolt by ordinary civilians, what about military Wahabis with ideological formation of violence committed readily and suddenly anytime to spread the Word of God by the sword?! Accordingly, such hadith gave the Najd Brothers the credit and merit to deem themselves as the ''chosen ones'' to achieve God's work to guide all people by sheer force to coerce them in creed. Thus, violence of that type was internally inside the Wahabi society and outside it in times of invasion and conquest, under the pretext of removing sins.

2- Thus, defining what was deemed to be sins or vices was based on whatever contradicts the thought of the group in authority, especially fanatical bigots of scholars. Hence, fanaticism was linked to bigotry and extremism. The Najd Brothers during the reign of Abdul-Aziz exemplified such faulty notions, as we read in the writings of Wahba: (…The brethren used to cut off, using scissors, long parts of any man's moustache in the streets of cities and villages after preaching the men in question, and did the same thing harshly if such men passed by colonies. The same policy was applied to long gowns whose cloth touched the ground, admonishing such men that long gowns would make them enter Hell in the Hereafter…). As usual, Wahba tries to clear the name of his master, Abdul-Aziz, from the extremist thought of the Najd Brother, overlooking the fact that Abdul-Aziz was the one who brainwashed the Bedouins to transform them into the Najd Brothers. (…However big the mistakes and faults of the brethren who exceeded all limits, the king and his government overlooked them at first, bearing patiently with the brethren's criticizing their imam and king…). This means that Abdul-Aziz had reared a monster that turned against him to attack him eventually, as per the above-mentioned hadith that allows revolts within all theocracies.

3- Wahba refers slightly, without details, to the atrocities committed by the Najd Brothers in Mecca after its conquest by Abdul-Aziz: (…As for the strictness of the brethren in Mecca once they entered it, they never heeded the present government, as anything deemed by them as vice or sin in Hejaz was forcibly changed by them using sticks, guns, or his bare hands…) (3). Wahba writes about the very first Najd Brothers appointed by Abdul-Aziz within the groups of ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'', a sort of religious police formed in Hejaz after invading it. Their atrocities provoked the ire of Ihsanullah, the consul of India, who wrote to his government this letter, quoted by Wahba: (…such religious police was given unlimited authority, using a large number of Najd soldiers in service, recruiting about 20 Najd soldiers in every street to watch over everyone, and there were about 260 Najd soldiers in Mecca, who were cruel and inhumane group that committed acts of terror against dwellers of Hejaz, without laws to govern and deter such Najd soldiers, especially when they forced men to pray in mosques regularly the five daily prayers, beating severely anyone who would dare to disobey them, whether such men were old or young, rich or poor, and some of such victims were flogged in public…) (4).

4- Of course, such atrocities led to more killings in many cases using guns as Wahba has referred to this earlier. Al-Zarkeley has written about an incident that he witnessed, when a Najd Brother in the desert ran into a man from the tribe of Anza, and noticed that this man did not wear the Wahabi headdress. The Najd Brother deemed this as a sign of apostasy, and he preached the man to urge him go to join a colony to learn 'Islam', and showed him one of the letters of Ibn Abdul-Wahab to peruse, but the tribesman refused and talked harshly to the Najd Brother, who pointed his gun to the chest of the tribesman. The latter was frightened and promised to go to a colony to renew his faith, but the infuriated Najd Brother killed him with the gun (5).

5- Corporeal punishment exacted by the Najd Brothers reached those men who were smoking, women who wore clothes in silk, and men who did not prayer five daily prayers regularly in mosques or did not fast during Ramadan. On 10^th of April, 1920, in the city of Al-Hufuf, the sister of the wife of Ibn Jalawy, the Wahabi ruler of Al-Ahsa, came to visit her sister, wearing a bright colored silk dress, and the Najd Brothers' religious policemen beat her severely in the street. Ibn Jalawy had to flog in public the man who beat her and to confiscate camels of these religious policemen, as a form of punishment for them after his men seized and chastised them. On 14^th of April, 1920, the Najd Brothers' religious policemen saw a Shiite girl walking alone in one of the streets of the city of Ta'if, wearing what they deemed as unchaste clothes, and they beat her severely in public. The relatives of the girl interfered to protect her. A march of protest followed, and Ibn Jalawy had to arrest and imprison 30 men of the Najd Brothers' religious policemen. Within another incident, in the city of Al-Jubeil, some of the Najd Brothers seized a beardless man with a long moustache, to cut it off for him by force. Some of the city dwellers fought them, killing two of the Najd Brothers' religious policemen. Of course, such opposition against the Najd Brothers' religious policemen was encouraged by the Wahabi ruler of Al-Ahsa, Ibn Jalawy, who tried to protect his people of Al-Ahsa against the brutality of the Najd Brothers, hated and despised by him. One of the British men in Kuwait noticed that Kuwaiti Bedouins wore the Wahabi headdress out of fear of the Najd Brothers, and began to smoke in private and in secret (6). This means that the terrorism of the Najd Brothers reached Kuwait at the time.

6- Since the Najd Brothers allowed themselves to meddle into the privacy and personal freedom of people, they interfered in the State affairs, giving themselves more power and authority without reference to their king and master and any governmental officials feared them very much. Wahba writes about how they cared for trivial matters of appearance in terms of dress code and moustaches, asserting that Abdul-Aziz was bearing with their aggressions patiently for a long time. An improbable, untrue story about the Najd Brothers was circulated at the time; Feisal Al-Daweesh took a pair of scissors to trim the gown of the king himself in his palace. Such propaganda was used to spread the notion that the leaders of the Najd Brothers were more pious and courageous than the king and that they deserved to share his rule and power (7).

7- Removing vices by force had become a major item of the Najd Brothers' defiance of and opposition against the government and the king, especially when the Najd Brothers forced the king to stop installing telegraphs and telegrams wires during the conquest of Hejaz. During the siege of Jeddah, Abdul-Aziz wanted to install such service from Mecca and Yathreb to his camp to know the news faster, but he had to give up the project in 1926. The Najd Brothers dared even to cut off wires of telephones as 'vice' that must be removed by force, in defiance of the State and of their king (8). Wahba repeats his defense of his king to clear his name and praise his patience with them despite their defiance: (…In 1926, the king had to stop installing wireless telegraph posts in Yathreb and elsewhere, to appease the infuriated brethren, and to demolish some mosques that contained tombs inside them. The king had no other choice but that, as he did not tend to stand before a strong current, but he used to wait for the calm after the storm to vanquish his foes when the convenient time came…) (9).

8- Removing vices by force reached an unprecedented zenith when the Najd Brothers declared their king/imam as an infidel and themselves as more pious and righties and thus fit to rule instead of him. Within the Riyadh conference in 1928, the Najd Brothers controlled the streets of the city and drove out the government officials, and their leader Sultan Ibn Bajad changed his name into ''Sultan Eddine'', and ordered his followers to chant his name in the streets of Riyadh as the forthcoming ruler in defense of faith. Residents of Riyadh were shocked and reminded the Najd Brothers that Islam in the Quran forbids taking pride in anything, but the Najd Brothers told them the hadith about the strong believer is better than a weak one. All of the Najd Brothers in Riyadh at the time brandished their arms and swords in the streets for days, declaring their rejection of the power and authority of the king. Private life was something in the past at the time, because the Najd Brothers interfered in it even to the minutest detail. Mere doubting of anyone not attending congregational prayers would induce public flogging, as occurred with a high governmental official in Riyadh. The Najd Brothers wanted to flog the Islamic leader Al-Sayed Ahmed Al-Sinoussy because he protested against the demolishing of the tomb of Khadija, Prophet Muhammad's first wife, but the king stopped them. The Najd Brothers' religious policemen beat in the streets anyone who would dare to disobey them (10). Thus, the number of vices to be removed would increase with the passage of time: beginning with dress codes until the call to remove the ruler himself as he was declared an apostate along with his ruling government, though he was the one to create the Najd Brothers.

Secondly: extremism outside the state: jihad for compulsion in religion:

1- When the Najd Brothers emerged for the first time, among their first mission was their participation in the conquest of Al-Ahsa region, confiscating for the sake of Abdul-Aziz all its wealth and riches owned formerly by its Shiite population. This was jihad for the Najd Brothers, but the Shiites there caused much trouble to the Najd Brothers who felt the immediate urge to convert all such Shiite population to Islam (i.e., Wahabism, in their view). They requested from the king on several occasions to force Al-Ahsa residents to convert or else to drive them out of Arabia. The link between jihad and removing vices by force was shown here; Al-Ahsa was the original location of Shiites in Arabia, and after it was conquered by Wahabis, its dwellers became 'sinners' to be removed, massacred, or expelled out of their homeland if they did not convert to Wahabism. The same problem was faced by the Najd Brothers after the conquest of Hejaz, as they forced its people to apply Wahabi rituals and dress codes and began to demolish all mosques that contained 'holy' tombs. Even Wahabis who never lived in colonies were urged to go there and many of the Najd Brothers advocated the notion of forcing new converts to live in the colonies for a while as a form of jihad!

2- The Najd Brothers used to send letters for others to call them to convert to Wahabism and join the Najd Brothers, or else, they were threatened to get killed. Such letters were overt and clear in its language of terrorism and threats in brief words. It is noteworthy that they never copies the letters written in the Abbasid Era, and ascribed falsely to Prophet Muhammad, as some claimed he sent them to rulers and leaders around him to call them peacefully to convert to Islam to obey God alone. The Najd Brothers sent instead letters of ultimatums and threat, terrorizing recipients of letters to be murdered in case of disobedience. John Habeeb has published among his documents some of such letters: (…In the Name of God the Compassionate, from Al-Dahasi to Al-Abboud the tribal leader, peace be upon those who follow God's guidance, we guarantee you and your tribe peace and security, provided that all of you will join us to gain God's satisfaction and all your families and possessions will be safe, as those joining us will be submitting themselves to God and enjoy the condescension and protection of Sultan Ibn Bajad and the Wahabi brethren…). (…In the Name of God the Compassionate, from Al-Dahasi to Ibn Samran, above all and before anything else, we guarantee all of your tribe, males and females, all peace and security, if you will join us to enjoy safety of yourselves and your property and families, by submitting yourselves to us, you will be submitting to God Himself, and you will enjoy the protection of the Wahabi brethren, and the peace of God as well as protection for you possessions, houses, and camels, and so, convert all of you to Islam very soon…). (…In the Name of God the Compassionate, from Al-Dahasi to Al-Dahasa tribe, we call of your tribesmen to convert to Islam; those joining us will enjoy the protection of God and the protection of Sultan Ibn Bajad and the Wahabi brethren …). (…In the Name of God the Compassionate, from Assaf Ibn Hussein Al-Mansour to Rasheed Ibn Sameer, greetings, you know quite well that the Imam and Sovereign of all Arabs is King Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdul-Rahman Al-Feisal Ibn Al-Saud and he ordered me to stay in Al-Jouf and to write this letter to you to inquire about your following the path of Islam led by the Imam Abdul-Aziz or not; peace will be granted only to the reasonable ones! The King and all Muslims in Arabia are posing this question to you; thus, we have warned you and you cannot blame anyone but yourself. That is all, greetings to all of you from your Wahabi brethren, 1340 A.H., Assaf Ibn Hussein…) (11).

3- In the same way, the Najd Brothers tried to invade Kuwait on 11^th of Oct., 1920, and to force the Kuwaitis to convert to Wahabism. When Al-Daweesh sieged the ruler of Kuwait, he sent him a messenger to urge this ruler to convert to 'Islam' and to prohibit smoking in his State. The Kuwaiti ruler, Salem Ibn Mubarak Al-Sabah, had to feign his agreement out of fear, and he sent a letter in response to Al-Daweesh: (…No reasonable man would refuse your requests, and we are with you with all our heart, but we beseech you to give us a two-day period to consider…). Within two days, he enlisted the aid of the British who came to the rescue immediately. Al-Daweesh felt that he was mocked and deceived by the Kuwaiti ruler, and thus sent him a letter: (…You tried to deceive us by feigning conversion to Islam in order to avoid a military confrontation…You had resorted to the infidels to protect you…One day, God willing, this account will be settled and we will get even…). Al-Rihany writes that the Najd Brothers lost a great number of their men in this war in Kuwait because of the British forces, but they never cared because of their urge for martyrdom and for subjugating the Kuwaitis to convert them forcibly to Wahabism, as a noble cause that came above everything else (12).

4- The Wahabi duty of jihad, as a notion embraced by the Najd Brothers, became a matter of dispute between them, as an opposition movement, and the king. The Najd Brothers wanted ardently to expand and invade Iraq to repeat the days of the so-called companions of Muhammad in their Arab conquests of the 7^th century. The Najd Brothers coveted very mush the fertile lands of Iraq and the Levant in northern Arabia, more than desert lands of Kuwait, Oman, and Yemen, especially that these three countries were occupied by the British 'infidels' who excelled in fighting with modern weapons that the Najd Brothers could not possibly face. GB defined borders of such countries as well as the KSA, Jordan, and Iraq, and such setting of borders stopped Abdul-Aziz from setting more expansionist plans to the north. The king had to curb the expansionist desire of the Najd Brothers; otherwise, they would have repeated the failure of the Qarmatians in the Middle Ages. GB built fortresses within borders to protect Arabs in Iraq and elsewhere against the raids of the Najd Brothers, and the fortress of Boseih was the last nail in the coffin of the loyalty of the Najd Brothers to their imam and king.

5- Despite the ardent desire of Abdul-Aziz to annex Iraq and Jordan (countries ruled by his foes: the sons of Al-Sharif Hussein) to his kingdom, he realized that the modern age entailed certain facts that must be faced and he had to relinquish such ambitions in order to make sure that the Saudi State he established would be viable; he even got rid of the Najd Brothers for that purpose. That was what the king who used to overlook the raids of the Najd Brothers began gradually to condemn them and to stop them firmly. The king took into his consideration the reaction of GB, and his British allies realized the vital importance to stop such raids by establishing fortresses. The king felt the urgent need to curb his ambitions regarding Iraq and the Levant, but the Najd Brothers could not. Wahba writes: (…Massacres committed by the Najd Brothers in Turba in 1919 to annihilate troops of Al-Sharif Hussein had nothing to do with the king and his royal orders, and he could not have prevented such massacres unless with civil strife or revolt. The nature of Bedouins who moved to the colonies to imbibe the creed (i.e., Wahabism) had changed as they were fanatical and extremist in all their stances. The king never desired nor encouraged to commit aggressions against the neighboring countries occupied by the British, and as long as raids of the brethren kept them satisfied with loot, with the least inconvenience to him, he never had to interfere when the British would defend their occupied countries…Yet, the king used to give pieces of advice to the brethren to retain peace and never to raid neighboring countries, but they never heeded his advice, as the British troops for them were merely infidels who must be fought until victory would be gained or martyrdom, God's approval, and Paradise, within the jihad notion understood by the brethren…) (13).

6- Let us imagine that the Najd Brothers might have succeeded in conquering Iraq: the same problem of removing vice and sins would be repeated, as most Iraqis were Shiites. Atrocities would have been committed daily there to cause more trouble for the king. When Abdul-Aziz nipped their military ambition in the bud, the Najd Brothers, as time bombs, had to expose inside the KSA and turn against the king himself. Such mentality of the Najd Brothers is reflected by what Al-Daweesh had said to the king in the Riyadh conference in 1928 shortly before the battle of Sabilla: (…You have prevented us from Bedouin raids in Iraq, and we are now no longer Muslims fighting the infidels and no longer desert-Arabs fighting one another for loot…) (14). This quote shows that Bedouin nature of raids and looting would be applied with or without religious pretexts and justification of jihad. We are sorry to say that despite the fact that the Najd Brothers are now mere lines within history books, their Wahabi Sunnite creed with its faulty notions, especially jihad, still thrives and spread all over the Arab world; it is a shame that Wahabis now in the Arab world are called Islamists, as if they were representing Islam, and such lies and falsehoods were created by Abdul-Aziz and his terrorist MB group in Egypt and outside Egypt.

Footnotes:

3- Wahba, ditto, pages 288 and 289.

4- Habeeb, ditto, pages 199 and 200.

5- Al-Zarkeley, ditto, page 362.

6- Habeeb, ditto, pages 80:84.

7- Kishk, ditto, page 629.

8- Kishk, ditto, page 623.

9- Wahba, ditto, page 290.

10- Kishk, ditto, page 628.

11- Habeeb, ditto, pages 85 and 86.

12- Al-Rihany, "Modern History of Najd'', pages 274:276.

Al-Rasheed, ''History of Kuwait'', pages 219 and 222.

13- Wahba, ditto, pages 245 and 246.

14- Habeeb, ditto, page 223.

Fanaticism and hatred of the other by the Najd Brothers:

Between religious fanaticism and extremism:

Fanaticism and extremism share one point; the hatred of the other anyway, whether the fanatics were weak or strong. If fanatics were in power and in full authority, they would be extremists in their persecution and forcing of the other to change their creed in order to apply the notion of changing vice by force. Hence, extremism is injustice and violation of freedoms and rights of others, especially related to religious freedom. the Najd Brothers were extremists in their hatred of foreigners especially the British whom were not forced to obey them, and thus, the Najd Brothers used utmost extremism in dealing with those under their control within conquests and invasions.

A historical overview:

1- The Umayyad caliphate was fanatical but not extremist in terms of religiousness; its internal policies were based on fanaticism by favoring Arab Muslims over non-Arab Muslims like Persians, Copts, Berber, Nabataeans, etc. and within Arabs, the Umayyads favored certain tribes over others such as Qorayish and the Hashemites. In many cases, fanatics would favor certain households within closed circles within the Umayyad Dynasty and its allies. Such types of fanaticism led to the collapse and downfall of the Umayyad Dynasty later on.

2- As for the Abbasid caliphate, fanaticism in it turned into religious extremism, especially during the reign of the Abbasid caliph Al-Motawakil. Unlike the Umayyad caliphs who used to grant awards to Arab Christian poets, who used to wear crosses like the famous poet Al-Akhtal, and take heavy taxes and tributes from non-Arabs even if they converted to Islam, the Abbasid caliph Al-Motawakil was fanatically prejudiced against Arab and non-Arab Shiites, Sufis, Jews, and Christians. Before the Abbasid Dynasty, Al-Khawarij group members, during the Umayyad caliphate, were religious Shiite fanatics who persecuted those outside their circle, unlike the tribal and racial fanaticism of the Umayyads.

Religious fanaticism of the Najd Brothers:

1- We have given the above historical overview in order to assert the fact that Arabia before Abdul-Aziz knew mostly tribal fanaticism, and Abdul-Aziz turned such tribal fanaticism into a religious one based on teachings of Ibn Abdul-Wahab of loving Wahabis and hatred of the other non-Wahabis. Such religious fanaticism was mixed with the tribal one in hatred and fighting those different in creed, doctrine, race, gender, etc. Life in desert areas, especially in Najd, makes fanaticism a necessary lifestyle, where isolation is coupled with fearing strangers, xenophobia, and lack of experience and civilized manners. Religious fanatics always resort to the zero-equation: black or white, with us or against us, without medial stance or position or any sort of compromises.

2- This was why the Najd Brothers never greeted non-Wahabis, and we have written in a previous chapter how one leader of the Najd Brothers refused to greet back Abdul-Aziz while delivering a letter to him from Ibn Bajad shortly before the battle of Sabilla. Abdul-Aziz understood the gesture very well; it meant that he was and infidel and apostate for them, and he was furious and dismissed the messenger. the Najd Brothers used to void talking to 'infidels' and covering their faces to avoid seeing and dealing with them as well.

3- Covering one's face out of severe hatred and extremist fanatical stances regarding religion reminds us of the people of Noah and the people of Muhammad in the Quran: "Whenever I called them to Your forgiveness, they thrust their fingers into their ears, and wrapped themselves in their garments, and insisted, and became more and more arrogant." (71:7). "They wrap their chests to hide from Him. But even as they cover themselves with their clothes, He knows what they conceal and what they reveal. He knows what lies within the hearts." (11:5).

4- Several stories about the Najd Brothers are narrated in many sources. Muhammad Al-Assad writes that he was in a journey through the desert for the sake of Abdul-Aziz, and some of the Najd Brothers saw him with his Arab servant, and despite the fact that Al-Assad wore an Arab dress, but they thought of him as a spy, until one of the Najd Brothers remembered that he saw him in the palace of the king (16). Al-Rihany writes that he met three desert-Arabs on the route, who were among the Najd Brothers, and they thought him a British spy and infidel, but he asserted to them that he was a Syrian camel merchant, but they insisted that peace greetings should be revoked verbally by him, and he did just that to avoid conflict. John Philby suffered a lot because he was a British convert to Wahabism, working under the king and dealing with many of the Najd Brothers. Even the king named him Abdullah Philby, but the Najd Brothers doubted him very much and never believed him to be a Muslim because he was a foreigner. Philby once heard some of the Najd Brothers discussing near his tent if they would stop greeting him or not, as they felt he was a ''dirty infidel''. They never responded to his greetings addressed to them, and they used to cover their faces so as not to see him, and one of them shouted at him that he hated him and Allah bears witness of that hatred! One of the Najd Brothers spat at the direction of the tent of Philby! Some of them kept watch over him to see if he would smoke like all British men, in order to expose him as a non-Wahabi spy. Of course, such acts were application of Wahabi teachings in the writings of Ibn Abdul-Wahab concerning declaring one's hatred of infidels and polytheists. some of the Najd Brothers used to warn the king, asserting that Philby would bring nothing but disasters to the kingdom.

5- The intellectual mindset and ideological formation are essential parts of such religious fanaticism; Al-Rihany writes this story about one of the Najd Brothers who accompanied him in a trade caravan, teaching everyone Wahabi notions: (…he kept talking to us about monotheism, and its three principles: to obey Prophet Muhammad in order to go to Heaven, to avoid disobeying him in order to avoid Hell, and never to worship gods beside Allah by befriending enemies of God and His Prophet…) (17). Of course, this was a distortion of the meaning of this Quranic verse: "You will not find a people who believe in God and the Last Day, loving those who oppose God and His Messenger…" (58:22), as this verse talks about the prohibition of befriending warring aggressive enemies that fight peaceful believers. Since the Najd Brothers typically began aggressions first against peaceful ones who never declared war on them, they deserve to be hated by God as per the Quran: "And fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not commit aggression; God does not love the aggressors." (2:190).

6- Al-Artaweiyya colony embodied religious fanaticism at large; John Habeeb writes that its ruler forced some visitors coming from Kuwait to be interrogated first, before being allowed to enter the colony, about their faith tenets. The same was applied to some of the Najd Brothers who came from Kuwait to the colony; to make sure their faith was not 'contaminated' by such contact with Kuwaitis! This is much like European inquisition, but doubled. Hamilton, a politician who was staying in Kuwait, writes in Dec. 1918 that some Kuwaitis urged the travellers not to go to the colony so as not to be put into that inquisition or religious quarantine for varying periods of time to test their adherence to Wahabism, and even ordinary Wahabis, among dwellers of cities and including Philby, used to avoid entering Al-Artaweiyya as if it were filled with lepers (18).

7- Such feelings of fanaticism did not just lead to such inquisitions but also to political opposition based on deep-seated xenophobia and hatred of the British in particular, and this led the Najd Brothers to declare their king as infidel as he dealt with foreign infidels peacefully. Abdul-Aziz understood the importance of allying himself to GB, and had to face the criticism points of the Najd Brothers, especially regarding the conquest of Hael, and disputes over that points escalated during the conquest of Hejaz. The Najd Brothers wanted to begin with Hejaz, whose ruler Al-Sharif Hussein worked for GB, and not Hael as this went with the British interests who hated leaders of the tribe of Shamar who allied itself to the Ottomans. The king retained his political vision and ordered them to conquer Hael first, to their consternation. This led the Najd Brothers to think that their king and imam had forsaken Islam by working for the interests of the infidel British (19). The more their king contacted GB, the more they felt that he became an apostate; this accusation was leveled against him in the Riyadh conference in 1927, especially regarding sending his sons to Cairo and London to study there. Things exacerbated as the British defined borders and when an Islamic conference was held in Hejaz with Egyptian and Iranian delegations attending it. The king of Egypt, the descendant of Muhammad Ali Pacha, was among the attendees, to the ire and fury of the Najd Brothers, who were prevented from attacking the Kiswah caravan coming from Cairo. Such events marked all subsequent military revolt of the Najd Brothers against the king.

8- Religious fanaticism and xenophobia drove the Najd Brothers to hare and ear modern inventions coming from the West; however, they never objected to guns made by Europeans, because their Bedouin forefathers used them before!

Religious fanaticism and fear of modern invention:

1- Wahabi xenophobia led to fear of modern inventions imported from the West, as they were items unfamiliar to the Najd Brothers who feared anything novel; as any novelty stirred their feelings of inability to use and cope with such inventions. And such fears could not be allayed but with denying such inventions using Wahabi teachings and swords instead of modern weapons used by GB to annihilate them later on within desert valleys near Jordan, filled with their corpses, in 1924.

2- Kishk writes about another type of fear derived from nationalistic feelings; isolated Bedouins feared and felt apprehensive against foreigners that might conquer and invade Arabia one day, especially that GB had occupied at the time Egypt like Iraq. Bedouins hated the guts of John Philby who came with such inventions like wireless, cars, and modern weapons (20). We personally disagree with this analysis of Kishk; Najd was never invaded or conquered by anyone throughout its history. People of Najd were the ones historically to initiate invasions of other regions near it in Arabia, and no one coveted to occupy Najd deserts. Thus, people of Najd had no previous experience of being conquered by Europeans, unlike the case in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Levant. We feel bound to say that Kishk, with his opinion, tries to impose his Egyptian culture of nationalism on the people of Najd, an obvious error of course.

3- There was economic fears part from the political ones; cars would have rendered camels and horses useless and profitless, especially during the annual pilgrimage and trade seasons. Thus, the Najd Brothers called the cars ''vehicles of the devils''. This funny stance reminds us of the stance of horse-carriages drivers when the tramway stations were built in Cairo!

When religious fanaticism turned into political opposition:

1- Thus, fear of and prejudice against modern inventions were part of fanaticism and extremism and were due to psychological, political, and economic reasons as well. Hence, the reasons and motives of Wahabi political opposition of the Najd Brothers, though seem funny and laughter-inducing to readers of today, they were serious enough at the time in the 1920s. Such political opposition included the Najd Brothers, many Wahabi scholars, and even many ordinary fanatical Wahabis outside the Najd Brothers. Each category of them had to reluctantly allow more room for modern inventions later on as per their degree of fanaticism; Abdul-Aziz was more open to novelties to draw benefits within his kingdom, with gradual introduction and usage of modern inventions so as not to shock the Najd Brothers and Bedouins in general. Yet, they protested vehemently against such things and the king had to bear with them patiently at first and tried to persuade them, until he had to punish some of them, but in vain. Reluctantly, the Najd Brothers allowed telephones to be installed only when the king made a sheikh recite the Quran through the phone to them, to refute that it was a diabolical invention (21).

2- Al-Assad writes that during his journey within the desert southern of Riyadh, accompanied by a servant and a guide from the Najd Brothers, this guide was infuriated when Al-Assad used his camera, thinking that this was a pagan thing endangering one's life and soul, and tried to leave both Al-Assad and his servant, Al-Assad tried to convince him that cameras were quite harmless and that if he left them both, they would surely lose their way and die of thirst. The guide was adamant in his view of leaving them out of fear of the camera, and Al-Assad had to threaten him at gun point to remain with them until they reach any city. Reluctantly, the guide stayed, under careful watch from Al-Assad and his servant for three days of this journey, so as not to allow him to flee. The guide complained to the judge of the city, and the judge favored the guide and commanded the punishment of Al-Assad; yet, the judge had to revoke his words when Al-Assad showed him a letter written and sealed by the king that showed that Al-Assad was the personal guest of the king and must be respected and never harmed, under the pain of death (22).

3- This story narrated by Al-Assad shows the cultural and historical background of Arabia at the time when the king and the Najd Brothers were foes; the Najd Brothers opposed the telephones and the king had to give his special guest a sealed letter for his protection. The king was forced to postpone introducing telephones to the kingdom because of the vehement protest and threat of revolt by the Najd Brothers. Wahba writes the following about the relation of the king and telephones: (…When the king saw telephones for the first time in Mecca and how they are useful in managing affairs and saving time, he wanted to have one in his tent outside Mecca to keep in touch with his men in Hidaa village, instead of using mules or camels to send written royal orders and decrees, but he had to give up the idea because of the protest of the Wahabi brethren who cut off phone lines as they deemed them vice to be removed by force. The king bore patiently with them, waiting for the passage of time to convince them later on. One of the brethren beat severely one of the servants of the king because he rode a bicycle, deemed by the brethren as ''horse of the devil'', as a diabolical novelty run by witchcraft. But the king punished that Brother severely to stop his aggression…) (23).

Footnotes:

15- Habeeb, ditto, pages 71 and 112:113.

16- Assad, ''The Path to Mecca", pages 32 and 33.

17- Kishk, ditto, pages 585, 588, and 701.

18- Habeeb, ditto, pages 103 and 104, and Kishk, ditto, page 701.

19- Kishk, ditto, pages 590 and 591.

20- Kishk, ditto, pages 589 and 735.

21- Umm Al-Qura Magazine, No. 208, 5^th year, 18^th of Dec., 1928.

22- Assad, ditto, pages 62 and 63.

23- Wahba, ditto, page 289.

From bigotry and extremism of the Najd Brothers into declaring themselves as more righteous and religious:

Firstly: the Najd Brothers declaring themselves as wiser in applying sharia:

1- Arabs before the advent of Islam knew from the Abrahamic traditions that fighting is prohibited during the four sacred months of pilgrimage, but they tried many times to manipulate the day that marked the beginning of the sacred months by postponing it: "The number of months, according to God, is twelve months-in the decree of God-since the Day He created the heavens and the earth, of which four are sacred. This is the correct religion. So do not wrong yourselves during them. And fight the polytheists collectively, as they fight you collectively, and know that God is with the righteous.Postponement is an increase in disbelief-by which those who disbelieve are led astray. They allow it one year, and forbid it another year, in order to conform to the number made sacred by God, thus permitting what God has forbidden. The evil of their deeds seems good to them. God does not guide the disbelieving people." (9:36-37).

2- Once Prophet Muhammad died, the Qorayish tribe overlooked such sacred moths within the Arab conquests, the crime they committed against God, violating the Quranic teaching and terrorizing innocent ones. This violation was worse than illegal postponement of the sacred months, prohibited by God as we read in 9:37. Later on, all Arabs fought and committed during such months for centuries inside and outside Arabia, and Wahabis were no exception to such violation of the sacred months.

3- Wahabis liked to declare themselves as wiser in applying Sunnite/Wahabi sharia texts and laws. During the lifetime of Muhammad, there was not but one source or text of sharia: the Quran. Quranic revelations have sometimes rebuked and corrected the behavior of Muhammad. Once he died, Qorayish led Arabs to commit the crimes of in Arab conquests and subsequent civil wars, resulting in the establishment of the Qorayish-led Umayyad Empire and the Qorayish-led Abbasid Empire. Such aggressions, massacres, and other atrocities committed within such periods entailed religious justifications, never found in the Quran; hence, the fabrication of hadiths (falsehoods and lies ascribed to Muhammad after his death) thrived as well as acts, history, and biography (Sirah) of Muhammad that have associated to him so many crimes and corrupt acts. In sum, a false character for Muhammad had been fabricated, which contradicts his true character mentioned in the Quranic text. Hence, new texts formulated the bases for new sharia laws that have nothing to do with the Quran and Muhammad. The Quran has been violated by countless volumes and tomes of the so-called interpretations, by distortions of its terminologies and meanings, and by fabricating narratives of reasons behind revealing such and such Quranic verses. Thus, such endless stream and shoreless and bottomless sea of vague and contradictory writings have put the Quran aside and created a new accumulated creed named Sunna. Wahabis, in their turn, added another literature of writings to the Sunna: the writings of M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab as more important than the Sunna, and sadly, more important to them than the Quran itself as well! This was a sign that Wahabis was a new creed that overwrites the Sunnite one, which is its root!

4- Such Wahabi additions to the hallowed writings of ancient 'holy' forefathers led to more leaders among the Najd Brothers to claim themselves as wiser and more understanding of Wahabism and its texts in comparison to their master Abdul-Aziz.

Secondly: bigotry and declaring oneself as more righteous between Islamic sharia and the Sunnite sharia:

1- Zealotry and extremism include holding religious views that prohibit the permissible (the halal), as per the culture of fanaticism and extremism. As we have read above, all new, modern inventions hated by the Wahabi fanatics were considered prohibited and devilish!

2- Zealotry and extremism include adding things never existed before in the divine sharia of the Quran, especially by prohibiting the halal things and allowing the forbidden things. New tools and modern inventions are definitely outside this circle; they are not forbidden within any religious text. It is the use of them that should be put to question: if a knife is used for cooking, it is Ok, but when used as a tool for murder, this is definitely forbidden. Likewise, a gun is to be used for self-defense and defending the innocent and weak, not for invasions, crimes, murder, and aggressions.

3- God prohibits adding views to the Quranic sharia: "O you who believe! Do not place your opinions above that of God and His Message, and fear God, Who is Hearing and Knowing." (49:1). Hence, the Wahabi/Salafist view of covering faces of women are against the Quran; all women must be identified within their IDs and character and faces like men, even God has told Muhammad this law specified for him alone: "Beyond that, no other women are permissible for you, nor can you exchange them for other wives, even if you admire their beauty, except those you already have. God is Watchful over all things." (33:52), which means that faces of women were NOT covered during Muhammad's lifetime; otherwise, how could he have seen their beauty? Women at Muhammad's lifetime were free to interact within all social, religious, and political circles equally with men with no niqabs (i.e., full-veil covering faces and the whole bodies as well) in goodness and in evil ways, in Yathreb city-state: "The believing men and believing women are friends of one another. They advocate virtue, forbid evil, perform the prayers, practice charity, and obey God and His Messenger. These-God will have mercy on them. God is Noble and Wise." (9:71). "The hypocrite men and hypocrite women are of one another. They advocate evil, and prohibit righteousness, and withhold their hands. They forgot God, so He forgot them. The hypocrites are the sinners." (9:67). Yet, within the Abbasid Era, the Ibn Hanbal doctrine sheikhs and scholars ordered niqabs as obligatory religious duty for women and entrapped them indoors to make them remain ignorant and backward for centuries. This falsehood began with adding lies and falsehoods and personal views to divine sharia in the Quran. The Quran commands chaste believing women to cover their chests and legs, and NOT their feet, faces, hair, necks, and arms; see 33:59 and 24:31. Hence, the Ibn Hanbal doctrine sheikhs and scholars did not like the Quranic commands and added to it wearing niqabs covering women's faces, hands, arms, and hair!

4- A worse Sunnite and Wahabi crime is to permit prohibited things in the Quran as religious duty and to prohibit halal or permissible things in the Quran. Prohibited items in the Quran are very few exceptions in life. For instance, God specifies a certain category of women that a man cannot possibly marry and then allows a man to marry any of the women outside such circle: "…Permitted for you are those that lie outside these limits, provided you seek them in legal marriage…" (4:24). This means that permissible things in life are the rule, with few exceptions; prohibitions are not the general rule in life or in the Quran. Another is related to food items; al food items are permissible except four items: dead animals, blood of animals, flesh of pigs, and animals slaughtered for idols, gods, and saints; see 2:173, 6:145, and 16:115. Such prohibited food items are explained further in 5:3, and God allows eating such items in cases of extreme necessity and forbids prohibiting other food items outside this circle of forbidden food items; see 2:168-172, 5:87, and 10:59.

5- Despite all this, Sunnite sharia laws add lots of details that forbids halal things (i.e., items never prohibited by God in the Quran) and allowing forbidden things and major sins mentioned in the Quran as such. For instance, Sunnite/Wahabi jihad allows aggressions, massacres, looting, invasions, rape, enslavement, and other atrocities as religious duty above all other duties; this occurred during Arab conquests of the so-called companions of the Prophet and within civil wars that followed them. Unlike the Quran that commands the capital punishment for murderers and killers, the Sunnite creed allows capital punishment for those deemed as apostates/infidels, those who stopped praying, adulterers and adulteresses, and other endless categories that fall under the Wahabi slogan of ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'', as per writings of Ibn Taymiyya.

6- Hence, fanaticism and extremism lead to adding corrupt notions to faith, by turning heinous crimes into religious duties and harmless acts into prohibited things, to the extent that most of things in life are prohibited by Sunnite Wahabis, and the halal permissible things became few exceptions! Not the other way round as per the Quran: the forbidden are exceptions to the rule of allowing all things in life.

Thirdly: zealotry and declaring oneself more righteous between Sunnite sharia and Wahabi sharia:

1- Wahabism is an offshoot of the Sunnite Ibn Hanbal doctrine known for its fanatical and extremist stances; even Egyptians used to call any fanatic extremist as Hanbali, namely, a follower of the Ibn Hanbal doctrine. When Wahabism emerged, Wahabis applied the Ibn Hanbal doctrine with blood-shedding and violence. They even have forbidden music as the sound of the devils, except tambours and drums used during jihad wars. That was why the Najd Brothers condemned the Egyptian Kiswah caravan entering Mecca with music and singing chants within religious music, deemed by the Wahabis as forbidden things that must be removed by force, and they never allowed wedding ceremonies that lasted for weeks of musical celebrations (24).

2- Smoking as habit was never known during the Abbasid caliphate; yet, when it was known and practiced later on, Wahabis had forbidden it to the extent of killing anyone smoking in public (25). The Cairo-based Al-Azhar institution at the time represented non-Wahabi Sunnite creeds, and one of its sheikhs, named Al-Dijwi, asserted in 1935 that smoking is never mentioned in the Quran as prohibited because it is not mentioned at all, and one cannot prohibit something without a legal holy text, except ignoramuses who forgot that originally, all things are permitted with the exception of the prohibited things in the Quran (26).

3- Forbidding smoking was linked to the political interests of Abdul-Aziz after the conquest of Hejaz; despite the king's allowing of the Najd Brothers to forbid smoking, tradesmen of Jeddah beseeched the king to stop the Wahabi brethren from burning the 100.000 pounds Sterling worth of tobacco cargos. He had to oblige them so that his subjects would not lose their money in the first year of his reign over Hejaz, especially that he allowed Al-Ahsa people to dig for oil on return for paying him 2000 pounds sterling annually. The king had nothing to do but to allow them to sell the cargos in Hejaz on the condition of not importing more tobacco in the future; yet, selling it means there would be people smoking it. Hence, we see the difference between banners, mottoes and slogans raised by a theocracy and real-life situations that entailed political measures. When tradesmen felt happy at such royal decision, bearing in mind that tradesmen in all times and climes direct policies, they urged the king to remove sanctions regarding importation of tobacco, as the Saudi state would lose revenues and taxes it needed for its treasury. The king had to grant them their wish for economic reasons, to the consternation of the Najd Brothers, who prohibited taxes system of Hejaz because of tobacco. Yet, the king ordered his scholars to issue a fatwa that tobacco is not forbidden in Islam, as it is not mentioned in any Wahabi or Sunnite texts. Hence, Kishk writes that the people of Jeddah imported and smoked tobacco in spite of prohibitions of the Najd Brothers (27).

4- Thus, conquest of Hejaz caused disputes among men within the nascent kingdom; Hejaz was an area open to the world and its different cultures because of trade and pilgrimage, whereas the Najd Brothers with their isolation and close-mindedness held many inquisitions at gates of Al-Artaweiyya and insisted on prohibition of all new items never known to them before. John Habeeb writes that once a woman brought coffee beans from Kuwait and she asked the scholars of Al-Artaweiyya about if it was religiously legal to drink coffee. Habeeb writes that even as he was writing his book (i.e., March, 1968), no women were allowed to go shopping in the market of Al-Artaweiyya; instead, women would gather outside the mosque and tradesmen will show their goods to them, under the supervision of mosque imams. Habeeb writes that no woman was allowed to make her voice heard in streets; instead, they clapped their hands to draw attention of anyone. A daughter of the king Saud tried to get to the market of Al-Artaweiyya in her car, but the general public of Wahabi men smashed her car and forced her to retire to her house of residence. King Saud approved of their aggression and rebuked her daughter for violating traditions (28).

5- Smoking was an issue that forced itself on Abdul-Aziz, not just in Hejaz or Jeddah, but all over the KSA; he once sent a cigarette case as a present to Dickson when he visited Al-Ahsa in 1919 (29), and this gift had a symbolic meaning; as cigars and cigarettes entered some colonies as well. John Habeeb mentioned that within Al-Artaweiyya, smoking in public was prohibited in 1968 (30), but not in private. This means that the list of prohibited things by Wahabis has been shortened when the Najd Brothers were killed off.

Fourthly: political manipulation of fanaticism and extremism: declaring oneself as more righteous and wiser politically and religiously:

1- If fanaticism, extremism, and bigotry are derived from a political background, they are linked to declaring oneself as wiser and deserving to rule instead of a current ruler/regime, mixed with feelings of religious superiority as if the more righteous and pious ones deserve to rule the land and to assume the political authority and power within a theocracy.

2- Here lies the ordeal of a theocratic ruler within all theocracies when faced with political opposition of persons declaring themselves as more pious within the man-made creed of the theocracy; the ruler must make some compromising between raised slogans and real-life internal and external problems. The religious and political opposition movements are usually assumed by persons that stick to the religious slogans and the literal application of them, and they gain more followers within brainwashed masses that might believe that such persons are more pious; piety within such societies consisted of more overt signs and appearance used in propaganda.

3- Hence, the history of the third, current KSA is marked with the emergence of such Bedouin figures, previously unknown, like Al-Daweesh, Ibn Bajad, and Ibn Heithlein. If it had not been for the emergence of Abdul-Aziz to establish the third, current KSA, these three Bedouin leaders might have lived and died in obscurity like their forefathers, but they came to be known in the limelight because of their political opposition and military rebellion against Abdul-Aziz, as per the climate of a theocracy we have mentioned above. More details about the three leaders are found below.

Footnotes:

24- Dickson, ''The Arab of the Desert'', page 128.

25- Al-Rihany, ditto, pages 141 and 142.

26- Huda Al-Islam Magazine, 1935 A.D., page 487.

Huda Al-Islam Magazine, 1349 A.H., No. 28.

27- Kishk, ditto, page 624.

28- Habeeb, ditto, pages 103 and 104.

29- Dickson, ''The Arab of the Desert'', page 127.

30- Habeeb, ditto, page 104.

Leaders of the Najd Brothers who competed with Abdul-Aziz for more power and authority:

These three leaders among the Najd Brothers were Bedouin leaders who helped Abdul-Aziz to establish his kingdom, and they revolted against him later on; the king had fought and subjugated them before, and he taught them Wahabism in order to become the Najd Brothers who imbibed Wahabi teachings, but using the same teachings, they revolted against him as they claim themselves to be more pious and more fit to rule the kingdom. They opposed their king and militarily rebelled against him, but he defeated them eventually using the help of GB. Let us focus below on each leader and his tribe.

Firstly: Feisal Al-Daweesh of the Mateer tribe:

The Mateer tribe:

1- This tribe was located south of Kuwait, near Al-Zulfi region. South of this tribe lived the tribes of Al-Ajman and Bani Khaled, the most famous tribes of the Eastern region. The Mateer tribe had about 1500 tent, making it a large tribe within Bedouin measures and traditions, and it included factions at the time as it used to have centuries ago (31).

2- The Mateer tribe enjoyed a high stature and fame among other tribes; if one tribesman of it was violated, the aggressor(s) would be crushed to death. Its tribesmen led armies and troops of other tribes, and they had unparalleled military prowess, which caused, along with their location, the tribe to be a point of contention between Abdul-Aziz (who conquered Al-Ahsa first at the time) and Kuwait, as both sides wanted to include the tribe within its borders (32). The Mateer tribe was a tool used to keep security in remote areas away from the reach of Abdul-Aziz, before he subjugated the whole of the Najd region later on, especially routes of caravans between Najd and Gulf ports (33).

Feisal Al-Daweesh:

1- Al-Daweesh was the messenger between the Mateer tribe and Abdul-Aziz until the whole tribe was controlled and subjugated by Abdul-Aziz by force and money (34). Al-Daweesh belonged to a faction of the tribe that was one hundred percent Bedouin, never related to cities or villages, and his faction had the most courageous men in fighting, and his father was Sultan Al-Daweesh and his mother was from the family of Al-Heithlein, from the tribe of Al-Ajman. She was the wife of a man of her tribe and family that was imprisoned for life in Turkey by the Ottomans. Her marriage was subsequently annulled by the Bedouins, as per their traditions, to allow her to marry Sultan Al-Daweesh, and she bore him his son, Feisal (35).

2- Al-Daweesh was known for being a highwayman, who was cunning, shrewd, and sly, raiding all caravans within his reach, and he used to change his allies and loyalties when this served his own interests. Al-Daweesh liked to raid and loot, until Abdul-Aziz fought him and made him repent and swear allegiance, and he was later on appointed by Abdul-Aziz as the ruler of Al-Artaweiyya colony (36). Such a post never changed the nature of Al-Daweesh; he stilled loved raids, spoils, and looting, as Abdul-Aziz said himself in an interview: (…Al-Daweesh was a Bedouin man with no religious beliefs at all, and he was one of our leaders with many disputes with us…his Bedouin mentality prevailed and his savage brutality dominated his behavior and whims…) (37).

3- The ambition of Al-Daweesh was shown when he would enter the capital, Riyadh, to meet the king, within a military procession like conquerors, according to Wahba: (…he would enter Riyadh like conquerors within a military procession of 150 armed men, and he would sit directly beside Abdul-Aziz, and never greeted any guests in the royal palace. He would not leave the palace unless the king would give him all that he wanted for himself and his tribe, such as arms, ropes for water-wells, slave-girls, clothes, and perfumes. Al-Daweesh was the only one that the king never refused anything…All people used to say that Al-Daweesh had no religion at all, he was a hypocrite who claimed to believe in Wahabism, but he was a false, very proud man…) (38). We conclude from this quote of Wahba that Abdul-Aziz had many possessions that included slave-girls or enslaved women filling his palace, and that Al-Daweesh cared to have his share of them every time he would enter the palace of his king, as Al-Daweesh considered himself as partner of Abdul-Aziz in all spoils like enslaved women, cattle, and clothes! This means that Wahabis used to enslave Muslims women!

4- Al-Daweesh was convinced that Abdul-Aziz owed him a lot as Al-Daweesh was the reason why the king was enthroned over most of Arabia because he fought for him, and Al-Daweesh bragged the fact before everyone in all meetings he held during his military revolt against the king (39).

5- The Salafist/Wahabi ideology allows ample room for the more extremist fanatics to claim being more pious and deserving to rule, and such notion led Al-Daweesh to fire bullets at the tomb of Prophet Muhammad during the siege of Yathreb, and this act was resented by the Yathreb dwellers and drove Abdul-Aziz to dismiss him from his post as a military leader (40). Al-Daweesh wanted ardently to attack Yathreb and to massacre its dwellers to loot their possessions and to punish them for not surrendering soon enough, and Abdul-Aziz stopped him firmly, and later on, Al-Daweesh was defeated by the king twice and had to give up eventually, and he died on the 3^rd of Oct., in 1931, having been taken ill ''suddenly'' when he was placed, after his defeat, under the ''care'' of Abdul-Aziz. We suspect that he was probably poisoned by the king, but no historians wrote about that suspicion. As usual, the king took care after the family of the deceased. (41).

Secondly: Sultan Ibn Bajad Al-Otaybi:

The Otaybah tribe:

The tribe of Otaybah was distinguished with its strong, powerful tribesmen and its countless camel. Its location allowed it to control the pilgrims' route coming from Jordan, as it was located between the middle of Najd and the east of Hejaz. It was not surpassed in number of tribesmen except by the tribe of Anza, but no tribe competed with it in controlling the middle area of the KSA. Some of the Otaybah tribesmen were Bedouins and some were city dwellers. This tribe was filled with fanatics and bigots whose extremism was not less than the tribe of Mateer. The Otaybah tribesmen had very good relations with the family of Al-Saud during the period when the Mateer tribesmen used to hold many disputes with the Otaybah tribesmen (42).

Sultan Ibn Bajad:

1- He was a descendant of the powerful tribe of Hawazen, whose mobile Bedouins moved within Riyadh and Mecca. After his tribesmen converted to Wahabism collectively, they moved to the colony of Al-Ghatghat and other colonies. Ibn Bajad was known for his tribal fanaticism, bigotry, strictness, and firmness, and thus, he joined the Najd Brothers easily as their traits of 'piety' matched his character traits. Ibn Bajad had but one trait that differed from traits of Al-Daweesh; Al-Daweesh lived within city lifestyles and moved a lot among regions like Al-Ahsa, Kuwait, Gulf ports, and Basra, and he dealt peacefully with the Ottomans and Turks. On the contrary, Ibn Bajad lived mostly within Bedouin deserts of the middle of the KSA and he used to seeing nothing but sands and rocks, until he conquered Mecca, and thus, Ibn Bajad used to attack and chase all foreigners in Mecca to kill them off, unlike Al-Daweesh who used to deal peacefully with Europeans.

2- Hence, the savagery and brutality of Ibn Bajad won so many battles for Abdul-Aziz; Ibn Bajad used to hurl himself and his troops into battles and skirmishes without prior written permission of the king, and he used to commit massacres as in the cases of Turba and Ta'if. Later on, the king had to send him back to Najd, but Ibn Bajad expected large rewards from his imam and king, especially that his ambitions, like that of Al-Daweesh, were limitless, even before he joined the Najd Brothers; he used to led thousands of Bedouin soldiers to raid and loot caravans of pilgrims and tradesmen, massacring all of them after confiscating their money, possessions, horses, and camels (43). When Ibn Bajad converted to Wahabism and joined the Najd Brothers, his character remained just the same; he looted and massacred people of Ta'if just as he had done with caravans of pilgrims.

3- Ibn Bajad began his revolt against his master Abdul-Aziz when he backed off from the siege of Jeddah, and he led the revolt against the king by declaring jihad in Iraq to embarrass the king with GB. Ibn Bajad attacked the Wahabi people of Al-Qassim area to loot and to confiscate their possessions. After the defeat of the Najd Brothers in the battle of Sabilla, Ibn Bajad surrendered himself to Abdul-Aziz who imprisoned him.

Didaan Ibn Heithlein and Al-Ajman tribe:

Al-Ajman tribe:

1- This tribe included many factions that used to live in the Najran area, but they moved later on to another area, named Al-Naqra deserts, near Al-Ahsa region. Al-Ajman tribesmen were more fanatical in their application of the Sunnite Ibn Hanbal doctrine, the root of Wahabism, and yet, their extremist tribal fanaticism prevented their being subjugated easily by Abdul-Aziz. They were forced to submit by the power of his sword. Whenever a chance they could get, Al-Ajman tribesmen would readily revolt against Abdul-Aziz or would let him down in times of need. The brother of Didaan Ibn Heithlein, Saad, was killed during battles between Abdul-Aziz and Al-Ajman tribesmen. When Al-Ajman tribesmen finally fought within the Najd Brothers on the side of the king, their only and primary target was to loot spoils, despite the fact that most of Al-Ajman tribesmen lived in colonies near their region, especially the colony of Al-Sirar, ruled by Didaan Ibn Heithlein, that housed 2000 men. When the conquest of Hejaz began, Al-Ajman tribesmen were reluctant to join the military forces of Abdul-Aziz. Finally, they let their animals graze within Hejaz lands for three months, unwilling to fight on his side. The king had to tell them to go home as long as they will not participate in the siege of cities of Hejaz (44).

2- Such tensions in the relationship of Al-Ajman tribesmen with the king led him to appoint a ruler over them and over Al-Ahsa, his paternal uncle's son, Abdullah Ibn Jalawy. Later on, Al-Ajman tribesmen joined readily the military forces of the Najd Brothers revolting against the king, as they bore personal grudges against him, and this resentment was expressed by their leader Didaan Ibn Heithlein against Abdul-Aziz because of his murdered brother, Saad Ibn Heithlein.

Didaan Ibn Heithlein:

He belonged to the biggest faction of Al-Ajman tribe, and he used to be outspoken in expressing his deep-seated hatred toward Abdul-Aziz, though the latter appointed him as the ruler of Al-Sirar, the biggest colony in Al-Ajman and Al-Ahsa. Didaan Ibn Heithlein never heeded plans of conquests set by the king, especially that he longed to avenge his murdered brother, Saad Ibn Heithlein, in 1919. His hatred of Abdul-Aziz grew more as the king punished him for being reluctant to join the siege of Hejaz, as he was a latecomer to it, by preventing him his due share of the spoils (45).

The link between the three leaders:

1- Al-Daweesh was a relative of Didaan Ibn Heithlein, because the mother of the former came from the same family of Heithlein, and the wife of Al-Daweesh was from Otaybah tribe, linking Al-Daweesh with Ibn Bajad as his one of his in-laws (46).

2- Another link between the three leaders was their ambitions, as their respective tribes controlled the most important regions and routes of the kingdom in the north-west (Mateer), the west (Otaybah), and the east (Al-Ajman) (47). The three leaders expected from their master and king to rule parts of the conquered lands in the name of Abdul-Aziz, or at least to live in them for the sake of trade; yet, to their surprise, the king appointed rulers from among his family members exclusively. When their hopes were dashed as far as political rule was concerned, they accused their king of apostasy and declared themselves more fit to rule and more pious, righteous, and loyal to the Wahabi faith than Abdul-Aziz. Sultan Ibn Bajad changed his name into Sultan Eddine, to declare himself among all tribes as sultan/caliph and supreme ruler instead of Abdul-Aziz. The followers of Ibn Bajad made military processions and took pride in their 'sultan during the conference in Riyadh. Al-Daweesh expressed outspokenly his desire to be appointed as ruler of Najd, whereas Ibn Bajad coveted to be appointed as ruler of Hejaz, and Ibn Heithlein wanted to become ruler of Al-Ahsa (47). Abdul-Aziz could never have granted them such wishes; the kingdom would have been cut to pieces. The king had nothing to do but to firmly order them to get back to Najd, and they had to revolt and to begin their military rebellion against him, under the claim that they were more pious and righteous than the infidel king who forsook Wahabism.

Lastly:

1- We conclude this chapter with excerpt of the letter of Abdul-Aziz about the Najd Brother after the battle of Sabilla: (…For three years, some of the brethren, especially dwellers of Al-Ghatghat, people under Al-Daweesh, and other fanatical bigots who took extremist stances in religion (i.e., Wahabism) had distorted and contradicted sharia laws (i.e., Wahabi sharia laws). They were haughty and arrogant, and some of them came from the Bedouin areas, and saw that their revolt was for the love of and the sake of religion (i.e., Wahabism). Yet, with the grace of God, most Muslims (i.e., Wahabis) knew that the brethren had gone overboard and rejected Islam (i.e., Wahabism) by their love to loot and massacre and their lack of piety under the pretext of religion (i.e., Wahabism)…We have gathered here scholars of Najd to undeceive the Muslims (i.e., Wahabis) about the evil people that we have defeated, and they bear witness to the fact that we have been patient with the brethren and advised them so many times before, to relieve and ease our royal conscience before Almighty God. Yet, our advice was in vain, as the brethren attacked fortresses within our borders with Iraq, and they wanted to deceive the faithful (i.e., Wahabis) to join them in such aggression for the sake of loot. When it was transpired that they were evil people seeking the transient worldly possessions by massacring others, we had to put an end to their crimes and aggressions, by first sending to them all scholars of the sharia (i.e., Wahabi scholars) but they adamantly refused to listen. When it turned out that they would not comply with sharia laws (Wahabism) and government (of Saudis), we asked God's aid to get rid of them using the Muslims soldiers (i.e. Wahabi fighters loyal to the king) to kill them off. There were few casualties among our Muslims soldiers. Most of the survivors asked for a royal pardon, as they were misguided at first, and we have forgiven them, with the exception of Al-Daweesh and Ibn Bajad, because they deserve sharia laws punishment as they were the root of evil and corruption…Al-Daweesh is taken ill and we do not know if he should live or not, and Ibn Bajad is imprisoned, and both men submitted to sharia laws punishment as they know they violated sharia laws by committing massacres… we regret to have had to kill the brethren, but we had to do it to ensure the safety of all Muslims in the kingdom, and may God forgive us and aid us in serving Islam and Muslims…The people of Najd feel safe and secure and happy now…) April, 1929 A.D./Shawal 1347 A.H. (48).

2- Abdul-Aziz in this letter says that his foes were fanatical and extremist bigots who violated sharia laws of Wahabism, but they thought of themselves as on the right side for their love of and the sake of Wahabism. He writes that many of the Najd Brothers fought for spoils and loot and political ambition using religion as pretext or cover. He seemed to have realized that the ideology and methodology of his foes were wrong and ignorant, leading to declaring oneself as more pious and thus fit to rule and to forever fight others as infidels who deserve to die. Of course, he meant Wahabism and Wahabis all the time, as we have shown in brackets. He criticized their military raids of Iraqi borders that led them to attack and kill some innocent Wahabi subjects of the king later on. He justifies his killing them off as they posed a veritable threat to peace and security of his subjects and as they never paid heed to advice and to Wahabi scholars. A confrontation was inevitable to annihilate them.

3- Finally, we see that Abdul-Aziz did not differ much from his Najd Brothers; he confiscated to himself and his men to speak in the name of Islam, describing the ones revolting against him as violators of faith and sharia laws. This was just the same treatment he received from his Najd Brothers as they described him as tyrant and a ''vice'' that must be removed by force as per Wahabi teachings. Both parties declared itself as more pious and thus more fit to rule. The decisive element in such cases as these was the military power and prowess – a useful, important lesson to be drawn!

Footnotes:

31- Umm Al-Qura Magazine, No. 298, 6^th year, 21^st Aug., 1930.

32- Howarth, ''The Desert King'', page 155.

Armstrong, ''Lord of Arabia'', page 66.

33- Lughat Al-Arab Magazine, Vol. 7, 3^rd year, page 388, Jan. 1914.

34- Al-Muqattam, No. 12268, 41^st year, 29^th June, 1929, an interview with Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud.

35- Al-Zarkeley, ''Arabia in the Reign of Abdul-Aziz'', page 464.

36- Al-Mukhtar, ditto, page 145.

Assad, ditto, pages 262 and 263.

Al-Zarkeley, ditto, page 465

Dickson, ditto, page 281.

37- Al-Muqattam, No. 12268, 41^st year, 9^th June, 1929.

38- Wahba, ditto, page 399.

39- Al-Khateeb, ''Abdul-Aziz the Just Imam'', page 172.

40- Al-Muqattam, No. 12203, 41^st year, 11^th Apr. 1929.

Al-Zarkeley, ditto, page 471.

41- Dickson, ''Kuwait and her Neighbors'', page 326 and 327.

42- Al-Muqattam, No. 12268, 41^st year.

Al-Zarkeley, ditto, page 467.

Hamza (Fouad), '''Heart of Arabia", page 177.

Arslan (Shakib), ditto, page 141.

43- Meullen, op. cit., page 66.

Howarth, op. cit., pages 167:170.

44- Al-Heidary, "Onwan Al-Majd in Chronicles of Baghdad, Basra, and Najd", pages 204 and 205.

Al-Zarkeley, ditto, pages 465 and 466.

Qassim, "The Arabian Gulf", pages 52:55.

45- Al-Rihany, ditto, page 414.

Al-Zarkeley, ditto, page 466.

46- Armstrong, op. cit., page 215.

47- Assad, ditto, pages 262, 263, and 268.

Habeeb, ditto, pages 202, 212, and 224.

48- Wahba, ''Fifty Years in Arabia'', quoted by Jalal Kishk, pages 660 and 661.

ANNEX to CHAPTER IV: an article published before in Arabic on our website in July, 2104, that can be a commentary on the above-mentioned facts:

Zeinab, A Donkey, and ISIS

Introduction:

We have received this question via an email message: (Why, Zeinab, the granddaughter of Prophet Muhammad, was chased from one country to another as we read in history? Had she any written will which was dictated by Prophet Muhammad? Would you kindly, with your expertise in history, please clarify this matter?). The answer to these queries is found by the end of this chapter, to link the miserable present with the more miserable past.

Firstly: Zeinab:

1- This historical character, descendant of Fatima, Muhammad's daughter, and Ali Ibn Abou Talib, is mentioned within the historical accounts of the Karbala battle, within the well-known audience between her and the second Umayyad caliph Yazeed Ibn Mu'aweiya, in Damascus. She later on returned to her birth-place, Yathreb, along with her remaining relatives who survived the Karbala massacre. It is claimed that she brought with her the severed head of Al-Hussein, which was buried in the area of Al-Biqee' area in Yathreb. Later on, a revolt against the Umayyads broke out in Yathreb. An Umayyad army was sent there, and it crushed and quelled this revolt, after episodes of mass-killings, rape, robbing, stealing, among other crimes, in Yathreb. This battle is called in history, the battle of Al-Hurrah, a year after the Karbala battle. We have referred to such events in detail in other articles on our website. We, as a researcher specialized in history, assert that Zeinab is never mentioned in history after the Karbala battle and massacre; no historical account of her is written after this battle is to be found at all after her return to Yathreb. Even historical accounts that narrate the battle of Al-Hurrah events never mention her name at all. We conclude that she had no role to be registered at the time by historians, who were shocked like the rest of Arabs after the Karbala massacre events.

2- All of the above-mentioned facts are in contrast with the myths written and propagated centuries after the battle of Karbala; when the cult of worshipping and sanctifying and deifying Al-Hussein (as a deity or a saint) and his sister Zeinab (as a goddess or a saint) became a major feature in the three earthly, fabricated, man-made creeds of the Muhammadans: the Sunnite, the Shiite, and the Sufi creeds. Some liars made up the myth that Zeinab fled Yathreb to Damascus, or to Iraq, or as some others claim, she fled to Egypt. In every location we mention here, i.e., Iraq, the Levant, and Egypt, shrines and mausoleums have been erected to revere and worship her. She became a cult of worship by the Muhammadans. This is polytheism and of course against the Quranic verses. The same cult included the worship and sanctification of the severed head of her brother Al-Hussein, which has its separate shrines and mausoleums. Hence, we have several tombs for Zeinab and the head of her brother! Of course, she had but one body, and her brother had but one head, buried in Al-Biqee' area in Yathreb. Hence, such several mausoleums and myths about Zeinab and her brother are mere falsehoods and a punch of lies that persist until today, just like the falsehoods of the three man-made creeds of Shiites, Sunnites, and Sufis, ascribed falsely to Islam.

3- Strange enough, Egypt never witnessed throughout the centuries of the Umayyad, Abbasid, and Mameluke eras the establishment of a mausoleum dedicated to Zeinab. However it has been established in Cairo, Egypt, in the Ottoman era, by an Ottoman governor in the 19^th century, when a Sufi person claimed that he had seen a dream that the soul of Zeinab had descended in that spot in Cairo! The mosque bearing her name was erected at the same spot! We have discussed and written this within two books we have included in the curricula of students in the History Department, Azhar University, in 1982. The titles of these two books are as follows: "Research in Sources of Religious History: A Practical Study" and "The Character of Egypt after the Arab Conquest".

4- The first title, unpublished here yet on our website, is an unprecedented work in the field of history research, establishing a new methodology of history research in religious history of the Muhammadans; we are the first researcher to create such methodology. The book tackles the Muhammadans' religious history sources and offers analytical study of them, along with practical application concerning how to glean and draw historical facts from them. Such sources are mostly unknown to most researchers, and they include books of Sufi feats of saints, books of pilgrimage spots of 'holy' saints' tombs, and books of social and religious aspects of life around such tombs. Among such books in the Mameluke era in Egypt the one titled "Al-Kawakib Al-Sayyarah" by Ibn Al-Zayyat and the other one titled "Tohfat Al-Ahbab" by the Sufi author Al-Sakhawy. We have written the following about these two books: both books mention all famous and all less-than-famous shrines or mausoleums and all the stories connected with its buried male or female saint, especially if the dead ones claimed to be descendants of Prophet Muhammad's progeny. Yet, both books never mention any mausoleum for Zeinab. It is never mentioned in other ancient historical books like "Al-Intessar" by Ibn Daqmaq and "Khetat Al-Makrizi" by Al-Makrizi, and both tomes describe meticulously each area in Cairo and in Egypt. The reason: the so-called mausoleum ascribed to Zeinab has been a fabricated tale in the Ottoman era, based on a vision or a dream by a Sufi in 955 A.H. (1548 A.D.), and this mosque/mausoleum had been restored and renovated in 1173 A.H. (1759 A.D.), and then the Ministry of Religious Endowments (i.e. Awqaf, in Arabic) in Egypt built the current mosque in 1940 A.D. on the ruins of the old one. The myth has it that Zeinab, the daughter of Ali Ibn Abou Talib, came to Egypt in the last days of her lifetime. Yet, all history books and accounts written before and during the Mameluke era never mention her arrival to Egypt at all. Her assumed arrival would never have been ignored by historians of course, especially that Al-Makrizi in his books mentions all those who came to Egypt among the so-called prophet's companions and their later generations. The same was done by Al-Siyouti in his book titled "Husn Al-Muhadarah", in alphabetical order as well. Both historians never mentioned Zeinab at all, despite their keen interest in registering all names of Arabs who came to Egypt, especially those who claimed to be among the prophet's progeny.

5- In our book, published here on our website, titled "The Character of Egypt after the Arab Conquest", we assert and prove the fact that the Arab conquest of Egypt did not offer anything new to Egypt in the political and strategic aspects concerning its geographic location, nor such a conquest brought anything new in the religious aspect of Egyptian life. It is the Egyptians who had Egyptianized the creed of the Arabs; old Pharaonic notions and creed tenets were restored dressed into Islamic terminology, especially the cult of worshipping the goddess Isis. Our book proves that in the Pharaonic cults lie the origins of the deification and worship of Zeinab, or any 'holy' female figure, for that matter. Zeinab has been described using the same epithets given to the goddesses Isis and Maat, and later on Mary the mother of Christ, by our ancestors, the ancient Egyptians. Among such epithets are the following: The Lady, Our Lady, Judge of the Court, and Guardian of the Weak Ones. We have written in this book the following paragraph.

6- The holy trinity of the ancient Egyptians that held its influence over most non-Egyptians in the ancient world consists of Osiris, Isis, and Horus. This trinity went on during the Ptolemy dynasty in Egypt; the formal solemn oath in the Ptolemaic Era was as follows: "I swear by Osiris, Isis, Horus, and the rest of the gods…etc." and this trinity and the Isis cult spread in ancient Greece even before Alexander the Great's conquest of Egypt. Divine and sacred secrets of the Isis cult were dressed in Greek attire; Dionysius is akin to Osiris, and holy goddesses and female figures in Greek mythology resemble Isis. It is noteworthy that the Egyptian holy trinity was linked later on with Zeus, in the form of the god Serapis, who replaced Osiris, as the Greco-Egyptian god in Alexandria, along with the Isis cult of worship. Isis had its unique stature and reverence in the deep inner recesses of the collective minds of Egyptians for centuries; she is the mother of a god, Horus, and the one who suffered a lot for her husband and child against forces of evil. Isis cult spread in Rome as well and throughout the Roman Empire that united all countries around the Mediterranean Sea and the rest of the ancient known world by politics and trade routes. Icons and cult of Isis spread very fast that way by ships of trade roaming different seas. We remember the famous papyrus discovered in Al-Bahnassa, in Upper Egypt El-Minya Governorate, that goes back to the 2^nd century A.D. and mention all locations of the cult of worshipping Isis in the ancient world, and in Egypt. This papyrus mentions 67 cities in the Nile Delta alone, and 55 cities outside Egypt, arranged in relation to their countries' geographical location. The domain of the Isis cult extended to India, Arabia, Sinop port of the Black Sea, and Rome. Horus of course was linked to Isis myths as her son-god. Both were deemed the precursors of the cult of worshipping statues and icons of Madonna and child: Mary and her son Jesus. Another female trinity of goddesses is mentioned in the Quran as being worshiped before Islam in Arabia: Al-Lat, Al-Uzza, and Manat; see 53:18-19. It is clear that the second Arab goddess, Al-Uzza, had derived its name from Isis, pronounced in the Pharaonic tongue as Iza or Izzet, and then within slight changes in pronunciation by the Greeks and their adding the last /s/ sound, it had become Isis, and the Arab named her Uzza. Rome conveyed the cult of Isis to the rest of Europe, only adding more of the ancient rites of the goddesses and rituals, hymns, and feasts of the abbesses and clergymen given formerly to honor other holy female figures and goddesses of Europe. Hence, the Egyptian trinity was practically worshiped in the whole area of North Africa, France, England, Italy, Germany, etc. until the end of the 2^ndcentury A.D., when Isis was replaced by Mary and the cult of Mariology. The image/icon of Mary carrying baby Jesus, an assumed god/ son of the Most High, a falsehood refuted in the Quran, resembles statues of Isis carrying baby Horus, ad this Mariology cult contains the clear mark and influence of the Egyptian Pharaonic mythology. A European historian talks in his book about the icon of Isis spread into the world from Egypt, and mentions that Isis is reflected in many European goddesses as the Holy Mater: Demeter, Venus, and Aphrodite, Artemis, Cynthia etc. and that the stature of Isis carrying Horus inside a crescent mood relates the sacred feminine to the moon and to Mary carrying the holy child/god Jesus, inside and outside Egypt. Isis statues, altars, icons, and temples spread all over Europe and votive candles used to burn before them, with bald celibate male clergymen served Isis and her altars. Isis was a virgin goddess carrying her holy child; likewise, Egypt has given the world the image of the virgin goddess Mary carrying the holy child/god Jesus, replacing Isis in all temples turned into tens of convents and churches inside and outside Egypt. Al-Makrizi tells us in his book that tens of churches and convents held the name of the Virgin Mary during and before the Mameluke Era, with statues of her and Jesus along with haloes. Annual ceremonies to celebrate her birthday were attended by both Muhammadans and the Coptic Orthodox Christians, in the same manner when all Egyptians used to worship Isis centuries before. Coptic Orthodox Christians celebrate a certain myth that Mary and her baby son fled to Egypt to avoid the persecution of Herod, the Jewish Roman ruler of Judea, and they assume that in her journey, she passed through certain locations turned into churches and convents centuries later. Hence, the Egyptian collective mind linked Isis to Mary for centuries and Egyptianized the figure of Mary and moved it to the rest of Christendom especially in Europe and Asia. Hence, the same cult of the sacred feminine figure was repeated in the character of Zeinab, who reincarnated Isis when the Sufi creed dominated the minds of the Egyptians. "The Lady" was then title of Isis and Mary that was given to Zeinab as well after the so-called Sufi vision of establishing her assumed mausoleum in the Ottoman Era. All these facts refute the myth of the journey of Zeinab coming to Egypt carrying with her the severed head of her brother, Al-Hussein, to live in peace in Egypt till her death. Other history books assert that Zeinab returned to Yathreb to take care for the surviving progeny of her dead brothers, Al-Hussein and Al-Hassan, after the battle of Karbala, and that she died and was buried in Al-Biqee' area outside Yathreb in 62 A.H. and all books written in eras of Arab rule or dynasties in Egypt never mention the assumed coming of Zeinab to Egypt at all, despite the utmost care of historians to register all hagiology or history of the so-called saints, and the locations of their shrines in Egypt, in the Fatimid and Mameluke eras. Let us remember that Al-Siyouti died in 911 A.H. toward the end of the Mameluke Era, and that Al-Makrizi died in 845 A.H. All these facts assert that the origin of the Zeinab myth in the Ottoman Era was due to the assumed vision or dream of a Sufi charlatan, and the Ottoman ruler built her mausoleum in 995 A.H. and it was renovated in 1173 A.H. (1759 A.D.) by the ruler Abdel-Rahman Katukhtha, and later on in 1940 in modern times. Such mausoleum is nearly 450 years old; yet, it enjoys until now countless pilgrims in Cairo! It has become a major rite in the Egyptian religious life now! Zeinab has been later on called the Lady of the Divan, a title similar to the title of Isis in the afterlife visions of the Pharaonic Era: Judge of the Court. That is why the Cairene district that houses currently the Zeinab mausoleum is called Al-Sayeda District; namely, the Arabic word for the epithet given to Isis and Zeinab: The Lady. The Egyptians have made Zeinab the Queen of Heaven, Queen of the Dead, Goddess of all gods and saints, just like Isis and Mary. It is a historical fact that Zeinab never came to Egypt.

Secondly: A Donkey:

1- In 1984, A.D., we were giving a lecture to the students at Al-Azhar University. A student asked us: Did the Prophet's granddaughter, Zeinab come to Egypt? We told him that the definite answer is no, and that anyone who says otherwise is a donkey! The student told us that Professor Dr. Al-Tayeb Al-Najjar asserts her coming to Egypt as a historical fact. We replied fast: Then he is a donkey! We did not intend to verbally abuse any professor; rather, we assert that the donkey is used in the Quran to describe those who specialize in ancient volumes, tomes, and books, carrying them over his shoulders without understanding any of their contents. This description is used in the Quran to refer to errant ones of the Israelites. "The example of those who were entrusted with the Torah, but then failed to uphold it, is like the donkey carrying works of literature. Miserable is the example of the people who denounce God's revelations. God does not guide the wrongdoing people." (62:5). Such misguided ones among scholars or theologians are described in worse terms in another Quranic context: "And relate to them the story of him to whom We delivered Our signs, but he detached himself from them, so Satan went after him, and he became one of the perverts. Had We willed, We could have elevated him through them; but he clung to the ground, and followed his desires. His metaphor is that of a dog: if you chase it, it pants; and if you leave it alone, it pants. Such is the metaphor of the people who deny Our signs. So tell the tale, so that they may ponder. Evil is the metaphor of the people who reject Our signs and wrong themselves. Whomever God guides is the guided one. And whomever He sends astray-these are the losers. We have destined for Hell multitudes of jinn and humans. They have hearts with which they do not understand. They have eyes with which they do not see. They have ears with which they do not hear. These are like cattle. In fact, they are further astray. These are the heedless." (7:175-179). When the student asked us his question, Dr. Al-Najjar used to hold great authority and power within Azhar University. We repeat here that we did not intend to slander him or to verbally abuse him; rather, we described him as we saw fit to him: one is either to be a real researcher in history and ancient tomes or to be a donkey or jack-ass. This is not linked to posts or positions but to efficiency and creative scientific research methodology. Without all that, experts in history resemble donkeys! Such type of donkeys spread in millions within the so-called researchers and University professors in the countries of the Muhammadans, and they spread ignorance disguised as facts believed by the common gullible people.

2- Dr. Al-Najjar was among the typical Azharite people who held high positions. He used to be our teacher in the First Year, History Department, Azhar University, in 1969 A.D. Once we read his book titled "History of Prophets", we deiced never to attend his lectures, and later on all other lectures in the Department. We returned at the time to our governorate to work as a private-school teacher in the Delta city of Hehya, Al-Sharqiyah Governorate, then the headmaster of a primary school in our village, Abou Herez, from 1971 to 1973. We returned to Cairo when we were appointed as a teacher in the History Department, Azhar University, after graduating with honors and high grades, in December 1973. We were thoroughly shocked by the ignorance of Dr. Al-Najjar and the rest of the staff in the Department. We saw at the time that it was a waste of time to attend their lectures and to stay in Cairo. That is why we returned to our governorate to work during the years mentioned above. We decided that it was enough to buy the curricula books and to study them before exams. We used to get high grades/scores with honors and became the highest students in degrees upon graduation, and that is why we were appointed in the staff of the Department, whose head was Dr. Al-Najjar (from 1969 to 1973). Late Egyptian President Sadat chose Dr. Al-Najjar as the Deputy of Azhar University in 1978, during which we were in a dilemma concerning our Ph.D. thesis, ending in a compromise: they wanted us to omit two thirds of the thesis and to discuss the remainder one-third alone in the viva. Dr. Al-Najjar was among the panel of Azharite scholars who discussed our Ph.D. thesis in October 1980. He praised us by saying: "You will cause trouble to researchers who will come after you", because we narrated an improvised synopsis of our thesis in flawless classical Arabic. Dr. Al-Najjar decided to impose this type of oral synopsis on others who will discuss their theses. Dr. Al-Najjar later on became the Head of Azhar University and was chosen in 1984 as a Member in the prestigious Academy of the Arabic Language in Cairo.

3- In our first year in the Department, in 1969, Dr. Al-Najjar put a book of his in our curricula titled "History of Prophets'', which we disliked very much and deemed it filled with errors exposing his ignorance. To our dismay, the same book was put in the post-graduate studies curricula. We felt insulted by this act; we were at the time a young teacher at the Department who had to study such ignorance to pass exams. Dr. Al-Najjar monopolized his specialization; he was the only professor who taught it, and he never cared for anything except to sell his scandal of a book to students! Other professors used to impose his book on undergraduate students to flatter him, fearing his authority especially after he left his post as the Head off Azhar University and concentrated his work in Islamic Civilization and History Department. When Dr. Al-Najjar commissioned us to teach his scandal of a book, we adamantly refused. We told him that we used to feel ashamed of ourselves to study and read it as a student, and we can never teach it as an assistant lecturer! We wrote our first book to teach it in our lectures, titled "Prophets in the Quran: An Analytical Study", along with other four books. Hell gates opened suddenly before us at the Department! We were suspended from work, interrogated formally, prevented from promotion, and banned from traveling abroad! We were questioned thoroughly in an inquisition-like court held in Azhar University with the usual accusation leveled against us: denying facts of Islam! Another accusation was defaming the stature of Azharite scholars! For them, contemplating the Quranic verses is a shame and a guilt that tarnished Azhar University! In our opinion, my endeavor was the embodiment of Azharite laws that stipulate the mission of Azharite scholars to elucidate facts and tenets of Islam.

4- Dr. Al-Najjar used to be among our chief foes in that affair, and he used to incite others against us. At the time, relations between Egypt and the KSA were cut due to Saddam Hussein's insult to Egypt when he held a conference for all Arabs and ignored Egypt altogether. The KSA-based and -sponsored Wahabi body called "The Union of the Islamic World" urged Azharite scholars to incite the Egyptian government to imprison or hang us, under the pretext of being an apostate or disbeliever! A conference held in Islamabad presided by the Pakistani (Wahabi) President M. Zia-ul-Haq in 1987, under the auspices of "The Union of the Islamic World", and attended by a group of Azharite scholars including Dr. Al-Najjar. Attendees of the conference discussed his scandal of a book and our book of analytical study on prophets in the Quran. The attendees gave Dr. Al-Najjar a prize and accused us of being a disbelieving infidel! The Egyptian attendees mentioned this accusation against us to President Mubarak. The same Wahabi union held another conference in Jeddah, attended of course by Dr. Al-Najjar, with the same accusations repeated against us and the call of our being punished somehow. We were the scapegoat to restore the cordial relations between Egypt and the KSA! Dr. Al-Najjar became later on the President of the International Center for Al-Sirah and the Sunna of the Prophet in the Egyptian Ministry of Religious Endowments in 1987, a center established by the KSA in Egypt to refute Quranism advocated by us. The KSA donated four million Egyptian pounds to this center, according to what is published by the Cairo-based newspaper "Al-Lowaa' Al-Islami". Such a center was never to be heard of ever again until now! It had no activities whatsoever. It seems that the four million Egyptian pounds went into the pockets of the Azharite sheikhs and scholars!

Lastly: ISIS

1- Eventually, mountains of religious ignorance begot ISIS terrorist organization.

2- ISIS apply what all were dreamed of by the Najd Brothers of Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud.

3- The Wahabi culture of ISIS is maintained, propagated, and defended by all Azharite sheikhs and scholars. For more than 30 years, Azharite students imbibed ISIS Wahabi culture; that is why some turned into terrorists who kill and destroy, thinking they serve God! It is ironic that Egyptian governments spend on them billions of Egyptian pounds to teach them the ISIS Wahabi culture and then chase them to imprison and punish them when they apply this culture, the ISIS religion, in real life!

4- Those who attack and refute the culture and religion of ISIS in Egypt is put to prison once accused by contempt of Islam, or rather, by daring to refute the Wahabi religion of ISIS!

5- Even if ISIS ends, more ISIS-like terrorist organizations will emerge, as long as Wahabism thrives!

References and sources to this article in this ANNEX:

1) Al-Abaady, "Egypt from the Days of Alexander the Great to the Arab Conquest", pages 50 and 274.

2) Ahmed Badawi, "A Social History of Egypt", pages 28, 95, and 96.

3) Arman, "Religion of Ancient Egypt", a chapter titled ''The Egyptian Religion in Europe", pages 17:19, 101, 479, 483, 487, and 487.

4) Menassi Al-Qumus, "History of the Coptic Church", 3^rd edition, 1982, page 20, about the goddess Isis in the history of GB.

5) Wells (H. G.), "A Short History of the World", pages 168:169, from the chapter titled "Religious Developments within the Roman Empire".

6) Al-Makrizi, "Khetat Al-Makrizi", Vol. 3, pages 551, 554, 558, 559, 560, 561, 563, 565, 568, 580:583, and 599.

CHAPTER V: Analysis of the politics of Abdul-Aziz in his Dealing with the Najd Brothers Opposition M

CHAPTER V: Analysis of the politics of Abdul-Aziz in his Dealing with the Najd Brothers Opposition Movement

Introduction: about real greatness and Machiavellian greatness in politics:

Firstly: types of greatness between ethics and politics:

1- Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud was a 'great' politician, a 'great' State founder, and a 'great' historical figure in terms of the Machiavellian criterion. Any historian has to acknowledge this fact; yet, does historical greatness based on the Machiavellian criterion constitute everything? In this introduction, we tackle the types of greatness between politics and ethics.

2- There is a positive, constructive ethical and moral greatness that change reality for the better via reform, while avoiding bloodshed as much as possible; all prophets of God had such greatness.

3- In our modern age, there are great persons who served humanity via their peaceful, positive, intellectual, realist change and reform; such as literary figures Leo Tolstoy and Tagore, reformist thinkers and politicians such as Sun Yat-Sen, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Nelson Mandela, and humanists like the nun Mother Teresa.

4- Within the culture of tyranny, despotism, injustice, and enslavement, the criterion of greatness is centered on the haughty, arrogant, affluent persons who monopolize power, authority, and wealth. The oldest, earliest example of this is the people of Noah, who refused to join Noah because his followers were poor; the affluent ones declared this to him as a reason for not joining him, and they asked Noah to drive them away, but he refused: "They said, "Shall we believe in you, when it is the lowliest who follow you?" He said, "What do I know about what they do? Their account rests only with my Lord, if you have sense. And I am not about to drive away the believers." (26:111-114). "The notables who disbelieved among his people said, "We see in you nothing but a man like us, and we see that only the worst among us have followed you, those of immature judgment. And we see that you have no advantage over us. In fact, we think you are liars."" (11:27). "…And I am not about to dismiss those who believed; they will surely meet their Lord. And I see that you are ignorant people." (11:29)

5- The Quran significantly describes leaders of disbelief, of injustice, and of sham greatness as ''retinue'', ''notables'', ''affluent ones'', and ''arrogant ones''. We recall that the affluent ones in Qorayish envied Muhammad, as an ordinary man who eats food and walk into markets, because he received divine revelations; they used to say: "…If only this Quran was sent down to a man of importance from the two cities" (43:31). Thus, the affluent ones in Qorayish admitted that Muhammad was a truthful and honest man who had high level of morals and ethics, but they felt he was no great man, because their criterion of greatness was the ability to commit injustices of all types to reach supreme power and full authority and to attain the largest wealth.

6- It is a bad habit within human history that such class of the affluent, arrogant ones in this transient world confiscates 'greatness', thinking it would go on with them even in the Hereafter. God says about this generality about humanity: "We sent no warner to any town, without its affluent ones saying, "We reject what you are sent with." And they say, "We have more wealth and more children, and we will not be punished."" (34:34-35).

Secondly: Machiavellian greatness:

1- Machiavelli, who died in 1527 A.D., writes in his book, ''The Prince'', the famous motto "the end justifies the means", and his book contains the summary of his political life in Florence, plus useful lessons drawn from history, as well as his personal experience with his master Savonarola, the reformist friar, who was put to death in 1498 and his corpse was burned, as he was the stubborn foe of the corrupt Catholic Pope, Alexander VI, who died in 1503 A.D. Savonarola's ethical and reformist endeavors were of no avail before the power and authority of the corrupt pope. Machiavelli learnt a lesson from the tragedy of Savonarola; greatness in this life has nothing to do with high moralistic and ethical attitude; rather, it is directly linked to discarding and disregarding it by submitting it to political ends.

2- Machiavelli drew 'useful' lessons from human history as well; he makes in his book a comparison between the false, fabricated character of Jesus, as a defeated crucified figure as per the Christian point of view contrary to the Quran, and the false, fabricated character of Muhammad, unlike his real character described in the Quran, as an invader and victorious military leader that his companions established an empire that, two centuries after his death, seized some parts of Italy itself and threatened Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantines.

3- Machiavelli witnessed during his youth the flourishing and greatness of Florence as an Italian power ruled by the House of Medici, which fell out of power in 1494 A.D. and Florence was made a republic that lasted until 1512 A.D., a period during which Machiavelli held several positions. He paid the price of such positions when the House of Medici regained power, accused him of conspiring against them, and imprisoned him for a while. He self-exiled into a rural region, to dedicate his time for extensive readings and to his famous book, "The Prince".

4- Machiavelli used his readings in history and his life experiences in politics, especially the story of the reformist friar Savonarola and the corrupt pope Alexander VI, to derive his political principles that he thought that any ruler should follow to achieve 'greatness'. His famous motto ''the end justifies the means'' is supported in his book with other phrases drawn from his readings in history of the world such as the following: (…only armed prophets succeed in bringing lasting change as they invaded and achieved victory…unarmed prophets failed…religions are necessary for governments not for the sake of virtue, but to enable governments to control people…a prince ought to support one religion or the other, even if he thinks it is a corrupt one…one draws great benefits from the appearance of being virtuous…it is no use for one to be always ethical on all issues…one had better make people fear him instead of to love him…).

5- Based on the above, we can say here that Machiavelli was a faithful student of the Arabs who committed the crime of the Arab conquests, once Muhammad died, by manipulating, misinterpreting, and misusing Islam, the great religion, to establish a huge empire; a 'great' on as per the Machiavellian criterion. The only difference between Machiavelli and the Sunnite theologians and sheikhs serving the caliphs coming from Qorayish is that such sheikhs forged and fabricated hadiths to urge people to blindly obey rulers and to kill renegades and 'apostates', with a focus on the notions related to the lower parts of the female and male bodies, whereas Machiavelli put in his book principles, for achieving political greatness, that manipulate the morals, ethics, and God's religion at the service of rulers by making them religion and morals underneath their feet. In short, Machiavelli put rules of how to manipulate and abuse religion to establish a state; this was what Qorayish managed to apply and realize centuries before Machiavelli was born.

6- Abdul-Aziz never read or needed to read ''The Prince'' to achieve the Machiavellian 'greatness'; he had a more than enough source in letters written by M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab, whose teachings were applied before by the prince Muhammad Ibn Saud to establish the very first KSA and by Abdul-Aziz to establish the third, current KSA, when he made good use of the Najd Brothers and got rid of them when they posed a threat and a veritable danger to his nascent kingdom, without reading the mottoes and phrases of Machiavelli: (…the end justifies the means…only armed prophets succeed in bringing lasting change as they invaded and achieved victory…unarmed prophets failed…religions are necessary for governments not for the sake of virtue, but to enable governments to control people…a prince ought to support one religion or the other, even if he thinks it is a corrupt one…one draws great benefits from the appearance of being virtuous…it is no use for one to be always ethical on all issues…one had better make people fear him instead of to love him…).

Thirdly: Downward steps of Machiavellian greatness:

1- Such steps are not upward but rather downward ones; as we talk about a downfall fluctuating between rock bottom and bottomless abyss.

2- The rock bottom of Machiavellian greatness is when a secular ideology is used to reach the throne/rule to be a tyrant or a despot, who would be 'great' and mentioned in history, such as by the racist nationalism of Hitler and by trading with and manipulating dreams of the poor like Lenin and Stalin. The thing worse than that rock bottom is the bottomless abyss; when religions are used to establish a theocracy to allow tyrants/despots to control and enslave people by corruption and monopoly of power, authority, and wealth, especially when such tyrants would consider themselves as 'owners' of their subjects in the name of God! Theocracies are the worst type of rule based on the worst types of injustices, as established by the caliphs coming from Qorayish and Abdul-Aziz and his forefathers and successors.

3- The veritable danger of the bottomless abyss of theocratic rule lies on the following points:

3/1: theocratic rule tarnishes the reputation of God's religion and creates a false god made of tyranny and hatred who loves bloodshed. Such horrid image is the one seen by people of the West and many orientalists about Islam; they imagine this bad image of God when theocratic tyrants manipulate God's name and religion to justify, legalize, and allow room for their crimes and atrocities, shouting 'Allahu akbar!' (i.e., God is the Greatest!) as they massacre the innocent peaceful ones, forgetting that God has sent Muhammad as a mercy to humankind, not to fight and murder humankind! The theocrats made Islam a personalized creed adapted for their purposes to massacre and loot all humanity!

3/2: As theocratic tyrants and despots claim falsely to belong to Islam, monopolizing its interpretation as well, the theocratic ideology would remain for some duration, deceiving people in the name of Islam. This is exactly what has happened when the ideology of Wahabism spread. Its millions of victims continue to increase in number since the very first KSA in 1745 A.D. until this very moment as we write this book (2000 A.D.). Such increase is inevitable unless Wahabism is not faced and refuted to show how it contradicts Islam (i.e., Islam is the Quran alone).

3/3: Ordinary criminals or even murderers might repent; in contrast, those massacring others within Wahabi jihad as a religious duty might never repent; devils make their sins appear good deeds to them, as God has told Muhammad: "What of him whose evil deed was made attractive to him, and so he regards it as good? God leads astray whomever He wills, and He guides whomever He wills. Therefore, do not waste yourself sorrowing over them. God knows exactly what they do." (35:8). As such sinners chose to stick to misguidance, god increases their misguidance: "Among the people are those who say, "We believe in God and in the Last Day," but they are not believers. They seek to deceive God and those who believe, but they deceive none but themselves, though they are not aware. In their hearts is sickness, and God has increased their sickness. They will have a painful punishment because of their denial. And when it is said to them, "Do not make trouble on earth," they say, "We are only reformers." In fact, they are the troublemakers, but they are not aware." (2:8-12). Those forsaking the Quran are deceived by devils that make their sins appear good deeds to them: "Whoever shuns the remembrance of the Dominant, We assign for him a devil, to be his companion. The devils hinder them from the path, though they think they are guided." (43:36-37). Those sinners will see those companions in the Hereafter, disowning them in vain after it is too late: "Until, when He comes to Us, he will say, "If only there were between me and you the distance of the two Easts." What an evil companion! It will not benefit you on that Day, since you did wrong. You are partners in the suffering." (43:38-39)

4- Sadly, history, especially in the Middle Ages, never care for real great persons, and it may distorted their image or tarnishes their reputation if they were famous enough. History has been – and until now still is – written within processions of sultans and rulers, making them appear 'great'. They are 'great' only within the Machiavellian criterion, but in the Hereafter, they will be tormented and mocked in Hell: "The Tree of Bitterness, the food of the sinner, like molten lead; boiling inside their bellies, like the boiling if seething water, seize him and drag him into the midst of Hell! Then pour over his head the suffering of the Inferno! Taste! You who were powerful and noble!" (44:43-49). The Machiavellian 'great' ones will hear in Hell 44:49, and in their eternal suffering will realize after it is too late the fact that: "His wealth did not avail him, nor did what he acquired." (111:2).

A word on the art of politics between the possible and the impossible: trying to evaluate policies of Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud:

Introduction:

1- It is an error to say that politics is the art of the possible; doing the possible is never a political act of cleverness or shrewdness. Politics is a distinguished field/art that only few people could engage into it successfully. Real politicians practice the art of politics within the relation between the possible and the impossible within real-life dominant climate and temporal conditions and circumstances and within a framework combining reality and a measure of imagination that help change reality within possible means, where stable facts and possible realizable dreams are merged.

2- Each region on our planet has its own stable facts pertaining to it exclusively, and politics had to deal with such permanent facts. The Middle East has its permanent geographical and historical facts that created some impossible elements that imposed a sort of politics to create new reality and change within suitable conditions, to achieve the possible in the time of the impossible.

3- Let us imagine this example to elucidate the last point: if a postgraduate student in the History Department is making a thesis about a certain historical phenomena in modern Egypt, and this student gathered al Egyptian and Arab authentic documents on the subject to analyze them thoroughly to present a realist image in the thesis to discuss. This student cannot possibly submit this thesis as it lacks a vital element: documents from Europe, Russia, the USA, etc. from their ministries and embassies. The reason: sadly, it is painful to admit that most of our real and authentic modern history has been formed by foreigners in their capitals and embassies, whereas Egyptians took 'pride' in reactions and NOT making actions and history, in most cases. We mostly never create our own policies; they are dictated on us by others!

4- The coming article/research on the art of between the possible and the impossible was published in the Cairo-based leftist independent Al-Ahaly Newspaper, on 1^st of June, 1994, and we re-publish it here in order to evaluate the Machiavellian policies of Abdul-Aziz that enabled him to establish his Saudi state.

Firstly: the possible and the impossible in the art of politics:

1- There are three types of the art of politics: 1) the possible in the time of the possible, 2) the impossible in the time of the impossible, and 3) the possible in the time of the impossible or the impossible in the time of the possible. Human movements on earth have three dimensions: the temporal, the spatial, and the human dimensions. There is status quo (i.e., the spatial dimension), the dominant culture (i.e., the temporal dimension or cultural climate), and the human beings that had to deal with current reality, conditions, and circumstances of this dominant culture, which is prevalent either by unanimous agreement or by force within certain authorities. Typically, any status quo or current regime is compatible and copes with the prevalent culture and the spatiotemporal aspects. Politics is the art of either retaining the status quo or current regime or destroying it; i.e., to revolt against it or to maintain it. The art of politics which is dealing with reality within its frame is deemed the art of politics of the possible in the time of the possible. Such politics is created rather than creating or creative, and it never struggles against anything and never seeks change as it retains stability, compromising, and settlement of disputes. Struggles and conflicts have to do with the politics of revolting to change the status quo and the prevalent climate or dominant culture. This second type of the art of politics is subdivided, in its turn, into two sections: A) one seeking to destroy and change the status quo but does not understand the culture of the age and its inevitable facts linked to the human elements and the prevalent climate; it fails accordingly, and we name it the art of politics of the impossible in the time of the impossible, causing much trouble in vain before, after, and during its defeat, and B) one seeking to destroy and change the status quo and it understands fully the nature and the possibilities of the climate and culture as well as the current status, using the impossible here or there against the impossible here or there. This politics succeeds in creating or causing change, making a new reality, climate, and culture, emerging victorious in its endeavors.

2- The willingness to change begins with an idea preached until people approve of it and feel enthusiastic enough to defend it and to bear any harm for its sake. People usually approve of such ideas when linked to religion, nationalism, the general good, or the fulfillment of dreams of the impecunious and the impoverished classes, as they represent the majority in all human societies in all eras. Such classes are the fuel of any revolt or revolution, and regrettably the victims of revolutionaries and politicians. Such classes of the silent majority are the arena, scene, or background of any struggle. People of new thought or notions resort to this silent majority to try to convince and revolutionize them by telling them that their benefit (in this life or the Hereafter) entails sticking to the new thought or notion and to defend it to realize it in real life after destroying a status quo that brought nothing but injustices. In contrast, tyrannical regimes stick always to the mentality of following the forefathers, hating and fighting any new thought by confiscating it to nip it in the bud by persecuting and oppressing free thinkers who preach new ideas. The struggle here begins with a confrontation with rulers/tyrants who control all supported by the dominant culture, climate, and elements of power, oppression, media, economy, etc. which make change very difficult unless leaders calling for change adopt the art of politics of the possible in the time of the impossible or of the impossible in the time of the possible.

Secondly: the art of politics of the possible in the time of the impossible and the politics of the impossible in the time of the possible

1- Both are considered the best types of politics that combine realism with creativity and political imagination within the frame of being knowledgeable of real facts of the status quo and the limits of changeability. Politicians here deal with reality and its facts realistically while allowing room for political imagination that makes the impossible possible, as much as they can, to create new reality by making use of gaps and mistakes within the status quo in terms of the local, regional, and international aspects. Politicians here try to use all potentials and powers within reach to be active and influential in serving their cause and to change the climate as per their political vision or project, thus making a new reality within a practical frame of complicated process. This type of politics requires the consolidation of all gathered information, analyses, data, etc. that allow a fully drawn map of alternatives, solutions, and ways of progress, with costs and possibilities of success along with mental boldness in the will of change and forcing change for the better any time convenient. Thus, this way, politicians create new statuses or events of change that cause waves of new ideas and people who think relatively and enact their visions, bearing in mind the dominant culture and climate to change it for the better within gradual steps. This entails dealing wisely with all powers in the scene so as to avoid as many losses as possible and lowering as many costs as they can, within a frame of evaluating the possible and the impossible and how to direct one's endeavors and efforts rightly to lessen sacrifices as much as possible. Each era or age has its unique dominant culture and climate controlling it. There are no one-size-fits-all solutions or panacea; politicians had to realize and discern facts of the real-life situations within their age and country, which might have nothing to do with older eras. Their political abilities must be used to create a new reality, using weak points of the old regimes to incite all the silent powers to be more influential and active and to neutralize or contain foes as much as possible to defeat them eventually. This takes place a lot and initiated by founders of States, leaders of revolts, revolutionaries, and leaders of intellectual, political, and economical changes of all tendencies.

2- Of course, we must be reminded here that the above has nothing to do with ethics, moralistic values, or God's Quranic sharia and the proper way to apply it. We write about it to analyze the state of affairs in real life and how politics can change status quos and create new reality. Thus, the political arena of successful politicians has ample room for the good, ethical persons as well as corrupt, evil persons. For instance, prophets of God changed status quos of their eras and created new reality with patience and suffering. The reality the created was based on rights of God and rights of human beings as per justice ordained by the celestial messages; see 57:25. Usually after prophets died, people after them destroyed their work by establishing earthly, man-made religions that contradict the call of the dead prophets they ascribed themselves to them. Both the calls and the earthly creeds belong to the same category of the art of politics of the possible in the time of the impossible and the politics of the impossible in the time of the possible. Both changed reality and created a new one using gaps in a status quo. Thus, political scenes allow room for good and bad founders of states and leaders of all sorts and tendencies that caused upheavals and revolts: Prophet Muhammad, Mu'aweiya Ibn Abou Sufyan, Abou Jaffer Al-Mansour (very first Abbasid caliph), Abdul-Rahman Al-Dakhil (Hauk of Qorayish who was the Umayyad caliph of Andalusia), leaders of Arab conquests in the 7^th century, crusaders, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Mandela, Hitler, Mussolini, David Ben-Gurion, and Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud. They are historical examples of politicians and leaders who changed reality as per the art of politics of the possible in the time of the impossible and the politics of the impossible in the time of the possible.

3- There is one major difference between the art of politics of the possible in the time of the impossible and the politics of the impossible in the time of the possible, despite their being one type of politics that includes the struggle between the possible and the impossible; let us quote the following examples.

-A-

Prophet Muhammad established his democratic state of Islam within an impossible dominant climate of tyranny, especially despotism exemplified in the Byzantine and Persian Empires and their control of the south of the Levant and Iraq. The tyranny of Qorayish controlled Arabia and trade routes between Yemen and the Levant that were linking India and Europe. Qorayish used its hegemony and control of the Kaaba to protect is trade caravans and to grow filthily rich. Within such milieu of injustice and political and religious tyranny, it was impossible to establish a city-state based on justice, freedom of religion, speech, and thought, citizenry, and human rights. Qorayish at the time were led by two factions: the Hashemites and the Umayyads, who were share paternal uncles, with the formers, led by Abbas the paternal uncle of Prophet Muhammad, overseeing pilgrimage activities and care of pilgrims and their idols around the Kaaba, thus leading Arabs religiously, and the latters, led by Abou Sufyan, controlled trade caravans in winters and summers. Both Abou Sufyan and Abbas stood against Islam, the burgeoning religion at the time. Abou Sufyan was leading the trade caravan that caused the battle of Badr. Abbas was among the Qorayish disbelievers who fought early believers in the battle of Badr. Both men fought against Islam and resisted its call until they suddenly converted to Islam upon the conquest of Mecca by the early believers. Thus, the climate at the time would not have possibly allowed the Islamic city-state to be created in Yathreb, as reality was based on tyranny, corruption, injustice, and the false belief in saints as sanctified persons and things made of stone like idols and tombs. This was the time of the impossible, but it contained gaps that allowed the possibility of changing that reality, especially the silent vast majority of the oppressed ones. These gaps allowed room for religious and intellectual reform to make Arabs discern the futility of worshipping stones and tombs that make Qorayish reign supreme over them controlling trade and religious life, and never allowing anyone to attack its caravans and making profits of pilgrimage. Such mental reform and change has been initiated by the Quran that incited the vast majority, consisted of oppressed impecunious ones, to defend itself against hegemony of tyrants and to reject idols and 'holy' tombs, and rising to retrieve lost rights. Confederates of disbelievers, after being militarily defeated many times, realized later on the impossibility to destroy and militarily crush the Yathreb city-state. Arabs outside Qorayish knew that the tribe manipulated them for its advantage to live in prosperity and leaving them needy, while deceiving them by idols around the Kaaba. Ironically, the persecution of Qorayish toward the early believers and its expulsion of them out of Mecca led to the creation of the Yathreb city-state as Muslims had to immigrate to avoid persecution. As Qorayish tried to attack Yathreb several times, the Quranic commands of military self-defense were revealed in the Quran; see 22:39. Military confrontations led eventually to the defeat of Qorayish and the conquest of Mecca, and Meccan leaders Abbas and Abou Sufyan felt obliged to convert to Islam, as the climate of the impossible was crushed to allow room for the possible state of Islam; see 110:2. Hence, Muhammad was a success story and a good example of the arts of politics of the possible in the time of the impossible.

-B-

Things and conditions changed for the worse once Prophet Muhammad died because the defeated leaders of Qorayish, with their defeated culture they represented, readily occupied the void after Muhammad's death, making use of the tribal fanaticism and the stature of Qorayish, as most immigrants to Yathreb among early believers were from Qorayish. Thus, the Yathreb city-state collapsed gradually as the dominant culture in the world in the Middle Ages did not suit it. Arabs who committed the crime of the Arab conquests got to know and draw near affluent ones and their lifestyles in Persia, the Levant, and Egypt, within the countries controlled previously by the Byzantine Empire. Thus, the struggle was between the Islamic culture of the Prophet embodied presumably by Ali Ibn Abou Talib, his paternal uncle's son, and later on the Shiite supreme murdered deity, and the man who represented the culture of Qorayish of invading other countries to loot and rule: Mu'aweiya Ibn Abou Sufyan. The dominant rules and culture of the era led to the defeat of Ali and the victory of Mu'aweiya, who established the Umayyad caliphate as per the art of politics of the impossible in the time of possible. Thus, the prevalent culture of tranny dominant in Iraq and the Levant allowed Mu'aweiya, ruler of Damascus, to win and to defy new Quranic values set by Islam in the Yathreb city-state, which was defeated and replaced by hereditary theocratic monarchy that raised the banner of Islam but it contradicted it of course. The Umayyad Empire coped with the dominant culture of its era of tyranny, and it manipulated Islam in politics though the empire contradicted Quranic teachings. The Quran, being intact and preserved in its entirety by God Himself, has carried the real notions of Islam until now. Rebellions against the Umayyads were initiated by the Arabs of Al-Khawarij group, who lacked experience in politics and thus failed to achieve anything but sabotage and terror that soon passed. The ones who defeated the Umayyads were their Qorayish relatives: the descendants of Abbas, who belonged to the same climate and culture and made use of it to their advantage and within deeper ways than in the case of the Umayyads; as the Abbasids called for their meritocracy to rule based on their being descendants of the paternal uncle of the Prophet Muhammad, i.e., Abbas, and their right to be sort of ''knights Templars'' who preserve clergymen and faith, making use of the assassination and persecution of Ali and his descendants (i.e., his progeny whose great-grandmother was Fatima, daughter of Prophet Muhammad). Thus, Umayyads succeeded previously as they had excellent experience in trade and in military prowess (as leaders of trade caravans of Qorayish in winters and in summers) and they based their empire on tribalism and tribal fanaticism while raising banners of Islam falsely. The Abbasids defeated them later on as they manipulated religion and made use of the logic of tyranny that dominated their age to create another theocracy based on clergymen who claim to defend 'true' faith, though their Sunnite faith contradicted Islam in the Quran. Religious tyranny of the Abbasids defeated the Umayyad tribal fanatics, though both Dynasties shared the culture of hegemony, monopoly, and tyranny. People supported the Abbasids s the climate at the time favored religious tyranny that made use of religious notions of the defeated Ali family and massacres. People felt at the time that the Umayyads defied Islam as some of the caliphs violated and desecrated the Kaaba Mosque and massacred people of Yathreb to quell them. Thus, the Abbasids defeated the Umayyads because the formers used the art of politics of the impossible in the time of the possible; their age and culture supported them more than the Umayyads, the current rulers at the time. The Umayyad Dynasty lasted for about 90 years (41:132 A.H./661:750 A.D.) and died out soon enough, whereas the Abbasid dynasty went on for nearly five centuries (132:658 A.H. / 751:1258 A.D.).

Thirdly: the art of politics of the possible in the time of the possible:

1- This is the worst type of politics as per the Machiavellian criterion, because political activism entails a measure of creativity and specialty more than ordinary work or endeavors. Thus, the art of politics of the possible in the time of the possible is akin to bureaucratic governmental work of administrations, with its statutes and regulations that revolve round the possible, with no imagination or ambition to change reality for the better or to create new, improved reality. Within this type of politics, compromising and piece-meal solutions are repeated to please all partied concerned and the retained policy is to create balances and to discard radical solutions for problems and crises that escalate with no hope in the foreseeable future. This created a volcano-like situation that might explode anytime, and despots would imagine their being safe and enjoying stability. Such politics reflects the reality and expresses it, maintain stagnation in all aspects. Mubarak's Egypt is the best example of this; it has raised mottoes of stability for a long time while postponing finding radical solutions to any crises that accumulate and no longer settle for temporary painkillers. Thus, the future carries explosions to come. Mubarak has adopted the same politics for a long time, thinking it is best for his family and ruling junta of businessmen. He never employed a vice-president, as he built his reputation by attacking his predecessor, Sadat, who in turn built his reputation by attacking his predecessor, Abdel-Nasser. Let us remember that Mubarak came to power suddenly and unexpectedly in 1981, as he was the vice-president before, and he showed off his being an 'honest' president unlike Sadat and his family who, he claimed, stole by corruption some millions of Egyptian pounds. Mubarak never tried to appoint a vice-president in order to curb off any danger or threat of betrayal. Mubarak as a despot has ruled with tyranny, and corruption soared to thousands of billions, with the family of Mubarak involved; Mubarak had to protect himself and his family by campaigning for his eldest son to succeed him. Such bad decisions were the possible in the time of the impossible, and Mubarak could not do this until now; he merely hints of it, while guiding the ship of Egypt into the unknown, as no reforms are possible now on all levels.

2- The same tragic fate awaits any ruler who would link his fate and the fate of his people to a foreign controlling power; he would be a mere puppet in the hands of such power that might be dethroned later on and lose everything, as happened to Al-Sharif Hussein in Hejaz as he allied himself to GB and to Sheikh Khazaal in Arabstan, both contemporaries to Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud.

3- We see features of the art of politics of the possible in the time of the possible in histories of those inheriting thrones after establishing a new state; for instance, Abdel-Malik Ibn Marwan had firmly stabilized the monarchy within the Umayyad Empire, established by his grandfather Mu'aweiya. The endeavors of Ibn Marwan were the art of politics of the possible in the time of the impossible. Ibn Marwan's descendants inherited a monarchy that they never strove hard to establish; they would spend their times in debauchery, affluence, and idleness until their state would collapse. This occurred as well to the descendants of Abou Jaffer Al-Mansour, who established the Abbasid Dynasty, the descendants of Al-Moezz Ledeen-Elah the founder of the Fatimid Dynasty in Egypt and the Levant, to the son and heir of Saladin, Al-Aziz Othman, and the descendants of the Ayyubid sultan Al-Adel, the brother of Saladin. In the 20^th century, Abdul-Aziz founded the third current KSA within the art of politics of the possible in the time of the impossible, leaving to his sons a stable kingdom dependent on GB and later on the USA. Hence, his descendants abandoned themselves to life of debauchery, affluence, idleness, and dissipation, following the art of politics of the possible in the time of the possible. Thus, once such royal family was frightened by Saddam Hussein when he occupied Kuwait, they shouted in fright and beseeched the help of the USA, opening their kingdom to the American marines; hence, the affluent 'soft' descendants of Abdul-Aziz are not like him in his boldness, bravery, shrewdness, horsemanship, and political acumen.

Fourthly: the art politics of the impossible in the time of the impossible:

1- This type of politics is the opposite of the above one, but it shares its result: failure and inability to change. This type of politics simply means disregarding the facts of a status quo or state of affairs, while sticking to dreamy, unrealistic targets and impossible ideological mottoes that can never be applied one day. Foolish rulers or politicians of that type might fight against the windmills in vain and would lose everything: just as the Najd Brothers failed to occupy Iraq and were killed off by realities they ignored and like Saddam Hussein who occupied Kuwait in a moment of folly and sheer madness.

2- Politicians of that type might use empty slogans, campaigns, and propaganda without ever attempting to apply them, and thus, they remain isolated from events taking place in the political scene, causing their enemies and friends to mock them. Examples of this include the Salafists in the Arab world, Kaddafi of Libya, and advocates of Pan-Arabism.

3- Those who belong to this type of politics commit political suicide and rulers of such type drive their people to ruin; the Hamas terrorist group in Gaza strip exemplifies this, as they raise empty mottoes of destroying Israel to throw it into the Mediterranean Sea, while knowing quite well that this is impossible with their modest means and arms. Instead of using realpolitik, as Hamas cannot possibly face the Israelis militarily, Hamas terrorists fights windmills in vain, and never suffer for it; as ordinary, impoverished, innocent Gaza dwellers are the ones suffering very much because of the folly of Hamas.

Fifthly: the overlapping between the possible and the impossible in circumstances and climate:

1- Political life is ever-changing: no foes or friends remain so forever, and there are no permanent interests, as the circumstances and conditions change with the passage of time. Cultural and political climates do change constantly. Shrewd politicians or rulers move within the right timing and conditions, or else, they would lose valuable chances that must be seized before it is too late to change reality for the better, taking into consideration full knowledge of their potentials and abilities within international, regional, and local conditions, so as not to fail; it is a very complicated process filled with details, and setting plans should always include alternatives to make room for any surprises. Below, we give examples of successes and failures within modern history.

2- Muhammad Ali Pacha made good use of political gaps among GB, France, and Russia to try to establish a strong State similar to the Ottoman Empire, especially when the Ottoman caliphate grew weak and Turkey was named the sick man of Europe. GB had to stop him as he reached coasts of Arabia, so as not to pose a threat to her route to India, and all European powers had to stop him so as to divide the countries of the Ottoman Empire among one another. Europe forced him to sign a peace treaty as his Egyptian armies reached Istanbul. He managed before to conquer the Levant; he coveted more and was shortsighted enough as to never know when to stop in the right timing and place, and he lost all and kept only Egypt as a monarchy for him and his descendants. Abdul-Aziz managed to take advantage of World War I that distracted Europe and GB to conquer Al-Ahsa; yet GB forced him to let go of Kuwait, and he backed off to preserve his conquered lands in Arabia. When the Najd Brothers, his sole military power, rebelled and wanted to raid Kuwait and Iraq, he left them to be killed off by GB, as he knew his limits well enough; he scarified them to save his nascent kingdom. John Philby urged him to conquer Yemen, but he refused so as not to lose everything. In contrast, Abdul-Nasser of Egypt got involved in Yemen wars and lost many soldiers and the gold of the Egyptian Treasury.

3- European colonial powers created borders, endorsed by the UN, of the Arab countries in a manner that might incite troubles and disputes within neighboring countries that might escalate to wars. Thus, this put an end to countries united together within empire as done by Saladin, Muhammad Ali Pacha, and Abdul-Aziz. Saddam Hussein tried to ignore this new reality when he invaded Kuwait: this was impossible in the time of the impossible. Saddam never drew the lesson of Abdul-Nasser when Baathists of Syria got their country out of the union with Egypt. Abdul-Nasser ignored the insult and never tried to revive the union; yet, he forgot this lesson when he sent the Egyptian army to Yemen, as he forgot that union among Arabs or Pan-Arabism should be done willingly and peacefully within the approval of all peoples, not by military force. He never understood that the age of unifying countries under one bloc or entity was gone forever in the age of democracy, and enthusiasm of Egyptians and Arabs never availed him anything when he was defeated in 1967, when a tiny nascent democratic state (i.e., Israel) invaded Sinai, taking it from a tyrannical Egyptian regime, though Egypt is 3000 years old, at least.

4- Thus, it is impossible in our modern age that a tyrant would militarily defeat a democracy. When two tyrannical countries fight, both would never achieve victory (like the Iraq-Iran long war), and Arab-Arab conflicts always end in the defeat of both parties, especially when international powers interfere to maintain the status quo or borders: such as disputes over borders between Egypt and Sudan, the KSA and Qatar, the KSA and Yemen, and Algeria and Morocco. A powerful tyrant always loses war if he would fight a democracy, as we read about the defeat of Hitler, Mussolini, and Japan in World War II when democracy reigned supreme in the 20^th century in the West. Even Israel, established in 1948 in Palestine, began its existence with democratic elections, and defeated three Arab countries in 1967: Egypt, Syria, and Palestine. Israel still defeats Arab in the fields of technology, military, and economy (probably because of the USA generous aid to Israel), despite its tiny land, little natural resources, and less population in comparisons to Arab countries.

5- Yet, no democracy, however powerful it is, can defy the international climate: the USA made a terrible mistake in Vietnam; Israel after 1967 grew arrogant and blind, ignoring the international community and the UN resolutions, and thus could not keep Sinai as Egypt managed to retrieve its land. Resentment against Israel by the international community allowed Sadat to enlist the help of the USA to urge her to impose a balance in its policies in the Middle East, allowing room for the 1973 war with favorable climate for Arabs and hostile climate for Israel, but as long as a tyrant and a democracy defied the international community fought in that unique war, that would have been a loss-loss situation: the Egyptian army managed to get into Sinai, but the Israeli army managed to create a breakthrough namedOperation Abirey-Halev that threatened Suez city and part of the Egyptian army. Thus, this stale-mate obliged both parties to negotiate under the auspices of the USA, and Egypt retrieved the whole of Sinai, while Israel gained normalization, and acknowledgment, and a peace treaty with Egypt. This was the art of politics of the possible in the time of the possible. Of course, Egypt has been the leader of all Arabs in victories and defeats, and Arabs never emerge victorious on all levels if Egypt would get into a downfall, and so far, this is the state of affairs since Wahabism controls the cultural and political life in Egypt.

6- Changing a status quo and creating a new status might occur within the politics of the possible in the time of the possible, provided that conditions are ripe for this and all circumstances would affirm it. This often occurs during the old-age state of a state on the verge of collapse, and some might seize the chance to achieve the desired change; let us quote some examples of this. Arab coup d'états used to occur within the politics of the possible in the time of the possible in the 1940s and 1950s, in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, as the masses were filled for the desire to change the regime to defeat Israel and to achieve union of all countries within Pan-Arabism. Syria had more share of coup d'états even in the 1970s, but coup d'états are impossible to happen now in the Arab world as conditions and circumstances have changed and the mentality of the masses has changed as they grow disillusioned. Another reason for this is that several Arab regimes had turned into military, police regimes that torture and oppress and kill people who have to submit, as we see in Syria. Likewise, the 1952 coup d'état in Egypt succeeded easily within the politics of the possible in the time of the possible; monarchy in Egypt grew old and was about to collapse anyway, and the Egyptian street and political scene were filled with trends of angry youths looking for a place under the sun. The Egyptian liberal period of 1920:1950 could not contain the new Egyptian youths of the middle and lower classes, who, being educated, were filled with looking forward to a better political and economic status, but such youths were shocked to find barriers of class and lack of social justice. Such frustrated youths were subdivided into many trends: communists, the terrorist MB organization, nationalists, etc., and sadly, the terrorist Hassan Al-Banna, the head of the terrorist MB assassinated in 1949, managed to gather most youths as he formed 50.000 overt branches of the terrorist MB organization all over Egyptian governorates. It was often said that some elements of the terrorist MB organization might have infiltrated into the Egyptian army in the 1940s, forming the Free Officers movement that led a successful coup d'état in 1952 that circumstance's favored and helped it to succeed and to be re-christened as a 'white revolution' – one without shedding a drop of blood. King Farouk hastily left his throne and left Egypt to Italy, and the military leaders of the Free Officers movement controlled and ruled Egypt. In 1954, they had disputes among one another, and the very first Egyptian president, Muhammad Naguib, who called for the officers to go back to the barracks to perform their military duties, was deposed in order to make room for the ambitious officer, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, to rule Egypt within a tyrannical regime that has controlled Egypt until now by subjugating and oppressing Egyptians, especially when Sadat made the army fire at people in the uprising of January 1977 and when the Mubarak regime did the same crime over and over on several occasions.

7- Within the politics of the possible in the time of the possible, good luck might serve some people unexpectedly; for instance, Abdel-Nasser hastily nationalized the Suez Canal in an act of defiance against the British and the French, leading them, along with the Israelis to attack Egypt within what came to be known as the Tripartite Aggression in 1956 (a.k.a. the Suez Crisis). Such aggression was also a political rave error of the UK, France, and Israel: it was no longer possible to act like former colonial powers anymore while disregarding the international community. The USA and the USSR agreed to oppose the Tripartite Aggression, driving all countries to do the same, forcing the UK, France, and Israel to withdraw their forces. Yet, Israel was slow in such withdrawal; it had to gain anything, and it occupied the village of Umm Al-Rashrash and renamed it Eilat, to have a port on the Red Sea. As per subsequent agreements, Israel had the right to move within the Straits of Tiran in the Red Sea with its ships, making it reach Ethiopia and the River Nile sources to threaten Egypt and its source of water and life: the River Nile. When Abdel-Nasser committed the error of ignoring the international community and formal agreements, by closing the Straits of Tiran in 1967, he defied the modern world and its climate while the Egyptian army was weak after the war in Yemen, giving pretext to Israel to invade Sinai in 1967, as the military rule was too bust oppressing Egyptians and left Sinai with little military protection. Kaddafi of Libya crushed monarchy and became president, but he committed the mistake of trying to meddle in the world affairs around him using his country's wealth and his love of conspiracies to cause changes to happen in the international scene to serve his purposes, and so, he faced the impossible and lost billions.

8- The stable, stubborn, stagnant climate imposes its culture even when circumstances change throughout Egyptian history, since the centralized tyranny was established in Egypt in the dawn of civilization. As a rule, he who owns military power will have power and authority to rule and would lose them if his military power is lost. People of Egypt usually have no say on the subject, as occurred during the Pharaonic era and foreign invaders. This rule applies to the military rule in Egypt that has begun in 1952 until now. Let us cite other examples. Within the Abbasid caliphate, the Tulunids in Egypt had established their state, which collapsed later on, and this made the Ikhshidid state rise to power temporarily before its downfall, allowing the Fatimids to conquer Egypt without fighting. When the Fatimids grew weak, Saladin established instead in Egypt the Dynasty of the Ayyubids, which grew weak decades later, and the era of the Mameluke sultans began afterwards without fighting as well. Such successive dynasties came within the politics of the possible in the time of the possible, because the dominant climate at the time was the culture of slavery and tyranny. We personally think this culture still dominates in Egypt until now, and the Mubarak military regime is making use of it within the politics of the possible in the time of the possible, and the military regime confiscates power, authority, and wealth by asserting the culture of slavery and tyranny to subjugate the Egyptians, who accept and submit to the status quo; in some cases a despotic ruler was deified by Egyptians, like Abdel-Nasser, and we personally lived within such morbid climate of deifying this president, within the period of our adolescence, and we wonder very much as some Egyptian thinkers until now worship him and call themselves Nasserites! May God forgive and cure them of that ailment!

9- Disturbed climate would stir upheavals, disputes, conflicts, and political unrest within the local, regional, and international levels. Let us cite some examples. The West made the whole world get rid of the Middle-Ages culture of monarchy linking itself to feudalism, knighthood, and clergymen, and moved within phases of overlapping cultures: from nationalism, communism, bourgeois, colonialism, capitalism, until human rights and globalization, and from the age of vapor to discoveries of the outer space and the internet. Such fast-paced changes have occurred within three centuries of human existence on the planet, after tens of centuries of theocracies and tyranny. Such phases of modernity and scientific advances overlap and never took place easily or smoothly, since the West went through these phases of history: the Magna Carta, the French Revolution, Freeing slaves in the USA, American civil war, ending racism, etc. Such changes were never easily done; humanity suffered tens of regional wars and two world wars and forming blocs and treaties and pacts, with massacres committed in Asia and Europe, the rise of Nazism, anti-Semitism, the rise of the USSR, and racist strife within Eurasia of Kurds, Armenian, and in the Balkans. France is the best examples of such upheavals and radical changes; the time was ripe for the downfall of Louis XVI, and the motto of the revolution controlled the masses: liberty, equality, fraternity. The Bastille fell into the hands of the revolting masses, and the motto never realized soon afterwards, when monarchy fell. The reason: the European culture an climate at the tie did not allow its application. Hence, France entered into a phase of massacres and coups until Napoleon came to power raising the banner of freedom but practicing tyranny. Napoleon was defeated by the cultural climate and by GB and Russia. But in retrospect, values of Napoleon defeated tyranny after his death, as liberty came to be the supreme value in Europe, especially in France, within the democratic transition that followed decades later. When Napoleon died, the royal family of Bourbon came to power, with the old traditions, as Talleyrand the prime minister said that they never forgot the old ways and never learnt anything new. Because they were not coping with the climate, they went into the dust pin of history soon enough, and values of democracy and the republic have been asserted. Within gaps and decisive moments of European history, some genius politicians achieved the impossible: Bismarck unified Germany, and Italy was unified by Mazzini and other leaders. The Holy Roman Empire was about to collapse, and the cultural climate was favorable to the phase of nationalism in Europe. Yet, political circumstances in Europe opposed this, but unities occurred despite all odds, as per the politics of the impossible in the time of the possible. When German and Italian nationalism went to an extreme, Hitler and Mussolini turned nationalism into Nazism and fascism within tyrannical rule that defied the West climate of democracy. Eventually democracy of GB and the USA defeated such tyranny. Let us cite another example; when the USSR emerged, communism was seen as the best remedy for the savage nature of capitalism. Communism spread within many countries after 50 years of the rise of the USSR, and the inevitable collapse began. The reason: the cultural climate changed, and the USSR can no longer lean on its military power and scientific advances alone, because the West applied the cultural of human rights, democracy, and rights of workers as capitalism learnt from past mistakes and stopped partially its being manipulative and reformed itself. Revolution of communications infiltrated the iron curtain and the communist camp had to surrender within this new climate, and the USSR fell down without shooting even a single bullet. Yugoslavia collapsed after being unified under Tito, the legendary communist leader, and the Serbs tried to restore the nationalist vein by reviving ethnic strife and tensions, an act of defiance to the dominant cultural climate of democracy and human rights in Europe that avoids armed disputes and re-defining borders. Hence, everyone opposed the Serbs to put an end for their hegemony over former Yugoslavia.

Lastly: what about the future of Arabs:

1- The modern age of today's world has two main features: 1) scientific advances that know no barriers and limits, especially in means of communication that made the planet a small global village, and 2) the century-ago dominant cultural climate of human rights and democracy. The second element is being spread all over the world by the first one, changing mentalities of people and making them aware of their rights and exposing tyranny covered with religious, racist, and nationalist calls. The international community no longer tolerates tyrannical rulers who oppress their people. Countries that run contrary to this climate will soon disappear in the 21^st century, with no future for any tyrannical country; it will collapse soon enough.

2- As for Arabs and Muslims, there is no room for tyrannical and military regimes especially monarchies similar to theocracies. There is no future for Wahabism and its political and terrorist movements like Salafists, Al-Qaeda, and the MB terrorist organization. Such historical garbage can no longer talk with the language of our age; the Wahabis live in the past and try to deceive people, but they never deceive anyone but themselves on the long run, as the internet is raising awareness and Wahabism, as an ideology, cannot defend itself against criticism for long; such defense will be in vain in the 21^st century.

3- Yet, some gaps and pits are still there in the Islamic and Arab world because of the Saudi Wahabism spread for decades that infiltrated into regions that suffered decades of oppression and the culture of slavery. We fear that any democratic transition in the Arab world might bring about civil strife; tyrants will not hesitate to unite and commit all crimes to maintain their existence. This occurred in Iraq, central intelligences of many countries, especially the American CIA, conspired to such the democratic transition of Iraq, ending in turning Iraq into bloodbaths. Iraq has a long route ahead to put itself on the way to democratic transition gain.

4- Democratic transition entails reforming education, media, and houses of worship to build the mentality of human beings, the best of God's creature on earth. The Arab mind must be freed from all sorts of confiscation and censorship to enable Arabs to be active participants in political and social life within freedom of speech and expression, creativity, and human rights that enable citizens to enjoy their share in the national wealth as per public services and free trade.

5- Tyrannical regimes must realize that it has no future in the 21^st century and that tyranny enroots the culture of terrorism all over the world: i.e., to pollute the global village within its ethics, morals, civilization, and environment, and this will no longer be allowed in the 21^st century. Thus, tyrannical regimes will inevitably disappear sooner or later, either peacefully or by military strife. Tyrannical regimes had better disappear peacefully to pave the way for the democratic transition without losses while keeping dignity; otherwise, the International Criminal Court will disgrace tyrants and history will curse them in its pages forever.

The cultural climate in the reign of Abdul-Aziz within the frame of the possible and the impossible:

Firstly: the Machiavellian greatness of Abdul-Aziz within the frame of the possible and the impossible:

1- Some might claim simply that Abdul-Aziz realized his life-dream of reviving the monarchy of his ancestors and to achieve this dream, he established the Najd Brothers. When they revolted against him to share power and wealth with him, he killed them off to rule his nascent kingdom to which he gave his family name, the KSA, alone along with his progeny that will inherit the throne. Such claims might be true overtly, especially in relation to the ongoing struggle between the founder of a state and his chief leaders. Yet, within the field of analysis the Saudi experience has its own unique features within temporal and spatial aspects as well as in relation to the character of the founder of the KSA.

2- The Saudi experience of unifying Arabia achieved early the unfulfilled dream of Arabs to unify all Arab countries as per the model of EU, a dream invoked by Abdel-Nasser (within the period of 1955:1966) with media and political momentum when he united Egypt with Syria for a short time, a dream shared by theoreticians of Pan-Arabism and nationalism, especially Baathists in Iraq and Syria. The Saudi experience was the establishment of a Sunnite theocracy that is still the dream of the fundamentalists in the Arab world, such as the terrorist MB group that imitates the model of the Najd Brothers and sticks to the Sunnite Wahabi Ibn Hanbal doctrine that they helped spread via Saudi money. They managed within social, cultural, media, and propaganda level to spread Wahabism all over the Arab world using oil-revenues of the KSA; yet, no MB state was built, the MB and Salafist terrorists caused nothing so far but an unstable MB rule in Sudan, civil wars in Afghanistan, and carnages and massacres in Algeria and Egypt in the 1990s. This means that both types of Wahabis, the MB and Salafist terrorists, have repeated the methodology of the Najd Brothers, but they lack the genius of a figure like Abdul-Aziz. The establishment of the KSA combined Arabism and theocracy, who could have imagined a Bedouin unifying all warring Bedouins to conquer Arabia? He managed to do it in the times of defining borders, while Saddam Hussein failed 50 years later to annex Kuwait and parts of Iran, thus wasting the future of Iraq for about the next 50 years.

3- Few people in history managed to establish viable states, even in the Middle-Ages period of the mobile and stable monarchies. Even fewer ones managed to do so in the modern history, such as Napoleon, Muhammad Ali Pacha, Bismarck, Lenin, Mao Zedong, and Tito. We can say that Abdul-Aziz surpassed them all and was more distinguished; he managed to found the KSA amidst impossible circumstances, but he dared and defeated the impossible and made it possible in the time of the impossible, and he created a new reality called the KSA, destroying on the way the kingdom of the AL-Sharif family in Hejaz and the kingdom of Al-Rasheed family in Al-Shamar area as well as killing off the Najd Brothers, to put them all in lines of history.

Secondly: the cultural climate dominating the political climate was the biggest challenge for Abdul-Aziz:

1- The cultural climate was the biggest challenge faced by Abdul-Aziz; the previously mentioned types of politics are legitimacies that ensure varying measures of success, but the best one is how to deal best with the dominant cultural climate to change it for the better while controlling and manipulating the existent powers and factors to succeed in introducing change with the least amount of losses within the possible an the impossible factors. Abdul-Aziz managed to discern what is really impossible and must be avoided (e.g., annexing Yemen and the Levant) and what seemed impossible for others but possible for him with great efforts and the least losses.

2- Each age has its dominant cultural climate; it is wrong if we apply givens, factors, and elements of our age now to the era of Abdul-Aziz. Our age has certain features: globalization, human rights, mass communications, global village, civil societies, and Americanization of the globe based on the USA and its hegemony as a sole pole until now, and modern inventions. This new world order imposes itself on the Third World countries that suffer tyranny, backwardness, regressive powers, manipulation, corruption, and lack of human rights. As for the age of Abdul-Aziz, GB and France as colonial powers used to control the Arab world, and such colonialism was the last vestiges of dictatorship, whereas the Islamic world had the ideal of the 'just despot', heralded and preached by the writings of Muhammad Abdou as the best possible solution (1). GB was occupying Egypt and controlling the rest of the lands of the Ottomans in the Levant, the Gulf, Mesopotamia, and India. France was controlling Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and vie with GB to inherit Europe's sick man. Thus, at the time of Abdul-Aziz, GB and France manipulated all leaders, kings, opposition figures, and even Al-Sharif family (that claimed to be descendants of Ali Ibn Abou Talib) in the Arab and Islamic world. Colonial powers incited revolts against the Ottomans everywhere, divided the Levant and Mesopotamia, gave Palestine to the Jews, and defined borders of all countries as per their interests and in accordance to Sykes-Pico agreement after the World War I.

3- Within such cultural and political climate, Abdul-Aziz emerged and faced the impossible, whereas Al-Sharif Hussein, who served his British allies, lost everything to colonial powers. Abdul-Aziz managed to build his KSA despite of GB and other colonial powers; he achieved the impossible in the time of possible or the possible in the time of the impossible, subjugating the political and cultural climate of his age to serve his purpose.

Thirdly: the impossible in the cultural climate in the reign of Abdul-Aziz:

1- The Sunnite Sufism was the dominant religion under the banner of Sunna (as opposed to the Shiite creed) in the Sunnite Islamic world. Sunnite Wahabism was an exception to this dominant rule; it had at the time few supporters in North Africa, especially Egypt. Wahabis resented, and therefore hated, Shiites and Sufis, because both groups worship and deify mortals and dead persons in mausoleums and tombs. Of course, in fact, such deification of mortals and worship of buildings are against the Quran. Shiites and Sufis in their turn resented, and therefore hated, Wahabis for their massacring innocent Muslims and permitting bloodshed in their cruel creed as well as their demolishing of mosques and 'holy' tombs. Of course, in fact, committing such violence and massacres and demolishing of 'sacred' mosques and 'holy' buildings are against the Quran.

2- Imam and head of Al-Azhar, Muhammad Abdou, who died in 1905 A.D., was a brilliant reformer who criticized both Sufism, for its backward and primitive notions and practices and the mental retardation of its adherents, and Wahabism for the fanaticism, extremism, and violence of its followers based on their corrupt notions. M. Abdou put certain fundamentals of Islam that refute and oppose the Wahabism ideology, which are as follows: 1) faith and belief are based on the reasoning mind, 2) the reasoning mind has priority over the texts of sharia in case of contradiction between the mind and the texts, 3) no one is allowed to declare anyone as an apostate or an infidel, 4) intellectual thinking must be directed to science and nature and God's creation, 5) all religious authorities or institutions must be demolished; there is no theocracy in Islam, it rather favors civil rule and authority, and Islam is not a ruling policy or regime of persons or groups, but a faith and a religion of God used in judgment, 6) protection of the Islamic call to stop any sort of religious persecution, as fighting is for self-defense and to deter foes, not for coercing others in religious matters or to declare others as infidels, 7) having good relations with those others who hold different religious beliefs, and 8) combining interests of this world and the Hereafter, as Prophet Muhammad never said that we should renounce the world to follow him, and extremism in religion is a bad lifestyle; one can enjoy the permitted and the legal in Islam without fearing any violation of the Quran (2).

3- What M. Al-Assad writes about Abdul-Aziz falls within the scope of what should have been in terms of Islam and in terms of just politics; he expresses himself and his culture NOT those of Abdul-Aziz and his dominant cultural climate and the impossibilities he had to deal with. Hence, the pieces of advice of Al-Assad to Abdul-Aziz would never have been applied; no ordinary Muslims would welcome the pieces of advice offered by a foreigner who converted recently to Islam and wanted to teach others the true creed, let alone Abdul-Aziz as a king. Abdul-Aziz liked, respected, and honored Al-Assad, and he felt him to be a true faithful Muslim, whereas he despised Philby and cast doubts on his conversion to Islam, as he thought that Philby was an opportunist hypocrite who sought to rise by flattering the king. Yet, for Abdul-Aziz, Al-Assad, as a non-Arab Muslim, could not possibly teach Arab Muslims their creed.

4- We quote paragraphs from the writings of Al-Assad to comment upon them: (…The king's expansions reached their zenith in the period 1924/1925 when he conquered Hejaz…driving out Al-Sharif family that assumed the rule of Hejaz after their revolt against the Ottomans in 1916 with the aid of the British. Invading this holy land, the king emerged before the eyes of the outer world, and he was 45 years old at the time…this was unprecedented feat, as most Middle East countries were occupied by Western powers…King Abdul-Aziz filled the Arabs with hope of an Arab state led by an Arab leader that might free all Arabs from their slavery to the West, even many Islamists in many groups were looking forward to revive the caliphate that raise the banner of the Quran alone, but their hopes were dashed; Abdul-Aziz was a mere king who aimed to rule a monarchy with absolute power and authority…Despite the fact that he was mostly a just king in private matters with his supporters and friends and a generous man with his foes with a genius mentality far above his followers, he never ventured to be an inspired leader with ambitions outside Arabia. He secured his kingdom in an unprecedented way in the last 1000 years, with strict laws and severe punishments, not by making his governors feel responsibility toward civilians…He sent a group of youths to study medicine and the wireless abroad, but never urged his people to educate themselves in any way; he left them in their ignorance that lasted for centuries. He talked a lot about the greatness of the Islamic way of life, but he did nothing toward a progressive society based on justice and self-expression within freedom. He was a simple, modest man, with zeal for work, but he would allow those around him to indulge in carnal pleasures. He was very religious in terms of rituals and duties of Islamic sharia, especially long night prayers, but he seemed never to perceive the essence of Islam; he never realized that prayers are a means to a spiritual end, not an end in itself. He loved to talk a lot about his responsibility toward his subjects, quoting hadiths about that topic, and when he was asked why he would not organize government in the KSA to make his heirs rule easily with less personal imprint on the State by giving it the name of the royal family, he simply said that he established his kingdom with his genius, sword, and endeavors, and his heirs are to exert their own efforts to maintain it and to introduce any necessary changes later on after his decease. His personal power and authority relied on his strong character and personality, not on organized government and learned officials…He was moderate in manner of talking and in his actions, with democratic modest spirit that allowed him to talk to Bedouins who came to him in tattered dirty clothes as if he were one of them, allowing them to address him by his first name, and yet, he would be so arrogant while talking to persons of high stature and to despise them when they submit to him as he used to despise all the low-class people who became suddenly nouveaux-riches…) (3).

5- We notice here that Al-Assad refers to the crisis of the Sunnite creed in its focus on religious duties, rituals, and commands as ends in themselves and not as means to attain piety, despite the fact that their end is piety and righteousness as per the Quran; see 2:21, 2:183, 2:194, 2:197, and 29:45. To make rituals and acts of worship the only focus is to make them pretext or justification to commit crimes and prohibited acts in the Quran, as one becomes victim of extremism. This occurred in the Sunnite Wahabi tutelage of the Najd Brothers in the colonies: they focused on killing and fighting, overlooking that fighting must be for the sake of God only; i.e., in cases of self-defense and to stop persecution, especially religious one, and NOT to commit aggressions and to raid and loot others to invade their lands or for any worldly ends. Hence, Al-Assad has cleverly discovered the root of evil and contradicted the dominant religious trend in the KSA and mainstream Muslims; moreover, he has shed light on the cultural gap between Abdul-Aziz and his subjects, and how he refused to educate all his people. Abdul-Aziz within these stances reflected the cultural and political climate dominant at his era.

6- Such dominant cultural and political climate was deeply rooted for centuries before, and such accumulations had to be explained in this research to show how the steps taken by both Abdul-Aziz and his Najd Brothers were inevitable, and the same goes for mainstream Muslims at the time inside and outside Arabia. Such cultural and political climate was the result of accumulated religious rituals, customs, traditions, tenets, and creeds that could not be possibly change overnight, even within the modern world, because such heritage became synonymous with religion itself, especially in a closed region like Najd, and even so in the more open Hejaz; as its former ruler Al-Sharif Hussein fought all innovations and novelties to the extent that he prohibited watches, cars, and eating while sitting on chairs! We can imagine the luck of Hejaz as the Bedouin desert-Arab Abdul-Aziz conquered it and expelled Al-Sharif Hussein and his family; he would turn Hejaz into another Najd region, as per words of Abdul-Hameed Al-Khateeb who sang the praises of the king and lauded his personality (4).

Fifthly: the cultural climate in Al-Azhar at the time:

1- It was a famous debate that occurred between Al-Zawahiri, the head/sheikh of Al-Azhar, and Abdul-Aziz in the Islamic conference held to discuss the fate of Hejaz after 1926. The head of Al-Azhar defended his Sufi stance or division to which most people all over the Islamic world at the time adhered; namely, protesting against demolishing of 'holy' tombs and mausoleums. Of course, sanctifying and worshipping such 'holy' tombs and mausoleums contradicts the major Islamic fact/tenet: There is no God but Allah. The conference failed, and most Muslims admired the stance of Al-Zawahiri, which in fact contradicted the Quran. All of them admired immensely the replies of Al-Zawahiri to Abdul-Aziz, as they expressed the dominant cultural climate at the time.

2- Al-Assad later on met sheikh Al-Maraghi, years before the latter assumed the post of the head of Al-Azhar. In order to know the dominant cultural climate at the time in Al-Azhar, after putting an end to the reformist endeavors initiated by Muhammad Abdou, we quote from the writings of Al-Assad his description of the knowledge of Al-Azhar and the stance of sheikh Al-Maraghi toward this type of knowledge: (…Within our endeavor to get a better image of Islam and its Truth, we perused many writings of interpretations provided by our Cairene Muslim friends…Chief among them was sheikh Mustafa Al-Maraghi, one of the most famous scholars of Islam at the time, who headed Al-Azhar later on, and he was in his mid-fifties, with stout body, joyful spirit, and deep knowledge…He was a disciple of the great Egyptian reformist Muhammad Abdou, and a friend of Jamal-Eddine Al-Afghani, and he was a thinker inclined to critical thinking, with taste and judgment. He constantly made me feel that Muslims in the modern age did not heed much their religion; the potential and traits in the message of Muhammad were not manifest in the life of Muslims of today, as much as there is little love among Christians, despite that love is the higher value in the message of Jesus, he told me. I entered inside Al-Azhar Mosque along with sheikh Al-Maraghi, noticing students in their uniform and headwear, perusing their books and manuscripts in low voice, sitting in a circle around one column and under each column a teacher/sheikh would instruct them in low voice, while they were listening attentively, never missing a word, to gain more knowledge. Yet, sheikh Al-Maraghi dispelled my awe at such sight when he told me they were like cattle of holy cows in India, eating as many ancient books and manuscripts as they can, never understanding these writings fully, as they never taught to think for themselves; they memorize and learn by heart, one generation of students after the other…I interrupted him by asserting that Al-Azhar is the most ancient university in the world, and a center of Islamic branches of knowledge that housed many thinkers and scholars within the last ten centuries. Sadly and bitterly, sheikh Al-Maraghi told me that this no longer happens, and that I exaggerate; Al-Azhar now is devoid of independent thinking, as it suffers intellectual sterility as most of the Islamic world now, and that its former glory is gone forever. Even its brilliant thinkers never thought that their ideas would be memorized by heart instead of being used and applied and developed; it is as if their ideas were infallible and irrefutable facts of Islam! If such ideas would be changed or developed, we must encourage free thinking instead of worshipping traditions and repeating them… I realized that sheikh Al-Maraghi by confiding in me such ideas, he wanted to tell me that the cultural degeneration and social sterility that sadden me everywhere in the Islamic world is because of the cultural stagnation of Al-Azhar…) (5).

3- When sheikh Al-Maraghi became the head of Al-Azhar, sterile curricula remained pretty much the same; as he failed to introduce any change in it, and the political and cultural climate did not allow this. When the head of Al-Azhar, M. Sayed Tantawi, under the Mubarak regime in the late 1990s, tried to change Al-Azhar curricula and to shorten them, everybody criticized him severely, nearly accusing him of apostasy; he had to swear before the Egyptian Parliament that he took such a decision for the sake of Islam.

4- If this happened in Egypt which is open to the outside world, then the challenge was bigger in Najd; we can now imagine how Abdul-Aziz faced and crushed the impossible in the cultural and political climate, as we will quote Wahba below as he writes about the dominant cultural climate in Arabia at the time, and how it was changed gradually, wisely, and calmly.

Footnotes:

1- Abdou (Muhammad), "Islam between Science and Modernity", Enlightenment Series, GEBO Publishers, 1993, Cairo, 2/pages 101:124.

2- Abdou (Muhammad), ditto, 2/pages 151:174.

3- Al-Assad, ditto, pages 291:223.

4- Jalal Kishk, ditto, page 42.

5- Al-Assad, ditto, pages 231:233.

The cultural climate in Najd in the reign of Abdul-Aziz between the possible and the impossible:

We quote below excerpts of an eye-witness about the impossible cultural climate in Najd in the reign of Abdul-Aziz.

Firstly: Wahba writes the following:

(…With the exception of few houses of scholars inside Najd and Al-Ahsa, the whole of Arabia had no schools of any type, and illiteracy dominated…In Hejaz in 1326 A.H., M. Ali Reda established two schools to teach youth reading and writing within the old way of learning by rote; one in Mecca and one in Jeddah, after facing opposition by the Al-Sharif family and the Ottomans at first…some Indians established similar institutes in Yathreb and Mecca, in addition to sessions of religious teaching in Kaaba Mosque, following the pattern of Al-Azhar, but on a smaller scale. At one point, some religious scholars in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Najd vehemently opposed the notion that Planet Earth moves and shaped like a ball and opposed the idea of learning foreign languages…Modern age prevented such scholars from exacting Middle-Ages punishments, like European Catholics centuries ago, on those asserting the roundness of Earth and those learning foreign languages. Hejaz suffered ignorance within Ottoman rule and Al-Sharif rule, and some schools never taught anything actually. King Abdul-Aziz endeavored to revive schools but his efforts were less than expected from a great man like him; he only allowed primary schools that rely on rote learning and memorizing by heart without thinking… Extremist scholars in Mecca in 1927 A.D. opposed the decisions of the Ministry of education concerning teaching foreign languages, drawing, and geography books that assert the roundness of planet Earth…The king assigned me to discuss the matter with the scholars and sheikhs. Me: His Royal Highness assigned me to explain to you the truth about the curricula you opposed; you know how much I admire and love your support of Sunna and how you vehemently refuse anything against the Quran and Sunna, but the time of blind following of scholars has ended, especially that your views about education have no evidence to support them at all from the Quran and Sunna. A sheikh: Perhaps you are right, but we have explained to our king and imam Abdul-Aziz the harms of such curricula. Drawing is absolutely forbidden as it consists of copying God's creation, and foreign languages will lead to the perusal of corrupt writings and religions of the European infidels, endangering morals and faith of students. As for geography, its heresies are taken from the ancient Greeks, and such heretical views were refused by our ancestors the ancient scholars. Me: Drawing is not against Islam; there is no evidence to support this view, and drawing is a skill needed for maps of geography and for geometry, among other sciences. As for foreign languages, many companions of Prophet Muhammad used to talk in several languages. We are compelled in our age to deal with many foreigners and we need translators we trust. We take from European knowledge what suits our needs and never contradicts our faith, and such books of knowledge was translated into Arabic before in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. Fearing for Islam is to accuse our faith of being weak that it might not stand a chance before European knowledge. In fact, our faith is solid and firm; it will not be shaken by European knowledge. Lastly, geography has nothing to do with creed and it does not contradict it; we will teach pupils about facts of other countries and regions, their locations, trade, and economy, etc. You cannot prevent evil altogether by declaring ordinary things as forbidden; one cannot stop eating grapes and dates because both are used to produce wine, right? No companions of Prophet Muhammad destroyed trees of grapes or palm trees of dates, right? A sheikh: We have expressed our views to the king and he might heed them or discard them as he did before. The king stopped such discussions later on, and he supported my view that there is no evidence to support the views embraced by the scholars concerning the curricula. The ministry of education increased the number of primary, elementary, and secondary schools after the decease of King Abdul-Aziz. Many brilliant students were sent abroad to learn in European universities to teach in the KSA later on…Scholars of Bahrain and Al-Ahsa opposed the same subjects in the curricula, and opposed reading of newspapers by ordinary people! Such scholars repeated views of the ancients without thinking, especially writings of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Al-Qayyim, revered by M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab, and they never cared to adopt innovative, creative thinking…scholars of Riyadh hated all inventions coming from Europeans, calling them as infidels, and hated new ideas in creed, and most people honored them and were convinced with their views…In 1928 A.D., I was with the supreme judge and one of the highest scholars Abdullah Ibn Hassan, inspecting Yathreb, and on our way, we stayed near water wells to dine, and we were joined by Philby before his conversion to Islam. I invited him to dine with us. When Ibn Hassan knew that Philby was a British Christian, he condemned my greeting and shaking hands with him, and he asked me why I invited him to join us. Philby was embarrassed and left the tent at once. The sheikh continued to rebuke me. I told him to wait; I wanted to appeal to the man to urge him to convert to Islam, and even Prophet Muhammad used to talk sweetly and leniently with unbelievers and used to invite them to dine with them at least to ward off their evil. I reminded him of the verse 3:159. Ibn Hassan delivered a speech to me about how the king never listens to the pieces of advice of any scholars anymore, despite their opposition to teaching certain subjects and their hatred of foreigners. In fact, most scholars knew very little outside Sirah of the Prophet and his companions; few of them knew sufficiently about the Arabic tongue, Quranic interpretation, history of Arabia, etc. yet, the heirs of king Abdul-Aziz began to take interest in books o law, history, and Arabic literature. The king was hindered by such ignorant scholars; he could not reform and spread education and schools as much as he wanted, and he had to adopt gradual steps in that respect to apply reforms in all aspects and fields. He spent ten years trying to introduce wireless and telephones scholars and trying to convince the scholars of such modernization…Once, the king sent me to Yathreb in 1928, and I went there to inspect the city along with one sheikh, who talked about the wireless as a diabolical invention that ran by the Jinn! He confided to me that the wireless never works unless with cattle sacrificed at its feet, while glorifying Satan! It was of no use to try and scientifically explain to the sheikh how the wireless works, and I reluctantly remained silent…I accompanied this sheikh a few days later to the wireless station and made him communicate with the king and receive his telegrams, showing him that no remains of sacrificed cattle were to be seen. The sheikh wondered very much, and came to visit the wireless station outside Yathreb alone many times, without telling anyone, to make sure we did not deceive him. He confessed to me, on our way to Mecca, that he was on the wrong, regretting the bad views he harbored against the king and myself…I seized the chance to convince him of the roundness of earth, an idea contrary to ancestral views held centuries ago. He shouted at me that I uttered words of disbelief! The king told me in 1932 in Riyadh that a group of scholars entered the palace to protest when they knew he would build wireless stations inside Riyadh and major cities in Najd. They told the king that he was mistaken and deceived by foreigners and that Philby would bring nothing but disasters to the kingdom! They feared GB would occupy the KSA and that Philby was a mere spy! The king told them that they were indeed mistaken; he was not the type of kings to be deceived that easily by anyone, and he threatened them by telling them that he honored them, but if they went on with their insults against him, he would stop paying their salaries and shun them forever or banish them out of Riyadh. He asserted to them that no hadith prevents cars and the wireless and any other modern invention…When thee wireless stations were established in Riyadh eventually, the scholars sent many men unexpectedly to inspect if there were any sacrifices offered there to Satan! Of course, they found nothing of the sort. They even bribed the workers there to tell them about devils in the station! Workers there tried in vain to assert to them that this is modern technology and that it has nothing to do with devils…) (6). Thus, Wahba describes Abdul-Aziz as a lenient king in almost everything, except in things related to his own personal hegemony or detracted his government; when scholars opposed him in 1930 as he celebrated the day in which he was enthroned in Hejaz, contrary to the Sunna in their beliefs, he feigned being on their side and view of things, but he never cared for their opposition to modern inventions introduced to the kingdom. He would be infuriated if anyone manipulated religion to protest against any reforms introduced by the king himself.

Secondly:

An American report mentioned in 1944 that Abou Baz, the preacher and sheikh, once delivered a sermon inciting the masses against the king who brought American experts to develop agricultural projects in the KSA. Abou Baz feared that the Americans, who began to irrigate and farm lands, would occupy the KSA gradually and Saudis work under them. He wondered why infidels were doing so in the KSA. The king sent for him many times to attend a meeting in the palace, but he refused to come several times and insisted on being treated with respect. The king sent for him his private car, and he eventually came to meet with the king. The king met with him in the palace, along with his retinue, princes, guards, scholars, and judges. The king told him that Islam entails to face rulers not to level accusations against them behind their backs. Abou Baz complained to the retinue that the king had sold the KSA to the infidels, violating his duties as a Muslim king. When the king asked him if he had delivered the whole of his speech, Abou Baz answered in the affirmative, and the king told him that they must resort to judges of sharia, not as a king and one of his subjects, but as two equal Muslim men. Scholars asserted to both the king and Abou Baz that Prophet Muhammad employed several polytheists among Jews and Christians to do work for him on several occasions, and consequently, the king did not violate sharia laws. The king sat again on his throne and asked Abou Baz if he believed scholars or not. Abou Baz said that he would obey them, but he was not convinced fully. The king gave him a period of 24 to apologize for such insult to the scholars, or else, his head will be cut off by the sword! Guards accompanied Abou Baz to a prison cell. Next day, he brought Abou Baz alone to the palace and talked to him coaxingly that his stance was offensive to Islam, and sent him home with many gifts (7). Thus, Abdul-Aziz made himself the sole reference to all scholars in matters of religion, so that they would never dare to stop his modernizing the kingdom by introducing progress and modern inventions to achieve welfare. He insisted that he took from the West what will benefit his subjects as far as scientific progress and advances were concerned (7). Abdul-Aziz struck a balance about what to get from the West to modernize the KSA, as the solution he offered was not at all an enlightened version of Islam that copes with the modern age (M. Abdou came with it but could never impose it on a more open Egyptian society), but imposing modernization by rulers while maintaining Wahabism as an ideology for the KSA. Even sheikh Al-Zawahiri, disciple of M. Abdou, worshipped 'holy' tombs, though M. Abdou mocked such practice. The solution lies in changing the cultural climate by science and education gradually, and mixing religion with science and to be open to the outside world (Arab and non-Arab) to a certain degrees. Abdul-Aziz knew after he got rid of the Najd Brothers that all power and authority must be in his hands alone, and even scholars must derive their power from him lone. The committee for the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice had to submit to him totally (8). Abdul-Aziz formed this committee in 1926 to replace the Najd Brothers before he made GB kill them off, and this means that he was planning ahead for the future.

Footnotes:

6- Wahba, ''Arabia in the 20^th Century'', page 283.

7- Jalal Kishk, ditto, pages 30, 31, and 64.

8- Umm Al-Qura Magazine: No. 111 and No. 115, 3^rd year, in Feb., 1927.

Abdul-Aziz and his openness to Egypt to defeat the impossible:

Introduction:

From the above, we conclude that the creed of the Najd people was based on 'hearing' and not reading. They would listen to any sheikh and believe him at once, as if his words were eternal, unquestionable facts of religion and of life. Abdul-Aziz felt that his deep-seated practice must be destroyed with great efforts. This oral-auditory culture has dominated within Sunnites in general until this very moment, because hadiths are based on listening and memorizing and spread by the word of mouth. Even the Quran would be memorized by heart by some Sunnites without understanding and reflecting upon it, thus forsaken by them. Such climate of utter ignorance made the Sunnites (especially Wahabis) tend to listen attentively to lies, falsehoods, and myths just like errant Jews and Christians; see 5:41-42, and like hypocrites in Yathreb; see 9:47. This applies to most human beings when they listen attentively to hadiths fabricated by evil ones who claim that such hadiths were divinely revealed, leading people to commit sins. "Likewise, We have assigned for every prophet an enemy-human and jinn devils-inspiring one another with fancy words in order to deceive. But had your Lord willed, they would not have done it. So leave them to their fabrications. So that the hearts of those who do not believe in the Hereafter may incline to it, and be content with it, and that they may perpetrate whatever they perpetrate. "Shall I seek a judge other than God, when He is the One who revealed to you the Book, explained in detail?" Those to whom We gave the Book know that it is the truth revealed from your Lord. So do not be of those who doubt." (6:112-114). Abdul-Aziz dealt with such corrupt cultural climate using patience and gradual change introduced by him, after he made use of such cultural climate in naming his kingdom the KSA, in 1932, as if the kingdom were an estate of lands and people owned by his family! Abdul-Aziz made use of the Egyptian strategic depth, which was more open than Najd, as stagnation was confined to Al-Azhar institution, with its few institutes and schools at the time. (N.B.: Al-Azhar gradually later on led countless of its schools to mushroom all over the Egyptian soil especially in rural areas, to spread ignorance disguised in the form of the Wahabi creed). Egypt in the 1930s was in its liberal secular period, and Abdul-Aziz made use of that to plant countless Wahabi organization all over Egypt. Abdul-Aziz discerned that the KSA would never go on and thrive without Egypt under his control, as history of the royal family of Al-Saud shows this fact clearly. We personally think that this is a historical strategic fact: the KSA cannot thrive without allying itself to Egypt. In order to make room for the KSA to lead all Arabs and Muslims, Egypt must deteriorate and be controlled or ridden by the Saudis to take Egypt's place of leadership. Thus, if Egypt one day retrieved its leadership and pioneering role of enlightenment and liberation as it used to be in former decades, the KSA will collapse either gradually or suddenly. Abdel-Nasser faced the Wahabi ideology with the motto of Pan-Arabism and by modernizing Egypt, but his projects and plans were thwarted by the KSA and its chief ally, the USA, and Abdel-Nasser was defeated in the 1967 war, and died of poison in 1970. He was succeeded by the Saudi agent and spy, Sadat, in 1971, and since that date, Egypt has fallen and deteriorated to an unprecedented lower level. Wahabism expanded in Egypt and ruined it and brainwashed its people and their mentalities. Let us focus in more detail on how Abdul-Aziz opened channels with Egypt.

Openness to Egypt:

Firstly: the importance of Egypt to the Saudi state of Abdul-Aziz:

1- Abdul-Aziz felt that spreading Wahabi ideology outside Arabia, especially in Egypt, was beyond the abilities of the Najd scholars; he felt the immediate urge to 'reform' Wahabism by introducing it to Egypt, as Egyptians could modernize and change its ideology for the better to cope with future challenges. Egypt must be made a strategic depth for his nascent kingdom. Wahba, his Egyptian consultant, played a role in openness to Egypt and in forming close relations between the KSA and Egypt.

2- Wahba cared very much to form close relations between the KSA and Egypt, and for instance, he writes the following about this: (…When the head of Al-Azhar, sheikh Al-Maraghi, came in 1925 with a letter from the Egyptian king to the Saudi one, on the occasion of the former's intention to perform pilgrimage in Mecca, we told the king that this is a suitable time to consolidate relation between Najd and Egypt, as Egypt is the pioneer and leader of culture and modernization in the Arab world…) (9).

3- As per the way of thinking of Abdul-Aziz regarding the future plans and gradual conversion of Egypt to Wahabism to spread Wahabi ideology all over the Arab world later no, in 1926, before the king got rid of the Najd Brothers, he established the committee for the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice, while he spread Wahabism in Egypt at the same time via certain organizations and certain agents working for him there. Abdul-Aziz wanted to develop and modernize the Wahabi ideology to make it get rid of its rigidity and stagnation; this was impossible in Najd, but possible in Cairo, the capital of culture of all Arabs at the time.

4- Egypt posed a problem for Abdul-Aziz; it used to control Hejaz region since the days of the Fatimids and the Mameluke and later under Muhammad Ali Pacha. The Egyptian influence in Hejaz was abruptly stopped when the Najd Brothers attacked the Kiswah caravan coming from Egypt. Thus, the king cared very much to have Egypt as his ally soon enough, to make it a friend, not a foe, to the new authority. Abdul-Aziz knew very well that Egypt caused the downfall of the very first KSA, and managed indirectly to introduce factors that led to the collapse of the second KSA. Hence, the fate of the third, current KSA is directly linked to its relation with Egypt. Egypt is the most ancient state in the Middle East, whereas the KSA was a nascent state in the 20^th century, before Israel, and Abdul-Aziz feared that the Egyptian strategic depth cannot possible be left alone to be a base of hatred and animosity toward the KSA, eventually fighting it to remove it from the map of Arabia, especially that Abdul-Aziz had enemies in Jordan and Iraq, as both ruled by kings from the Al-Sharif family. Abdul-Aziz had enough enemies in Yemen and the Shiites of Al-Ahsa, Hejaz, and Iran. If Egypt would join forces with his enemies, this will be to the detriment and ruin of the KSA.

5- in contrast, this Egyptian strategic depth might be a treasure for Abdul-Aziz to face all his foes in the east, north, and south. He had to win over the Egyptian side in the west at any cost. He endeavored to do this along with his Egyptian consultant Wahba and managed on the formal level to stop problems arising from the Kiswah caravan coming from Cairo. Within the cultural and popular levels, Abdul-Aziz began in 1926 to change gradually the Egyptian religious nature from Sunnite Sufism into Sunnite Wahabism, to make Egypt an extension of the Wahabi call to protect the KSA. The agents or spies that helped him in such project in the Egyptian soil were two Levantine sheikhs: Moheb-Eddine Al-Khateeb and Rasheed Reda.

Secondly: the spread and propagation of Wahabism in Egypt:

Rasheed Reda helped in the establishment of the following organizations to make Wahabism infiltrate gradually into Egypt:

A) Al-Gameiyya Al-Shareiyya (i.e., the Sharia Society) was established by a sheikh called Mahmoud Khattab Al-Sobky in 1913, based on absolute submission to Sufism. Al-Sobky authored his four-volume tome titled ''Al-Mahmoudiyya Ways of Sufism and Fiqh Verdicts''. Later on, Al-Sobky began to write in defense of the Sunnite creed, by criticizing Sufism in the Wahabi way. He wrote 26 books within that subject until he died in 1931. His son, Amin Al-Sobky, went on in the route of his father, writing nine books on the Wahabi call until he died in 1968. Hence, within the Saudi influence that began to infiltrate in empty via Rasheed Reda, the mosques of the Sharia Society spread all over Cairo and other governorates later on. It is now the biggest religious society in Egypt that controls more than 2000 mosques, thousands of imams and preachers, and millions of followers. Now (i.e., 2000 A.D.), this Sharia Society is under control of the terrorist MB group, spreading the Salafist/Wahabi thought all over the Egyptian society.

B) Gameiyyat Ansar Al-Sunna (i.e., The Society of Supporters of Sunna) was established in 1926 by an Azharite sheikh called Hamid Al-Fiqi, for whom Abdul-Aziz built a grand house in Abdeen, a Cairene district, which became a center for the Wahabi call. This society specializes in propagating Wahabi though and publishing books authored by Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Al-Qayyim, and it has its weekly magazine issued first in 1936 and until now (i.e., 2000 A.D.), named ''Al-Hadey Al-Nabawi" (i.e., the Guidance of Prophet Muhammad), which spread Salafist/Wahabi thought under the pretext or banner of Sunna.

C) Gameiyyat Al-Shobban Al-Moslimeen (i.e., The Society of Muslim Youths) was established in 1927 by Moheb-Eddine Al-Khateeb, the fellow sheikh of Rasheed Reda, the Levantine Salafist sheikh. Its first head was Dr. Abdel-Hameed Saeed. It was established to gather as many male youths as possible to convert them to Wahabism secretly. Chief among its members was Hassan Al-Banna, who headed the terrorist MB organization, named as such to imitate the Najd Brothers of Abdul-Aziz. The terrorist Hassan Al-Banna used to frequent this society a lot to preach the youth, and he was assassinated in 1949 at its gate as he was getting out of it to his car.

D) The terrorist MB group was established in 1928 as an armed political movement, and Rasheed Reda oversaw its formation carefully and closely according to his instructions to Hassan Al-Banna, his disciple, and it is noteworthy that Rasheed Reda introduced Hassan Al-Banna to the Saudi elite and the pillars of Wahabism in the KSA, and made him meet Abdul-Aziz and Wahba as well as Muhammad Naseef, whose family controlled and who son, Abdullah Naseef, headed the Islamic World Association, a body specializes until now in infiltrating the Saudi influence all over the Islamic countries, and this body helped to recruit and militarily train youths to fight in Afghanistan.

Thirdly: Rasheed Reda the Saudi agent:

His endeavors were successful even outside the scope of the four preciously mentioned bodies; he established a school to graduate and train preachers and imams in the Cairene district Al-Rawda in 1912, beside Al-Zahraa organization founded by the Levantine Salafist sheikh Moheb-Eddine Al-Khateeb. The magazine launched by Rasheed Reda to a great success and popularity was named ''Al-Manar'' (i.e., the lighthouse) and it specialized in propagating Wahabism and praising the KSA as the leader of the Islamic world. Besides, Rasheed Reda authored many books about the notion of caliphate, the Sunnite creed notions, and refuting the Shiite creed, and he calls in his writings for the restoration of the caliphate ruling system, headed by the caliph Abdul-Aziz Ibn Al-Saud. He established Al-Manar publishing house to publish books of Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Al-Qayyim, and Ibn Abdul-Wahab. Rasheed Reda died after he saw off Saud, the heir and crown prince, and son of Abdul-Aziz, in the port of Suez in 1935, leaving the torch-bear, the terrorist Hassan Al-Banna, to continue his endeavors within the terrorist MB group.

Fourthly: Hassan Al-Banna the Saudi agent:

Hassan Al-Banna confesses in his autobiography titled ''The Call and the Preacher" that he held good relations with Wahba and the Saudi circles. His younger brother, the Islamic thinker Gamal Al-Banna, confesses this relation between his older brother, and their father, and the Saudi authorities, in his book titled ''Letters of the Young Hassan Al-Banna to his Father''. There is a well-known photo of Hassan Al-Banna kneeling to kiss the hand of Abdul-Aziz. Dr. M. H. Heikal, the famous Egyptian historian, politician, and literary figure, who died in 1956, mentions in his autobiography that he first met the youth Hassan Al-Banna in the pilgrimage season in Mecca in 1936 and that Hassan Al-Banna was closely linked to the Saudi authorities, taking financial aid from them. Hassan Al-Banna used to keep the budget of the terrorist MB group as a secret. Some former terrorist MB members at the time accused Hassan Al-Banna of financial fraud and hiding sources of financial aid from leading members of the Guide Council of this terrorist group. Using the Saudi financial aid, Hassan Al-Banna, the simple impecunious teacher of primary pupils, managed to establish 50.000 branch of the MB terrorist group all over Egypt, from Alexandria in the north to Aswan in the south (10). Hence, Abdul-Aziz replaced the rebellious Najd Brothers with loyal and submissive terrorist MB group members who spread Wahabi ideology all over the Arab and Islamic world and could use violence any time – this had occurred and still occurs until this very moment in Egypt and elsewhere – and the MB members seek to reach the rule of Egypt and all Arab countries soon. If this happens, the Saudis will be ruling Egypt without military conquests. Abdul-Aziz used military conquests in Arabia in spite of the stance of international powers, another impossibility that he faced and crushed by making use of their being busy during World War I.

Lastly:

Before we write some lines about the last impossibility that Abdul-Aziz faced and crushed (i.e., the will of international powers at the time), we summarize in the following points how he dealt with the first impossibility: the cultural climate.

1- Abdul-Aziz got rid of the military danger or threat posed by the Najd Brothers easily and with least cost, efforts, and losses, and their remnants turned into part of the defensive military submissive to him as a king, and he made peace with the rest of his foes.

2- As for Wahabi scholars, Abdul-Aziz controlled them fully by putting a certain level or ceiling to their freedom of criticizing and protesting, so as to prevent them from impeding the way of modernization and progress. He made it his policy to make use of advanced technology of the West and the openness of Arabs everywhere, especially Egypt, without injuring the Wahabi ideology. Hence, a new trend in Najd was created that sought to travel abroad to learn and to come back to teach and build the culture and life in the KSA. Thus, Abdul-Aziz dared the impossible in Najd: changing stagnation of fossilized traditions sanctified as creed. Later on, the kingdom has been filled with cars, motorbikes, bicycles, radios, telecommunications, wireless stations of telegrams, and other inventions.

3- Thus, despite preserving the Wahabi ideology in the KSA, Abdul-Aziz led his kingdom into spacious horizons when he focused on Egypt and made use of the terrorist MB group to spread Wahabism all over the Islamic and Arab world. The Egyptian religiosity or religiousness level has been transformed gradually in the 20^th century from Sunnite Sufism into Sunnite Wahabism, and the Wahabi ideology gained momentum in the 1970s in Egypt after the fall of other ideologies such as Pan-Arabism and Marxism among other Leftist ideologies. In sum, Abdul-Aziz moved his problem of modernizing Wahabism into Egypt and prevented the terrorist MB members from ever coming to the KSA to preach, so as not to have his problem with the Najd Brothers repeated. Abdul-Aziz limited and curbed the influence of the Wahabi scholars and sheikhs so as not to oppose modernization, and the Saudi markets welcomed all products of the West, no longer considered devilish products. Meanwhile, the Wahabi ideology infiltrated gradually into the Egyptian soil, and Egypt was naturally open to the West and the Arab world. Saudi scholars had to exert efforts to gain fame and authority outside the KSA in a wider scope in the Arab world, especially in Egypt. The signs if this were shown in the 'sudden' spread of Wahabi extremism and bigotry in the 1970s in Egypt, when the terrorist MB and Salafists (two wings of the Wahabi ideology in Egypt and elsewhere) repeated what the Najd Brothers did 50 years ago in prohibiting countless things.

Footnotes:

9- Wahba, ditto, page 268.

10- Mansour (Ahmed Subhy), an article titled "The Egyptian Religiousness and the Najd Religiousness", published in ''Humankind and Development" Magazine, issue No. 61, April and June 1998.

The impossible in dealing with international greater powers:

1-Abdul-Aziz never dreamt of limitless expansions in Arabia; he knew his limits very well, unlike dreamy overambitious leaders who lose everything in the end. Abdul-Aziz knew how to deal realistically with real-life situations, knowing very well what was possible, what was unattainable, and what was impossible that will turn into possible in the foreseeable future with lots of endeavors and efforts exerted. Hence, he defeated and dared to face the impossible of international greater powers like GB; he expanded his kingdom step by step and kept good relation with GB, while never caring to please the British by fighting on their side against the Ottomans or taking their opinions in his military conquests. Yet, the British were his allies and gave him a monthly salary for a long time. Abdul-Aziz managed to ally himself to GB, while his foes were forced to ally themselves to weaker and losing parties. When Abdul-Aziz realized that the USA began to rise, he allied himself to it before GB lost its grip on the Middle East. It is the same policy adopted by Israel now, whereas Arabs allied themselves with losers (the USSR) that led them to the 1967 defeat. Thus, Abdul-Aziz preceded the Zionists in allying himself to the USA to establish his kingdom about 20 years before Israel was established.

2- Of course, Abdul-Aziz had permanent interests and never permanent international friends, and hence, his stances varied as per his interests. Several Arab rulers are confining their visions to the idea of the two poles: the USSR and the USA, and in all cases, they work against the interests of their Arab people. This does not apply to Abdul-Aziz; he formed his kingdom during World War I and left Arab rulers to ally themselves to the Ottomans, and they lost. He left Al-Rasheed and Al-Sharif families and Arab nationalists to ally themselves to GB and France, but both powers let them down in Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour promise that made all Arab lose everything. Abdul-Aziz allied himself not to GB, but to the British interests and ambitions; he annexed Al-Ahsa and Hael and GB could not protest, as Abdul-Aziz depended on his own military power (i.e., the Najd Brothers at the time) and he owed nothing to GB. Rulers of Yemen, during their dispute with Abdul-Aziz over borders, allied themselves to Italians and lost their wager. Abdul-Aziz wagered over the British fears of Italian influence, and he won this battle of borders. During World War II, some Muslim leaders allied themselves to Germany and Italy, such as the Shah of Iran, Rasheed Al-Kilany in Iraq, Amin Al-Husseiny in Palestine, and King Farouk in Egypt, and all of them lost their wager. Abdul-Aziz allied himself to GB and won. When Hashemites who ruled Iraq allied themselves to GB and never paid heed to the rising USA, they lost the throne, whereas Abdul-Aziz allied himself soon enough to the USA and used oil revenues to consolidate and cement such relations to preserve his kingdom.

3- Abdul-Aziz was shrewd enough as a Bedouin man or a desert-Arab; he knew his way through the desert and through the route of his political ambitions. He knew when to stop, when to wait, and when to seize a chance. Abdul-Aziz knew the limits of the possible and the impossible and how to change reality. Abdul-Aziz made use even of the recklessness of the Najd Brothers to measure the reactions of the international powers. When the Najd Brothers exceeded their limits and thought themselves as independent agents not pawns with the king, he disowned them and let GB kill them off. He made use of their power, fame, and savagery to conquer Hejaz without battle. When he realized that their raids on Iraq and Jordan would involve him in facing GB, he let the Najd Brothers down and enlisted the aid of GB to kill them off to defend its colony and the route to India: Iraq.

4- Such political shrewdness of Abdul-Aziz in dealing with GB led the British to build the fortress of Boseih in spite of their treaty with Abdul-Aziz, and they used warplanes to kill off the Najd Brothers. Abdul-Aziz feared that Feisal Al-Daweesh would present himself as an alternative to Abdul-Aziz to the British, but his recklessness made GB realized that Abdul-Aziz was a better ally to maintain stability in Arabia, and happily shot the Najd Brothers to massacre most of them, and GB handed over Al-Daweesh, and other rebel leaders, to Abdul-Aziz.

5- The terrorist Hassan Al-Banna in Egypt made use of the political genius of Abdul-Aziz in dealing with the terrorist MB members; Al-Banna made the group into two subsections as to fit the Egyptian conditions at the time; one overt group for preaching and recruitment of youths, and one secret terrorist group of assassinations that Al-Banna would disown its members when they would commit their crimes and got arrested! He would deny their being members of the MB!

6- On the contrary, Al-Daweesh never benefited from the example of his master Abdul-Aziz; Al-Daweesh was busy with his ambitions and prowess and arrogance, never to discern the true facts of situation around him, and he contradicted himself on several occasions. He once attacked and raided Kuwaitis as 'infidels' and later on sought refuge in the palace of its ruler who refused to help him of course. Al-Daweesh accused Abdul-Aziz of being an apostate as he dealt with the British, and he sought the help of the British himself, but they headed him over to the king. Al-Daweesh felt that the British must chose him as king instead; but they knew they could not trust him, and eventually they favored Abdul-Aziz after they used Al-Daweesh to threaten Abdul-Aziz to make him knew his limits.

7- Within disputes over borders with Yemen, Abdul-Aziz showed his political genius; Ahmed Ibn Al-Imam Yahiya, the son of the ruler of Yemen, Al-Imam Yahiya, conspired against the life of Abdul-Aziz by sending assassins to kill him in the Kaaba Mosque in Mecca. When the assassination attempt failed of course, Abdul-Aziz took revenge by enlisting the help of the terrorist MB group of Hassan Al-Banna in Egypt, as it branched in several countries as well. The Algerian terrorist MB member,Fodil Al-Ouartilani, was among the mysterious assistants of the terrorist Hassan Al-Banna. The MB branch in Yemen used Fodil Al-Ouartilani under orders of Al-Banna and his in-law, Abdel-Hakeem Abdeen, to interfere in the Saudi-Yemeni conflict, causing trade projects, upheavals, and political alliances to occur in Yemen, transformed into a full-fledged revolt (a.k.a. Al-Waziri coup) in 1948, led by a man called Abdullah Ibn Al-Wazir, and Al-Imam Yahiya was killed. Ibn Al-Wazir negotiated with Abdul-Aziz, and the latter retrieved regions of Aseer, Najran, and Jizan within the Saudi borders. When Yemeni tribes revolted against Ibn Al-Wazir and his coup, he tried to enlist the aid of Abdul-Aziz, who refused to help him by sending any troops or warplanes, and thus, the coup ended soon enough; and Fodil Al-Ouartilani fled Yemen and the KSA authorities refused to receive him. It is noteworthy that during the stay of Abdul-Aziz in Jeddah, he heard Philby weeping outside the king's royal tent, and Philby blamed the king for not conquering Yemen when he had the chance, and this false step would make him lose the KSA later on. Abdul-Aziz told him that no Saudi king ruled Yemen before, and security was never guaranteed there, with much sectarian and tribal unrest that would end the KSA if Yemen was annexed to his kingdom, and that his dispute with Yemen was over the regions of Aseer, Najran, and Jizan who were Saudi territories retrieved at last (11). This shows that Abdul-Aziz knew his limits regarding the notions of the possible, the insurmountable impossible, and the impossible that might change later on. He never ventured to conquer Yemen, so as to avoid its quagmire; on the contrary, Abdel-Nasser fell into that quagmire and did not get out of it until the 1967 war broke out.

8- New realities imposed themselves on the relation between Abdul-Aziz and Jordan and Iraq; unlike the case during the Middle Ages, the modern age specifies defined borders between countries, allowing no room for Bedouins to graze cattle and animals freely anywhere, as they used to do before. This marked the end of the age of conquests, invasions, and annexing. Yet, Abdul-Aziz seized the chance of certain gaps in this new reality and conquered regions to form his kingdom while GB and other powers were busy in the World War I. yet, he knew his limits very well; annexing Jordan and Iraq was an insurmountable impossibility. He preferred to define borders with them in a way that allowed his taking as much desert areas as possible inside the KSA, to the north and to the east. He knew that circumstances of limitless conquests that were available during the reign of his ancestors are no longer there. Abdul-Aziz gained as many advantages as he possibly could by allowing GB to define borders within his whole-hearted agreement. One advantage was to gain international acknowledgment of his nascent kingdom, plus GB promising him financial and military aid. He knew he had to make the international community recognize the KSA, as part of the international political affairs and its culture and protocols. Thus, he readily made the treaty of Al-Akeer with GB, and once the Najd Brothers were killed off with their Middle-Ages culture, the interests of all parties dictated that they acknowledge on another: a protocol of friendship was signed between the Hashemite-ruled Iraq and Abdul-Aziz in 1930 (12). Normalization between the KSA and Jordan followed soon enough, as the Middle East began to know the era of separate, independent political entities. In Ta'if conference, Abdul-Aziz declared that his kingdom was to be named the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) on 10^th of Aug., 1932, as per his royal decree, and ordered that constitution be written with a system of inheriting the throne and how governments would be formed. He made all Saudis swear fealty to his heir, crown prince Saud Ibn Abdul-Aziz on 11^th of May, 1933 (13). Yet the steps of writing constitution and how governmental and political bodies would be formed never took place during the reign of Abdul-Aziz, and this reluctance or laziness has shaped the opposition movements in the post-Abdul-Aziz era.

Footnotes:

11- Mansour (Ahmed Subhy), ditto, page 28.

Kishk, ditto, pages 50, 51, and 81.

12- Umm Al-Qura Magazine, No. 308, 7^th year, on 31^st Oct., 1930.

13- Umm Al-Qura Magazine, on 23^rd Sept., 1932.

Kishk, ditto, pages 691, 692, and 693.

The huge gap between Abdul-Aziz and his contemporary Arab rulers:

The huge gap in the mentality and shrewdness of Abdul-Aziz in comparison to his contemporary Arab rulers especially in Arabia is a topic that will make us return here to the idea of the impossible within a given dominant cultural climate and how this influences the political vision. We quote Wahba here as he was the one to live in Arabia and knew its rulers, enabling us via his writings to know their mentalities and how Abdul-Aziz was distinguished among them and surpassed them all. Below, we quote an excerpt from the writings of Wahba: (…I will demonstrate to readers here the governmental systems of Arabian regions and how they were ruled and governed; it is an image derived from what ordinary Arabs and Muslims would understand from the notion of government as seen by Arabian rulers...I will mention here two stories to explain these facts…The first story occurred in the winter of 1915, as I was talking to Jabir Al-Sabah, the brother of ruler of Kuwait, Mubarak Al-Sabah, trying to convince him to talk to his brother about heavy taxes and the way such money was spent. Mubarak Al-Sabah in his last days discarded religious and Arabian traditions as he squandered money on himself to live luxuriously by imposing heavy taxes on houses. I reminded his brother, Jabir, of the hadith about every caretaker is responsible or his people, never forgetting to praise Mubarak Al-Sabah and his other good traits and how he defended Kuwait and cared for the interests of Kuwaitis and made trade flourish…Jabir told me that I understood subjects of the king Mubarak very little, and I should not repeat words of the scholars. He told me that subjects of the kingdom are like cattle that must have their wool shorn every once in a while. I told him that even cattle needs care to breed, and shearing them must not reach to their skin to get their wool. He told me that an absolute ruler must control fully all his subjects, bodies and souls, as well as all the lands and all things on it, and if the people were wealthy, they might revolt against the ruler. I refuted his claims and asserted that Kuwaitis loved their country and ruler, and they were not enemies to him, and that tyranny breeds animosity. He told me that it is no use to argue; they as the royal family members understood their subjects and the best way to rule them, and that he grew tired of my sermonizing him…the other story happened 19 years later, in 1932, as a Bedouin old man visited me and asked me about Europe and its men, kings, climate, military troops and so on. He asked me that if the European kings and rulers were like King Abdul-Aziz, and I told him about the British king whose kingdom was vast enough around the globe. He asked me if delegations visit the British king and if he would give them money and gifts or not. I told him that he meets only with high officials and men of high ranks, giving them medals and honors of merit, while people within the British army and its ranks receive salaries. The Bedouin man asked if the British king is very rich with treasuries filled with gold and precious stones. I told him that the king and his royal family had their high salaries and the treasury is under control of the Minister of Finance to spend on the salaries of governmental officials, military men, the fleet, etc. and then education and other ministries, with budgets known to all. He asked me if the British and European people would kill under orders of their king, and I told him that European kings do not manage their work by themselves, and courts would sentence men to death, and kings would change the sentence into imprisonment, but the kings could not order the hanging of someone without court sentences…The Bedouin man told me that they were no real kings if they would not confiscate the treasuries of their kingdoms, as Arab kings do… Arabian rulers never cared very much about foreign affairs, and some countries (e.g., Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain) signed treaties with GB that would not allow them to communicate with any other foreign country. No region of Arabia held good international relations except Hejaz at the time…The ruler of Bahrain once asked me if King Abdul-Aziz appointed a consul or an ambassador in Al-Ahsa or Qatif, but I refuted this rumor at once, and I asked him if it were true, why should we do this to care for the British interests or those of any nationalities of people working inside the KSA. The ruler of Bahrain mocked me and said that if the British raised their flag anywhere, they would occupy and invade it, and this would endanger the KSA. I told him that the KSA might one day have embassies in India and GB and would raise the Saudi flag there as well. He told me that the British stopped all influence of the rulers of Bahrain in the last 50 years, and I retorted that Bahraini rulers should have taken care for the interests of their people, so as not to allow GB to interfere in Bahraini affairs and that GB would not endanger its interests and subjects residing there, as Bahrain suffered for a while from misadministration. The ruler of Bahrain told me that GB would give pieces of advice only, not to control everything in Bahrain and that King Abdul-Aziz must take care and never would let off his guard regarding the British influence inside the KSA and never to allow embassies to be built there. This Bahraini ruler represented the mentality that dominated at the time all over Arabia…Once, people of Dubai and Oman refused to install quarantine in their coasts in 1928, despite the fact that the epidemic of cholera at the time struck Iraq, and they just refused that Iraqi ships would come near their ports…they refused for a long time to build airports inside their countries so as to avoid British interference in their countries similar to what occurred in Bahrain at the time…) (14).

Footnotes:

14- Wahba, ditto, pages 139, 140, 146, and 147.

PART II: The Wahabi Opposition during the Reign of King Saud, King Feisal, and King Khaled

PART II: The Wahabi Opposition during the Reign of King Saud, King Feisal, and King Khaled

A general introduction on the post-Abdul-Aziz Saudi Wahabi opposition movement:

(A) A general overview:

Abdul-Aziz put an end to the opposition movement of the Najd Brothers and established his Saudi state via the art of politics of the impossible in the time of possible or rather the possible in the time of the impossible. Since the time in which he declared the name of this Saudi state as the KSA in 1932 until his death in 1953, he dedicated his time to firmly establish administrational and organizational systems to make his KSA a viable well-governed state, thus doing the possible in the time of the possible, after finishing successfully the policy of defiance of international powers when he dared to do the impossible. His internal organization of government was successful due to many internal and external factors; chief among them was huge oil revenues and riches that came suddenly as a result, causing many social changes, such as the quick pace of modernization and openness to the world. Such conditions allowed room for the existence of a class of open-minded secular elite and the marginalization of the role of religious (Wahabi) scholars and sheikhs and their control of politics and society. Social changes took place within all members of the Saudi society, elite and non-elite, as all of them moved suddenly from ascetic and simple lifestyle/culture into the affluent lifestyle/culture, without a gradual medial stage to make the society cope with such hurried changes. Such sudden internal developments occurred simultaneously along with World War II, which changed the political and strategic map of the globe, a change reflected on the Middle East and Arabia. Two competing powers emerged at the time: the USA and the USSR, with Cold War between them as well as the polarization of the countries all over the globe between these two poles. Both poles vied for more influence in the Arab world, as its countries were divided into two camps supporting one pole against the other. Naturally, Abdul-Aziz took the side of the USA. At the time, many revolutions, revolts, and coups occurred in the Arab world, and Abdul-Aziz had to protect and preserve his nascent burgeoning kingdom amidst revolutionary storms so as not to let the KSA collapse. His endeavors in that respect were done while he was in his old age, having spent his youth in several battles. Naturally, he would aim for the stability of his kingdom by modernizing and developing it alongside with gaining oil revenues that allowed room for affluent lifestyle, after getting rid of the Najd Brothers and their opposition movement and controlling Wahabi scholars and sheikhs to avoid their criticism by making them subservient to him out of fear or out of greed for money. Their tendency to be obsequious showed itself earlier in their flattery to Abdul-Aziz on several occasions, especially when they approved, and dare not to oppose, his renaming the kingdom as the ''Kingdom of Saudi Arabia'', the KSA. Moreover, all scholars ignored what the king demanded regarding changes in the legal system, writing a constitution, and forming modern governmental system. Abdul-Aziz did not insist, either. Thus, the earliest chance to initiate democracy and to hold rulers to question and impeachment was lost; the Najd Brothers used to oppose Abdul-Aziz and protest against his decisions by holding conferences, initiating debates, voicing criticism, and issuing statements, and all this was no longer possible after they were killed off. A new era began by Abdul-Aziz between 1932 and 1953. His heir and son, Saud, was enthroned as Gamal Abdel-Nasser came to power as President of the Arab Republic of Egypt. The conflicts and disputes between Abdel-Nasser and King Saud caused the emergence of an opposition movement on the margin of such disputes: this opposition movement was manifested mainly by Nasser Al-Saeed, who was born in the region of Hael, and who adopted a Nasserist (or Nasserite) wave that imitated the iconic leader Gamal Abdel-Nasser. The opposition movement of Al-Saeed represented a Leftist (gauche), nationalist tendency coupled with a mature Islamic thought. On the margin of the opposition movement of Al-Saeed, other various opposition movements emerged (Leftist, communists, and nationalist) that reflected the dominant climate and culture of Abdel-Nasser's Egypt: Nasserism was an ideology that influenced the Arab, Islamic, and African spheres in the 1950s and 1960s. The opposition movements that followed the Nasserist ideology in the KSA ended when Nasserism was crushed in the 1967 war. Nasserism collapsed totally when the right-wing leader, Sadat, became president of Egypt, and he allied himself to the Salafist-Wahabi trend inside Egypt and the KSA. This caused a flourish of the Wahabi ideology all over the Islamic and Arab world. The revival of Wahabism, with a vengeance, in the KSA and the Arab world led later on to the terrorist step of Juhayman Al-Otaybi when he invaded the Kaaba Mosque in Mecca in the dawn of Tuesday, on 20^th of Nov., 1979, on the first day of the Hijri year 1400. When such aggression ended by military forces, a wave of Wahabi opposition movement scholars and religious figures emerged and was influenced – somehow – by the culture of human rights, and this wave was represented by "the committee of the defense of sharia rights''.

(B) An overview of the policies of Abdul-Aziz from 1932 to 1953:

We give here more details and analysis of the policies of Abdul-Aziz from 1932 when he gave his kingdom the name of the KSA to his death in 1953. We have mentioned earlier the Austrian journalist who converted to Islam, Muhammad Al-Assad, the close friend of Abdul-Aziz, and how he was surprised because of the change that occurred to his friend, the king, after the Islamic world was waiting for Abdul-Aziz to realize the dream of forming an 'Islamic union' in the style of caliphate. It was transpired later on that Abdul-Aziz desired no more than to establish a kingdom within the territories ruled by his forefathers in Arabia at one point. We have mentioned earlier that Al-Assad noticed how Abdul-Aziz began to lead and affluent lifestyle of pomp and extravagance, along with his retinue and cortege, despite his earlier religiousness and simple life. Al-Assad felt the contradiction between the tyrannical rule of one despot who confiscated power and authority despite the veneer of democracy in the way Abdul-Aziz talked with Bedouins in his palace, allowing them to call him by his first name without titles. Such contradictions were noticed without commentary or explanation by Al-Assad; yet, he attributed them to the fact that Abdul-Aziz harbored inside his mind two mentalities or cultures, unlike the one culture and unilateral mentality of the Najd Brothers and the rulers around the KSA at the time, which was the Middle-Ages mindset to which they adhered steadfastly. Abdul-Aziz had one more culture: allowing free zone or room inside his mind for novelties and modernity and how to deal with the modern age and what it entailed. As per his policies as a founder of a state within the politics of the impossible in the time of the possible, he had to deal with many contradictions: Wahabism and modernization, the Najd Brothers and the British forces, and tyranny and democracy. He had to strike a balance between such contradictions to serve his own purposes and interests; thus, he realized what seemed beforehand as impossible: to found the KSA, to give it the name of his royal family, and to leave the rest to the passage of time as he exported the Wahabi ideology to Egypt and consequently Egypt was to carry it to the Islamic world. This raised the ambitions of some others to undertake the mission which Abdul-Aziz failed to perform: to establish one Salafist/Wahabi union that unites all Islamic and Arab countries with one spiritual reference in the KSA and its Wahabism. Abdul-Aziz felt at that point in time that after he struggled against the impossible for years, he must get some rest and enjoy his life after achieving all his ambitions as he was over 50 years old. The only thing left for him to do, and he did it, was to ally the KSA to a greater international power (i.e., the USA) and to consolidate the relations between the KSA and the greatest regional pole of power in the Middle East (i.e., Egypt) to protect the KSA from outside. His endeavors inside the KSA included modernization of systems and introducing new inventions. This means that his policies changed from ''the art of the possible in the time of the impossible'' into ''the art of the possible in the time of the possible'' within the period (1932-1953). The latter policies were later on adopted by Saud, his heir and successor, and the other successors to the Saudi throne. Thus, within the period 1932-1953, Abdul-Aziz applied the dominant culture in Arabia: politically, this means a despot who confiscated power, authority, and wealth and tyrannically ruled and owned the land and its people without anyone daring to question his decisions. This attitude was applied by Abdul-Aziz even before the conquest of Hejaz; he would say that God is the Eternal King and Abdul-Aziz himself the temporary king and sovereign over Arabia, as he derived legitimacy using his own sword. He was a king and people were the subjects he owned and controlled, just like a shepherd and his cattle: he can manipulate, invest, or slaughter them, as such were the traditions of all Middle-Ages sultans, caliphs, kings, and despots, in the East and in the West. Harmony existed between Abdul-Aziz and the dominant culture and mentality in Arabia after getting rid of the Najd Brothers and subjugating the Wahabi scholars and clergymen and keeping them under his control. Abdul-Aziz forgot, intentionally or not, all his promises about the Islamic Shura (consultation) and writing a constitution. Abdul-Aziz became a full-fledged despot in the full sense of the word, just like rulers around him at the time. His only addition was the man-made Wahabi ideology raising falsely the motto of Islamic sharia; Abdul-Aziz felt and said that he embodied this sharia. He was supported morally by the ruling system of caliphs in ancient times. He felt he had the right to imitate the caliphs in their confiscation of power, authority, and wealth, and to have religious scholars under his command to justify his steps and decisions. The art of politics of the possible in the time of the possible does not mean to dispute or collide with greater international powers; on the contrary, it means to cope and to ally oneself to them. This was applied by Abdul-Aziz within the period 1932-1953; as he replaced GB – without losing its friendship, of course – with the USA, when he saw that it is a rising power and that GB declined in power and in the international political scene. Perhaps John Philby was the engineer of that shift, despite his being British; as he was a model of practical, pragmatic politician whose loyalty was for his personal interests. He realized that his interests and that of the king were secure and safe when the KSA would ally itself to the USA, while keeping friendship with old GB. Thus, Abdul-Aziz made sure his KSA would be safe for a century to come, as luckily, oil will be the real life-blood of the artery of the Saudi-American relations. Oil is the keyword to understand and analyze the policies of Abdul-Aziz and his successors, the opposition movements inside the KSA along with their stances, attitudes, and future, and the circumstances and conditions of the Middle East. As the USA laid its hands on the oil of Arabia to control it before, during, and after World War II and within the Cold War and the New World Order, passing with the first and second Gulf wars, in order to understand the influence of oil on the KSA and the opposition movements inside it.

(C) Oil: the fearful test by God:

In the 1^st century A.H., the 7^th century A.D., the Bedouins and desert-Arabs of Najd went through a fearful test or ordeal, along with most Arabs in Arabia, especially the Qorayish tribe and the so-called companions of Prophet Muhammad, and this fearful test was that countless treasures of ancient empires fell into their hands after Arab conquests. Disputes over how such treasures of conquered lands ought to be distributed among Arabs led to the Arab civil wars and divisions among Muslims, divisions that still stand until now between Sunnites and Shiites and sub-creeds within these two generic terms. Among the last manifestations of such divisions is the ongoing dispute and conflict between Sunnite Wahabism and Shiites on one hand and Sunnite Wahabism and Sufis on the other hand. Wahabis founded the KSA on most of Arabia, and soon afterwards, the whole world was amazed that Al-Ahsa is situated over a huge treasure of oil that exceeds the treasures of Caesars, Tsars, and Persian emperors. Instead of disputes to occur between dwellers of Al-Ahsa and the Saudi royal family that thought of itself as the owner of Al-Ahsa by conquest, the descendants of Caesars, the Americans, got the oil in exchange for money and protection of the KSA by the White House. Hence, the fearful test of oil turned into the main question posed by the opposition movements: do the USA and the Saudi authorities under it and subservient to it have the right to gain these treasures of Muslim lands? Other queries raised by the post-Abdul-Aziz opposition movements were centered on other issues as well, as we will show in a coming chapter. The USA promised John Philby the salary of 1000 pounds per month in return for his intercession to the king, Abdul-Aziz, and a large reward if he would convince the king to allow the USA to confiscate purchase of Saudi oil. The USA resorted as well to Abdullah Suleiman, the financial consultant of Abdul-Aziz. GB tried to vie with the USA for Saudi oil, but they failed, and Sir Longer, the representative of the Anglo-Persian Company left at once, leaving the scene for the American company ''Standard Oil of California'', which got the concession of oil purchase within easy conditions, as per the royal decree no. 1135, published in the Umm Al-Qura Magazine, on 10^th of July, 1932. The easy conditions included that the company would pay 50.000 pounds for the Saudi government once it starts to work and 100.000 pounds within two years, and the Saudi government would receive 4 shillings per ton of oil, on the condition that no taxes or fees would be imposed on the company by Saudi authorities. 14 months later, after the company made sure of this treasure that will produce oil for many years to come, the lands of the concession extended to cover over half of the KSA lands in May 1939. ''Standard Oil of California'' was joined by the Texas Company, and the Arab company, Aramco, managed every process. The area of lands as well as the period of the concession, 44 years renewable until 2003 A.D., and other easy conditions were criticized by analysts and researchers, as they were unjust to the Saudi side, especially that some considered that the Saudi government thus lost its political independence by being not able to impose any sort of taxes or fees (1). Yet, those analysts and researchers never understood the aim of Abdul-Aziz; he wanted the USA to undertake the protection of his kingdom to protect its interests even until 2003, amidst a changing world and possibly changing borders as World War II drew near. Thus, Abdul-Aziz succeeded whereas Al-Sharif Hussein failed miserably when he wagered on GB as his ally and he lost everything and made all Arabs suffer the consequences of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Abdul-Aziz succeeded as he discerned that he must rely on the rising power of the USA that must link its interests to his and would defend the KSA accordingly. Moreover, Abdul-Aziz in this way made sure his successors would be secure and enjoy the treasures and wealth and affluence because of oil without having to worry, unlike Arab kings and rulers who feared the consequences of World War II. This was the political climate of the Saudi oil concession given to an American company. Oil revenues led to complicated governmental hierarchies to be formed. Abdul-Aziz lived to see the kingdom's wealth rise to 10 million $ before World War II, 60 million $ in 1948, 160 million $ in 1952, and 250 million $ in 1953, the year in which he died. Oil revenues during his reign led to widened governmental services and the emergence of new social classes. Abdul-Aziz inculcated into his family members that the wealth of the KSA was their own money, as per Salafist viewpoint of things during caliphates that the caliph owned the lands and its people. Thus, the KSA was owned by Abdul-Aziz and his Al-Saud royal family, who were helped by others like the family of Al-Sheikh, tribal leaders, and technocrats. For instance, Abdullah Al-Suleiman was the Treasurer of Abdul-Aziz and became the Minister of Finance in 1932, and his sole mission was to satisfy all personal needs and requests of Abdul-Aziz; there was no barrier between the kingdom's finance and the pocket money of Abdul-Aziz until his death or the personal money of King Saud until 1959. Thus, Abdul-Aziz and his sons enjoyed the life of extravagance and affluence, discarding gradually all Wahabi extremism and asceticism. Luxurious living and debauchery became ordinary in the palaces of princes. In his old age, the wives and concubines of Abdul-Aziz were more than 300 women, and he begot 21 known princes within the period of 1900-1932. Chief among his sons were Turki, Saud, Feisal, Muhammad, Khaled, Nasser, Massoud, Fahd, Abdullah, Bandar, Sultan, Mashaael, Musaaed, Abdul-Mohsen, Mashary, Met'eb, Talal, Abdul-Rahman, and Turki the second. When Abdul-Aziz enjoyed oil revenues, as he was 52 years old, he begot Nuwaf and Nayef in 1933, Fawwaz, Majid, and Suleiman in 1936, Abdul-Elah in 1938, Ahmad in 1939, Sutam and Ahmad in 1940, Mamdouh, Mashhood, and Maslool in 1941, and finally Hammoud, Abdul-Majid, and Miqrin in 1942 (2), not to mention unknown princes and princesses. Hence myths and legends began to be yarned about the Saudi royal palaces where princesses and concubines resided within intrigues similar to the stories of One Thousand and One Nights. Within an era that shook the whole world with regional and international wars, revolts, coups, revolutions, and massacres, the Saudi royal family enjoyed luxurious life of affluence by giving the oil to the USA, provided it will ensure the security, stability, and continuity of the KSA. Yet, the Saudi kingdom kept its entity and identity, and Abdul-Aziz retained his charismatic character that relied on his personal history of struggle. His son and heir, Saud, tried to go on living in the lap of luxury as he used to during the reign of his father, but the political climate, conditions, and circumstances changed; an opposition movement emerged against him that caused his dethronement. Thus, the worst catastrophe of ''the art of politics of the possible in the time of the possible'' was being influenced by what others do and to imitate them: when Egypt's revolutionary leader President Abdel-Nasser emerged, the reverberations of his revolution must reach Arabia. Thus, we begin below writing about the opposition movement during the reign of King Saud Ibn Abdul-Aziz.

Footnotes:

1- Ahmed (Rifaat Sayed), "The Desert Saint", pages 19:23.

2- Al-Yaseeni, "Religion and State in the KSA", pages 93:93, 101, 126, and 130:135.

CHAPTER I: The Opposition Movement of Nasser Al-Saeed

CHAPTER I: The Opposition Movement of Nasser Al-Saeed

Introduction: the Sunnite opposition movement of Nasser Al-Saeed during the reign of King Saud (1953-1964):

The genius, ideal, and unique location of Egypt imposed on Abdul-Aziz to exert double efforts to pave the way to spread Wahabism in Egypt, resulting in the terrorist Hassan Al-Banna forming the terrorist MB group that adopted the Wahabi ideology. Favorable circumstances and conditions in Egypt coincided to enable the terrorist MB group to mushroom like cancerous cells all over Egyptian soil in the period 1928-1952. At the time, Egypt witnessed an era of liberalism that lacked social justice; hence, there was very little room for social mobility flexible enough to welcome the learned ones among the sons of peasants and workers (i.e., the lower classes) to climb the social ladder to the middle classes. Likewise, there was no flexibility to allow sons of the middle classes to rise to the high classes. Yet, within the political atmosphere of liberalism and the freedom in political activism, journalism, and the literary field, the youth deprived of self-expression joined any trends of revolt and opposition of different ideologies: chauvinistic parties like Young Egypt Party (i.e., Misr Al-Fatah), communist and socialist parties within the Leftist spectra, and lastly, the ultra-right, conservative religious groups like the terrorist MB group. Some other youths joined the Egyptian army via the military college, and some rebels formed a movement inside the army called ''The Free Officers Movement'' that included members of all the previously mentioned opposition movements, who welcomed the 1952 coup d'état and turned it into a full-fledged revolution. It was rumored that the Free Officers Movement allied itself in particular to the terrorist MB group, but they parted in different ways as their disputes were insuperable barrier. The terrorist MB group conspired and plotted the assassination attempt of President Gamal Abdel-Nasser in 1954, and he had to banish and imprison many of the terrorist MB group members as a result. Some of them fled to the KSA, the homeland of their ideology. Hence, a confrontation between a Nasserist Egypt and the KSA in the reign of Saud seemed inevitable. The genius, ideal, and unique location of Egypt made Abdel-Nasser exert little efforts to export his revolutionary ideas outside Egypt, especially to the KSA. It was easy for the Egyptian President to quell and curb the terrorist MB group members and their activities inside Egypt. In fact, he stopped the spread of Wahabi/Salafist thought in Egypt and even cornered and limited such thought in the KSA, as Nasserism imposed itself because of the weight of Egypt as a pole in the Middle East. Even some Saudi princes were influenced to the extent that they called themselves ''the Free Princes'' to imitate the name of "The Free Officers'' in Egypt. The genius, ideal, and unique location of Egypt coupled with the leadership and policies of Abdel-Nasser in the 1950s followed the art of politics of the possible in the time of the impossible: he revolutionized Egyptians, drove out the British occupation, faced the Tripartite Aggression in 1956 (a.k.a. the Suez Crisis), achieved a temporary unity with Syria, and defied international powers in the scene, and yet, his greatest achievement was his changing the international, regional, and local political and cultural climate as he spread the Leftist and the Pan-Arabism ideologies as well as notions like positive neutrality and non-alliance and the solidarity of popular forces. Abdel-Nasser dared to defy the colonial powers and the American arrogance as the USA backed Israel. It was a natural step that the Egyptian President would ally himself to the USSR and the socialist east camp, as he led the Third-World countries and their peoples in their struggle for liberation and getting rid of the old colonialism and the American imperialism. Thus, he stood against the countries of the capitalist west camp as well as the so-called regressive countries. The KSA, Iran, and Jordan were among the so-called regressive countries at the time. King Saud paid a heavy price for this new climate created by Abdel-Nasser within the local, regional, and international levels; as Saud lived in luxury, affluence, and extravagance while retaining tyranny and Wahabism like his father. His lifestyle and political life might have continued in the same manner without much protest, pretty much like the last 20 years of his father's reign, if it had not been for the political and cultural climate created by Abdel-Nasser. King Saud faced a Nasserist or Nasserite opposition movement inside his kingdom that led eventually to his dethronement; it was easy for opponents and foes of King Saud to embrace the Nasserist ideology and to discard the Wahabi one, and this was what Nasser Al-Saeed just did. Strangely, Abdel-Nasser as a despot in his internal policies adopted the same tyrannical ones of King Saud; yet, Abdel-Nasser accused King Saud of being a dictator who wasted money in extravagance, luxurious living, and profligacy. Abdel-Nasser ruled with revolutionary legitimacy as a dictator; for instance, he annulled the 1921 Constitution, confiscated and restricted the liberties and freedoms Egyptians enjoyed during the liberal period of 1923-1952, incarcerated, exiled, persecuted, and restricted his foes and opponents inside the Egyptian army and outside it, and persecuted and imprisoned communists and persons he called the regressive ones. If King Saud spent millions in extravagance and luxury, Abdel-Nasser wasted the gold of Egypt in an unfortunate adventure in Yemen, and he and his regime received a fatal blow as he was defeated in the 1967 war. We conclude then that tyranny of all sorts lead to the same result. But the Egyptian propaganda machine of the powerful regional pole, Egypt, condemned King Saud and catapulted Abdel-Nasser into fame and glory in the eyes of his admirers. Abdel-Nasser managed to silence the voices of his detractors, foes, and opponents, whereas King Saud had many detractors, foes, and opponents who were outspoken and vociferous inside the KSA, forcing him to give up the throne. It is noteworthy that the political and cultural climate inside the KSA was favorable toward the flourishing of the Nasserist ideology and propaganda, especially that the generation of King Abdul-Aziz died or retired. The next generation included several persons who received secular and civil education and readily embraced new ideas and notions. Even those who received conservative education among this generation used to listen to radio stations and to use modern inventions, as they were more open-minded than the Najd Brothers and the religious scholars during the era of Abdul-Aziz. As King Abdul-Aziz died, and no one inherited his charisma and strong character, his son and successor, King Saud could not occupy his father's place and could not gain his stature, and he was criticized severely for a long time. Thus, the internal side of the KSA interacted with the external influence of the Nasserist ideology coming from Egypt, as a new type of opposition movement, led by Al-Saeed, emerged in the KSA. Overtly, this type of opposition led by Al-Saeed seemed outside the fundamentalist Sunnite Wahabi opposition movements. There were influential factors within the opposition movements against King Saud embodied by the role of ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'' religious police forces and the so-called 'Islamic' universities that led to the rise of fundamentalism, as the policies of King Saud escalated the opposition movement until he was dethroned at one point. Yet, a closer look by researchers would show that the opposition movement of Al-Saeed, though influenced by socialism and Nasserism, was derived chiefly from a fundamentalist Sunnite vision and religious discourse in its essence. We are to remember that the decisive, real factor that influenced the opposition movements was oil, as its revenues led to the modernization of the KSA and led to much internal transformation. This modernization negatively influenced the role and stature of Wahabi clergymen and also led to limited development; as the infrastructure suffered and the lower, impecunious, underprivileged classes still lived in despicable conditions without reform, in contrast to the affluence and extravagance of King Saud. The external influence of oil revenues was the King Saud's allying himself to the USA, his hatred of Abdel-Nasser, and his animosity toward the socialist east camp. Within such climate, the Saudi opposition movements during the reign of King Saud were directed toward the dominant socialist thought, with varying degrees. Al-Saeed was the most prominent and most famous opposition figure, and the most vociferous with steadfastness to his stances. His reference was a religious one with a vision to achieve justice as the supreme higher value of Islam. The thought of Al-Saeed in his writings bears the imprint of religious innovative thinking that shows the fact that Islam fits all eras and locations if there would be enlightened Islamic thinkers who would derive innovative, creative notions from the Quran as fitting their age. The innovation of Al-Saeed was Islamic in the sense that justice as the higher value dominant in the Quran must be linked to sharia objectives and a realistic view of the age as well as the social conditions and circumstances. The role of Wahabi clergymen dwindled to a great extent in the KSA, and other opposition figures were engrossed into nationalist and socialist tendencies. Al-Saeed was the only opposition figure that coupled his Nasserist and socialist tendencies with an Islamic vision. In this chapter, we trace the influence of oil revenues on internal policies of King Saud (personal extravagance and modernization of the kingdom) and his external policies, as oil made the KSA the main point of international interests and made it influential within the international community. The alliance between the KSA and the USA resulted in the animosity of the KSA toward Narcissism, socialism, communism. We trace as well how external and internal policies of King Saud helped to escalate the opposition movements and to direct them to socialism. And lastly, we outline Al-Saeed and his life, opposition movement, demands voiced by him, and analysis of his discourse in terms of political, religious, and intellectual aspects, and how his opposition movement influenced the inside of the KSA. His opposition movement was not a Wahabi one; yet, we trace it here because it is could not be overlooked and as it led to Wahabi opposition movements after it, such as the one by Juhayman Al-Otaybi.

Firstly: the historical background of the Sunnite opposition movement of Nasser Al-Saeed during the reign of King Saud:

Oil as the most influential factor in policies of King Saud and in the opposition movement:

(A) Development of oil production during the reign of King Saud:

Abdul-Aziz witnessed during his lifetime the huge leaps in the KSA annual national income derived from oil revenues. It was 200.000 $ before World War I, 10 million $ shortly before World War II, 60 million $ in 1948, and 160 million $ in 1952. In 1953, when Abdul-Aziz died, it reached 250 million $, and the KSA revenues in general reached the total sum of 757 million SR, from which 90% came from oil revenues (1). Despite the extravagance and huge spending of King Saud, resulting in financial troubles that led to his dethronement, the KSA national income in the last year of his reign reached the total sum of 500 million $ (2). Such sums influenced the era and policies of King Saud; oil was the real factor influencing the opposition movements that emerged later on.

(B) Oil and the affluence of King Saud:

Until 1959, when the very first state oil-based budget appeared in the KSA, there was no clear distinction or barrier between the State money and that of the royal family. Abdul-Aziz used to consider the State money as his personal property spent on ameliorating conditions of the KSA in the way that pleased him; in just the same way caliphs did during the Middle Ages. Within the modernization process of the KSA, the Finance Ministry was established to undertake the management of the State money and to differentiate the money allotted for the royal family and the throne and the finance of the State. In the 1958:1959 budget, the Saudi throne and the royal family received 17 % of the budget for its expenditure as well as 19% within 'other expenditure' as per the wishes of the king. Unlike his father King Abdul-Aziz, King Saud was a spendthrift, a squanderer, and a big spender, especially after oil revenues soared, and news of the affluence and extravagance of the royal palaces were much talked of as contradicting Wahabi and Salafist teachings and the Spartan living of the KSA before the discovery of oil (3). King Saud spent in building a new city named Al-Nasseriyya, an eight-square-kilometers city which included tens of palaces, the total sum of 8 million SR, and when he felt that the designs of its palaces were old, he demolished the city and rebuilt it spending 850 million SR, a sum that included 43 million SR for municipality services. Al-Nasseriyya included schools for the princes – sons of King Saud – sports halls and courts, movie theaters, swimming pools, and all other luxuries that money could buy as well as American restaurants that prepare meals for King Saud and his sons in return of a monthly sum of 350 thousand $. American personnel used to supervise all facilities of Al-Nasseriyya. Al-Kharj Farms Project was established specially to provide Al-Nasseriyya with milk, butter, chickens, meat, and watermelons, and this project's costs reached the total sum of 27 million $, with chickens and cows imported specially from the USA to the project with the total sum of 20 million $ (4). Simultaneously, 300 Bedouins had their hands cut off by the governor of Al-Ahsa because they were so hungry that they stole, slaughtered, and ate two camels, and the governor fined them the total sum of 600 SR in return for the two stolen camels (5). In fact, King Saud followed the footsteps of his father, King Abdul-Aziz, in giving salaries to Bedouins, but these salaries were meager, measly stipends for ordinary Bedouins and large – to some extent – o the tribal leaders (6). This gap between poverty and extravagance and affluence inside royal palaces stirred the opposition movements against King Saud and directed them toward socialism and social justice, with references of Nasser Al-Saeed differed partially from those of the other communists and socialists, as Abdel-Nasser's Egypt spread the socialist ideology.

(C) Oil and modernization of the KSA:

The discovery of oil and its subsequent economy and revenues in the KSA led to the establishment of complicated administrational hierarchies, unlike the simple administration during the reign of King Abdul-Aziz. Until 1951, there were three ministries only with simple management staff: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, established in 1930, Ministry of Finance, established in 1932, and Ministry of Defense, established in 1946. Complicated ministerial affairs grew as Ministries of Education, Agriculture, Transport, Trade, and Industry between 1951 and 1954. Six ministries were added along with three State Ministers without ministerial portfolios between 1960 and 1962. Independent departments and bureaus of State management and administration as well as ministerial councils and governmental public agencies were established in the 1960s for railways, airports, mining, oil, etc. (7). This modernization of the KSA led to four main results as follows.

1- Marginalization the role of Wahabi scholars: The Najd clergymen were more extremist and influential that their peers elsewhere in the KSA, especially in Hejaz, a region more open to the outside world and its modern age. Hence, Salafist education was dominant in Najd in contrast to the secular one that dominated Hejaz even before its conquest by Abdul-Aziz. Both clergymen of Hejaz and Najd were under the control of the Saudi authorities that had to strike a balance between modernization and the Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalism typical of Najd. Naturally, modernization adopted by the Saudi authorities had its influence over the power and authority inherited and enjoyed by the Wahabi scholars especially in Najd and Riyadh, the Saudi capital that aimed under the auspices of King Saud to be a modern capital. Because of administrational and hierarchical complications within public and social services as well as municipalities and religious organizations led to the marginalization of the role of clergymen in all aspects; for instance, there were few members in all religious originations or councils who were clergymen. Scholars no longer had any influence or control in managing religious endowments, religious schools, and Ministry of Education. Besides, education curricula were no longer confined to religious subjects; as modern sciences were included despite Wahabi scholars' vehement opposition. Even in courts and within judges, oil revenues and expansion of public services led to the exclusion of clergymen from courts and the posts of judges, as they could not cope with new problems, disputes, and cases especially related to foreigners. Abdul-Aziz used to deal with such cases himself until the 1930s, and he no longer could go on undertaking this mission. Religious courts could not deal with criminal laws and civil suits as well as complicated disputes resulting from oil companies. Abdul-Aziz had to specify certain courts for such matters and to employ experts, who received secular education, to deal with them, like trade disputes settlement departments, cheating cases committees, and supervision councils. Such entities were annexed to the Saudi judicial system, while including only two Wahabi scholars to represent sharia (8).

2- Subjugation of Wahabi scholars to the Saudi State: Within policies of modernization and development, the Saudi authorities had to fully control all clergymen and to employ them within the following councils and committees: ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'', religious researches, fatwas issuing, supervision of girls' education, the Wahabi call, and the supervision of mosques and religious endowments. The committee for ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'' has been the oldest Saudi authority, since it began in 1903, founded by Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdul-Latif Al-Sheikh in Riyadh after its conquest by Abdul-Aziz. This committee expanded along with territories annexed by Abdul-Aziz in Arabia until it reached Hejaz, where Mecca and Yathreb are, and its supreme management was always in the hands of one of sons of Al-Sheikh family, who would receive instructions by Abdul-Aziz. Members of this committee had no certain defined missions; at first, their authority covered supervision of all mosques, markets, streets, routes, and cities to make sure everyone adhered to the dress code and growing beards as per Sunnite Wahabi traditions. Yet, after the conquest of Hejaz, a region culturally open to the outside world, the committee had to lessen the number of its missions. Later on, this led to the emergence of the opposition movements against Abdul-Aziz, and he had to issue a royal decree in 1930 to include the committee to supervision panels of the police forces, while depriving its members from the power of arresting people; their mission was confined to report to the police about 'sinners'. Hence, their role turned into bureaucratic supervisory one, confined later on to urge people to perform prayers on time, s their previous missions were undertaken by Ministries of Health, Interior, Finance, Agriculture, Justice, etc. as well as municipalities (9). The marginalization of their role was linked to turning them into ordinary employees with certain missions that could not allow them to transgress their limits so as not to get fired. The same goes for the bodies of the Wahabi call, fatwas issuing, researches, guidance, etc. that became independent ones under the control of the king directly as well as the Prime Minister. Their additional mission was to confirm the spread of Wahabism inside the KSA and to spread it outside the KSA. Hence, no religious scholars had any voice within the opposition movements against King Saud, and even the Salafist opposition movement of Juhayman Al-Otaybi criticized harshly the scholars working in governmental entities and he used to call scholars of the Saudi authorities as scholars of certificates, who never dared to contradict the authorities and were eager to please the king instead of being loyal to the Wahabi call he adopted. Hence, opposition movements against King Saud never included clergymen, because they were busy vying with new competitors: the secular experts required by the Saudi state to help modernize and develop it.

3- Creating secular and civil competitors to Wahabi scholars: The reign of King Saud witnessed the emergence of civil, secular elite of experts of all specializations that vied with the religious elite in the field of being employed by the Saudi State. This civil, secular elite group emerged via the secular education that began formally in 1952 when Abdul-Aziz established the General Administration of Education in spite of the vehement opposition of the Wahabi scholars. This administration metamorphosed into the Ministry of Education in 1953, headed by Prince Fahd, with departments to train teachers in all fields and stages as well as sending brilliant students to study abroad in foreign universities. Two faculties of Sharia and Teachers were established in Mecca, and King Saud built schools for girls' education, as the education sector's expenditure reached 168.8 million SR in the fiscal year 1960:1961. In spite of the vehement opposition of the Wahabi scholars, girls' schools spread since 1960 after the Saudi State recognized the right of women to get educated in 1959. Universities for young women were built in 1960:1961, annexed at first to Riyadh University, and their number increased later on. In 1957, the King Saud University and the Abdul-Aziz University were built in Riyadh as well, including in later years faculties of petroleum and mining and so on. A new different generation graduated from such universities, differing a lot from the mentalities of their fathers and the traditional religious mindset. This generation found employment in all administrations of the Saudi State, playing a great role in modernizing the KSA, and many reached high positions and formed the secular elite that influenced the era of King Saud. Even secular ministers were appointed along with princes between 1954 and 1985, and their number increased in 1960 when King Saud appointed five ministers outside the royal family, including four who graduated from Cairo University, and the fifth one from Texas University who became the Oil Minister; all of them were in their thirties of age. Hence, secular ones had greater role in governmental posts, except in national guards and religious bodies. Competition grew fierce between Salafist/Wahabi clergymen and secular laymen in the field of State administration. Secular ones wanted to apply reforms and social, political, and economic developments, while clergymen wanted to assert the religious imprint in everything. King Saud was the one to strike a balance within such a conflict between the two trends so as to enable the KSA to preserve Wahabism and to cope with changing conditions and circumstances (10). Yet, policies of King Saud did not ameliorate the conditions of poorer classes. While the Wahabi/Salafist elite kept busy competing with the secular elite to retain interests and gains of scholars, opposition movements came from secular ones who were influenced with the socialist ideology who perceived the urgent need for reform to ameliorate the conditions of poorer classes.

4- Disregarding social reform and modernization of the infrastructure: Echoes of reform and modernization never reached dwellers of villages and desert Bedouins and tribesmen who were still living in the tedium of traditions, but some of them perceived the new changed and demanded to have their share of modernization. Some demands turned into opposition movements as many tribesmen felt they must take revenge from the Al-Saud family. This was what happened to Nasser Al-Saeed, who was born in Hael. Aramco company played a big role in modernizing the Saudi society via modern education. The very first primary school for teaching adults was built in 1940, and brilliant students sent abroad to get university degrees in Europe and the USA knew the signs of scientific advances and progress, and came back to the KSA filled with new ideas related to duties and rights of citizens (11). Aramco suffered because of such results, especially when Al-Saeed delivered a speech before King Saud in Hael School on 11^th of Dec., 1953: (…In the Name of Almighty God, in the name of suffering workers, in the name of peasants who have fallen preys to usurers, in the name of scattered homeless Bedouins, and in the name of a great nation deprived of the light of knowledge for ages, may God grant you a long life, O Saud!…). We see here that Al-Saeed addresses King Saud as he was visiting Hael to make its people swear fealty to him, and he talked to him about the impecunious peasants, workers, and Bedouins, and he addressed the king thus: (…O Saud, did you take the trouble of this bumpy routes in order to enjoy your time or to make propaganda for yourself?…Within the hundreds of cities, villages, and desert areas, there are countless impoverished people begging for money…suffering poverty, illness, and the cursed ignorance…You could have travelled by a plane, but you chose the car, and I am inclined to think that you have come to see for yourself the suffering of your subjects…I presume that many cars of yours broke down in such bumpy roads…There are no paved routes, nor any remedies, cures, doctors, clear water, jobs, or even houses fit for humans…No doubt you spent your rest time in tents within every city you visited…including Hael, as you could not possibly reside in such poor houses of Hael…). This means that modernizing the KSA did not reach the vast majority of the subjects of King Saud who reigned from 1953 to 1964. Aramco that was part of furthering education and sending students abroad to learn and get university degrees had its scandals and was notorious for its dealings with workers. Raising awareness by education caused revolting workers to unite under the leadership of Al-Saeed, who said the following to King Saud about Aramco and the rebel workers: (…We, the workers, have been tortured and fired…Some of us have been imprisoned in groups behind barbed wires under scorching sun without food and water…When finally food was allowed to them, it was poisoned, O King Saud! 17 workers died of it and the rest were rescued by gastric lavage…The colonial company Aramco claimed that poisoning was not intentional, as kitchen cauldrons were not clean enough…This was not true…A Palestinian doctor asserted that poison was added and he can prove it by the samples he found…I can prove my assertions with evidence…) (12). In fact, Aramco was the axis of modernization, as oil revenues defined the Saudi policies outside and inside the KSA. Saudi oil represented to Gamal Abdul-Nasser as well as all socialists inside Egypt and inside the KSA as the center of American colonialism in the Middle East as oil made the KSA the focus of interest of the international community that influenced world events, shaped external policies of King Saud, and had its impact on socialist opposition movements inside the KSA.

(D) Oil influence on the foreign policy of King Saud:

We have given above an overview of the influence of Saudi oil (13) that led to stability enjoyed by King Saud to apply his internal and external policies especially his alliance with the USA. Yet, King Saud felt enmity and animosity with Egypt, after the Egyptian 1952 coup that metamorphosed into a full-fledged revolution and its leader, President Gamal Abdel-Nasser, who embraced socialism and joined the east camp declared his despise for King Saud. King Saud stood with the USA in the Cold War, and the Egyptian President stood with the USSR. Gamal Abdel-Nasser deepened enmity of King Saud as he quelled and imprisoned the terrorist MB members in Egypt, and most of the terrorist MB members fled to the KSA. Gamal Abdel-Nasser supported the opposition movement of Nasser Al-Saeed, whereas King Saud had nothing but to support the terrorist MB members who sought refuge in the KSA. We tackle below the Sunnite fundamentalist opposition movement of Al-Saeed that has a socialist tendency.

Footnotes:

1- Al-Yaseeni, ditto, pages 94 and 95.

2- Fouad Al-Ibrahimi, Arabian Peninsula Magazine, No. 16, May 1992, page 28.

3- Al-Yaseeni, ditto, pages 94 and 95.

4- Nasser Al-Saeed, ''Letter to King Saud''.

5- Nasser Al-Saeed, ''History of Al-Saud'', page 547.

6- ''The New Peninsula'' Newspaper, an article titled ''The Saudi State'', undated and with no address, a newspaper used to be issued by the Popular Democratic Party in 1970, in South Yemen.

7- Al-Yaseeni, ditto, pages 92, 93, 101, and 102.

8- Al-Yaseeni, ditto, pages 117, 119, 1120, and 121.

9- Al-Yaseeni, ditto, pages 104:109.

10- Al-Yaseeni, ditto, pages 123, 124, 153, 164, 165, 167, 169, 170, and 171.

Fouad Al-Ibrahimi, ditto, page 29.

11- Fouad Al-Ibrahimi, ditto, page 29.

12- Nasser Al-Saeed, ''History of Al-Saud'', pages 110:121.

13- Ahmed (Rifaat Sayed), "The Desert Saint", pages 19:23.

Secondly: the opposition movement of Nasser Al-Saeed: (his life – his struggle and demands – analysis of his ideological discourse within originality, contemporariness, and progressiveness – the influence of his opposition movement):

The life of Nasser Al-Saeed:

Before the Egyptian 1952 coup-turned-revolution and the emergence of Gamal Abdul-Nasser, Al-Saeed emerged as an opponent of the royal family of Al-Saud, driven by two factors: his upbringing and his despicable working conditions. He was born in Hael one year after it was conquered by Abdul-Aziz, i.e., in 1923. The violent animosity and deep-seated hatred of the people of Hael toward Abdul-Aziz led the people to call children born after the fall of Hael as ''children of the fall''. Even Al-Saeed has mentioned in his writings that his family felt sad when he was born as if they did not want any newborns after the fall of Hael into the hands of its enemies. Thus, Al-Saeed was brought up in a climate that fostered the hatred of Al-Saud family. His grandmother, Hasna Al-Saeed, used to gather women every Thursday night to deliver speeches to them about hating Al-Saud family and to urge the congregation to supplicate God to make the KSA collapse one day. Al-Saeed has mentioned in his writings the victims among his family members who died while defending Hael against the Saudi conquest: Abdulla Al-Eissa Al-Saeed, Eissa Al-Saeed, Suleiman Al-Saeed, and Fahd Al-Saeed. He has mentioned in his writings that he entered the prison cell as a child with his grandmother, as she was punished because she refused to accept alms money sent to her by the governor of Hael, Mousaid Ibn Jalawy, via one of his servants. The old grandmother gave severe beatings to the servant and she was got arrested at once. Before people of Hael managed to urge the governor to set her free, the governor set her free only after he verbally abused her in public before gathered people, in 1930.

The struggle of Nasser Al-Saeed:

Within such climate of hatred, Al-Saeed was brought up and when he became a young man, he joined Aramco as one of its workers. Soon enough, Al-Saeed gathered around himself a group of rebel workers on 17^th of Sept., 1947, to lead a demonstration, calling the day ''the Palestine Day'', in the city of Raheema, protesting the division of Palestine and demanding that the KSA would stop giving oil to the USA and GB. The Prince Turki readily tried to calm down the workers who joined the march, urging them to return to their work, and when Al-Saeed refused, the Prince had all of them arrested and carried to Saud Ibn Jalawy, governor of Al-Ahsa, who set them all free later on. In the same year, 1947, Aramco issued a legal statute of to regulate work and workers, giving work permits and prohibits founding syndicates or workers' unions. Al-Saeed formed in 1952 a committee that represented workers to demand their rights. Members of that committee were arrested but were set free because the rest of workers went on a strike in Oct., 1952, to protest the arrest of the committee. Aramco suffered great losses as a result, and after setting the committee members free, Al-Saeed was banished to Hael. He returned to work in 1953 when workers pressed Aramco. Soon enough, Al-Saeed led the biggest strike led by the committee members that managed to convince 6500 workers in Al-Dhahran city to go on a strike, demanding more social services, salaries raise, and the right to form a syndicate. They submitted a request to the Crown Prince, but he rejected their demands, ordered the arrest of Al-Saeed and the committee members, and formed a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter. The arrest of Al-Saeed among others led 13000 Aramco workers to go on a strike in Al-Dhahran and other cities, declaring that they would die for their rights. The Saudi authorities had to send armed forced in the Easter Region. The Crown Prince ordered workers to return to work, threatening those who disobey that they would get fired. Workers ignored his threats, and he ordered the arrest of some of them, but had to revoke his orders, and he ordered the release of Al-Saeed and all the arrested workers from Al-Ahsa prison, after forcing Al-Saeed to sign a paper to assert that he would not leave Hael. Aramco had to introduce reform; it gave workers financial aid for food and clothes, build a school for sons of workers, lessened the working hours, and formed a committee to receive all complaints of workers to deliver them to the management. Meanwhile, Al-Saeed in Hael knew that Abdul-Aziz died and that King Saud was heading to Hael among other regions to make people swear fealty to him, and he delivered a speech about demands of the people that infuriated King Saud to the extent that he wanted to have him killed, but had to reconsider such an idea. Later on, Aramco workers forced the company to have Al-Saeed again as worker, who caused more trouble as usual. In 1956, Al-Saeed adopted an embraced Nasserism and socialism of Egypt, and he managed to convince workers to go on a strike to call for political demands of reform. King Saud arrested Al-Saeed and some other leaders of that strike, issuing a royal decree on 11^th of June, 1956, that incriminated all types of strikes, on the pain of imprisonment. King Saud secretly planned to have Al-Saeed murdered, but one of the royal guards, a friend of Al-Saeed, warned Al-Saeed, who fled hastily to Beirut, Lebanon, and then to Damascus, Syria. Since his flight from the KSA, Al-Saeed remained a vociferous critic and opponent of the KSA and its royal family from outside, issuing and publishing statements and inciting sedition and rebellion. He formed a body he called ''Union of the People of Arabia'' with a Nasserist, Islamic tendency. After Syria broke its union with Egypt in 1961, Al-Saeed was chased by the Saudis and the Syrians, and he left Damascus to Beirut and then to Cairo, where he supervised the radio program ''Sound of Arab Nation'', which was anti-KSA and anti-separatists in Syria, and this program attacked the regressive Gulf monarchs. Another radio program of Al-Saeed in 1962 was titled ''Enemies of God'', which was anti-KSA. When the Yemen revolution broke out in 1962, Al-Saeed moved to Yemen, where he opened an office of opposition and supervised a radio program named ''Supporters of Satan''. He led as well the armed struggle within Yemeni borders. His political activism abruptly stopped after the 1967 war, as he was chased away from place to another when Abdel-Nasser and King Feisal normalized relations between Egypt and the KSA. Al-Saeed had to move secretly between Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. After King Feisal was assassinated, his successor, King Khaled, issued a general pardon of all political and opposition figures self-exiled to avoid the Saudi prisons, and all such figures returned home to the KSA with the exception of Al-Saeed. When troubles stirred again in the oil-rich Eastern region in November 1977 and Juhayman Al-Otaybi occupied the Kaaba Mosque in the same year, Al-Saeed left his home in Damascus and went to Beirut to attack the KSA in the media, newspapers, and news agencies. Al-Saeed 'disappeared' suddenly and was seen for the last time on 7^th Dec., 1977, and his end remains mysterious (14), but some rumors spread about some Palestinian factions in Beirut kidnaping him and sending him to the KSA, where he was tortured and put to death.

Footnotes:

About Nasser Al-Saeed and his life

14- Nasser Al-Saeed, ''History of Al-Saud'', pages 97, 98, 99, 104, 105, and 716:720.

Ahmed (Sayed Rifaat), ditto, pages 48:88.

Al-Yaseeni, ditto, pages 178:180 and 190.

The demands of Nasser Al-Saeed:

Demands that Al-Saeed struggled to attain were included in the speech he delivered to King Saud, mentioned in his book titled ''History of Al-Saud'' (15). Al-Saeed later on explained his demands in detail within a letter he sent to King Saud in 1958 from Cairo. His demands were as follows.

1) The establishment of a free parliament or a people's assembly that would represent the nation.

2) After parliamentary elections, members of this parliament would formulate a modern constitution based on the Quran and the Sunna and the soul of justice derived from the Quran, including the rights of the nation, specifying the missions of the judiciary, legislative, and executive authorities.

3) The parliament must issue laws to stop slavery and its trade in the KSA, and preventing cutting off of hands and legs as well as flogging of citizens, while asserting freedom of the press, religious freedom, freedom of expression, and freedom of holding meetings and gatherings. Laws should be issued about obligatory education for males and female in the KSA, with obligatory military service. Torture in prisons must be banned, and no one should have the right to annul the Saudi nationality from any citizen. Zakat alms and money must not be collected from the poor among peasants and Bedouins. Other laws must be issued related to amelioration of working conditions and to ensure workers' rights, with the right to allow them to form unions and syndicates to voice their demands to the Saudi government, while annulling the unjust statutes of Aramco. Courts of workers' cases must be formed, while Saudi workers must be made on equal footing with foreign ones, especially American ones, with laws preventing firing workers for no reason, while giving them paid holidays. Other laws must be issued related to amelioration of the despicable conditions of peasants by applying agricultural reforms, lowering customs, taxes, and fees, and introducing economic reforms. The parliament must issue laws related to facing the authority of Aramco and the USA, like the one about banning the building of American military bases in the KSA, and to annul the royal decree no. 223/2/2639 issued in 1357 A.H. about giving Aramco leeway to control workers and commit injustices against them, while forcing Aramco to pay compensations for its workers and victims.

4) Legislative reforms must be followed with social and economic reforms for the sake of workers and to modernize the rudimentary regions in the KSA; paved routes must be built to ease transportation, workers must have clean, healthy housing, and heavy industries of mining should be introduced to male Bedouins work in them, as they represent 60% of the Saudi population. Peasants require an elevated standard of living and the State must care for their agriculture and protect their produce against greedy usurers, Agricultural banks must be established to give the peasants loans and guidance and to import machines and agricultural experts for them. All Bedouin lands must be reclaimed and distribute among them to turn them into peasants. All workers unjustly fired must return to their work in Aramco.

5) Al-Saeed within such above-mentioned demands urged the human development of Saudi citizens to civilize all society, especially Bedouins via education and work and dignity. That was why he urged the education of all girls and to make military service obligatory to make all citizens be able to defend their homeland as a religious and national duty, and he insisted that Prophet Muhammad urged the education of all Muslims, males and females. He repeats in his letter that education curricula and programs must reach all regions in the KSA with removal of all obstacles, while sending more students to study abroad in all fields and establishing girls' schools. He demanded the raising of the cultural and social awareness among policemen, while urging the education of prisoners to cultivate and refine them. He demanded the immediate release of the political prisoners who must retrieve their jobs and be compensated along with families of those killed in prisons, and all this would lead to human development.

6) Human development is linked to legislative, social, political, and economic reforms and to combating corruption caused by the American colonialism and its agents inside the KSA, as per words of Al-Saeed. He urged the ban of what he called espionage bureaus of the USA in the KSA that spied on the Saudi citizens and army, as such bureaus were run by the American agents and Saudi agents working for the USA against their nation. Al-Saeed mentions their names and locations, and he demanded the expatriation of Pakistanis and other foreigners he called ''enemies of Arabs'' employed by Aramco. Al-Saeed links ending corruption to preserving wealth of the Saudi citizens and making budgets of expenditures and revenues well known to the people in order to build more new projects and cities in the KSA. Al-Saeed urged to put an end to royal extravagance for carnal lusts and appetites, building sumptuous palaces, and importing luxurious items like fancy cars and apparatuses etc., in order to allot more money for charity instead of gifts, bribes, commissions, royal journeys abroad, where the royal family members would spend millions without restraints. Within another part of his letter, Al-Saeed demands the removing of all traitors, spies, mercenaries, ignoramuses, and thieves from all governmental posts as they stole money of the Saudi nation, and they must be fired regardless of their being relatives of Al-Saud, and their ill-gotten money confiscated to be returned to the Saudi treasury for the sake of all citizens and workers who request facilities and other services. Such sums of money will solve problems of the needy, the beggars, and the handicapped who could not work, especially those who had their hands and legs cut off as well as victims of floods and fires. Thus, Al-Saeed demanded the annulment of the committee, managed by Al-Sheikh family, for ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'' as such committee did not do their sharia duties; rather, they serve Al-Saud royal family in controlling and restricting freedoms of citizens; this influence exerted by Al-Sheikh family was deemed by Al-Saeed as religious tyranny shamefully and falsely attributed to Islam which was manipulated and misused to serve their purposes and to harm the Saudi citizens. For Al-Saeed, this committee ''promoted vice and prevented virtue'', and its members should be distributed to other jobs to serve the people as the Saudi citizens did not need guidance from corrupt groups.

7) Of course, disbanding the committee for ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'' was linked to secular reforms and vision of Al-Saeed related to education of women and girls and the annulment of slavery and the stop of corporal punishments of flogging, etc. At the time, there were about 600.000 male and female slaves inside the KSA. Another demand of Al-Saeed was religious freedom for Shiites to perform their rituals as fellow equal citizens, as hateful sectarianism must be banned. This was linked to notions of Al-Saeed about freedom of thought and expression, especially in his demands to release of all political prisoners. He even urged that persons of the committee for ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'' should be given other useful jobs, so as not to remain jobless; their rights included being employed elsewhere.

8) Al-Saeed did not concentrate only on internal reforms; rather, he focused as well on reforms concerning the external policies of the KSA; he demanded that the KSA must end its dependency on the USA by embracing positive neutrality and joining the caravan of Arab liberation led by Gamal Adel-Nasser. Al-Saeed demanded that the KSA must not meddle in the affairs of other countries and to avoid the cursed principle of Eisenhower, the USA president, and that the KSA must have the right to deal with other countries in terms of the political and economic aspects, such as the USSR, China, and all counties in the communist camp, regardless of its ruling regimes, while preserving the sovereignty and independence of the KSA.

Footnotes:

15- Nasser Al-Saeed, ''History of Al-Saud'', pages 110:121.

Analysis of the ideological discourse of Nasser Al-Saeed: a general overview of his writings:

Al-Saeed in his book titled ''History of Al-Saud'' adopts a unilateral vision that saw no good at all in the history of the royal family, and we could not quote his views on Abdul-Aziz unless when other historians share the same items. We have noticed how Al-Saeed was partial and biased and was not very honest in interpreting and narrating many historical events. The discourse of Al-Saeed was oratory and pompous, filled with verbal abuse and coarse language; his book seemed to be a long letter of anti-Al-Saud propaganda. He used to mention all names of people involved in any event within his personal history an relations with them, and no evidence is found to give credit to all of his assertions about his contemporaries. Thus, readers may believe or disbelieve in such assertions, and this applies to his discourse in general and to his speech delivered to King Saud that resulted in strikes and rebellions in Aramco that had to satisfy its workers. Yet, a 1960s Hollywood movie was produced about such workers' revolts, starring Yul Brynner. This means that Al-Saeed forced his presence in the history of the KSA in the 1950s and the 1960s as a combatant who suffered exile because of his views until his mysterious disappearance in Beirut during the movement of Juhayman Al-Otaybi. Regardless of our reserve about his book about written in the form of semi-autobiography, we tend to think that his demands of reform were natural, just, and truthful, not merely because he suffered incarceration, exile, torture, and being put to death because of his views, but also because of his adherence to his stances and faithful to his principles while others deserted all their demands to return to the KSA and made peace with the Saudi authorities when King Khaled issued a general pardon for them after King Feisal was assassinated.

Analysis of the ideological discourse of Nasser Al-Saeed within originality, contemporariness, and progressiveness:

Originality of Al-Saeed is embodied in the fact that he derived his intellectual and political visions from a traditional view of Islam and the so-called Sunna away from Wahabi extremism. Thus, his fundamentalism, in the roots of his thought in taking from traditions what suited his age, was coupled with contemporariness of outside ideas of the cultural climate of his age. His religious innovative thinking was unprecedented at the time and even secular ones in the KSA never came out with such visions. Let us focus below on that topic in detail.

Religious fundamentalism in the vision of Nasser Al-Saeed:

The fundamentalist aspect of Al-Saeed is exemplified in his discourse, diction, not only in religious innovative thinking. His way of addressing King Saud in Hael shows this; he addressed him using his name without honorifics, justifying his attitude using religious reasons: (…O Saud Ibn Abdul-Aziz, allow me to use your name without any royal honorifics, unpleasant to God the Only Eternal King, Who dislikes injustice to people…). This was a new way to address kings, making Al-Saeed seemed crazy or so bold as to deserve to die by orders of a brutal, unjust king. He was right to think that honorifics and glorification are for God alone. In his address, Al-Saeed quotes many Quranic verses and many of the so-called hadiths and purported history of Muhammad and some pre-Umayyad caliphs, in order to assert his political demands and reformatory vision. For instance, when he talked about abolition of slavery in the KSA, we see he never resorted to Wahabi jurisprudence and ancient scholars views on the subject: (…The parliament to be elected must abolish slavery, for it is a shameful crime no longer exists in free countries, may God grant you long life, O Saud!…). Al-Saeed quoted the Quran to warn King Saud against consequences of injustice: "…those who perish would perish by clear evidence, and those who survive would survive by clear evidence…" (8:42). "And that the human being attains only what he strives for. And that his efforts will be witnessed. Then he will be rewarded for it the fullest reward." (53:39-41). "…and peace be upon him who follows guidance." (20:47). This last verse used frequently by Sunnites to warn and preach, and Al-Saeed used stories of the prophets in the Quran as well as history of previous reformers to warn King Saud against injustice, and how kings in history who used religions in a bad way lost everything eventually. Al-Saeed asserted that Islam has nothing to do with injustices perpetrated in its name, asserting Islamic Shura (consultation) principle and that Islam seems to favor republics and not kingdoms as a rule/regime, and he criticized the affluence, extravagance, and the luxurious lifestyle of the royal family, quoting the events of asceticism of earliest caliphs. Al-Saeed boldly said that the Saudi cooperation with the USA was a betrayal against the Saudi nation and against Islam, and he quoted hadiths and verses calling for justice and equality of both genders and all citizens, urging not to make creeds interfere in political games. Thus, Al-Saeed presented innovative religious reasoning and notions though he was a socialist and civil thinker in the first place. This unprecedented way of thinking never came from clergymen of Wahabism who worshipped ancestors and ancient books and tomes of the past centuries. They never realized that the modern, new age brought new conditions and circumstances that entailed new and innovative religious thinking. Thus, the Saudi authorities had to employ civil and secular employees and experts in all sectors as we have explained earlier. This proves that scholars could no longer cope with modern problems in the judicial system, educational system, etc. Hence, Al-Saeed, an ordinary Muslim, managed to perceive the higher values of the Quranic sharia, especially justice, the Supreme values in the Quran, and used them to judge circumstances and conditions of his society, urging a peaceful change or reform to ameliorate such despicable conditions of the impecunious and the wronged ones. Thus, Al-Saeed was flexible enough in his mental framework by inking Islam to socialism, within a vision to improve the lives of the Saudi lower classes that suffered ignorance, illnesses, poverty, and injustice. By the way, Al-Saeed never quoted Ibn Abdul-Wahab, Ibn Taymiyya, or Ibn Hanbal; on the contrary, he refused such Wahabi ideology, especially related to corporeal punishments for the poor, never applied to the filthily rich big thieves. This was against the Islamic justice asserted by tens of Quranic verses and the so-called biography of Prophet Muhammad. Thus, Al-Saeed did not delve deep into the labyrinth of Sunnite jurisprudence typical of the Middle Ages; rather, he linked his socialist call for justice to Islamic value of justice and charity, advocated by all prophets of God, and he asserted that this must be the basis of the KSA constitution to be written later on as soon as possible. Prophets of God, as per views of Al-Saeed, were messengers of justice, freedom, and higher values and principles; real religiousness must lead to justice on all levels. With the final words of his addressing King Saud, we read the following as he wish a better future for the KSA: (…The Saudi paradise of the near future must be about prosperity for all, justice for all, freedom for all, and work for all, under the supreme value of justice…Injustice will lead to the collapse of the KSA…The crime of cutting off hands and legs is done to poor workers and peasants as well as the homeless and the jobless, who are hungry and impecunious…ironically, such Quranic punishments fit for the filthily rich ones who are thieves turned into governors, rulers, and high officials…). Hence, Al-Saeed was against the misuse of the Quranic sharia laws: (…And flogging as a punishment must be stopped and so is torture in prisons…Prisons must be turned into schools to rectify the prisoners, who received fair trials in courts, to allow them to be good citizens in the future). At the same time, Al-Saeed urged not to take alms and zakat from the poor and impecunious among villagers and Bedouins who could not face corruptions. Al-Saeed called for equal treatment of foreign workers and Saudi workers inside the KSA if they had the same job and rank. Thus, Al-Saeed took into his consideration the reality and real-life facts, with a vision aiming for a better future based on freedom, dignity, and equality, and justice, and that was why he urged recruiting women into the army like men and to educate all women and girls, so as to allow them to defend their homeland. Realistic views of Al-Saeed included his call for the abolition of the committee for ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'' as it appeared to be useless and lost its purpose and it began to restrict citizens for no reason. The vice that must be fought was affluence, extravagance, and luxurious living of the royal family as well as slavery, injustices, and corruption, while virtue that must be promoted was to curb the USA and Aramco from crushing Saudi dignity by its agents and spies and to introduce reforms on all levels within Islamic higher values found in the Quran. As for wealth and revolts, we give two examples of political and religious issues Al-Saeed dealt with within creative, innovative thinking under the topic of wealth and revolts. Did Al-Saeed propose armed rebellion to change Saudi regime by force? Or did he want to do this via a peaceful call? Did Al-Saeed propose within socialism to distribute oil wealth within a Red Revolt typical of the cultural climate at the time? Let us begin with his views about armed rebellions; when he got out of prison to find King Saud coming to Hael to make its people, haters of Al-Saud royal family, swear fealty to him, and while some obsequious hypocrites did so while celebrating the coming of the new king to them, he boldly faced the new king with demands and requests of the nation, and he writes in his book that King Saud was infuriated and left Hael while asserting that celebrations of Hael were good except that Al-Saeed got on his nerves. Al-Saeed dared to tell him that his reign would never be a happy one unless he would apply justice and reforms on all levels so that the people would give him legitimacy and trust, not mere swearing of fealty done out of fear or bought with money and gifts like some master buying slaves: (…Trust is given by people to a ruler in accordance with good manners and history of the ruler worthy of trust as well as the belief of the ruler in higher human values, especially justice, brought by prophets of God…). Al-Saeed enumerated then in his delivered speech the demands of the nation that included citizens ruling themselves by themselves within Shura councils or in the parliament, based on the declaration of human rights, as rulers must not let down or betray their citizens. In his letter later on addressed to King Saud, criticizing his external and internal policies and demanding constitutional rule of a king leaving most of responsibilities to a chosen Prime Minister and his government, within a freely elected parliament, Al-Saeed reminds the king of his speech addressed to him in Hael, urging him to apply all the proposed ideas. Hence, Al-Saeed never called for armed revolt or rebellion to change the Saudi regime by force, despite his suffering in Saudi prison cells and his exile and feelings of being chased and threatened from one Arab capital to the other. He insisted all his life on the peaceful nature of his call and demands to change the Saudi regime for the better to make it more democratic and just within peaceful means. Hence, he never called for removing the Al-Saud family from the throne. Al-Saeed wanted fealty to be transformed into trust and love given by the people to their rulers, so as to make people the source of power and authority by choosing themselves their rulers as per their faith, morals, ethics, and belief in the supreme values mentioned above. This was a great Islamic innovative thinking derived from the Quran by Al-Saeed, as he saw Islamic Shura (consultation) ordered by God to Muhammad: "It is by of grace from God that you were gentle with them. Had you been harsh, hardhearted, they would have dispersed from around you. So pardon them, and ask forgiveness for them, and consult them in the conduct of affairs. And when you make a decision, put your trust in God; God loves the trusting." (3:159). Hence, people of Yathreb were the source of power and authority of Muhammad as their ruler who helped him to reengage into self-defense wars against the Qorayish aggressors and persecutors. "And He, God, united their hearts. Had you spent everything on earth, you would not have united their hearts, but God united them together. He is Mighty and Wise." (8:63). Hence, Al-Saeed and his vision of Islamic Shura principle drew the attention of a true, often-forgotten Islamic fact overlooked by all Wahabi scholars, asserting that Islam is against monarchy and for republic system of people choosing their rulers and representatives in the parliament, with the ability to question and hold responsible anyone within equality of people in duties and rights; it is against Islam to make one family confiscates all power, wealth, and authority without the nation sharing some of them as well. Hence, Al-Saeed rejected the notion of using force or armed resistance; he called for a white revolution to change peacefully everything for the better: (…the ailments of poverty, ignorance, illnesses, and injustices must be cured by a revolution, and we demand from you, O Saud, to undertake this revolution…). Hence, he wanted the king to remain enthroned but to undertake the necessary reforms on all levels. This was his notion of a revolution for the sake of the people that would make the KSA paradise on earth with equal distribution of wealth and justice for all. Al-Saeed quoted many religious texts to prove that Islam is against affluence and extravagance and injustices, and that it was no longer possible for a king to treat the treasury as his own personal money and his subjects as his own property. Al-Saeed wanted to purify governmental offices and sectors from big thieves whose ill-gotten money must be retrieved to the treasury of the State to serve people. That was why Al-Saeed hated Aramco as a colonial arm of the USA to deceive the Saudi people and steal their wealth while persecuting workers. Al-Saeed reminded King Saud that the poor had to have their equal share of the money of the treasury as per Quranic teachings; see 17:26, 8:141, 30:38, 51:19, 4:5, and 70:24-25. Hence, Al-Saeed for us appears as a Sunnite fundamentalist figure with an enlightened vision that combined Islamic originality and contemporary viewpoints as well. Of course, contemporariness had the lion's share in his discourse, and it colored his reading of the Quran and the fundamentalist Sunnite views.

Contemporariness in the discourse of Nasser Al-Saeed:

The reign of King Saud was marked with trends of nationalism, communism, socialism, and Nasserism, especially that Egypt was the center of such cultural climate in the Arab world within the period 1955:1966. Al-Saeed coped with such trends within his innovative, creative Islamic vision of his enlightened mind, as he saw no contradiction between his religious Sunnite fundamentalism and his tendency toward socialism. He was biased toward workers, peasants, Bedouins, and the poor, persecuted ones in general and against affluence, extravagance and injustices, and thus, this suited his Islamic vision as well with no contradictions with socialist tendencies at all. Of course, within his discourse, radio programs, and writings, Al-Saeed used a style that appealed to the emotional response of hearers/readers within nationalistic vision addressed to the Saudi citizens, as we have read about his telling King Saud about the poisoning of workers of Aramco. That was why he was incarcerated many times during his struggle against Aramco, and the company tried to bribe him with a high-salary post, but he refused of course, and he refused before to take 500 SR as a gift before he would deliver his speech before King Saud within the Hael celebrations of his coming to it. Al-Saeed asserted his surprise at these sums given to hypocrites and flatterers, and he insisted that speeches, demands, and requests of people are not bought and sold, but executed and applied. He writes that he used to spend his salary on the workers' movement and would eat whatever workers gave him. Let us remember that Al-Saeed began his speech delivered to King Saud in a way combining his tendency to socialism and his religious nature. His diction of using terms like ''our Arabia'', ''our people'', ''our nation'', ''our country'', and ''our people'' asserts the notion that people are the source of power and authority of any rulers. He avoided using terms such as: ''the KSA'', ''the Saudis'', and ''the Saudi state'' as he disliked the notion of a royal family owning the lands and its inhabitants. Al-Saeed disliked very much the notion of one family confiscating power, wealth, and authority, and preserving for itself the right of annulling the nationality of any citizens. Al-Saeed believed in equal rights of all citizens, males or females, within the definition of citizenry, and that was why he called Shiites of Al-Ahsa his fellow citizens and brethren, in his demanding religious freedom for all and to abolish the hated sectarianism. Thus, Al-Saeed was a pioneer in Arabia in calling for citizenry rights and equality that transcends differences in creeds, tribes, and doctrines, and hence his asserting of the peaceful nature of his call. Despite his outspoken hatred of Al-Saud family in his book, he still considered the family members as part of the nation; he loathed the notion of civil wars and internecine strife, despite the cultural climate at the time that was filled with bloody revolutions, coups, military conflicts, etc. under banners of liberation from colonialism, imperialism, and regressive powers. Al-Saeed resented the fact that the USA built military bases in Saudi soil to serve American purposes, but he aimed at a white revolution led by King Saud himself, as he told him in his letter from Cairo and his earlier speech delivered in Hael. Al-Saeed took pride that Arabia is the cradle of Arabism and Islam, as he intertwined his nationalist feelings with Sunnite fundamentalism, as did Gamal Abdel-Nasser in Egypt. It is noteworthy that Al-Saeed preceded Abdel-Nasser in solidarity with Palestinians. In Cairo, Al-Saeed used to talk about ''our Arab nation'', and he supported Gamal Abdel-Nasser and the 1952 coup-turned-revolution that advocated socialism and Pan-Arabism and criticized regressive powers. It is noteworthy that Al-Saeed praised his grandmother imprisoned for her defiance and hatred of Al-Saud that she never accepted regressive people and never took money or financial aid from them, and thus, she was better than the stances of the Arab League in fighting colonial regressive powers (16). Within his Nasserism and Pan-Arabism, Al-Saeed hated Aramco ant its agents, especially Pakistanis, and he called the KSA to cut all relations with the capitalist USA and to turn to the communist, Eastern camp led by the USSR. This was akin to the fundamentalist Sunnite call of allying oneself to friends and to declare enmity toward foes. His call to King Saud to lead a white revolution stemmed from such Sunnite notion.

Progressiveness in the discourse of Nasser Al-Saeed:

What is meant by progressiveness here is that Al-Saeed preceded people of his age in Arabia and in all Arab countries, especially in the mindset of Wahabi scholars, in his innovative, creative thinking within Islam, as he introduced notions that need to be built upon and discussed, and in the call for the culture of citizenry. Arabs and Muslims until now suffer from the problems of the minorities of ethnic, religious, racial, and cultural groups. Al-Saeed preceded even the Pan-Arabism of Abdel-Nasser by calling the KSA to break with the USA and its monopoly. Al-Saeed called for human rights that were applied two decades after his death, in his call to abolish slavery from the KSA and to annul corporeal punishments as well as reforming prisons and to release political prisoners, while preserving the value of justice and dignity with all prisoners and to stop torturing prisoners. We read how Al-Saeed called for the political and religious freedoms as well as freedom of speech and expression in the media and especially the press. We assert certain points in his pioneer call for human rights:

1- Al-Saeed preceded the dominant climate in the KSA at the time in his call for the abolition of slavery; there were at the time 600000 male and female slaves in the KSA.

2- Al-Saeed preceded everyone in linking human rights to Islamic tenets and facts in the Quran, as per his views on corporal punishments. Until now (2000 A.D.), Saudi authorities are challenged by human rights societies in that respect. We discern the genius of Al-Saeed when we compare his notions to that of Dr. Al-Masaary, the Sunnite Saudi man who emerged 20 years after the mysterious disappearance of Al-Saeed. Dr. Al-Masaary, as well as his friends, speaks about human rights but denies it regarding his foes in creed, doctrine, and culture, rejecting certain human rights that do not go with Wahabi/Salafist mentality.

3- Arab cultural elite members focus on the rights of the cultural elite persons in terms of freedom of speech, thought, creed, and political participation – only if they were among those on the right of the ruling regime and authority. Arab cultural elite Leftist members, on the other hand, focus on amelioration of social and economic conditions and circumstances as the main human rights. Some other groups focus on rights of women and minorities. All this happens now in 2000-2001, in the 21^st century, and all groups vie in receiving financial aid from the West to their organizations or societies, whereas Al-Saeed who preceded them all never gained anything but being exiled, afraid, chased, hunted down, imprisoned, tortured, and killed. Al-Saeed was a real pioneer of drawing a complete, brief plan to apply human rights on all levels within the culture of citizenry and enlightened Islamic thought.

Footnotes:

16- Nasser Al-Saeed, ''History of Al-Saud'', pages 14, 19, 101, and 108.

The influence of the opposition movement of Nasser Al-Saeed:

The early beginnings of the struggle of Al-Saeed in Aramco and the consequent strikes and then his struggle inside and outside the KSA and forming an alliance with Gamal Abdel-Nasser made Al-Saeed stir the stagnant pools and influence others within three aspects as we detail below.

Firstly: the emergence of various types of opposition movements:

Military opposition movement:

Abdul-Rahman Al-Shamarany was a friend of Al-Saeed and supported his movement, and they got to know each other in 1957, and he was the one to notify Al-Saeed that King Saud planned to have him murdered, and Al-Saeed fled to Beirut. Al-Shamarany, one of the royal gourds in the KSA, confided to Al-Saeed that his rebellious nature was stirred when Palestine was lost and by impoverished citizens in the KSA, who were a majority. Other factors influencing Al-Shamarany were his meeting with leaders of the 1952 coup in Egypt, the Free Officers, and his personal meeting with Gamal Abdel-Nasser, as Al-Shamarany was the link between King Saud and the Egyptian President at the time. Al-Shamarany mentioned that he complained to Gamal Abdel-Nasser the despicable conditions of Saudi citizens, and the Egyptian President told him that there was no time to weep; the matter required much work and organization. Years later, Al-Shamarany organized rebel groups and was discovered and killed in 1958. Several officers and pilots were arrested at the time, accused of being members of a plot to assassinate King Saud. In 1962, six Saudi officers were arrested, accused of contacting the Free Princes, who were residing at the time in Cairo. Another plot to dethrone King Saud was discovered in 1969, and over 100 military figures were arrested.

The 'Free Princes' movement:

Al-Saeed mentions in his book that several princes of the royal family were influenced by his speech delivered to King Saud in Hael, and Prince Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Aziz declared his support for Al-Saeed to the people of Hael, and Al-Saeed was encouraged to visit this prince in his palace, along with other princes gathered to hear Al-Saeed. The Prince asked Al-Saeed to give him a report of the demands of the people and the army, and Al-Saeed did just that and kept a copy of the report to himself. The Prince promised Al-Saeed to deliver this report to King Saud, supporting it as much as he could to urge the King to apply recommendations of the report. Yet, Al-Saeed writes that those dreamy princes were seeking propaganda; those ''Free Princes'' were seeking to amuse themselves with sweet talk to appear as sympathizers with citizens and nationalists. Al-Saeed narrates that he met with the Prince Abdullah Feisal, the Interior Minister, and the Prince condemned the injustices done to workers of Aramco, urging Al-Saeed and his fellow workers to bend to the storm until his father, Feisal, would be enthroned as king. Strangely, Abdullah Feisal urged Al-Saeed and his men to try to assassinate King Saud! The Prince gave Al-Saeed the book written by Philby, telling him that a revolution was inevitable, but revolting men should differentiate between traitors and national ones like Feisal and his son Abdullah; this was their problem. Al-Saeed narrates also that he met with Prince Sultan, the Defense Minister, to give him a report of the demands of Aramco workers. In a car, Prince Sultan noticed the vast difference between places of princes and huts of the impoverished as something un-Islamic at all, and he gave moral support to Al-Saeed, telling him that King Saud would accuse any caller for justice of communism. When Al-Saeed urged Prince Sultan to make any reform himself, the latter told him that he could do nothing, as he was an ordinary man like Al-Saeed. Prince Sultan confided to Al-Saeed that he was blacklisted and nicknamed the Red Prince, as King Saud accused him of being a communist, and thus, he could not help Al-Saeed against Aramco. Hence, Al-Saeed considered the so-called Free Princes as a ploy or a way to kill time for their own pleasure. If we would believe Al-Saeed in that claim, we would conclude that Nasserism negatively influenced the Saudi throne and royal family; thus, the so-called Free Princes took precautions by claiming their support for socialism, as they feared the near future; their sweet words were empty ones to Al-Saeed. One of the so-called Free Princes told Al-Saeed once that the only solution to save the homeland was to cut off the heads of the royal family! Finally, Al-Saeed writes the following about the so-called Free Princes: (…They sought empty propaganda to be spread by the naïve citizens who would easily buy sweet, empty words about freedom, democracy, etc., as words were corrupt goods consumed by the dreamy impecunious ones to help them to have patience when they would hear sweet talk of the apparently sympathetic princes…). Al-Saeed asserts that Al-Saud family had no positive points at all; he ignored Prince Talal who headed the so-called Free Princes who were four princes that demanded in 1962 a constitution be written by a legislative council. The Prime Minister, Prince Feisal, refused such demand and tendered his resignation. King Saud appointed himself as a Prime Minister and made Prince Talal the Finance Minister, and others of the so-called Free Princes assumed other posts. King Saud had tensions with the so-called Free Princes who demanded a constitution to be written and pressed upon it. When Prince Talal criticized King Saud in public, he was fired from his ministerial post, and other of the so-called Free Princes tendered their resignation. Prince Talal gave up his title as a prince in 1966 and resided in Cairo, where Al-Saeed resided at the time as well. Prince Talal formed in Cairo a ''committee for the liberation of the KSA'' that never posed any real danger or threat to the Saudi regime, as it had no certain ideology or popularity anywhere. When Nasserism dwindled after the defeat of Egypt in the 1967 war, Prince Talal regained his title and returned to the KSA.

Opposition movements of the Leftist and nationalist activists (i.e., communists and Baathists):

The influence of Al-Saeed in the emergence of Leftist opposition movements in the KSA is undeniable, even of some of them were partially influenced by Leftist and nationalist revolts in Yemen, Iraq, and the Levant. Yet, Al-Saeed was the one to pave the way since the late 1940s and vociferously in the 1950s, and others followed his example inside the KSA. As for Baathists, they controlled Iraq and Syria and tried to spread their influence to Arabia. In 1958, a Saudi branch of the Baath Party was established, to be the biggest group of opposition in 1963. When Syrian and Iraqi Baathists separated in mid-1960s, most Saudi members tendered their resignation, and the rest joined either the Syrian or the Iraqi Baathists. Those supporting the Iraqi Baathists lived in Iraq, issuing a magazine called ''Saut Al-Taleea'' in 1978, influential among Saudis studying in the USA and Europe. They published booklets and studies that criticized Al-Saud royal family, without adopting a certain ideology. Those supporting the Syrian Baathists lived in Damascus, issuing a magazine called ''Saut Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia'' that voiced views of nationalists. As for the Popular Democratic Party, it was established in 1970, with Marxists and nationalists as its members, and it aimed at armed struggle to free the KSA and later on the Arab world from regressive powers; they modeled the thought school of Mao Zedong. This Party had its main headquarters in South Yemen, issuing a newspaper called ''Al-Jazeera Al-Jadida'', which was smuggled inside the KSA. Despite its radicalism, the Popular Democratic Party was disintegrated, and some former members formed the Popular Struggle Front in 1971, issuing a magazine called ''Al-Nidal'', and the Front had no other activities beyond this. The Popular Democratic Party was succeeded by another smaller party adopting Stalin-Lenin ideology. Another opposition movement called the Saudi Council for Peace and Solidarity was established, which issued a statement in 1977 in a local newspaper, asserting that King Fahd never achieved what he promised to do (i.e., writing a constitution, establishing a Shura Council, workers' syndicates, and a democratic liberal government, releasing some political prisoners, and nationalizing Saudi oil) after the assassination of King Feisal in 1975, and that King Fahd arrested more people and liquidated opposition figures in 1977. Another opposition movement called the National Liberation Front emerged in 1956 that included some communists and workers, but workers left it to form the National Reform Front. Communists aimed at hanging all features of life in the KSA to establish a regime that would reflect interests of the people, including writing a constitution that would assert democracy, workers' rights, and all political rights. Another aim was the struggle against imperialism, Zionism, regressive powers, American military bases, unjust military treaties, and unjust foreign concessions. Another aim was forming relations with the USSR and all socialist and communist countries. By 1975, the Front was re-christened ''The Saudi Arab Communist Party'', and it posed no threat at all to the Saudi authorities. Finally, the Leftist opposition movements deteriorated and dissolved; when King Khaled declared a general pardon after the assassination of King Feisal, he welcomed al exiled political figures to come back to their homeland. Most of them accepted and hurried back to swear allegiance to the Saudi regime and fealty to King Fahd. Many of them grew rich via working in investments, thus joining the manipulative, oppressive classes. Some of them denied their past communist history and persecuted workers under them until the Saudi authorities interfered! Some historians explain such return to the KSA and regression in thought instead of going on with struggle in exile with one reason: bad conditions of life in exile after the dwindling of Nasserism and Leftist ideologies, and their salaries as political asylees were meager, in the time when Saudi standard of living was raised. Communism fell out of favor and the extremist Right wings took over in many Arab countries. Of course, those political asylees could not give up luxurious life in air-conditioned hotels in exile during the apogee of the Leftist ideology in the 1950s and the 1960s; hence, when Nasserism ended, the Saudi and Wahabi influence gained momentum all over the Arab world, and they had better seize the chance of general pardon of King Fahd to return to the KSA and declare their ''repentance'' (17). It is noteworthy that there was a vast difference between the Wahabi Najd Brothers' opposition in the 1920s and that of leftists and nationalists in the 1950s and 1970s, except for Nasser Al-Saeed as a unique, prominent case; the Najd Brothers used to throw themselves into the embraces of death in hope of going to Paradise, as a way to get rid of the abject poverty and their despicable conditions, and thus, they raised arms against Abdul-Aziz while not caring to preserve their own lives. As for the next generations of affluent leftists and nationalists, they fled the KSA to serve other Arab tyrannical regimes not better than the Saudi tyranny, allowing themselves to be manipulated by such regimes against their foe: the KSA. Hence, when the support of such regimes lessened, such leftists and nationalists readily went back home to the KSA, forsaking all previous principles. The only one who kept loyal to his stances and principles was Al-Saeed; as he refused to return to the KSA and went on being outspoken and vociferous in his criticism of the Saudi regime in rare courage, without recklessness typical of the Najd Brothers, uniquely coupled with peaceful ideology and Islamic higher value of justice.

Secondly: the second influence of the opposition movement of Nasser Al-Saeed: King Saud dethroned and some reforms demanded by Nasser Al-Saeed took place:

The Saudi royal family felt the urgent need to avoid any popular discontent or revolt by transferring the executive powers of King Saud to Crown Prince Feisal (who became later King Feisal) in 1985, but King Saud retrieved such powers in 1960, while keeping the authority of the Crown Prince as it was. Later on, King Saud was dethroned and King Feisal was enthroned in 1964, and the latter had declared earlier in 1962 his reform program which was influenced by views of Al-Saeed, as Feisal said the following: (…This reform aims at establishing a unified system based on the sharia principles…And the Constitution will be imposed and written in accordance with the Quran, Sunna, and wisdom of earlier caliphs and Sunnite good ones among our ancestors, with clear points declared in relation with the basic principles of ruling and the relation between rulers and the people…). The points declared by King Feisal included the following: the Saudi State will follow Islamic sharia laws, a Constitution will be written and a Shura Council be formed, regional governments will be established all over the kingdom, the judicial system will be independent within an independent Ministry of Justice and a supreme judicial council comprising 20 secular members, media will be made Islamic with a focus on the Islamic call, reforms will be applied to the committee for ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'', introducing social solidarity to achieve welfare of citizens by controlling prices, financial aid will be specified to build more schools and for caring for students, social care and security will be reinforced, a working statute will be formulated to protect workers' rights, jobless ones will be trained and employed later on, new laws will be issued to promote investments, slavery will be abolished, and infrastructure will be improved (18). Of course, oil revenues allowed for the implementation of some of such promises by King Feisal, and Al-Saeed felt happy to see some of his demands realized while in his exile, despite the fact that attempts on his life never ceased. He lived to see King Saud dethroned and forced to seek asylum in Cairo, Egypt, to die there in 1969. Al-Saeed lived to see King Feisal assassinated in 1975, and went on in his writings and radio programs as well as issuing written statements, until he heard of the violent movement of Juhayman Al-Otaybi who occupied the Kaaba Mosque in 1979, and Al-Saeed had to get out of his hiding place to head to Beirut to voice his views on such wrong step, but as we have mentioned earlier, he disappeared in Beirut mysteriously.

Thirdly: the last influence of the opposition movement of Nasser Al-Saeed:

Before the mysterious end of Nasser Al-Saeed, he helped create the conditions that led to the emergence of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, as the Saudi authorities persecuted all Leftist and communist opposition movements, enlisting the aid of the Salafist/Wahabi trend. Thus, the balance between the Salafist and secular trends was lost, especially when Sadat, the Egyptian president, allied himself to King Feisal, and the terrorist MB exerted a strong influence all over Egypt and the Middle East. When the Salafist/Wahabi trend grew stronger, opposition movements sprang off it like that of Juhayman Al-Otaybi and Dr. Al-Masaary. This was the last influence of the opposition movement of Nasser Al-Saeed. The coming chapters will show the Salafist/Wahabi opposition movements of Juhayman Al-Otaybi and Dr. Al-Masaary.

Footnotes:

About other opposition movements:

17- Nasser Al-Saeed, ''History of Al-Saud'', pages 122, 123, 544, 547, 649, and 682:685.

Ahmed (Rifaat Sayed), ditto, pages 41:49, 58, 61, and 95.

Al-Yaseeni, ditto, pages 132 and 144:192.

18- Al-Yaseeni, ditto, pages 96, 165:167, and 174.

CHAPTER II: The Development of the Sunnite Fundamentalist Opposition Movement in the Reign of King F

CHAPTER II: The Development of the Sunnite Fundamentalist Opposition Movement in the Reign of King Feisal and King Khaled: Juhayman Al-Otaybi and the Invasion of the Kaaba Mosque

Introduction: between Nasser Al-Saeed and Juhayman Al-Otaybi:

Despite the huge difference between Al-Saeed and Al-Otaybi in terms of culture, the Sunnite fundamentalist trend, and the type of opposition movement, both men harbored a personal grudge against the KSA and a desire to wreak revenge on Abdul-Aziz. Al-Saeed sought to avenge his people who fought against Abdul-Aziz and resisted his invasion until they were defeated and Hael was conquered. He was born after the conquest of Hael and brought up amidst a milieu of a family bitterly hating Abdul-Aziz and seeking revenge. Grown up, Al-Saeed formed his own special peaceful opposition movement. Unlike Al-Saeed, Al-Otaybi was born within the tribe of Otaybah, whose tribesmen revolted against Abdul-Aziz, and his grandfather was among those rebels who died during the battle of Sabilla. Like Al-Saeed, Al-Otaybi lived within revenge-seeking people that made such environment of resentment reflected on his life and culture; Al-Otaybi imbued such hatred that colored his stance against the KSA, until he ended up invading the Kaaba Mosque in Mecca, calling for an awaited Mahdi named Al-Qahtany. There is another factor linking Al-Saeed and Al-Otaybi; the opposition movement of the former led to a climate that was the exact opposite of the one dominated during the reign of King Saud; i.e., the Salafist trend dominated the KSA under the auspices and supervision of King Feisal when he allied himself to Sadat against the secular, Leftist, and communist trends. When the Salafist ideology spread in both Egypt and the KSA, the resulting climate suited the emergence of the opposition movement of Al-Otaybi that began clandestinely and eventually led him to invade the Kaaba Mosque.

In this chapter about Al-Otaybi, we do the following.

A- We perform an analysis of policies adopted by King Feisal that were the direct result of the huge oil revenues and the increase in the KSA income after the 1973 War, as this was linked to international and regional changes in the cultural and political climate that led to the rise of the Salafist trend in the KSA and the Middle East.

B- We give a brief historical account on Al-Otaybi and his operation of invading the Kaaba Mosque and the repercussions and meanings of this invasion.

C- We analyze finally the ideology of Al-Otaybi within his letters and the main topics and issued discussed by him in his writings to discern his main ideas and his intellectual methodology in his call. We conclude that the main idea that Al-Otaybi revolved around was ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'', and through it, he formed his stance vis-à-vis the KSA, Shiites, foreigners residing in the KSA, and Wahabi scholars inside the KSA, especially Ibn Baz. Al-Otaybi used a certain Salafist school of thought or doctrine that has a special approach or view of the so-called hadiths, views of ancient Salafist Sunnite scholars (like Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Abdul-Wahab), and their interpretations in order to convince, refute, or embarrass his opponents and intellectual foes. His writings show his bias for the Najd Brothers, especially in their rebellion against King Abdul-Aziz, as well as his bias against King Abdul-Aziz.

Firstly: the climate in which Al-Otaybi and his movement emerged. Oil and the policies of King Feisal (1964:1975) and the rise of the Salafist trend:

A- Oil:

Oil was the main factor controlling everything during the reign of King Saud, influencing his policies, the international and regional conditions and circumstances, and the Saudi opposition movement that tended toward the Leftist trend. The opposition movement of Al-Saeed was colored with socialist tendency despite its religious roots. When King Feisal reached the throne, the Middle East region entered a new era; Nasserism dwindled in the Arab world since the 1967 War, and when Abdel-Nasser died, Sadat took over as president of Egypt and allied himself to King Feisal and fought against socialism and Leftist activists. This went on simultaneously with soaring oil prices after the 1973 War. King Feisal made use of the breakthrough in the income of the KSA to support and reinforce his internal and external policies resulting in the rise of the Salafist trend and authority to face the secular, Leftist opposition movement inside the KSA. The Wahabi Salafist trend churned later on the opposition movement of Al-Otaybi. The huge oil revenues aided King Feisal, and after his death, oil revenues directed the opposition movement of Al-Otaybi to be Salafist; hence, oil had the greatest influence on the opposition movements during the reign of King Saud, King Feisal, and King Khaled.

B-The influence of the Salafist trend on the policies of King Feisal:

King Feisal (106:1975) was a distinguished, outstanding personality among the sons of King Abdul-Aziz; he participated in his father's successful endeavors to found the KSA, ruled Hejaz once conquered as its governor, worked as a foreign minister, Prime Minister, Head of the Consultation Council, and was the de facto ruler of the KSA when King Saud faltered as a king and failed to rule properly. The main feature of the personality of King Feisal was that he combined the Salafist Sunnite fundamentalism and experience in international politics, which made him base his relation with the West on mutual interests. Within the last years of the reign of King Saud, there was a conflict between the Salafist elite and the secular one in governmental bodies. Previously, most of the Saudi opposition movements were secular and socialist, but once King Feisal was enthroned, he gathered all power and authority in his hands and declared his reformist program that was influenced by demands of Nasser Al-Saeed. No political reforms were applied during his reign; instead, social, economic, and educational reforms were adopted. As for the educational policies and reforms, King Feisal focused on religious education based only on Salafism / Wahabism, and he built many universities such as King Abdul-Aziz University, Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University in Riyadh, and King Feisal University in Al-Dammam and Al-Hufuf cities. Such universities give certificates in Islamic sharia studies and the same goes for the main Islamic University in Yathreb. During the reign of King Feisal, many Salafist Wahabi organizations and foundations emerged, chief among them the department of religious studies and researches and call, guidance, and fatwas centers as independent bodies subservient to Feisal as a Prime Minister, specializing in the spread of Wahabi ideology and distribution of Wahabi books for free all over the Islamic world. The king used to appoint 15 scholars, including one of Al-Sheikh family members, in the fatwas council as per royal decree No. 1/173 issued in 1971, to provide views tailored to the royal desires and wishes as per sharia laws in all political and religious topics and to guide the subjects in acts of worship, creed notions and concepts, and other religious issues. It is noteworthy that many Al-Sheikh family members held ministerial posts in the ministries of education, justice, agriculture, irrigation, etc. as well as religious posts, and this fact reflects the rise of the Salafist trend that has soared high during the reign of King Feisal in all fields and bodies, in contrast to the secular elite members that used to occupy such positions. King Feisal was much attentive to the Islamic world countries and all Muslim communities in the West; he contacted all such people via the International Society of the Muslim Youths, under the banner and motto of ''Islamic solidarity'', with Riyadh as the main headquarter of such body established in 1972. When representatives of that body convened in Riyadh under the auspices of the Saudi minster of education, it transpired that the aim of this body was to make the KSA the sole leader of the Islamic countries and to propagate Wahabism among all Muslim youths all over the world. It is noteworthy that those persons managing this body were Saudi youths who received secular education in the West, whereas the books distributed for free by this body were on jihad, Wahabi Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya jurisprudence and theology. Among the books distributed for free were those authored by the terrorist MB members and thinkers: Sayed Qutb, from Egypt, and Al-Mawdody from India. Reforms of King Feisal led to the increase in the number of ministries as they became 23 ones in 1975, and this was accompanies by an expansion in the number of independent committees and bureaus that employed many ambitious experts and skilled employees in high posts, on the condition of spreading the Salafist trend and never to criticize it. This put an end to the conflict between the secular elite members and the Salafist elite members in the KSA. Sadly, the secular elite members, who graduated from Egyptian and West universities, competed with one another to prove their approval of the Salafist trend and Wahabi values that dominated the KSA at the time. They vied to assert that there is no contradiction between Salafism and modernization in the 1970s. Among such people were as follows. Dr. Hassan Abdullah Al-Sheikh, Minister of Education, who headed the supreme council of research in the King Abdul-Aziz University, and Dr. Suleiman Abdul-Aziz, the Minister of Trade, who graduated from Cairo University and got his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the USA. He asserted in his thesis that the Salafist Wahabi sharia laws cope with contemporary world but there is a gap between Wahabi scholars and the cultured elite and economists, as secular persons do not care about contributions of scholars. Dr. M. Abdou Yamani who got his Ph.D. degree in geology from the West authored many books on Salafist thought and ideology and was rewarded by being appointed as the head of King Abdul-Aziz University in 1974 and the deputy of the Minister of Education, and later on became the Information Minister in 1975. In the same vein, Dr. Hisham Al-Nazer, Minister of Urban Planning, declared in his writings that Islam (i.e., Wahabism in his view) does not contradict modern life and that economic development serves the Islamic nation. Dr. Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Minister of Oil and Mining, who got his degrees from Harvard University, declared that progress could be achieved via Wahabi sharia alone as it is based on happiness of the individual and the Islamic nation, and his writings are based on the books authored by Ibn Al-Qayyim (1). Hence, the Salafist tendency was reflected on the policies as well as the social, economic, and educational reforms applied and adopted by King Feisal and it was shown in the thinking of the secular elite among those men working under him. As for those Leftist secular cultured men who went on in their opposition against the Saudi authorities, they suffered persecution.

C- Arrest of Leftist opposition figures and the increase in oil production:

After the defeat of Gamal Abdel-Nasser in the 1967 War, he held a conference in Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, and both Abdel-Nasser and King Feisal made peace and reconciled with each other, and Nasser Al-Saeed paid a heavy price for it along with the socialist, Nasserist, and communist opposition figures inside and outside the KSA. King Feisal contained the Leftist opposition movements by his program of reforms that led to more prosperity in the KSA, using increased oil revenues to keep the citizens busy and employed and urging them to consume imported products while serving the KSA to modernize it. Some of the opposition figures joined people serving King Feisal in his projects and sang his praises, and some refused to stop criticizing him, and King Feisal dealt with them violently and harshly. Saudi security apparatuses kept discovering and crushing all secret Leftist organizations from 1969 to 1971 in all governmental bodies, the army, and social strata and classes, imprisoning more than 1000 persons. Tens of opposition figures fled the KSA. Publications distributed secretly inside the KSA denounced the torture of incarcerated persons inside prison cells within the arrest wave of 1969:1971, which was the worst one in comparison to arrest waves of 1953, 1956, 1964, and 1967 in terms of torture and the number of quelled bodies and imprisoned persons. Of course, the Leftist opposition movements were crushed as a result, and many of its figures fled the KSA to expose and scandalize King Feisal and the KSA worldwide. Increase of oil revenues led to an unprecedented degree of prosperity and consumerism that diverted citizens away from opposition and protest. Hence, Aramco got the approval of the Saudi authorities to increase oil production more than 6 times between 1969 and 1980; from less than 3 million barrels a day in 1969 to more than 8 million barrels a day in 1973. Hence, governmental revenues tripled and Aramco had to enlist the aid of 6 new companies and this led to more Saudis being employed and got too busy working and making money to oppose and protest anything. The Saudi royal family members invested money in the West and in some Arab countries as per their interests and relations with the outside world, and this led to more restrictions imposed on the opposition figures outside the KSA and enabled the Saudis to spread Wahabism easily all over the globe (2).

The increase of oil revenues after the 1973 War and its influence on the new opposition movements:

The 1973 War, when the Egyptians and the Syrians sacrificed all for victory, led to the increase of Saudi oil revenues that tripled and quadrupled: from 1.2 billion $ in 1970, 4.2 billion $ in 1973, 37 billion $ in 1979, 70 billion $ in 1979, to 90 billion $ in 1980 after the Iranian revolt of 1978 (3). Huge increases in oil revenues led to more support and momentums of the reforms and policies of King Feisal that wen on after his assassination, especially spreading Wahabism/Salafism all over the Islamic world. Hence, the new opposition movement was naturally a Wahabi non-secular one because of many political, economic, and social factors in the KSA. Capitalists increased in number and formed a new social class, while tribal leaders no longer enjoyed any power or influence as their role was done by the policemen and the security guards. Thus, many Bedouins and peasants immigrated to cities to get jobs, especially as security guards and policemen (4). They were trained to quell and persecute those who oppose the KSA; hence, Bedouins and tribesmen were trained to be sort of Brothers but in a lesser degree within different conditions. The Bedouins and tribesmen were also influenced by the new circumstances and social changes and were not isolated from people as was the case in the Najd Brothers who were isolated in colonies. Thus, Bedouins and tribesmen trained as policemen were more flexible and their tribalism waned eventually as desert areas lost their economic power of grazing animals and agriculture. In cities, ambition for riches dominated and was linked to the social power and influential persons. Moreover, awareness was raised when oil revenues led to more foreigners working inside the KSA and made Saudis mingle with other cultures and modern inventions of audiovisual media; even ordinary learned citizens could watch and listen to west media and to other viewpoints and send their sons to learn abroad and in Egypt to get to know the outside world better. Such awareness brought about the need for more political reforms that will heal the negative items of affluence and stinginess; no political reforms were executed by King Feisal as he promised. The Iranian revolt of Khomeini came as a surprise to all Saudis in 1978, and it encouraged the Wahabi fundamentalist opposition figures to become more vociferous, especially the opposition movement of one Bedouin man who liked and admired the Najd brothers: Juhayman Al-Otaybi who embraced the Shiite notion of the awaited Mahdi (i.e., savior) to fight and resist the Saudi State with it.

Secondly: a brief historical account on Al-Otaybi and his invasion of the Kaaba Mosque (20^th of Nov., 1979 A.D. / 1^st of Muharram 1400 A.H.)

Who Juhayman Al-Otaybi was:

Al-Otaybi was brought up, amidst a Bedouin, religious environment, by his father who was called Hakeem, and his paternal grandfather was killed in the battle of Sabilla. Al-Otaybi worked for about 18 years within national security guards, and he tendered his resignation 6 years before invading the Kaaba Mosque in Mecca. He joined the Islamic University in Yathreb, thus combining military training with Wahabi culture and the ancestral belonging to the Najd Brothers. He desired to revenge those who killed his grandfather; he suddenly left the university and his job to devote his time to his call – which mainly consisted of verbal opposition against the KSA royal family – and he was aided by his friend Muhammad Ibn Abdullah Al-Qahtany, the second man in the invasion operation, presented by Al-Otaybi as the awaited Mahdi. Al-Qahtany was a student learning Wahabi theology by his tutor sheikh Ibn Baz, and before that, he worked in a hospital in Riyadh and was fired when accused of theft and was imprisoned for a while, and once released, he joined the Islamic University and met with and befriended Al-Otaybi in 1979. Al-Otaybi, who was married already, got married to the sister of Al-Qahtany. Al-Otaybi got noticed by the Saudi authorities that arrested him many times but released him every time for lack of evidence to prove his involvement in any action or movement and because of the mediation of some scholars and sheikhs who knew him (5), until everyone was much surprised when Al-Otaybi invaded the Kaaba Mosque with his men in the first day of the 15^th century A.H.

Before the invasion of the Kaaba Mosque: the reason behind choosing the Kaaba Mosque for the operation:

Purportedly the main reason was to embarrass the KSA and to draw the attention of the international media; even the Lebanese newspaper Al-Safeer wondered about the reason behind choosing the Kaaba Mosque as a location, especially that the invaders intended to stay for a long time, as they brought tons of food items, especially dated, along with arms and weapons as they brought their wives and children along.

1- Sources of arms: it was easy to procure arms inside the KSA as the invaders attacked barracks of the national security guards in Jeddah as well as some small factories of arms to steal some weapons. It was easy to buy some arms and weapons from tribesmen, as owning weapons was easy and without any type of restrictions as far as trading in them was concerned. Many arms were smuggled inside the KSA from Syria, Iraq, Jordan, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia. At the time, the Saudi authorities arrested about 500 smugglers of arms.

2- Preparations before the invasion of the Kaaba Mosque: Al-Otaybi and his men managed to procure maps of the Kaaba Mosque to study them to get to know the strategic point in it to set plans o invasion, while procuring masks to resist tear gas. Groups of his men reached the Kaaba Mosque weeks before the intended date of the invasion, preparing all storehouses of victuals and ammunition smuggled by all means such as coffins and cars, until they were smuggled inside the Kaaba Mosque.

3- Was this invasion a part of a bigger terrorist operation?: some of the newspapers asserted that such invasion was part of an unsuccessful coup, as many incidents occurred in several areas inside the KSA, but the Saudi authorities took severe measures and closed the airports and telecommunications, arrested hundreds of suspects in several cities (Mecca, Yathreb, Tabuk, Jeddah, Riyadh, Ta'if, etc.), and imposed a curfew. Policemen discovered several secret arms storehouses, and the Saudi government asserted that the Yathreb Mosque (i.e., the one containing the mausoleum presumably pertaining to Prophet Muhammad) was about to be invaded if it had not been for the security guards.

4- General remarks: it is noteworthy that most of the invaders were Arabian (i.e., from the Arabian Peninsula) but some of them were coming from Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, Iran, Yemen, and Turkey. Debates grew fierce about the second man in the invasion, Al-Qahtany, as some asserted he was an Egyptian man, as his father asserted in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Safeer. Some women participated in the invasion, and some newspapers estimated the total number of invaders as 400 persons and some as between 600 and 4000 persons. The movement was financed via collecting donations from pious ones who aided the pious poor men of Al-Otaybi and via selling religious books.

Events of the invasion of the Kaaba Mosque:

Shortly before dawn, a big number of cars stopped in the street outside the Kaaba Mosque, and out of it hundreds of men, women, and children moved into the Kaaba Mosque, chanting ''Allahu Akbar!'' (i.e., God is the Greatest!). As they entered the Kaaba Mosque, which was filled with pilgrims, they controlled and manned the gates, and closed them, as well as loudspeakers of the radio of the Kaaba Mosque. The Dawn Prayers ended by this time, led by the imam sheikh Muhammad Ibn Shebl, and Al-Otaybi delivered a sermon in the microphones and speakers, declaring his rejection of the rule of the Saudi royal family as they violated sharia laws, vehemently attacking them one by one of the princes; he explained the targets and ideas of his men and why they wanted to end the Saudi rule. The sermon revolved around three axes: 1) revolting against the Saudi state, 2) cutting all links with the West and all countries of the Christian infidels, and 3) putting an end to all corruption and deviance in society and applying sharia laws strictly. By the end of the sermon delivered by Al-Otaybi, he presented Al-Qahtany as the awaited Mahdi the imam of all true Muslims, and how all features of Mahdi applied to him, urging people present to come to know him and swear fealty to him along with his men. Arms and weapons were distributed once they were moved from the vault of the Kaaba Mosque, and all men of Al-Otaybi took their positions in strategic points to get prepared for the reaction of the Saudi authorities that got news of the invasion three hours after it occurred.

The stance of the Saudi authorities:

The Saudi authorities took quick precautionary measures like hiding all ammunitions from all army men and policemen, heavily guarding all ministries and governmental bodies, mobilizing all army men and policemen to get ready when needed, while giving the process of body-guarding the royal family members to a special national guards group loyal to the royal family members. The Saudi authorities imposed a curfew in Mecca, Yathreb, Ta'if, and the eastern region of Al-Ahsa, as its people revolted once they got news of the invasion. Saudi media covered all events, while supervision was strict on newspapers and postal services. The Saudi authorities closed all borders and airports and stopped people coming to the KSA or getting out of the KSA. When airports were opened later on, strict inspections were applied to all comers, and many foreigners from Iran and Pakistan were deported out of the KSA in 26 planes. The school year was suspended in all faculties and universities in Mecca and Yathreb, as some of the students participated in the invasion. Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdul-Aziz, the head of the national guards at the time, stopped his vacation in Morocco and hastily returned to the KSA, while the crown Prince Fahd remained in Tunisia in his vacation, while following up the events in the media. The Saudi authorities undertook an arrest wave of all suspects in Yathreb, Mecca, Jeddah, Al-Ahsa, Tabuk, and Sager, the birthplace of Al-Otaybi.

The decision of fighting the invaders:

The Saudi Interior Minister at the time, Nayef Ibn Abdul-Aziz, took the decision to fight the invaders in the morning of the next day after the invasion, and the Saudi authorities asserted in the media that they took all measures of care to contain the situation and to save pilgrims taken hostages inside the Kaaba Mosque, based on fatwa issued by Wahabi scholars, as invaders refused adamantly to surrender. Military actions began against the invaders before the fatwas issued by Wahabi scholars would be formulated and written.

The fatwa of Wahabi scholars:

The fatwa of the Wahabi scholars was issued in the fifth day after the invasion and published in the sixth day after it in all the Saudi newspapers. It was formulated and signed by 30 scholars in Riyadh after they met with King Khaled once the invasion occurred, and the king delivered the facts of the incident to them. Once the fatwa was issued, the scholars put the date of it as the invasion first day's date so as not to embarrass the Saudi State that began the military measures indeed before the issuing of the fatwa.

Here is the text of this fatwa:

(In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate: Praised be Our God and His Messenger Muhammad, peace be upon him, and his blessed family and companions. On Tuesday, the very first day of Muharram, 1400 A.H., those signed below were convened under the orders of H.R.H King Khaled Ibn Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud in his office to tell us that at the dawn of this day, after the Dawn Prayers, some armed groups of men and women have invaded the Kaaba Mosque and closed all of its gates, with armed guards on every gate, who have declared their swearing fealty to a man whom they called the awaited Mahdi, and they have taken pilgrims inside the Kaaba Mosque as hostages, and have shot those who tried to resist them inside and outside the Kaaba Mosque. H.R.H King Khaled asked our view about such armed groups and we told him that they must be called to Islam and to peace by surrendering their arms, and if they accept, they would be arrested until tried using sharia laws, and if they refuse, all measures must be taken to arrest and fight them and to kill them if necessary: Almighty God says in the Quran: "…But do not fight them at the Sacred Mosque, unless they fight you there. If they fight you, then kill them. Such is the retribution of the disbelievers." (2:191). Prophet Muhammad urged us to kill those who aim to divide the Muslim nation and its unity, in the hadith of Bokhary and Moslem. Other Quranic verses and hadiths of the same meaning are so many, and we beseech Almighty God to make His religion victorious and His Word reign supreme and to vanquish enemies of Muslims and Islam, and we implore Almighty God to accept our prayers; God is the Answerer of Supplications. Praised be Our God and His Messenger Muhammad, peace be upon him, and his blessed family and companions.)

A commentary on the fatwa of Wahabi scholars:

1- This fatwa was signed by 30 scholars and not all scholars of the KSA as mentioned in the statement issued by the Ministry of Interior. Tens of scholars never signed this fatwas because either they opposed Al-Saud royal family or they opposed the text and phrasing of the fatwa. Of course, many scholars were not invited to sign in the first place! We note that the 30 scholars who signed the fatwa worked in governmental bodies under the control of the Saudi State, though some of them were sympathetic with Al-Otaybi and his men, as noted by Fahd and his brother Nayef.

2- This fatwa was issued based on information provided only by King Khaled and his brothers, who were foes to Al-Otaybi, and such information was never authenticated and verified. It is noteworthy that some citizens notified the signed scholars that such information provided by Al-Saud was partially untrue.

3- The phrasing and text of the fatwa show two things 1) governmental pressure was applied to the signed scholars, and 2) the fatwa did not satisfy Al-Saud royal family members wholly; as the fatwa ascribed all information to the king and his royal family, while the royal princes wanted a fatwa fully supporting military actions taken against the invaders, thus showing the information provided by the king as condemnation of the invaders without asking scholars to provide any opinion to solve the problem.

4- This fatwa did not allow or permit Al-Saud to re-invade the Kaaba mosque, despite the fact that King Khaled said to them that the invaders fought and shot others and refused to surrender for the sake of the holiness of the Sacred Mosque. Kuwaiti newspapers asserted at the time that scholars offered – two days before issuing the fatwa – to be mediators between King Khaled and the invaders to stop any further possible bloodshed inside the Sacred Mosque, but he adamantly refused.

5- Apparently, Al-Saud royal family members pressurized scholars to mention in the fatwa that invaders were renegades and apostates who forsook Islam by committing such horrid action and because they defied the king/ruler/imam. The scholars had to submit to the royal wishes; yet, they refused to call invaders as renegades (or Al-Khawarij) and had to mention a hadith ascribed to Muhammad instead.

6- This fatwa showed that all invaders must be tried as per sharia laws in case they give up, despite the fact that scholars knew that all courts in the KSA at the time use man-made laws. This shows slight sympathizing with the invaders under their leader Al-Otaybi, though they would never approve their invasion of the Sacred Mosque as a way to force reform. This alluded to the fact that the scholars wanted the Minister of Interior to leave them to judge the invaders and not to try them in Saudi courts that would certainly hang them for raising arms against the Saudi State.

Events of fighting the invaders:

When military operations began to liberate the Sacred Mosque, the Saudi authorities at first underestimated the power of the invaders, as they killed off the first Saudi military group of security men. This led to the realization that invaders were in great numbers with excellent fighting experience. Helicopters and tanks were sent for at not, on Wednesday 21^st of Nov, 1979 to participate in the military operation to liberate the Kaaba Mosque. It is noteworthy that some Saudi soldiers refused to fight and shoot invaders inside the Kaaba Mosque, and some of them were shot in the battlefield as a punishment for disobedience. When hesitation spread among Saudi soldiers, Prince Sultan had delivered a speech to them in vain. Meccan preachers had preached them in vain. Saudi soldiers insisted on a fatwa by Ibn Baz, which did not happen. Prince Sultan delivered a speech to them and praised their courage to liberate the Kaaba Mosque from Al-Khawarij (rebels or renegades). Some high-rank soldiers supported the view of the prince, and it was apparent that those who refused to fight will be either killed or imprisoned. Yet, about 1000 soldiers refused adamantly to fight inside the Kaaba Mosque and joined the men of Al-Otaybi. Fighting and battles went on until the Saudi authorities managed to liberate the Kaaba Mosque, to kill some of the invaders, and to arrest some of the, as pronounced by the Saudi Minister of Interior on 15^th of Muharram, 1400 A.H. / 4^th of Dec., 1979. About 63 of arrested invaders were put to death in prison on 9^th of Jan., 1980, and others later on were put to death, as per Al-Nahar newspaper (6).

Results of the invasion and its political significance:

1- The KSA adopted a double-faced policy to please and appease both Saudi Wahabi coreligionists and civil, secular citizens: to focus within the formal religious discourse of the State on the fact that Islam is the creed of moderation in everything and that rebellion against Al-Saud was impossible as their application of sharia laws prevented this. On the margin of such discourse, fanaticism and extremism were criticized; meanwhile, the Saudi State imposed many restrictions on women and foreigners working in the KSA so as to force them to maintain traditions of society. Video tapes rental shops were closed down, and to appease secular citizens, the KSA promised to formulate the Constitution and to establish the Consultation Council. King Khaled ordered on 18^th of March, 1980, the formation of a committee headed by Prince Nayef, the Interior Minister, to formulate the project of the Constitution and to establish the Consultation Council, allowing newspapers to tackle this subject as Islamic heritage. Although King Feisal mentioned such Consultation and the Consultation Council in his reform program, he had not the time to apply such program as he was assassinated (7).

2- On the other hand, despite the fact that Al-Otaybi hated Shiites of Al-Ahsa region, they revolted in the Eastern region simultaneously at the time they heard of Al-Otaybi and his invasion of the Kaaba Mosque. 400 thousand Shiites participated in this revolt, after a long time of non-revolt. 20 Shiite men fell dead in such events, and hundreds of them were arrested. The revolt began during the Shiite feast of Ashura on 27^th of Nov., and it was easy to turn congregations into demonstrators who express political protest. 20 thousand Saudi soldiers tried to disperse the Shiite protesters but the demonstrations went on non-stop and daily for two consecutive months (8).

3- The political significance of this tragedy was manifested in the dilemma of the Salafist Wahabism that allows more room for opposition figures to declare themselves as more fit to rule in terms of political and religious aspects; any foe of the KSA would use Wahabi notions to allow themselves to speak in the name of sharia to urge opposing and resisting the Wahabi ruler. It was apparent that the KSA needed religious innovative thing outside the Wahabi circle or scope by making good use of the higher values of Islam within the Quran; or else, the KSA and its citizens will go on suffering as victims of their own Wahabis. Yet, sticking to Wahabism and punishing those who dare to criticize it, as the KSA regards it the only 'true' image of Islam, allow more chances to rebel against the KSA using the Wahabi ideology itself, as occurred before during the reign of King Abdul-Aziz.

Thirdly: a reading of the Wahabi ideology of Al-Otaybi in his writings:

It is noteworthy in the topic of comparing Al-Saeed and Al-Otaybi that Al-Saeed was not welcome by the Saudi public opinion, unlike Al-Otaybi, despite the fact that Al-Saeed was peaceful in his call. Of course, Al-Saeed used bad language and verbal abuse in his writings when criticizing Al-Saud royal family, but he never called for any armed revolt or rebellion against them though coups used to occur in the Arab world at the time. As for Al-Otaybi, his call led to the crime of committing violence in the Kaaba Mosque, the holiest place in Islam and to all Muslims, made a sanctuary and safe place by God to all people. Most Saudi citizens rejected Al-Saeed because his opposition movement was based on new religious thought that contradicts Wahabism, and he never made a secret of his hatred and despising of all Wahabi notions and scholars. On the other hand, Al-Otaybi emerged from Wahabism itself, trying to achieve what the Najd Brothers failed to do during the reign of King Abdul-Aziz. Hence, it was easy to condemn Al-Saeed and to doubt his being a Muslim as he lived outside the KSA and chased by it, whereas Al-Otaybi was not doubted in terms of faith despite his invasion of the Sacred Mosque, as he based his writings on the books authored by Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Abdul-Wahab, and he quoted Salafist hadiths ascribed to Prophet Muhammad along with Wahabi interpretations of the Quran and hadiths that form the pillars of Wahabism. Thus, Al-Otaybi stuck faithfully to pure Wahabism and was eager to apply it as per the principle of ''promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice''. Like any extremist preacher or scholar, Al-Otaybi thought of himself as representing the 'absolute' truth and his foes as infidels, even if his opponents were his own Wahabi scholars who taught him. Let us discuss below the complicated relations between Al-Otaybi and Wahabi scholars of his time.

The stance of Wahabi scholars regarding Al-Otaybi:

We note that Wahabi scholars were reluctant in supporting the Saudi authorities against the movement of Al-Otaybi despite its enormity and the desire of the KSA to mobilize Wahabi scholars to face such catastrophe that embarrassed it on the national and international levels. The fatwa of Wahabi scholars did not satisfy the royal family members, and Prince Fahd and Prince Nayef had to admit that there are people and Wahabi scholars who sympathized with Al-Otaybi. The fatwa of the 30 Wahabi scholars exposed indirectly such sympathy with Al-Otaybi as their fate was seen as internal affair decided by sheikhs and not Saudi military courts. Of course, if Wahabi scholars were to judges Al-Otaybi, he would not have been declared an apostate and put to death, as he used books authored by Ibn Abdul-Wahab and Ibn Taymiyya to protest against the Saudi rulers and to condemn scholars subservient to them who never apply Wahabi sharia laws to the letter. Even if Saudi authorities pressurized Wahabi scholars, other incidents in history assert that when Wahabi scholars tried others, they would acquit them on the pretext that the defendants were mad if they sympathized with them. Al-Saud royal family feared that if Wahabi scholars tried Al-Otaybi, the trial would turn into a condemnation session of the Saudi authority itself, and the KSA naturally wanted to avoid this at any cost; hence, the trial and hanging of Al-Otaybi and his men were done hastily without any interference from Wahabi scholars, and interrogations with them were linked to torture and verbal abuse of the arrested men as per media coverage on Saudi TV channels and as per many Arab and Western newspapers. Once interrogations ended, the Saudi authorities put to death 180 persons secretly as per direct orders of King Khaled to the Interior Minister on 9^th of Jan, 1980, as mentioned in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Dostour in the words of the Saudi Minister of Defense who asserted that their heads will be cut off as per the 'Islamic' punishments regardless of their nationalities. This made him a judge and a hangman at the same time, asserting the fact that such hanging was done without trial. King Khaled issued a royal decree to put them to death on 9^th of Jan, 1980: (… We perused all interrogations and confessions of such criminals who invaded the Sacred Mosque … terrorizing all peaceful Muslims inside and taking them as hostages… such criminals must be put to death to please God and to punish them for their horrendous crime against Islam … scholars of the Kingdom approve of such punishment as per the Quran: 5:33). King Khaled ordered his Interior Minister to put to death all names of those men involved in that horrible crime of killing people inside the Kaaba Mosque, while those who helped the terrorists by guarding gates to be imprisoned. Women involved who served the criminals and cooked for them were sentenced to be imprisoned for two years, while children under puberty who helped the criminals were sent to a penitentiary for children to make them good citizens in the Islamic nation. It is noteworthy that the fatwa signed by the 30 Wahabi scholars was issued on the sixth day of the invasion, and thus, it could not be used as a reason to justify capital punishments, and it never urged putting criminals to death, however the enormity of their crime was. King Khaled lied when he said he received a death-fatwa orally from scholars of the KSA, and scholars were surprised to know that Al-Otaybi and his men were put to death without taking the opinion of Wahabi scholars. Of course, some princes knew that some Wahabi scholars sympathized with Al-Otaybi and his men, and the Minister of Defense used to lose his patience with some Wahabi scholars who urged and nagged him to set free some of Wahabi opposition figures. Minister of Defense once said within a conference held with students of Riyadh University (i.e., now King Saud University): (…Those criminals were known to the security apparatuses and were arrested before and then released, but the problem lied in the fact that they hided behind religion to deceive people, and they assumed they guided them … As responsible men, we had to stop them … Their secret movements were carefully watched in Najd by security men for five years … Some of the invaders sued to be imprisoned, but relapsed shortly before the invasion via the mediation of some scholars and sheikhs … This applies to Al-Otaybi as well as he was released many times before via their mediation …). This shows that Al-Saud resented the fact that some scholars and sheikhs used to defend the men of Al-Otaybi and that Al-Otaybi was watched over for five years in the Islamic University and he sued to contact Ibn Baz, the blind scholar and the most famous clergymen and religious judge in the KSA at the time (9). Hence, the sympathy of some Wahabi scholars with Al-Otaybi and his men before and after their invasion was more than just the joined ground of Wahabi ideology; as such sympathy was simply letting down the Saudi authorities and jeopardizing the Saudi role in protecting the Kaaba Sacred Mosque. Such sympathy must be understood within two contradictory factors: 1) the rise of a strong Salafist trend since the 1970s in the KSA, and 2) this trend is devoid of any innovative, creative thinking to cope with the modern age. Such two factors together explain the crisis of the KSA regime with its Wahabi ideology. The Salafist trend rose by the policies of King Feisal as we have mentioned before, and it went on via the policies of King Khaled; thus, the KSA modernized its technology without modernizing Wahabism and religious thought inside the kingdom, despite the plethora of religious institutions using high-tech, state-of-the-art apparatuses (unlike the case during the reign of King Abdul-Aziz the founder of the KSA). Thus, no creative mind appeared all these decades, and Wahabi sheikhs imitated all previous centuries-old traditions in religious thought and practices, thus creating a gap between the State, as the Saudi authorities could not do without modernization on all levels especially to cope with complications of international politics, and traditional Salafist trend that enjoyed power in the Saudi society and repeats words and notions of centuries-old traditions. Hence, Wahabi scholars resented many things and policies inside the KSA but could not dare to oppose it in public as they received high salaries from the State and the royal family. Thus, they sympathized with Al-Otaybi and his men as they applied Wahabi ideology to the letter and were more courageous than State scholars and voiced their views outspokenly. On the other hand, when religious views are used politically, the most extremist ones are usually more outspoken, vociferous, and daring, thus winning the support of those who would not dare to voice their resentment. Hence, extremism and fanaticism drew admiration when used by opposition figures in an age devoid of true, original religious innovative, creative thinking. This was how Wahabi scholars saw Al-Otaybi. Let us tackle below how he had seen them.

Views of Al-Otaybi regarding Wahabi scholars in the KSA:

Despite the fact that Wahabi scholars never approved the invasion of the Sacred Mosque by Al-Otaybi and his men, the gap between those scholars and the Saudi authorities widened as many scholars refused to sign on the fatwa and most scholars denounced the fact that Al-Otaybi and his men were put to death without trial. Ibn Baz stood with and his call before his invasion of the Kaaba Mosque, and he interfered many times to urge the Saudi authorities to release men of Al-Otaybi out of prison cells and to stop torturing them and urging the royal family to stop chasing them (10). Yet, Al-Otaybi in the letters and writings he authored before the invasion showed his utter hatred of all scholars, as we tackle below.

1- Al-Otaybi attacked scholars, warned against them, and urged disobeying them:

In his vehement attack on Wahabi scholars subservient to the KSA, Al-Otaybi asserts in his letters that the Anti-Christ is less dangerous than misguided and misguiding imams who sell their creed and faith for the sake of money by flattering rulers (11). Al-Otaybi writes that such hypocritical scholars are described in the Quran as follows: "And relate to them the story of him to whom We delivered Our signs, but he detached himself from them, so Satan went after him, and he became one of the perverts. Had We willed, We could have elevated him through them; but he clung to the ground, and followed his desires. His metaphor is that of a dog: if you chase it, it pants; and if you leave it alone, it pants. Such is the metaphor of the people who deny Our signs. So tell the tale, so that they may ponder." (7:175-176). Thus, Al-Otaybi asserts that seeing words and deeds of such hypocritical scholars, they were divided into two types by him: some who judge others by their appearance and flatter the rich and despise and drive out the poor, and some others who forgot their Islamic University degree and engaged in trade and money-making activities, forsaking their jihad for their faith and creed, competing with rulers and tradesmen in collecting wealth and clinging to the ground (12). Al-Otaybi refutes in his writings the accusation leveled at him by some scholars that he was like Al-Khawarij by asserting that such scholars were akin to the ancient Jewish clergymen who gained ill-gotten money and misguided others away from the righteous path of God (13). Al-Otaybi asserts that such scholars are precursors of the Anti-Christ who would appear one day, as they refuse to apply Sunna of Prophet Muhammad (14), and thus he warns against such corrupt hypocritical scholars who seek to distort Islam to the masses for the sake of affluent tyrannical rulers (15) and thus, they are worse than the danger of the Anti-Christ (16). Al-Otaybi quotes Ibn Abdul-Wahab and Ibn Taymiyya in types of polytheism, which include blind obedience of corrupt scholars without thinking, thus deifying them as gods along with Allah, as such views apply to most Saudi scholars of his age (17).

2- Al-Otaybi exempted Ibn Baz from his attack:

Al-Otaybi never attacked Ibn Baz, but he slightly criticized some of his stances and approved of some others. Al-Otaybi asserts in his writings that Ibn Baz fluctuated between his loyalty to traditional Wahabi ideology and his loyalty to the KSA regime and his post under it. Thus, Ibn Baz endorsed Salafist Wahabi notions of Al-Otaybi, but he did not approve his invasion and attacking the KSA using the Wahabi ideology. Al-Otaybi cared very much about the views of Ibn Baz about him in terms of religious knowledge and political stances, but Al-Otaybi insisted on attacking the KSA as the sole responsible State for everything bad in Arabia, even when he writes about Ibn Baz, he would strongly attack the Saudi rulers: (…When we give pieces of advice to these rulers, they would ask us to refer to Ibn Baz and other Wahabi scholars … such sheikhs are like governmental employees who sing the praises of the State and flatter the rulers and princes … to maintain their salaries … we know the high stature of Ibn Baz … but they have chosen him as a blind sheikh trusted and loved by people so as not to see the sins and vices of the rulers … This devilish ways are used to misguide Muslims…). Al-Otaybi blames the Saudi rulers for such degeneration: (…These rulers never care for pieces of advice given to them by others … Even When Ibn Baz would advise them to avoid sinning, they would deny being sinners and go on sinning … Even Ibn Baz, the erudite man of the Sunna, would not condemn those who contradict this Sunna, among the Saudi rulers … Ibn Baz would aid and help the rulers and pray for Al-Saud family – May God forgive him … he must condemn them instead so as not to deceive Muslims …) (18). Despite his virulent attack on Wahabi scholars subservient to the Saudi State, Al-Otaybi would praise Ibn Baz and deplore his relation with the State. Ibn Baz did not like the attack of Al-Otaybi on the KSA using Salafist and Wahabi ideology. Al-Otaybi saw that Wahabi scholars loyal to the KSA would not be trusted as they did not perform their duty of ''promoting virtue and preventing vice''.

3- Al-Otaybi hated scholars because they blindly obeyed the KSA:

Al-Otaybi based his opposition movement against the KSA on one main issue: the Najd Brothers' military opposition and revolt against King Abdul-Aziz. Al-Otaybi never forgot the Wahabi scholars who aided King Abdul-Aziz against the Najd Brothers, by calling them ''Al-Khawarij'', especially that the scholars called Al-Otaybi and his men by the same epithet. Al-Otaybi writes the following about the Saudi rulers: (…When one opposes these rulers, they soon call one ''Al-Khawarij'' to make other Muslims shun us as if we were enemies of Islam …), and then he reminds readers about the Najd Brothers' revolt against King Abdul-Aziz as he never allowed them to fight Shiites of Iraq (19). Hence, Al-Otaybi hated Saudi rulers past and present and harbored deep-seated animosity toward Wahabi scholars supporting Al-Saud family: (…Al-Saud family seems bent on destroying Islam … May God curse them! We hate very much scholars subservient to Al-Saud family as they cause evil to remain to both rulers and subjects, as they deceive people and flatter sinners of the rulers … Anyone who would advise rulers to avoid sinning and apply sharia, they would tell him that he was not more knowledgeable than scholars who support Al-Saud family … duplicity remains the main order of our life in this State …) (20). Al-Otaybi saw that when scholars work under the State, they would be inclined to be lax in performing their duty of ''promoting virtue and preventing vice'', as Satan makes them care only for their salaries and thus be eager to please and flatter rulers and to misguide people (21). Al-Otaybi had authored some verses in vernacular Arabic about this type of obsequious scholars:

They are akin to infidels in all regions

They made clergymen like cattle or sheep

That sees rejecting posts as a disgrace

While never have qualms in keeping silence

Regarding sins committed daily around them

They see religion as a means to gather ripe fruit

And to perform foreplay with girl-slaves (22)

It is clear that Al-Otaybi resented the fact that Wahabi Salafist scholars deserted their duty of ''promoting virtue and preventing vice'' because they were eager to keep their posts and high salaries. Hence, the mentality of Al-Otaybi kept the two factors intertwined: 1) he hated the State for not performing the duty of ''promoting virtue and preventing vice'' and the insurmountable gap between texts and applications, and 2) he hated the Wahabi scholars working under the Saudi State who were reluctant to perform their religious duties. The letters of Al-Otaybi give more details about his resenting the scholars and hating their reluctance to perform the duty of ''promoting virtue and preventing vice''.

4- Al-Otaybi hated scholars because of their reluctance in performing the duty of the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice:

Al-Otaybi resented the weakness of scholars and their reluctance to condemn sinning and non-application of Wahabi sharia, as a direct result of their relation with the Saudi State that influenced their relation with the Saudi authorities and the people. Let us tackle the resentment of Al-Otaybi against scholars who were reluctant to perform their duty and who deceive people and flatter the ruling royal family. Al-Otaybi divided scholars into two types which he saw as the main reason of destroying Islam: Sufi scholars and sultan's scholars (i.e., those who flatter and please rulers), and Al-Otaybi annexed to them those religious policemen of ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'' who were lax in their duties, as per the views of Al-Otaybi: (…Obsequious, hypocritical scholars flatter sinning rulers and religious policemen care for observing people performing acts of worship while overlooking sins committed by the ruling family to retain their salaries … even sheikhs and judges of courts are blindly obedient to rulers …) (23). This means that Al-Otaybi resented all sheikhs of all types as long as they serve the KSA and promote virtue among people and not among rulers, caring to expose sins of people and not those of rulers: (… Scholars care only about an article or an event considered by them as sin committed by sinful people, while overlooking sins committed by governmental officials and the ruling family members … they disregard corruption of government and of the State that imposes its regime and rule by force … the devils confiscated their minds … they never care to stop sins and they do not know their faith quite well; they fill their houses with pictures and statues … such scholars would justify anything for themselves, while claiming they follow Sunna … they do not practice what they preach …) (24). Al-Otaybi writes that the Abrahamic religion of Islam is based on two roots: devotion of worship to God alone and to reject and disown polytheism and polytheists who should be enemies of true Muslims. Al-Otaybi saw that scholars of his time as some who are Sufis and worship tombs, some who are doctrinal fanatics and want to omit hadiths, some who care to refute communism and Marxism and seek to prove God's existence, and some who seek to control rule inside the KSA. Yet, he saw that all of them are ignoramuses and obsequious to the Saudi authorities as they (…overlook sins committed by ruling princes that seek to destroy Islam …) and they are like those who apply corporeal punishments on the weak and not on the strong among sinners: (…Hypocritical scholars condemn easily those outside power and overlook sins of those who give them their high salaries and try to excuse them and justify them by any means, while declaring themselves as weak who could not change anything at all …) (25). Al-Otaybi asserts that the reluctance of such scholars to say the word of truth was because of their eagerness to please rulers who pay their salaries and thus they forsook Sunna: (… They swore fealty to them so as to overlook their mistakes and sins and to gain their money gifts and to control mosques and to gain power over people … they had to flatter and get lax and remain silent regarding sins, to the extent that evil reigns supreme in the lands … Do such scholars imitate Prophet Muhammad in declaring good people as good and bad ones as bad?! Di they perform their duty in exposing sins and corruption of kings, rulers, ministers, princes, and heads and presidents in governmental offices? Did they dare to utter the word of truth when acts done contradict sharia laws? … If they really do their duties to the utmost degree, they should prosecute and condemn all princes living in palaces and affluence!) (26). (…Scholars remain silent regarding polytheism and innovative disbelieving notions and acts … They might deplore them in mild words using all possible hedges, as they had done for tens of years, and nothing changes for the better … as if their job was to preach the Friday sermons, and not to change evil and sins by force … as long as their salaries go on, they are readily overlook sins committed by the affluent …) (27). Al-Otaybi refuses the logic of those who condemn and denounce in their hearts and never voice their views in public, as this was not enough (28). Al-Otaybi criticizes the disgraceful status of teachers/sheikhs of religion in universities and institutes who taught nothing but ignorance, except for Ibn Baz and another sheikh as per views of Al-Otaybi, and he asserts that a graduate student told him about it: (… A graduate student of Islamic studies told us that he never benefited from his studies and that he learned one thing only: all scholars seek to get high salaries from the authorities and they study for this purpose alone …) (29). We notice that Al-Otaybi made many mistakes in Arabic writing, and yet, he mocked the ignorance of scholars. Al-Otaybi saw that if the purposes of scholars graduated from Islamic studies were to earn as much money as they could, they were ignoramuses who would by obsequious and hypocritical to rulers and people in power and would never serve Islam and misguide people by their erroneous stances regarding creed and faith: ( … Religious policemen lower their heads and overlook sins and terrible mistakes of rulers and those in power, not lowering their heads in piety, but out of fear and obsequiousness, thus mocking our creed and faith, as we see the same attitude in all religious ministries and institutions, leading people to think very ill of clergymen … power should be in the hands of scholars to apply sharia laws properly …) (30). On the other hand, people imitated religious policemen in their laxity and leniency, within views of Al-Otaybi, and feared the royal family as much as clergymen feared it, and Al-Otaybi blamed bitterly the KSA for such state of affairs: (…Little faith or lack of it cause the fear of scholars and subsequently to all people in Arabia … they ought to fear God alone not any mortals, but scholars justify their silence by their being weak, as they fear rulers and men in power instead of God … In fact, people would never cease to use Sunna and hadiths and Quranic verses to justify sins and sinners, and also would justify them by saying that scholars allowed and sanctioned them …) (31). Al-Otaybi unintentionally gave us some historical and social features of the Saudi social life of his age, supported only with his own point of view which analyzed deeply the state of affairs. We have thus demonstrated his deep-seated hatred of the Wahabi scholars, what about his hatred of the KSA itself?

The stance of Al-Otaybi against the KSA:

Al-Otaybi between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers:

We have previously explained his stance against the KSA regarding the Salafist principle of the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice. We now tackle his other political views regarding this principle which was the basis of Wahabism (which in turn was the basis of establishing the KSA itself) as per the Salafist notion of changing vice/sins by force. Hence, Al-Otaybi was an extension of the thought of the Wahabi Najd Brothers who revolted and were killed off during the reign of King Abdul-Aziz. Within the environment in which Al-Otaybi lived, he desired eagerly to revive the Najd Brothers, as his grandfather was one of them and got killed like them, who founded the kingdom of King Abdul-Aziz on the basis of the Salafist principle of the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice. when they insisted on going on with jihad outside the KSA borders, King Abdul-Aziz fought them and had them killed off to confiscate wealth, power, and authority. This idea compels itself on the minds of readers of letters of Al-Otaybi, as he tries in them to use the Salafist ideology to oppose the KSA and gain supporters who would apply Wahabi sharia laws by force in Arabia. Al-Otaybi prepared himself for this idea within the religious, political and military aspects; he joined the Islamic University to study Wahabism and the national guards to get trained in using arms and weapons. The KSA, during the reign of Feisal, linked itself to the USA and the West, especially when the KSA drew nearer to Egypt and when the USSR grew weaker. Such state of affairs vexed Al-Otaybi very much; as allying oneself to ''infidels'' was a calamity for him, and thus, he made sure his lines would reflect his defense of the stance of the Najd Brothers and his attack on King Abdul-Aziz: ( … Abdul-Aziz, the founder of their kingdom, was a tyrant, and sheikhs and scholars under his power and authority flattered and pleased him and some remained silent … Abdul-Aziz employed the Najd Brothers to learn sharia and to immigrate into colonies to swear fealty to him based on Sunna and Quran … He made them conquer lands for his sake, and he confiscated all spoils leaving them very little … but when Abdul-Aziz achieved his purpose and became king, he stopped the military jihad for God's sake outside Arabia and befriended the Christian infidels … when the Najd Brothers fought Shiite polytheists in Iraq who worship Ali, his wife, and his progeny as gods beside Allah, Abdul-Aziz stopped them to please the UK, calling them ''Al-Khawarij'' or renegades because they disobeyed his orders not to attack Iraq … Abdul-Aziz forgot that Prophet Muhammad said that no mortals should obey mortals in disobedience of God … we seek firstly to defend the late Najd Brothers – May God have mercy upon their souls – who fought for the sake of God and were betrayed and deceived by Abdul-Aziz, while they were faithful to God, but the KSA declared them as Al-Khawarij rebels and declared them as apostates who betrayed Islam … the KSA ruling princes tarnished the reputation of the Najd Brothers … yet, some of the Najd Brothers who remained alive would tell us the whole truth about them … No doubt that the royal family verbally abused the Najd Brothers as they want to retain their authority without having to face any groups to emerge similar to the Najd Brothers, and this is not strange, what is really weird is when those royal family members who seek riches and affluence of this transient world seek to abuse the really ascetic fighters of God, and Abdul-Aziz, their grandfather, had once said to descendants of Al-Sharif Hussein that he would help them against the Najd Brothers, as he sought to stop their jihad in Iraq by allying himself to Christian infidels of the UK … evil gates opened ever since in the KSA until now … ignoramuses of sheikhs and scholars of today repeat the same falsehoods about the Najd Brothers, calling them as "Al-Khawarij'' or renegades to deceive people and the masses and to please the Al-Saud family, saying that whoever would dare to imitate the Najd Brothers would be killed… and so would be the fate of those calling to apply Sunna and sharia and Quran …) (32). We have quoted this long passage because Al-Otaybi expresses in it clearly his stance regarding the KSA since the times of its founder and how he favored the Najd Brothers and hated the KSA and the Wahabi scholars for their sake, and he wonders how the Najd Brothers be called Al-Khawarij while this epithet fitted those who allied themselves to Christians of the West and left Shiites in the KSA alone without converting them to Wahabism by force. Hence, such notions led Al-Otaybi to apply what the Najd Brothers failed to do: he delved deep into studies of Wahabi sharia and Salafist culture to attack the KSA from within its ideology using notions of Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Abdul-Wahab in order to attack the KSA on the religious and political levels, casting doubts on the legitimacy of the Saudi regime and rulers and those working under them, as we tackle this topic in details below.

Al-Otaybi and his description of the perfect caliph:

Al-Otaybi saw that a caliph must have two features: he must rule people using justice and right and he must not follow his own whims and caprices: (… Those rulers who forsake Sunna and Quran and followed their own whims and caprices, instead of God's sharia, have gone astray, away from the path of God …) (33). Al-Otaybi said that a caliph must come from the Qorayish tribe and a devoted, pious Muslim man, in order to embarrass Al-Saud and to undermine the legitimacy of their rule: (…And no one should swear fealty to any man who did not fit into such conditions and stipulations…) (34). Al-Otaybi asserts that no two caliphs are to exist; it must be one man, and the other must be put to death according to some hadiths he quoted (35). We note here that within most of the history of Muslims, there were many caliphs and rulers that simultaneously existed and declaring themselves as the right caliph ordained by God; this occurred throughout the Abbasid era, the Fatimid era, and Arab ruling Andalusia. As for the Quran, we find the flowing verse: "If two groups of believers fight each other, reconcile between them. But if one group aggresses against the other, fight the aggressing group until it complies with God's command. Once it has complied, reconcile between them with justice, and be equitable. God loves the equitable." (49:9), and we understand from it that in such cases, there would be two leaders of two groups and third group would try to reconcile them to avoid bloodshed; hence, Islamic countries might have disputes and different leaderships in one location, not just one ruler/caliph for all countries as Al-Otaybi tried to convince his readers using Salafist notions. Al-Otaybi was wrong to quote such notions, as the KSA rulers received fealty by the majority of Saudi people, and the other 'caliph' put to death was Al-Qahtany, his awaited Mahdi. Thus, Al-Otaybi saw that rulers who did not apply sharia as infidels, and he compared legitimate sharia-based caliphate to hereditary monarchies imposed by tyrants as we will tackle below.

Between caliphate and imposed monarchy:

Al-Otaybi saw that caliphate was a good system when based on Prophet Muhammad's deeds and acts and sayings, but such caliphate was wasted when imposed monarchical regimes began by the Umayyads. He asserts in his writings that Salafist hadiths predicted and brought glad tidings of the return of good caliphate based on Prophet Muhammad's deeds and acts and sayings, when fealty would be based on the truth of God's religion and jihad to spread 'Islam' and impose God's creed: (… This entails to kill the infidels and to immigrate away from evil masses and to stick to one's sword …). This quote shows clearly that he admired the Najd Brothers and wanted to repeat their days of 'glory', (… As for our days, we live within imposed monarchy of tyrants, and Muslims did not choose their caliph or ruler; rather, kings imposed themselves on them and force people to swear featly to them, and such kings never apply sharia and never imitate justice of Prophet Muhammad to support Islam, and even their laws and legislations contain no traces of sharia unless items that would support the caprices and whims of kings and rulers …). In sum, Al-Otaybi saw that the KSA is a tyrannical and imposed monarchy that rejects true Wahabism; caliphate must be restored based on the divine truth of the Quran and on Sunna and jihad that entailed on-going, incessant wars to convert the whole world to Wahabism. He shows that people must be the source of legitimacy and authority on their own accord in rightful religious caliphate system, unlike imposed monarchy that imposed fealty by the sword: (… Hence, we assert that the Saudi king does not follow the methods and traditions of Prophet Muhammad, and based on sharia laws, fealty to him must be annulled and people must not obey him …) (36).

Fealty and obedience between religious caliphate and imposed monarchy:

After he mentioned conditions and features of legitimate rightful religious caliphate, Al-Otaybi asserts that a caliph must be from the Qorayish tribe among religious devoted pious men (37). In another part, he divides ruling regimes into two types: those ruling using the Quran and Sunna and deserve to be obeyed, and those ruling without them and deserve to be disobeyed, and the former is the religious caliphate to come and the latter is the current imposed Saudi monarchy that deserve to be disobeyed even if it applies Islam, because of its imposition by the sword (38). We give more details of this now. ( … Imposed rule is not based on free fealty out of people's accord, and it contradicts God's sharia: Saudi rulers are not from the Qorayish tribe and destroy Islam and fight Muslims instead of supporting Islam and applying sharia laws. Another point is that fealty is forced by the sword to the Saudis, which makes fealty null and void, and we urge people not to obey the Saudi rulers …). Thus, Al-Otaybi urged that no one should obey Saudi authorities and rulers and they should be avoided and shunned: (… Muslims in Arabia suffer under imposed rulers, who do not apply sharia and creed, and they should disobey such rulers who shun the Quran and apply laws imported from the West, and thus, fealty to such rulers is annulled, and sharia laws urge us to shun and avoid them as they destroy religion and Sunna … Even Prophet Muhammad in a hadith urged us to avoid and shun rulers who will not come from the Qorayish tribe …) (39).

Al-Otaybi and his religious notion of avoidance:

Al-Otaybi writes the following to allude to the KSA: (… rulers of Muslims in our age prefer persons who agree with them and remain silent, and thus draw them nearer and use them to rule people falsely in the name of Islam, persons who remain silent and avoid everything, and thus they would avoid such persons, and persons who oppose rulers vociferously and show the truth, and rulers would act violently against them, as Qorayish fought Prophet Muhammad and the early believers, using their scholars who impose faulty notions on Muslims … tyrant rulers base their power on three ways of how to deal with religious scholars: if they agree to rulers, they manipulate such scholars and lavish gifts on them to use them against opposition figures, if such scholars remain silent, the rulers would either ignore them or send them gifts to keep them silent, and finally, if scholars would oppose rulers vociferously and show the truth in their pieces of advice, rulers would accuse them of being from Al-Khawarij and have them killed. We could not stand being near rulers and could not oppose them openly so as not to give them a chance to kill us, and the third choice was the only one left for us: avoidance and shunning …) (40). (… Hence, to keep oneself safe from such tyrant rulers who act blindly and utter nonsense, one is to shun and avoid them, but one is to utter the truth when asked about anything related to religion, and not to help tyrants in their evil ways … When one mingles with people, one is to avoid vices and sins and denounce them verbally, not to remain silent, as this silence is a grave sin in itself, and after denouncing sins, one is to avoid sinners …). Thus, Al-Otaybi chose to shun and avoid rulers at first, and he urged readers of his letters to stop working with the KSA, and he quoted the following Quranic verse: "While the angels are removing the souls of those who have wronged themselves, they will say, "What was the matter with you?" They will say, "We were oppressed in the land." They will say, "Was God's earth not vast enough for you to emigrate in it?" These-their refuge is Hell. What a wretched retreat!" (4:97), and he quoted a hadith asserting a prediction of an age when people would avoid money and persecution and flee to preserve their creed. (…We assert that having jobs inside the Saudi State is forbidden and one should leave one's job as long as the State does not apply sharia laws and calls brethren like ourselves as Al-Khawarij, renegades, urging to kill or imprison us…) (41). In fact, Al-Otaybi knew that his view about jobs incurred the wrath of Saudi authorities and some scholars issued fatwas to arrest and kill him, as he called to stop having salaries, within governmental jobs, from the KSA ruled by 'infidels' and apostates. Thus, he used Salafist thought to oppose and undermine the legitimacy of the KSA: (… Corrupt scholars assert that they assumed such jobs to serve Islam and guide Muslims; this is a falsehood … and they blame those who forsook their studies and jobs as if they were forsaking Islam; this shows how corrupt scholars are mere ignoramuses who lacked insight … real Islam has dwindled and it lacks supporters …)(42). Al-Otaybi prohibits his readers to join or work in the police stations and supports his views using hadiths: (… We conclude from such hadiths that they apply to Saudi authorities now, and the best stance is to avoid them, as no obedience is due to those disobeying God, and one must resign from any governmental posts … We see that the quoted hadith here applies to most princes who talk falsely and act sinfully, but no one dares to advise them out of fear and awe … their fearful fate is in eternal Hell, indeed …) (43). We conclude from such a stance of Al-Otaybi that he incited citizens to stop being loyal to the KSA, even to leave their influential posts. Hence, avoidance call of Al-Otaybi had its political aspect, using words to declare one's avoidance and not just to deny sins of others, especially rulers, in one's heart.

From avoidance to condemnation:

Al-Otaybi asserted that obedience must be for rulers who apply Islam and pray regularly in public, even if they live in sins and debauchery, but subjects must declare their disowning of the sins of rulers in their hearts, using words of their mouths, and by changing sins by their hands if they possibly can. What was important for Al-Otaybi was to apply sharia laws, but he pinpointed the fact that Muslim rulers of today are not imams to be followed: (… We have provided evidence to prove that Muslim rulers of today are not imams to be followed, as they are not from Qorayish tribe and they never apply religion and sharia laws, and they took fealty by sheer force and not willingly by people, and we implore the Almighty to help us get rid of such rulers …) (44). Hence, according to Al-Otaybi, all regimes in Muslim lands are infidel, sinful, and a vice that must be changed by force as per hadiths. Did Al-Otaybi declare rulers as apostates?

From avoidance and condemnation to declaring others as apostates:

Al-Otaybi admits that declaring others as apostates is a dangerous notion: (… One is to take very careful thought before pronouncing, judging, or declaring others as apostates, and one is to leave it to erudite sharia learners and scholars, but we notice that the ignoramuses declare rulers as following footsteps of Moses' Pharaoh or the Anti-Christ, while supporters of such same rulers exaggerate and liken them to pre-Umayyad caliphs …). Hence, Al-Otaybi deplores in his writings those who easily declare others as apostates as per their whims and changeable stances and fickleness. Did Al-Otaybi fall into the same trap? His writings show that he was among those who change their stances as per changing conditions and circumstances; his early letters show he felt that it was abhorrent to declare others as apostates, even rulers, but he did that in his late letters, especially when his conflict with the KSA deepened: (… We do assert that Muslims rulers of today must be avoided and disobeyed and their fealty annulled, but we are not to declare them as apostates, as some of them perform prayers indeed … they are to be declared as infidels if there would be sufficient proofs of sins and misconduct that shoe they forsook Islam, and such declaration of their being infidels must be made in public so as to make one avoids being among the hypocrites who will suffer in the inner-most depths of Hell …) (45). But he soon contradicts himself when talking about some princes: (… The quoted hadiths here apply to most Saudi princes who utter falsehoods and deny sharia and no one dares to advise them out of fear and awe … May God smite them all in Hell as a well-deserved punishment …) (46). We see here that Al-Otaybi implies that the Saudi rulers are infidels, but his late letters show this clearly without implying, as he used fatwas of Wahabi imams, especially Ibn Abdul-Wahab, about things that make their doers forsake Islam, seeing that such things apply to the Saudi rulers: (… One is an n infidel if he did not declare polytheists as apostates or if he tried to correct their faulty doctrines instead of converting them by force to Islam …). Of course, he meant Wahabism. (… One asks here why Saudi rulers did not declare worshippers of Ali and his wife and children as infidels and apostates … why Saudi rulers did not apply this verse: "O you who believe! The polytheists are polluted, so let them not approach the Sacred Mosque…" (9:28)? We see that Shiite polytheists fill cities of Mecca and Yathreb, and the Saudi king is very lenient with Shiites of the south and of Al-Ahsa, and takes zakat alms from them to the poor, as though they were true Muslim …). Hence, Al-Otaybi resented the fact that the Saudi king allowed Shiites to perform pilgrimage and accepted their zakat and deal with them leniently as his faithful subjects, whereas Ibn Abdul-Wahab, Ibn Baz, and other scholars considered the Shiites, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, the late Egyptian president, and Habeeb Bourguiba, the late Tunisian president, to be infidels: (… We remind Saudi rulers that they greet Bourguiba within Islamic feasts as if he were Muslim, despite the fatwa of Ibn Baz that he was an enemy of Islam who criticized the Quran … Why King Feisal prayed for the soul of Abdel-Nasser after his death, despite the fatwa of Ibn Baz that he was an enemy of Islam, and the sheikh never revoked his fatwas … We beseech Ibn Baz to decide and declare his final stance regarding such important and vital issue to all Muslims bearing in mind the following verse: "And do not argue on behalf of those who deceive themselves. God does not love the deceitful sinner. " (4:107)…) (47). This means that Al-Otaybi used Ibn Abdul-Wahab and Ibn Baz to declare Saudi rulers, and all Arab rulers, as apostates, thus falling into the same trap he warned against in his early letters. He followed his whims in declaring Shiites as infidels, and he adopted Salafist notion of declaring others as infidels, as if Salafists were deputized by God to judge people before the Day of Judgment.

From declaring others as apostates to military rebellion and the invasion of the Kaaba Mosque:

Within the Salafist culture of Al-Otaybi, declaring others as infidels entails fighting them and killing them off if they refuse to convert to Wahabism, as Wahabi jihad entails force to change and remove vice. Al-Otaybi saw that the KSA regime was a vice to be removed by sheer force within legitimate jihad following Wahabi sharia laws. Of course, he could not face the Saudi army with his men, and thus, he choose to invade and occupy the Kaaba Mosque to declare his men and his Mahdi to the whole world; he knew quite well that his military movement will not stand and will not succeed, and he might be killed, but he insisted to send his Salafist message, ignored by the Saudi State, to the whole world to gain moral victory in terms of culture and intellect instead. He knew he was on a suicide mission that will end in his death sooner or later. He felt the urge to do this; the Najd Brothers failed and were betrayed by Abdul-Aziz, which was because they knew little about faith and jurisprudence unlike scholars of Abdul-Aziz. Al-Otaybi insisted on avenging the death of the Najd Brothers and achieving moral victory over Saudi rulers and scholars based on his knowledge of Wahabi creed, even if this meant his certain death. Of course, Al-Otaybi believed in avoidance and condemnation but he wanted to perform his suicide mission to prove his point before he died; he knew in advance that his invasion of the Kaaba Sacred Mosque would not last for long. This indicated that he changed his mind and decided to collide with the Saudi authorities; he felt disappointed with Ibn Baz and other scholars who flatter rulers and did not wish to declare the Wahabi truth in public, as we read in his final letters and the harsh style he adopted in it: (… Applying sharia and creed would not be by flattery and silence, but by declaring the truth outspokenly and vociferously to all people, while being ready to bear the consequences of being tortured, persecuted, imprisoned, or put to death … Those who try but would not succeed in this life will attain Paradise in the Hereafter, and they are not to run away from hardships and persecution … They are not to ally themselves to unjust rulers and flatter them like hypocrites for the sake of money …) (48). We see here that Al-Otaybi felt weary of those reluctant to join his movement and military action, and that he knew he could not defeat the KSA militarily but must achieve moral victory by drawing the attention of the whole world. He writes the following to those men of his group who left him to join the side of the Saudi State to attack it later on (… Saudi rulers care only for people's obedience, and not for the fact if they follow Islam rightly or not, and they tolerate people of other doctrines and creeds … they deceive Muslims to establish their Saudi State firmly and not an Islamic caliphate … Prophet Muhammad managed to establish his state in Yathreb by shunning and avoiding polytheists, killing and holding captive very few persons, whereas Al-Saud family deceived thousands of Muslims and killed off thousands of them in acts of betrayal and treachery …)(49). This shows that some of the men in the group of Al-Otaybi deserted him by trying to join the KSA to attack it from within in the nearest chance possible later on, or so they told him. Al-Otaybi was sieged by those who deserted him and the Saudi intelligence and security men chasing him; he had to hasten his pace and invade the Kaaba Mosque, as he would not die unless after he would hammer his message home to the Islamic world. He added his imprint in the last chapter of the struggle between the Najd Brothers and Al-Saud royal family. To what extent his ideas were similar to those of the Najd Brothers?

Between the condemnation done by Al-Otaybi and that done by the Najd Brothers in the reign of Abdul-Aziz:

Circumstances and conditions differed between the era of Abdul-Aziz and his Najd Brothers in compassion to the era of Al-Otaybi; modernization was an issue taken for granted and all Salafist scholars use modern inventions and consume products of the West, no longer thought to be diabolical or devilish as the Najd Brothers used to think. Despite the Salafist thought of Al-Otaybi, he never condemned importation of modern products from the West, but he was annoyed by the term ''modernizing Wahabism'' to make it cope with modern civilization and help in keeping good relations with other non-Muslim nations in tolerance, as allying oneself to the West was deemed by him as an affront and unforgivable crime an sin in Wahabi ideology. Hence, Al-Otaybi agreed to the thought of the Najd Brothers in that respect: (… There is no such as thing as modernizing Islam in dealing with other countries … We know but one Islam that came to us via Prophet Muhammad: we are to stop dealing and interacting with polytheists and infidels and we are to show enmity toward them … to show to them they are wrong … the notion of the East mingling with the West by the work of infidels has nothing to do with Islam … let apostates and rejecters of faith live in the West as they please …) (50). Al-Otaybi asserts in his letter that the Abrahamic creed of Islam is based on devoting one's life and acts of worship to God alone and that includes disowning polytheists and deeming them as enemies. Hence, despite changed conditions and eras between the time of Al-Otaybi and that of Abdul-Aziz, as Al-Otaybi lived in the era when Saudis consume West products and use modern inventions, there are no differences whatsoever between the stance and notions of Al-Otaybi and those of the Najd Brothers in terms of rejecting the Saudi alliance with the West. Al-Otaybi repeated the condemnation of the Najd Brothers of Abdul-Aziz because of his good relations with Shiites inside the KSA and with the Christian 'infidels' of the West. This shows that Al-Otaybi followed the footsteps of the Najd Brothers and their Salafist notions based on predictions hadiths like the Anti-Christ and the Signs of the Hour etc. especially hadiths about those forsaking Sunna and allying themselves to Europeans, as two features applying to Al-Saud family, especially Abdul-Aziz, in views of Al-Otaybi: (… People of monotheism (i.e., the Najd Brothers) were killed by Abdul-Aziz because they insisted on following sharia by going on with their jihad for God's sake …) (51). Al-Otaybi addresses here scholars who live off money gifts lavished on them by princes and rulers: (… When one asks a sheikh about the source of his money, he would not tell you that this money is gotten from conquests and fighting infidels in Arabia, but would tell you that he received it from the rulers for issuing a fatwa to allow embassies of infidels to be built in the KSA … and allowing room for Shiites to live inside the KSA instead of converting them to Islam …) (52). Al-Otaybi accuses all Arab rulers of being hypocrites: (… All such rulers are hypocrites who ostentatiously pose as Muslims while they ally themselves to the infidels and polytheists like Christians, Jews, communists, and Shiites, who are all enemies of Islam … all rulers unite in this and in fighting real preachers who call for Islam and application of sharia laws …) (53). Al-Otaybi hides not his deep-seated hatred toward Saudi Shiites, and he resented the fact that the KSA did not force them to convert to Wahabism, and he saw that Shiites are like any infidels and polytheists of the West; he mocks the KSA here: (… Our country and our scholars have deceived the citizens when they assert that the KSA is a state of monotheism, despite the existence of Shiites and allying the West infidels and their fighting the true Muslims killed by the UK and Abdul-Aziz (i.e., the Najd Brothers) while being lenient with those who worship Ali, his wife, and his sons …) (54). Al-Otaybi declared Saudi rulers as apostates for merely allowing Shiites to perform pilgrimage (55). He imitates the Najd Brothers, when they rejected modern clothes and inventions, in rejecting and condemning TV and media and photography as diabolical items and Signs of the Hour: (… People of the wrong delude us with a deluge of sins like radios that began with reciting the Quran and news, and ended in airing female voices … TVs began to show unveiled women on screens, along with airing of lewd songs…) (56), He condemned as well pictures on coins and banknotes as well as banks in general as a an invention of usury coming from West, as Signs of the Hour and the nearness of Judgment Day: (… The Saudi rulers claim that they rule with Quran and Sunna and yet they allow banks of usury and put photos on coins and banknotes … this is indeed one of the Signs of the Hour entering every house …) (57). We see here Al-Otaybi hated the photo of Abdul-Aziz on Saudi coins and banknotes and resented the fact that even Salafist scholars keep statues, pictures, and photos in their homes without distorting them (58). Al-Otaybi had reminded his readers in his last letters that bad corrupt scholars trim their beards and wear refined short clothes, unlike commands of Sunna (59). This reminds us of Feisal Al-Daweesh claiming he cut off a piece of the long gown of Abdul-Aziz using scissors. Al-Otaybi revived the notions of the Najd Brothers in opposing the Saudi rulers, even after 50 years of their being killed by the UK. He repeats the same items of their opposition and condemnation of Al-Saud family using traditional Wahabi thought. The only difference was the fact that the Najd Brothers knew little of Wahabism, unlike Al-Otaybi who delved deep into it. That was why Al-Otaybi managed to embarrass the KSA and all his foes, and scholars could not openly refute his views inside his letters.

The methodology of Al-Otaybi in his writings:

Al-Otaybi wrote his letters within different conditions and circumstances; contradictions fill his writings regarding relations with the Saudi authorities, but the main feature in all his letters is his being influenced by Salafist books of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Al-Qayyim, among other scholars of the extremist Ibn Hanbal doctrine, as well as writings of Ibn Abdul-Wahab whom he tried to imitate in terms of style of writing. Al-Otaybi even summarized views of Ibn Abdul-Wahab and other ancient scholars, and both their styles and his merged and overlapped sometimes, unless he would wrote that he quotes so and so. Al-Otaybi used views of imams that support his points of view, and Ibn Baz told him many times not to use such views regarding his foes in the Saudi State; yet, Al-Otaybi and his notions coped with traditional Salafist notions of hating Shiites as well as Jews and Christians and declaring them as infidels and disbelievers whom are not to be allies or friends to Muslims (i.e., Wahabis), as asserted by Wahabism and ancient scholars. The only dangerous problem in Al-Otaybi and his writings was that he wanted to apply his notions by committing a grave sin: he invaded and occupied the Sacred Mosque and terrorized people in it; he justified his crime using hadiths of predictions and Signs of the Hour. He used such hadiths to prepare his men to invade the Sacred Mosque and to declare Saudis as infidels. In his early letters, Al-Otaybi does not focus much on hadiths of predictions and Signs of the Hour, but he did the exact opposite in his last letters to condemn all Saudis and princes and to prepare others for his call about the so-called Mahdi. Such writings lead us to think that he prepared his invasion and planned for it for years in his mind in terms of intellectual and practical levels. He used to quote heavily hadiths of predictions and Signs of the Hour, especially about episodes of turmoil, the so-called Anti-Christ, and the so-called Mahdi and called all Muslims for a general revolt or revolution against all Arab regimes to create caliphate later on with big endeavors (60). In other letters, Al-Otaybi explains how such hadiths predict Al-Saud and West powers interfering in Arabia; he had to hasten the emergence of the so-called Mahdi in Mecca to start his desired revolution and to make room for fighting European infidels as per predictions hadiths of Salafism (61). Al-Otaybi asserts in his last letter that since the Saudis allied themselves to European Christians, sooner or later, predictions hadiths will be fulfilled as the Christian 'infidels' will fight Muslims and betray them (62). This shows that Al-Otaybi prepared his readers and his followers for his military action in Mecca, as he links past and present and appeal to the emotional/religious side of his readers in his discourse (63).

A commentary on the methodology of Al-Otaybi in his writings:

Using the Salafist methodology itself, one can easily refute ideas of Al-Otaybi in his usage of hadiths of predictions and Signs of the Hour: Ibn Al-Qayyim himself (1292:1350 A.D.), whom Al-Otaybi quoted heavily and imitated his style in many books, refuted in his writings all hadiths of predictions and Signs of the Hour (64). To prove his point, Ibn Al-Qayyim quoted these Quranic verses: "They ask you about the Hour, "When will it come?" Say, "Knowledge of it rests with my Lord. None can reveal its coming except He…" (7:187). "With God rests the knowledge of the Hour…" (31:34). "Say, "I do not say to you that I possess the treasuries of God, nor do I know the future, nor do I say to you that I am an angel…" (6:50). "Say, "I have no control over any benefit or harm to myself, except as God wills. Had I known the future, I would have acquired much good, and no harm would have touched me..." (7:188). And Ibn Al-Qayyim quoted other hadiths to support his view of refuting and casting doubts on all hadiths of predictions and Signs of the Hour. But Al-Otaybi overlooked intentionally these views of Ibn Al-Qayyim. By the way, Ibn Al-Qayyim contradicted himself in his other books when he asserted the authenticity of the hadiths about the so-called anti-Christ, Mahdi, the second coming of Christ (65). This shows that Ibn Al-Qayyim started a good step of resorting to the Quran alone to refute hadiths, but he retreated son enough and did not go on with this intellectual route. This led to the fact that all Muslims paid a heavy price between the deaths of Ibn Al-Qayyim in 1292 A.D. and of Al-Otaybi in 1979. Even the KSA paid a heavy price for preserving Wahabi and Salafist ideology without correcting, rectifying, or updating it using the Quran and modern age values of democracy and human rights. Thus, the problem still persists and the veritable danger or threat still exists, and likes of Al-Otaybi and Al-Masaary will emerge as long as creative, innovative thinking is forbidden as far as Salafism and Wahabism are concerned.

Footnotes:

1- Al-Yaseeni, "Religion and State in the KSA", pages 101:102, 108:112, 131, 147:151, and 165:170.

2- Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia newspaper: the editorial titled "New Features of the Saudi Foreign Policy", pages 2:9, and an article titled ''Images from the Saudi Terrorism", pages 14:22.

3- Al-Yaseeni, ditto, page 173.

4- Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia newspaper: a study on the political and social status in the KSA, pages 26:31.

5- Ahmed (Rifaat Sayed), "The Desert Saint", pages 65.

Ahmed (Rifaat Sayed), introduction to the book titled ''''Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi", pages 11:13.

Al-Yaseeni, ditto, page 195.

6- Details within the following issues of newspapers and magazines in order of events:

The Lebanese Al-Safeer newspaper, 6^th Feb., 22^nd, 24^th, and 29^th Nov., and 2^nd, 12^th, and 21^st Dec. 1979, 9^th, 10^th, and 20^th Jan., 1980, and 1^st Feb., 1980

The Cairo-based governmental daily Al-Ahram Newspaper: 22^nd, 24^th, 25^th, and 30^th of Nov., 1979

The Lebanese Al-Anwar Newspaper: 16^th Jan., 1980, 24^th Nov., 1979, and 22^nd Nov., 1979

The Kuwait-based Al-Rai Al-Aam newspaper, 23^rd, 24^th, 25^th, 26^th, and 28^th Nov., 1979 and 9^th Dec., 1979

The Kuwait-based Al-Qabas newspaper, 18^th Dec., 1979, and 21^st Nov., 1979

The Lebanese newspaper Al-Dostour, 24^th and 30^th Nov., 1979

The Lebanese Al-Hawadeth newspaper, 7^th Dec., 1979 and 18^th Jan., 1980

Newsweek, 7^th Dec., 1979

Le Monde, 22^nd Nov., 24^th Nov., and 3^rd Dec., 1979

The Saudi Al-Riyadh newspaper: 22^nd, 23^rd, 25^th, 26^th, 28^th, and 29^th Nov., 1979 and 1^st and 4^th Dec., 1979

The Lebanese Al-Nahar newspaper, 21^st, 22^nd, 25^th, 24^th and 30^th Nov., 1979 and 10^th Jan, 1980

The Saudi newspaper Al-Jazeera, 22^nd Nov., 27^th Nov., 25^th Nov., 10 Dec., and 11^th Dec., 1979

The Saudi Al-Madina newspaper, 26^th Nov., 2^nd, 6^th, and 11^th Dec., 1979

The Saudi newspaper Al-Bilad, 24^th Nov., 8^th Dec., and 11^th Dec. 1979

Al-Osboue Al-Arabi newspaper, No. 1058, 21^st Jan., 1980

The Cairo-based governmental Al-Gomhouriyya Newspaper, 24^th, 26^th, and 27^th Nov., 1979

Der Spiegel, 23^rd Dec., 1979

The governmental Cairo-Based daily Al-Akhbar Newspaper, 24^th Nov., 1979

The Economist, 15^th Dec., 1980

The Kuwait-based Al-Watan newspaper, 22^nd Nov., 1979

The Kuwait-based Al-Anbaa Newspaper: 22^nd, 24^th, and 25^th of Nov., 1979

The Lebanese Al-Louaa newspaper, 22^nd Nov., 1979

The Kuwait-based Al-Siyasa Al-Kuwaitiyya newspaper, 25^th Nov., 1979

The Saudi Middle East newspaper, 27^th Nov., 1979

Al-Watan Al-Arabi newspaper, No. 147

The Guardian, 4^th Feb., 1980

Le Point, 28^th Jan., 1980

7- Al-Yaseeni, ditto, pages 201:104.

8- Hiro, "Iran under the Ayatollahs", 1985, London, pages 335 and 336.

Ahmed (Rifaat Sayed), introduction to the book titled ''''Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi", pages 43:45.

9- The Lebanese Al-Safeer newspaper, 9^th of Jan., 1980 and The Lebanese Al-Hawadeth newspaper, 18^th of Jan., 1980.

10- "Islamic Intifada Files: the 7^th Memory of the Invasion of the Kaaba Mosque", Al-Thawra Islamiyya Editions, page 70.

11- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 80.

12- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 6, Part 2, page 364.

13- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 61.

14- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 78:79.

15- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 5, Part 2, page 342.

16- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 80.

17- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 2, Part 2, pages 249:252.

18- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 82:93.

Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 4, Part 1, page 176.

Islamic Intifada Files, pages 69 and 70.

19- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 89:91.

20- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 88.

21- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 82.

22- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 4, Part 1, page 195.

23- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 61 and 62.

24- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 84:96.

25- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 7, Part 2, pages 452:455.

26- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 80:81.

27- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 5, Part 2, page 330.

28- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 6, Part 2, page 346.

29- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 4, Part 1, page 176.

30- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 60:62 and 93.

31- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 83.

32- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 89:91

33- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 57.

34- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 69.

35- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 71.

36- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 67 and 68.

37- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 69 and 70.

38- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 58 and 59.

39- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 70 and 71.

40- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 89:91.

Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 4, Part 1, page 190.

41- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 93:94.

42- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 96.

43- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 80, 81, and 84.

44- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 4, Part 1, page 159.

Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 99.

45- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 95.

46- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 71, 84, 86, and 88.

47- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 8, Part 2, pages 254:256.

48- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 7, Part 2, page 457.

49- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 7, Part 2, page 457.

50- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 4, Part 1, page 189. Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 7, Part 2, pages 451 and 452.

51- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 79 and 80.

52- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 61.

53- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 71.

54- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 88.

55- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 2, Part 2, page 255.

56- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 2, page 216.

57- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 4, Part 1, page 160.

Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 2, page 214.

58- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, page 96.

59- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 2, Part 1, page 135.

60- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 1, pages 74, 79, and 88:99.

61- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 3, Part 1, page 155.

62- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 4, Part 1, page 194.

63- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 1, Part 2, pages 202:218.

64- Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 2, Part 2, page 261. Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi, Letter 5, Part 2, page 322.

65- Al-Jawziyya (Ibn Al-Qayyim), "Al-Manar Al-Manif Fe Al-Sahih Wa Al-Daweef", edited by Dr. Abdul-Ra'uf Saad, edition of 1952, Cairo, pages 240:245 and 192:208.

PART III: The Fundamentalist Wahabi Opposition that Begot Osama Bin Laden: A Brief Historical Accoun

PART III: The Fundamentalist Wahabi Opposition that Begot Osama Bin Laden: A Brief Historical Account

Overview of PART III:

1- This PART III analyzes the Wahabi opposition in the 1990s after the Gulf War, resulting in the emergence of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights whose influence lingers until now, with the emergence of Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda fundamentalist terrorists. We call such persons of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and Al-Qaeda as ''fundamentalists'' to differentiate between them and ordinary Wahabi scholars serving both the KSA and its royal family members. In CHAPTER I of this PART III, we give a brief historical account of how the fundamentalist opposition movements emerged and developed and what the stance of the Saudi authorities and its scholars was, along with factors leading to such state of affairs: modernization, the Gulf War, the Afghanistan War, relations with Sudan, the human rights culture, the Salafist-secular conflict inside the KSA, and finally the natural accumulation of opposition movements. We tackle also the nature of the Wahabi Saudi Sunnite fundamentalism before and after the Gulf War and how it led to the emergence and development of fundamentalist Wahabi opposition movements. We discuss ''the letter of interests'' and ''the advice memo'', and then how the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights was established, along with the response of the Saudi State. We will discuss how the conflict grew fierce between the KSA and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights as it moved to London. We will explain how the founder of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Dr. Al-Masaary, had disputes with his coreligionist and friend in the committee, the opposition leader Dr. Saad Al-Faqeeh, and how the latter had to leave the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. CHAPTER II and CHAPTER III tackle more analyses of the opposition movement led by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

2- In CHAPTER II, we analyze the political conflict between the KSA and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights intellectually and in terms of Wahabi jurisprudence and creed, as the conflict revolved around to obey rulers as per Wahabi scholars subservient to the Saudi State or to obey sharia as presented by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights as a motto to raise itself above the Saudi authorities and the Saudi people as well.

3- In CHAPTER III, we analyze this conflict within the framework of the issue of ''promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'' and how the call of the fundamentalist opposition movement of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights changed its course from peaceful call to the call for violence and terrorism. We analyze the style of the discourse of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and what it condemned from the Saudi internal and external policies.

4- We end PART III with CHAPTER IV, an additional chapter that we have written to criticize the methodology and notions of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights within the framework of the issue of ''promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'' within a Quranic/Quranist point of view, and finally we analyze notions of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights within a sociological point of view.

CHAPTER I: Roots of the Current Fundamentalist Wahabi Opposition Movement

CHAPTER I: Roots of the Current Fundamentalist Wahabi Opposition Movement

Introduction:

1- King Feisal managed to defeat trends of socialism, Nasserism, and nationalism amidst suitable regional and international conditions; as such trends posed a veritable threat to the KSA during the reign of King Saud. The alternative proposed and applied by King Feisal was Salafism coupled with coping with the modern age politically and technologically. Such policies led to the KSA financing, forming, and sponsoring all Wahabi calls, activists, movements, and institutions all over the Islamic world and within international organizations to keep close ties to Muslims in the West countries as well. The KSA sent many students to study abroad in universities of the West to modernize the Saudi society with education and technology to cope with progress in the world. Hence, a new Salafist generation emerged who embraced Wahabism that differed from the one adopted and represented by Wahabi scholars of the Saudi State and that coped with active, revolutionary sort of Salafism adopted by the terrorist MB group in Egypt and its international branches. This new generation used IT and all modern inventions and the language of the modern age to employ them to serve political aims, as we will detail later on.

2- It was possible to postpone the collusion between the KSA and this 'modern' generation of Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalists; writings of that generation assert that they focus on the political education first of the citizens (1) – thus imitating techniques of the terrorist MB group – to form cadres slowly but steadily called scholars of the 'Islamic' awakening to shape the future for the next generations based on the fundamentalist principles. But external factors hastened the pace and date of such collusion with the KSA: the Gulf War, the Afghanistan War, and the relation of the KSA and the Sunnite fundamentalist regime in Sudan. Other factors include 1) the progress in telecommunications that removed barriers, borders, and distances, resulting in lessening of the Saudi State supervision and surveillance. This formed a type of awareness among Saudi citizens about the culture of human rights and made opposition figures inside the KSA easily contact international human rights activists, 2) accumulation of experience within generation who inherited the opposition vein from the Najd Brothers, Al-Saeed, and Al-Otaybi, learning useful lessons from them, especially that such former opposition movements occurred not very long ago; only decades ago within three generations of Saudis, and 3) the Salafist-secular conflict that used to emerge every now and then within the phases of the struggle of the fundamentalist opposition movements and the KSA.

3- We are not to forget the most important factor; this Wahabi opposition movement was much influenced by the terrorist MB group, established in Egypt by agents of King Abdul-Aziz, and its branches mushroomed like cancerous cells all over the Arab world. King Abdul-Aziz forbade the members of the terrorist MB group to ever enter into the KSA; yet, when the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser quelled and oppressed this terrorist group in the 1950s and in the 1960s, many its members fled into the KSA, working there within the fields of education and the Wahabi call. The Saudi generation taught by the terrorist MB group members was influenced by the cunning, deceitful traits of the terrorist MB group members and their ambition to revolt and rule. Yet, the main threat to the Saudi royal family was the fact that this Saudi generation taught by the terrorist MB group members learned one vital notion: authority and power stem from Salafist Wahabi thought and those specializing in it and are NOT derived from the Saudi royal family members. This means that even the Saudi royal family members have to submit to Wahabi sharia laws and scholars, and not the vice-versa, and consequently, Wahabi scholars and preachers are entitled to control fully the external and internal Saudi policies, as in any theocracy. Thus, this Saudi generation resented the fact that the KSA allied itself to the USA and the West in general, as Wahabism contains the notion of re-establishing caliphate and dividing the planet Earth into two camps: camp of war against disbelieving infidels and camp of peace and Islam ruled by Wahabis. Hence, the Saudi opposition at that point aimed at stopping the Saudi royal family members from confiscating and controlling power, authority, and wealth. Of course, this is a nightmare for the Saudi royal family members, but it was the ambitious dream of this Saudi generation which was taught both Wahabi heritage and traditions inside the KSA and natural sciences in the West and its universities and lived there to see what human rights mean. Such generation returned to the KSA to find itself marginalized and excluded from Saudi decision-making circles confiscated and fully controlled by the Al-Saud royal family who appoint only those trust-worthy hypocrites and in-laws. Thus, those ambitious enough to dream of more room of political participation were deprived of it and found in the terrorist MB group members a room for self-expression.

4- We are to remember that King Abdul-Aziz taught Wahabism for the Najd Brothers to manipulate and use them to establish his kingdom, and this in itself made him face the contradiction between re-establishing kingdom of his forefathers within certain territories that he could never go beyond them and Wahabi notions of on-going incessant war all over Arabia and later on all over planet Earth to force human beings to convert into Wahabism under one Wahabi caliphate, a desire upon which the Najd Brothers insisted. Such a dispute led King Abdul-Aziz to enlist the help of GB to exterminate them within Iraqi-Saudi borders, and King Abdul-Aziz had to use his agents in Egypt to spread and propagate Wahabism in it – in the name of Salafism – and to establish the terrorist MB group to replace the Najd Brothers. With the passage of time, the terrorist MB group has posed a veritable danger and threat to the KSA inside its lands. King Feisal spread Wahabism all over the Arab world and the Islamic world and he managed to crush secular and Leftist trends all over the KSA. When Wahabism became the only force inside the KSA, Wahabi opposition movement of Juhayman Al-Otaybi emerged. When Wahabism/Salafism has lingered in the KSA until now and billions of $ have been spent by the KSA to spread and propagate Wahabism (as though the 'true' version of Islam) all over the world even inside Muslim minorities in the West countries, the revolution of telecommunications and constant contact with the West countries led to the emergence of a new Saudi generation impressed and influenced by the international MB terrorist organization; such generation aimed at using Wahabi sharia against the KSA and its Wahabi scholars of Al-Sheikh family and to stop the Saudi royal family members from confiscating wealth, power, and authority.

5- This widespread Salafist trend rose high enough inside and outside the KSA to the extent that tens of Wahabi opposition movements emerged and split out of it and even warred and disputed with one another intellectually, religiously, politically, and militarily. This is typical of the MB terrorist group, with its numerous secret and overt organizations and societies that specialize in the Wahabi/Salafist call, political activism, and military actions. Hence, we conclude that Wahabism as an ideology carries inside itself the factors of split and division, as any group of Wahabis would readily confiscate for itself the Wahabi sharia to declare others in power as illegitimate, unfit to rule, and infidels who would never apply Wahabi sharia. The KSA, which spread and propagated Wahabi ideology all over the planet, is the very first victim of Wahabism, and the KSA will remain as its victim as long as it embraces such ideology and prevents its being discussed and refuted, passing it as if it were the 'only true' form of Islam; a scandalous falsehood that is refuted easily and successfully by Quranists.

6- We are writing this book in 2000 A.D., as the 20^th century ends and a new century comes along with new circumstances and conditions favorable to the learned Saudi generation who is in search of a place under the sun, and it has felt obliged to seek a chance within the opposition movements using and manipulating Wahabism. What are such new favorable circumstances and conditions?

Factors, circumstances, and conditions that led to the emergence and development of the opposition movement that begot Bin Laden:

1- The Gulf War:

Statement No. 3 issued by the London-based Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights says that the crisis of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has revealed the veritable danger within the formation of the Saudi society and State, and all Saudi leaders of reform convened to discuss such a danger. The unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'', who was apparently an unknown leader inside the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, expressed the sentiments of the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights regarding the First Gulf War; as Saudi media ignored the invasion of Kuwait for several days while the event was covered by the international media. Wahabi Sunnite fundamentalists of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and other Saudi opposition movements were surprised to see that the KSA government and royal family sought the aid of the USA without military mobilizing of Saudi youths. Sunnite fundamentalists got news of Saudi contracts to buy arms and weapons from the USA, and they felt that the USA is the supreme ruler in the Middle East region, especially in the KSA, and the very first mission of the USA was to preserve and protect the Saudi royal family. Dr. Al-Masaary mentions in his book titled "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA" that his views of the KSA have been influenced by the Gulf War; namely, he has cited among the many proofs of the illegitimacy of the KSA its deliberate weakening of the Saudi military, causing the country to be weak before its enemies, and its reliance on the enemies of Islam (i.e., the Americans) to defend the KSA. Al-Masaary issued a fatwa to prohibit reliance on infidels to defend Muslim countries against other Muslims, asserting that allying oneself to infidels makes one an infidel. Al-Masaary used in his above-mentioned book the report of the international institute of strategic studies in London, published in 1981-1982, to prove that Saudi military expenditure budget was more than 15 other countries combined and more than the military expenditure of 11 Islamic countries; the ratio of Saudi to American military expenditure was four to one. Al-Masaary has accused the Saudi royal family and high officials of corruption, taking bribes, and stealing public money of the KSA. Hence, we conclude then that the Gulf War was a decisive point in the relation between the Wahabi Sunnite fundamentalist trend and the Saudi regime, as collusion and confrontation were bound to occur; and the KSA had to adopt a new policy of fighting Wahabi fundamentalists inside and outside the KSA (2). Hence, the First and Second Gulf Wars helped shape the fundamentalist Wahabi opposition movements, as we will discuss later on in detail, and it is noteworthy that such Gulf War coincided with the sour harvest of the Saudi relations with Afghanistan.

2- Afghanistan:

The KSA readily and speedily helped the fundamentalist Wahabism in Afghanistan when it waged war against the communist regime that relied on the USSR. Encouraged by the USA, the KSA helped fundamentalists reach Afghanistan and mobilized them into military camps trained to fight fiercely. Such mission was undertaken by Bin Laden, who was to become later on an important icon of fundamentalist Wahabi opposition movements against the KSA. This indicates that the Saudi experience in Afghanistan greatly influenced the KSA and the fundamentalist Wahabi opposition movements inside it. The victory won by Arab militants and jihadists in Afghanistan gave momentum to all fundamentalist movements in the Islamic world, especially inside the KSA. Such jihadists returned to their countries having gained considerable organizational and military experience as well as acquired dangerous intellectual and religious notions. Arab regimes interfering in Afghanistan paid a heavy price for such meddling; the KSA was no exception. Unfortunately, victory won by such jihadists coincided with deteriorated relations between the KSA and Afghanistan; even Saudi media mentioned that the KSA agreed with Pakistan to stop fundamentalists reaching power in Kabul and how the KSA interfered in the disputes between Afghani factions, as some of these factions with secular vein received Saudi financial aid and hided their differences with the KSA. These factions purportedly trained Saudi expatriates to carry and use arms and weapons. On the other hand, fundamentalist opposition movements inside the KSA was looking forward to a new model, before confronting the Saudi State, that differed from the Saudi one and wished that victory in Afghanistan would reinforce Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalist movements inside the KSA militarily and intellectually (3). Al-Masaary mentions in the eighth chapter of "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA" under the title ''The KSA and the Afghani Game'' that he has resented and criticized the KSA in its appointing itself as guardian of all Muslims and paid millions to win over fundamentalist Afghani factions to its side, though it persecutes fundamentalists inside the Saudi State. Al-Masaary has criticized the fact that some Afghani leaders submitted to the KSA; yet, he felt overjoyed when Saudi youths returned home from Afghanistan filled with new ideas of fighting and resisting the Saudi government and regime and its allies. This change of heart occurred despite millions paid by the KSA to the Afghani government (4).

3- The relation between Sudan and the KSA:

Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia Magazine published in May 1992 that 40 armed Afghans attacked the Saudi embassy in Kabul, on 12^th of May, 1992, and analysts considered such attack as proof of hatred and tensions between Afghanistan and the KSA. Meantime, the magazine tackled in the same page the Saudi support for John Garang, the leader of rebels in South Sudan who aimed at separating South Sudan from its North ruling Sunnite fundamentalist nationalist front in Khartoum. The magazine asserted that Zaki Badr, the former Egyptian Interior Minister at the time, who worked in the KSA as a consultant in the field of chasing fundamentalists, foes of the KSA, is chasing Sudanese Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalists inside the KSA. As per this issue of the magazine, the KSA undermined the Sudanese regime economically by banning Saudi investments there. The magazine asserted in a separate highlighted analysis that the Sudanese authorities found Saudi equipment, weapons, and arms within South Sudan territories regained by Khartoum. The magazine asserted that Saudi financial aid to Sudan came to a halt suddenly once Jaafar Nimeiry, president of Sudan, announced that he would apply sharia laws in Sudan. The same decision to stop Saudi financial aid to Sudan went on despite the successive Sudanese governments, even under Omar Al-Bashir, and the magazine gave reasons for it; the USA gave orders to the KSA to that effect, while Egyptian authorities urged the KSA to stop Saudi financial aid to Sudan. Another reason was chiefly that the KSA wanted to be the only force to apply sharia based on its Saudi model in the Islamic and Arab world, while rejecting any other models, especially the Sudanese one (5). We personally tend not to believe this final reason at all. We see that the Saudi experience in Sudan repeated the Saudi one in Afghanistan. North Sudan posed as a future threat to the KSA because of its geographic location near Arabia and the shared creed, culture, and tongue. Let us remember that Sudan witnessed the Khartoum conference held after the 1967 War and within it, Abdel-Nasser and King Feisal made peace with each other and formed an alliance. Nasserism was crushed gradually for the sake of Saudi Salafism and Wahabi ideology to make it expand in Egypt and all over the Arab and Islamic world. This had its influence over Sudan and Afghanistan, giving momentum to Sudanese Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalism, especially when Nimeiry announced in September 1982 laws the application of sharia to obey Saudis controlling Sudanese economy. Nimeiry had to submit to the KSA to seek protection while facing his Leftist, socialist, and communist foes in Sudan. The Saudi influence went on after Nimeiry stepped down after a coup and his successor used to work before within a Saudi Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalist organization whose mission was to spread Wahabism all over Africa. Sudanese Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalism reached power finally when Al-Bashir and Al-Turaby made a successful go in 1989 against a democratically elected government. Yet, the Sudanese Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalism was overambitious; it aimed to reach power and rule the KSA and Egypt. Al-Bashir posed a threat to the KSA and Egypt in this way, especially when the Egyptian Zaki Badr was appointed as we said above as a security consultant to the KSA. He was the sworn enemy and expert of Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalism in Egypt when he worked there as the Interior Minister and used his expertise in the KSA. Hence there were tensions in the Sudanese-Saudi relations that influenced the tensions between the Saudi government and the Saudi fundamentalist opposition movements, as the latter accused the former of punishing Sudan for applying Wahabi sharia. It was a chance to the opposition movements to undermine the KSA based on a falsehood.

4- The culture of human rights and its organizations:

Nasser Al-Saeed was perhaps the very first Saudi man to preach the culture of human rights before its roots became rooted all-over the world after his death. The culture of human rights has become part of the human conscience especially in the West countries that control the politics of the world. When the USSR collapsed along with the European regimes relying on it, the culture of human rights was asserted; it became a tool used by the West, especially the USA, against its foes in, for instance, China, Iraq, and Egypt. It is noteworthy that the West countries, especially the USA, overlook violations of human rights within friendly regimes which are allies to the USA. Governments' making political use of the culture of human rights is regarded as an indicator of how the culture of human rights is part and parcel of international influence over world politics. This is accentuated by the UN and the international community that have made the culture of human rights as part of international laws; all countries all over the world had to sign on it even with reserve. This led to less control of centralized authorities over nations and individuals. Likewise, human rights organizations have now the moral and legal right to interfere to save persecuted ones or groups and to monitor especially women's rights, rights of minorities, human rights activists. The KSA as a Salafist traditional Wahabi regime based on monarchy and doctrinal basis seemed to offer a climate that made human rights activists seek to work inside it even if Saudi authorities were reluctant to help and to agree with that. The KSA never liked to allow human rights organizations to meddle in Saudi affairs, and the Wahabi opposition movements inside the KSA overlooked contacting human rights organizations; yet, such organization took the initiative to contact Saudi opposition figures. With the passage of time, Saudi opposition figures came to trust human rights organizations and to readily contact when the revolution of telecommunications and technological advances made contact so easy and made barriers between Saudi citizens and the outside world dissolve. But we are to remember that even the KSA sent students to learn abroad in the universities of the West even before advances in telecommunications were allowed inside the KSA. Hence, Wahabi opposition movements inside the KSA already had the chance of self-expression and alter on of holding close ties to the human rights organizations, whose role was important in influencing both the Saudi State and the Saudi opposition movements.

5- The Salafist-Secular conflict within the Saudi cultural elite:

Salafist policies of King Feisal resulted in controlling and dwarfing of secular influence and trends inside the Saudi society and government. When Salafist trends inside the KSA, especially the terrorist MB group members, controlled education inside the Saudi State, Wahabi Salafist ideology and trends dominated all social spheres, strata, and classes; especially the influential powerful ones. This caused palpable changes in daily life and a tangible reality in Saudi life and its phenomena in schools, houses, social spheres, etc. aided by a Salafist heritage and traditions. Wahabi symbols and scholars regained their power and influence, whereas secular, liberal, socialist, nationalist, and Leftist trends were crushed; yet, some of the secular figures infiltrated into the Saudi government to make up for the loss of the interest of the masses and citizens, making money by serving the Saudi authorities and giving up their political ambitions and the willingness to change the Saudi society for the better. Thus, Salafist trends dominated almost all aspects in the Saudi society, whereas secular figures had to be content with governmental posts. This atmosphere of containing secular persons was encouraged by the readiness of the Saudi government under King Fahd to seek the aid of secular figures after the catastrophe of invasion of the Sacred Kaaba Mosque in 1979; the Saudi authorities doubted Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalists and never allowed them to assume high positions inside the government. Simultaneously, Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalists never sought to assume political or governmental positions and posts to vie with secular figures, as per the author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'', who was apparently one of the pillars of Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalist opposition movements, as he asserts the contradiction between Salafist dominance in the Saudi society and the absence of Saudi Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalist opposition figures on the levels of media and governmental posts. Such state of affairs led to disputes and resentment later on the level of fundamentalist grassroots and to the desire to revolt which was stirred by the Gulf War (6). Naturally, the Salafist secular conflict accompanied the disputes between the opposition movements and the Saudi government. The secular figures seized the chance to ally thems3lves to the Saudi state to occupy more high positions inside the KSA instead of the Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalists. This was exemplified when the London-based Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights resented the fact that a Salafist sheikh who was the Saudi ambassador in London was replaced by a secular ambassador (7). Of course, Salafist trends consider secular ones as representatives of the West 'infidels'. It is noteworthy that Al-Masaary, who is a political asylee in London and lives in a secular society, mentions in his above-mentioned seminal book that one of the proofs of the illegitimacy of the Saudi State, in his opinion, is allying itself to the secular West countries, in the fifth chapter of his book (8).

The start of the fundamentalist Wahabi opposition movements:

Safar Al-Hawali, Salman Al-Ouda, and Abdul-Mohsen Al-Obeikan:

Before the Gulf War:

1- Before the Gulf War, the KSA witnessed only two important events that drew the attention of the Saudi society within the secular-Salafist conflict. 1) The first event that took the KSA by surprise was that Sheikh Saad Al-Ghamdy opposed modernity in one of his audiotaped sermons that spread all over the Saudi society; he mentions in that tape that modernity is a symbol of secularism, an enemy of Salafism. The widespread of this tape was considered at the time as an evidence of the deep infiltration of Salafism into the Saudi society. 2) The second event that shook the Saudi society to the core was the accusation leveled by one of the royal princes against Sheikh Dr. Aaidh Al-Qarni of being involved in a homosexual scandal, but the Saudi courts acquitted him later on, leading his fame and popularity to rise, an indicator that the Saudi society sympathized with Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalist scholars.

2- Such sympathies were the fruit of education sector inside the KSA dominated by the terrorist MB group members and their likes; leaders and main figures of Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalism took great care not to collide with the Saudi State, as it grew wary of them after the terrorist operation of invasion of the Sacred Kaaba Mosque. The KSA awe, stature, and power were soaring high before the Gulf War, and its legitimacy has not been yet put to question at that point, as per the unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family''. When the Gulf War broke out, many core changes occurred in the relation between the KSA and the Wahabi opposition movements.

Within the First Gulf War (Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait):

1- The Gulf War came as a shock for both the KSA and the Saudi fundamentalist opposition movements. The KSA sought readily and speedily the help of the USA and made Saudi media justify this. More justification was made by making high-rank Wahabi scholars issue a fatwa based on the Salafist notion/motto of ''necessities allow prohibitions''. The fundamentalist Wahabi opposition movements rejected such fatwa as baseless and contradictory with sharia evidence to support it. They insisted that such fatwa is more dangerous than the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the existence of American forces inside Arabia; this fatwa was sign of the imminent collapse of the formal religious institutions on which the KSA leaned to support its legitimacy and raison d'être. Hence, the leaders of Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalist opposition figures decided to replace the Saudi religious institutions in declaring Salafist Wahabi stances and views.

2- Sheikh Safar Al-Hawali began to expose the American project in Arabia without blaming the Saudi formal religious institutions and their fatwas; he focused on refutation of the Saudi pretext of enlisting the help of the USA within two lectures in Jeddah and Riyadh in September 1990. Audiotapes of both lectures spread all over the Saudi society, to the embarrassment of the Saudi authorities and formal Wahabi scholars subservient to the KSA. Simultaneously, Sheikh Salman Al-Ouda delivered a lecture on reasons of collapse of countries, and its audiotape spread within the Saudi society, bearing fears and wishes of the present and the future.

3- Simultaneous with intellectual endeavors of both Al-Hawali and Al-Ouda, among other sheikhs, there were practical efforts that seemed random and superficial: such as the call for supporting Kuwaiti refugees, that never happened inside the KSA, the calls to warn against the aftermath of wars and its influence on societies. Such scattered efforts unified into a popular collective work, led by popular sheikhs like Abdul-Mohsen Al-Obeikan and Abdullah Ibn Jibreen, among others who called for a general assembly open for all inside a mosque in Riyadh, when in the first time in the history of the KSA the gathered men called for organized collective popular work. The gathered men had deputized Al-Obeikan to set the plan and a date for a second assembly similar to the first one.

4- Prince Salman, ruler of Riyadh, tried to urge Al-Obeikan to cancel the next assembly, but Al-Obeikan adamantly refused. Ibn Baz interfered and convinced Al-Obeikan to hold the assembly inside the Saudi Fatwa House instead of the mosque in Riyadh and to confine attendees to a limited number of notable figures, and Prince Salman agreed to attend the assembly himself.

5- Before the assembly took place, the famous Nov. 1990 demonstration of women occurred in Riyadh, as these women demanded their right to own and drive cars and vehicles. Needless to say, fundamentalists saw the events as a conspiracy made by secular persons and the Saudi State to distract fundamentalists and prevent them from holding their assembly. Yet, popular discontent and anger in the Saudi street made them hasten to hold the assembly within conditions stipulated by Prince Salman, who attended it and saw that less than 100 attendees gathered as he wished. Among the attendees was the unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family''. 10000 persons gathered outside the Saudi Fatwa House, where the assembly was held, to support Al-Obeikan, who convinced the gathered men to go home. Prince Salman aborted demands of Al-Obeikan by reiterating the words of Ibn Baz who said that each work has a master, meaning Prince Salman who ruled Riyadh at the time and must manage everything.

6- Thus, the assembly failed, but it was the very first attempt to link fundamentalist students of sharia who oppose the KSA regime with the Salafist cultural elite and Salafist universities' teachers, who formed some sort of Wahabi technocrats, thus combining the high stature of technocrats and the ability to plan by the youths/students supported by the popular discontent.

After the Second Gulf War (liberation of Kuwait and bombardment of Iraq):

1- We are to remember that when the Second Gulf War was about to break out, Saudi Sunnite Wahabi opposition fundamentalists took care to stop their activities so as not to allow anyone to accuse them of weakening the internal front. This lasted until the war ended. This launched a new phase of initiatives that began with the speeches and lectured delivered by opposition sheikhs and scholars.

2- Coalition against Iraq at the time won victory and Saudi media invested the matter for the sake of the KSA to support the Saudi decision to enlist the help of the USA. Thus, Saudi opposition fundamentalists felt that the Saudi media distort their image as if they were troublemakers to be quelled soon enough.

3- Meanwhile, opposition fundamentalists seized the chance of the end of the Gulf War to take the initiative to submit a letter of demands: a pivotal point in the history of Wahabi fundamentalist opposition movements that we will tackle below.

Letter of demands: the very first positive step taken by the fundamentalist opposition movements (conditions and preparations, criticism and analysis, and influence):

1- Since King Abdul-Aziz crushed the opposition of the Najd Brothers, the motto of ''sheikhs know best'' was the order of daily life in the KSA; it means that the rulers and/or scholars were experts and know-all persons and no one dares to question them, unless within written messages sent secretly and discreetly via Ibn Baz, or one would tell Ibn Baz to remove vice himself. The Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalists wanted eagerly to bypass this tradition and send their letter of demands directly to the Saudi ruling authorities in public.

2- At first, Sheikh Abdulla Al-Tuweijri made the first attempt; he wrote the letter of demands signed by about 200 judges, landowners, scholars, and university teachers to send it to the royal family. Among those signed was the unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family''. Sadly, this letter of demands was not ever published or made known to the nation, and it was overlooked by the royal family which grew wary of those who signed it and ordered close watch over them.

3- Once the very first attempt failed, fundamentalists met to discuss the best way to send a letter of demand urging comprehensive reforms discussed in public by all Saudis. They felt the urge to write a short letter that includes everything in one page in a simple language understood by everyone and using sharia terminology. The letter must address the Saudi nation as well as rulers. The letter must have room for signatures of high-rank scholars. The one who phrased the letter of demands was the unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'', and the letter was supposed to be distributed among all Saudis at the same time it reached royal family members. This was the very first challenge to the idea of secretly and discreetly offering complaints. Yet, secrecy in writing and distributing the letter during the lunar Hijri month of Ramadan was needed so as not to abort the project. A timelines was proposed and maintained to collect signatures. The letter of demands was submitted to King Fahd in the lunar Hijri month of Shawwal 1411 A.H.

4- Many Riyadh scholars signed the letter, including Al-Obeikan, Al-Tuweirji, and In Jibreen, and one of them carried the letter to make other scholars sign it in Mecca, Yathreb, the eastern region, Al-Ahsa, and the south region, and then returned to Riyadh

5- 400 signatures were collected and photocopies and then the committee of the letter of demands received endorsement of Ibn Baz, who wrote in a page and a half his support for the demands and advised rulers to take the letter into recommendation and to refer it to high-rank scholars to study the demands and see to their achievement. Ibn Otheimein cautiously wrote another supportive endorsement letter.

6- The London-based Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia Magazine published an edited version of the letter of demands before it reached King Fahd, signed by 40 cultural elite members. This urged the committee of the letter of demands to hasten their pace and to submit the letter to King Fahd in the lunar Hijri month of Shawwal, with an original copy sent to him plus a copy to Ibn Baz, and copies to other sheikhs and princes. All copies carried 400 signatures, with a note that briefed the contents of the letter of demands.

7- Sheikhs including Al-Obeikan, Ibn Jibreen, and Al-Tuweijri submitted the letter to the royal divan in Jeddah and received a receipt of it, and other copies were sent to other princes and notables, in the name of the Shawwal Document.

8- The second step undertaken by the unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'' was to distribute the letter of demand inside and outside the KSA within two weeks once King Fahd and princes and other notables and scholars received it.

9- The unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'' says in this book that King Fahd and the princes were astounded and shocked not only by the content of the letter of demands but also by the huge number of signatures collected from all over the KSA regions without Saudi central intelligence and Saudi authorities knowing anything about it and even about Ibn Baz endorsing the letter. They were shocked further to know that the letter spread all over the KSA by volunteers who distributed in in shops, mosques, hoses, etc. and no security guards managed to stop that effort, until the letter of demands reached outside the KSA to international media. The letter of demands was much talked of by the BBC in London and even a Chinese communist newspaper in Peking commented that this letter of demands smashed the Marxian motto or statement of ''religion is the opium of the masses'', as in the Saudi letter of demands, people made religion as a motivator to mobile the masses to demand justice and reform on all levels by religious scholars who became pioneers of a cultural, intellectual revolt and renaissance. The Saudi authorities tried hard to make some signatories revoke their stances and apologize. Three men apologized secretly out of fear of the angry masses. Saudi citizens talked about the letter of demands for a long time thrilled by it.

10- The Saudi government referred the letter to high-rank scholars subservient to the Saudi authorities who issued a statement to condemn the public distribution of the letter of demands, as advice must be done in secret and discreetly to rulers as per traditions. Yet, fundamentalists of the opposition movements were happy and content as this statement was a kind of acknowledgment of their existence and of the influence of their Wahabi fundamentalist opposition full-fledged movement by addressing the citizens and raise their political awareness by this unprecedented experience. Here, we copy the letter of demands below and then we comment upon it.

(… Peace of God be upon ruler of the Land and custodian of the Sacred Mosque … The Saudi state is distinguished by its declaration of applying the Islamic sharia, and its scholars give pieces of advice to rulers as ordained by God … in such critical times, everyone realizes the need for change and reform the current conditions that brought fearful ordeals and bad times. Hence, we demand our rulers to reform certain aspects as per the list below:

Establishing a Shura Council to discuss external and internal affairs with members of experts in all fields with high moral and ethical standards, who will be independent and will not be influenced by any other body while undertaking their missions.
Submission and phrasing of all regulations, laws, and systems related to economy, politics, administration, etc. as per Islamic sharia laws and annulling all laws that contradict sharia, and this effort must be done within a committee of sharia scholars with deep knowledge and all powers.
Upright nature, devotion, and high moralistic level as well as expertise must be required from all specialists in all fields in governmental high officials inside and outside the KSA; when proved otherwise, such persons must be fired because of jeopardizing Saudi interests and reputation.
Justice and equality must be applied to all Saudi citizens in rights and duties without nepotism, and manipulation of power and corruption must be punished as they are violations of rights that might lead to destruction of societies as we know from Sunna and hadiths.
Seriousness in supervision of responsible officials and holding them accountable for all their actions, while firing corrupt ones who misuse their posts or take bribes or failed to perform their missions.
Applying justice within all social categories and classes, especially by reducing taxes and fees and to lessen State expenditure and resources sapped because of affluence and extravagance, as State expenditure must be prioritized to cover the basic needs first. Moreover, monopoly must be removed as well as illegal appropriation of lands. Banks must be purified from usury to apply Islamic sharia banking.
The KSA needs to establish a strong army equipped with state-of-the-art developed weapons to defend the country without resorting to foreigners.
Saudi media must be rebuilt as per new policies to serve Islam and the Saudi citizens to raise their culture, awareness, and moralistic aspect, while removing anything that contradicts such regulations and aims as per sharia laws.
External policies of the KSA must reflect interests of the Saudi citizens in accordance with sharia laws and Saudi embassies must reflect this trend.
Development of all Islamic / religious institutions inside the KSA to make it independent and perform their missions to the fullest.
Unification of all courts and judicial system bodies to make justice for all within independent bodies to execute court rulings.
Rights of Saudi citizens and society must be guaranteed while removing all obstacles preventing such guarantees so as to ensure and preserve human dignity in accordance to sharia laws. …).

We analyze below the letter and we assess its influence at the time.

1- The letter of demands did not specify how the Shura Council members will be chosen or elected and who will appoint them: the king or the fundamentalists who thought of themselves as guardians of the nations. The latter choice was their aim as will be shown later on.

2- To use sharia laws as a measure stick to all other regulations and laws entails that the traditional Salafist scholars will be in a dilemma; they must use innovative, creative thinking and NOT traditions centuries-old views of ancient scholars to deal with complicated affairs of economy and politics to aim for the general good of the Saudi society. This did not happen so far during the reign of all Saudi kings. The only innovative, creative thinking was done by the opposition figure Nasser Al-Saeed who was a peaceful moderate opposition leader killed by the KSA and no Wahabi scholars would apply his ideas because he was not a Wahabi man.

3- How the people who signed the letter of demands expected corrupt royal family members to punish corrupt officials who received bribery?! They kept secret of the matter of distributing of the letter of demands among Saudi citizens out of fear of being punished or imprisoned! How they would expect rulers to fire their relatives and in-laws?! Such a demand might entail submitting the Saudi government to opposition fundamentalists; this was impossible in the Salafist political thought. No one at this point in the 1990s could suddenly imitate the West secular ways of separating executive, legislative, and judicial authorities within freedom of thought and political action and man-made laws; as fundamentalists considered western laws as disbelief in Islam and their sharia was ancient scholars' views and books unfit for the 20^th century.

4- The same last point applies to the demand to make all citizens equal; this was unrealistic as no one can force royal family members to apply such equality to make them on equal footing with peasants and employees. The matter entails realistic mechanism that would never be within the royal family members. This shows that opposition fundamentalists raised unrealistic mottoes to reach power and authority by sheer deceit.

5- The same objection applies to the other demands (9) because changing radically the State mechanisms entails either to convince the king or to force him to introduce such changes by sheer power that exceeds his.

6- In fact, King Fahd declared his being convinced and issued three royal decrees in March 1992 tacking writing a constitution, establishing the Shura Council, and regions' special laws. It was a modest start of constitutional and political reform of a ruler who had full power to legislate and execute alone without reference to the Saudi citizens.

The letter of demands influenced King Fahd in his initiative of political reform:

1- In 1952 A.D. (1343 A.H.), King Abdul-Aziz established a Shura (i.e., consultation) Council with branches in Mecca, Yathreb, Jeddah, Ta'if, and other cities, but it dwindled gradually until it was abolished when the Saudi cabinet was formed in 1952 as well, until the three royal decrees issued by King Fahd in 1992.

2- King Fahd reacted to the letter of demands by establishing a new system for the Shura council that aimed at widening the base of decision making and giving more powers to supervisory sub-councils to monitor revenues and expenditures of the State and how its money is used and to submit annual report to the cabinet. The Shura council would introduce new system (the royal decree avoided the usage of words like 'law' and 'legislation') and would express views on all State policies, annual reports, development plans, concessions, international agreements, laws, etc. The Shura Council will include 60 experts and specialists chosen personally by the king, and each member will be over 30 years of age and will not combine his membership with any governmental posts. The Shura Council would be held for four years that will be renewable.

3- The regional systems would be giving more powers to governors and rulers of regions to include citizens of the region to participate as members of local councils to discuss issues related to their cities, within 40 articles of law.

4- We give here examples of articles of the very first Saudi constitution formed under the auspices of King Fahd: Article No. 1 asserts that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab and Islamic State whose constitution is the Quran and Sunna and its language is Arabic and its capital is Riyadh. Article No. 6 asserts that the citizens will swear fealty to kings based on the Quran and Sunna to obey him for better or worse, in prosperity and adversity. Article No. 8 asserts that the KSA rule is based on justice, Shura, and quality based on Islamic sharia laws. Article No. 26 asserts that the KSA protects human rights as per Islamic sharia laws. Articles of Part V tackle duties and rights of citizens in education, healthcare, employment, social solidarity, etc. Part VI tackles authorities of the KSA in 28 articles, as the king is the sole reference in all legislative, executive, and judiciary authorities and that the judicial authority is independent and applies Islamic sharia laws (10). Of course, this reform tried to cope with Salafist demands as would suit the dominant culture in Arabia. Yet, the Shura council remained a gathering of the affluent retinue who would not disobey the king; just as retinue of Moses' Pharaoh mentioned in the Quran, and its members had nothing to do with citizens. But it was a good first step in reform in the 1990s.

5- The fundamentalist opposition movement should have made use of the King Fahd reforms to cooperate with the Saudi state to base such reforms as the base of other future reforms to turn decisions into realities. Yet, this did not happen; facing reality and daily life entailed innovative, creative thinking in religious notions to cope with modern age. Such thinking was impossible by Salafists / Wahabis who are tied to bottomless and shoreless ocean of hadiths, fatwas, traditions, ancient teachings and views, etc. especially of Ibn Abdul-Wahab and Ibn Taymiyya. Reforms would entail radical changes in the popular culture and mentality to make people accept reforms. The mentality of the masses in the KSA has been imbibed with Salafist and Wahabi ideology; the ordinary citizen would consider any innovative, creative thinking in religious notions as apostasy. The fundamentalist opposition movement opted for the easier and less successful choice: raising mottoes and banners to declare others /rulers as 'less' Wahabi or faithful in order to make political gains. Thus, the fundamentalist opposition movements went on from the letter of demands to the memo of advice to the emergence of the Committee of defending Legitimate Rights and its disputes with the KSA.

The Wahabi fundamentalist opposition movements and issuing the memo of advice:

Before issuing the memo of advice:

Intellectual attack on the Saudi state by ''the grand tank'' in Riyadh:

1- Once King Fahd issued his royal decrees as a response to the letter of demands, the fundamentalist opposition movement ignored the royal decrees and developed their style and methodology of opposition in a way to attract the masses to convince them that the fundamentalist opposition movement figures would be an alternative to the royal family ruling the KSA. The unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of the Al-Saud Family'' admits that the letter of demands was an important factor of the change strategy; the fundamentalist opposition movements began to care, as a priority, for conveying their message of reform to the masses by all means and to crush the barrier between the fundamentalist opposition movements and the Saudi people via using audiotapes to spread ideas. The first of these audiotapes was nicknamed ''the grand tank'' in Riyadh.

2- This audiotape contains questions about if the KSA applies sharia indeed or not, and it contains messages to the ruling regime, scholars, the army, policemen, etc., and such messages have been phrased in a way to embarrass the KSA and its men. Copies of the audiotape spread fast and secretly all over the KSA and shook every Saudi region. Real religious scholars are no longer the ones appointed by the KSA but they are deemed as such by their deeds, words, and knowledge. The willingness and ability to change vice are no longer confined to rulers, but to all citizens.

3- When the first audiotape spread and achieved success, it was followed by a second one talking about a comparison between what the KSA s and how it should be as a theocracy, in terms of media, the military, politics, economy, judicial system, etc. The unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of the Al-Saud Family'' asserts that this tape raised the awareness of citizens concerning the difference between raised mottoes and banners and practical application of Islamic sharia laws.

4- After the second and last audiotape, a ''university committee for reform and advice'' was formed, and within one year, it submitted its memo of advice.

Memo of advice:

1- The fundamentalist opposition movements created a suitable climate at the time that would accept any surprise, and such movements made good use of surprises to serve their interests, as we conclude from our reading of the events leading to the memo of advice.

2- In the lunar Hijri month of Rajab 1412 A.H., a group of youths sent a letter to Ibn Baz urging him not to support Madrid conference of peace, deemed by them as a betrayal toward Islam. As copies of the letter spread, Ibn Baz had to postpone giving his opinion about the conference, and the Saudi Ministry of Waqfs (i.e., religious endowments) that controlled mosques, ordered preachers not to tackle Madrid conference. One preacher did not abide by this order and talked about it 'neutrally' in the sermon in the mosque of the hostel of Saud University teachers. Discussions following the sermon led to attacking the conference.

3- Riyadh authorities sent for this preacher and reproached him for talking about this topic in his sermon. This preacher in his next sermon attacked the Saudi police that spied on citizens and people admired his sermon. The preacher got fired and was replaced by a new one. People attending Friday congregational prayers at this mosque got angry and channeled their ire toward Saud University teachers and formed a committee to contact the Riyadh authorities. As usual, audiotapes spread talking about this subject. Prince Salman, ruler of Riyadh, refused to meet the formed committee, and so did King Fahd, and the committee had nothing else but to meet routinely once a month with Ibn Baz

4- After meeting with Ibn Baz, the committee members widened the scope of their mission; they demanded that the monthly meeting with Ibn Baz would be turned into discussions of Saudi affairs. Ibn Baz asked the committee to write to him a memorandum about all issue to be discussed. A memo was written, revised, and phrased by the unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'' as well as sheikhs Safar Al-Hawali, Ibn Jibreen, and Al-Ouda. This was the memo of advice, submitted to Ibn Baz via a delegation of scholars and university teachers. Three weeks later, a Paris-based newspaper published the memo of advice, causing the high-rank Saudi scholars to attack the memo of advice and to accuse its authors of slander and bad intentions toward the KSA. The memo of advice was photocopied and spread all over the KSA after such propaganda, and additional letters of Ibn Baz and King Fahd were enclosed with it.

5- The memo of advice included ten parts that tackle Salafist views on the role of scholars in daily life and public life, secular Saudi laws that contradict Wahabi sharia, the urge to reform the judicial system and to make it independent from the Ministry of Interior, human rights violated in the KSA, role of scholars to monitor human rights, economic affairs of the Saudi state and how public money is spent and invested in banks of usury, social injustices and racial discrimination, the conditions of the Saudi military and strategies of reliance on 'infidels' in the West, the spread of nepotism and corruption, red tape and bureaucracy problems, low status of the Saudi media performance and its usage as a tool to spread lewdness and moral degeneration, and finally the KSA external policies that aid enemies of Islam and fight Wahabi preachers.

6- Authors of the memo of advice claimed that they defined problems and proposed solutions to corruption spread in all sectors of life in the KSA. In fact, the memo contained nothing but Wahabi preaching and it offered no realistic solutions to any problems; it never contained any numbers and statistics or documents and plans related to any social or economic problem. This distribution of the memo all over Arabia was seen as a reply to the attack of scholars on it and on its authors, and the memo had been signed by several opposition scholars like Ibn Jibreen and Al-Masaary.

7- The unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'' ignored the reform project proposed by King Fahd in March 1992, as he claimed that the items of the letter of demands were never applied and that the royal family ignored the memo of advice. This was taken as an indication of the falsehood that the Saudi rulers apply sharia and stick to it: (…If the Saudi regime was truthful, it would have used sharia to apply reform offered by the memo of advice and the letter of demands …) (11). This means that the Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalist opposition movement of this committee considered itself as representative of sharia and its views express it. It considered that those who oppose such committee had opposed Islam! This committee considered that it has summarized Wahabi sharia in the memo of advice, as if such a paper written within few days contained the magical solution of all social, political, and economic ailments inside the KSA.

The establishment of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and the stance of the Saudi government toward it:

1- As the KSA regime ignored the memo of advice even when it spread all over the country, the Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalist opposition movement of this committee began to monitor (as if using Hisbah notion) all deeds and words of rulers and the government to see if reforms would be applied or not. This means that the committee made itself a body above the nation, citizens, and the rulers. Soon enough, this small committee expanded and had new members, and it renamed itself the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. This committee allowed no one to criticize and monitor its activities; as if the committee became a minute theocracy of Wahabi scholars raising a false banner or motto of ''helping the wronged ones who suffer injustices''. The following quotes are from the book titled ''The Earthquake of the Al-Saud Family''. (… People can differentiate between what pertains to sharia and what does not in the KSA … We do not need endorsement by rulers to apply sharia laws in Arabia … It is a popular demand to remove all sorts of injustice done to Saudi citizens, and we can cooperate together to achieve this end … All countries around the globe embrace human rights, and even the USA made 1993 A.D. as the year of human rights … and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights carry the same banner to embarrass the Saudi regime and to excel and outdo the West … As the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights has rooted itself to sharia laws as well as human rights …). We conclude then that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights aimed to use banners and mottoes to deceive both the West countries and the Saudis citizens; its real motive was to practice Hisbah (inquisition) with both ruled and rulers in the KSA.

2- Once members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights declared its launch as it emerged as a full-fledged opposition movement, one sheikh of its members was insulted and arrested. Other members held many meetings indoors inside their houses to phrase the founding document of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. Many scholars and sheikhs signed this document including Abdullah Al-Masaary, Al-Tuweijri, and Ibn Jibreen, and choose the name of the committee.

3- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights issued Statement No. 1 to declare its emergence on 3^rd of May 1993. This statement was distributed among all news agencies, and it contained phones numbers of founding members. The BBC phones Abdullah Al-Masaary, the secretary of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, and knowing no English, he passed the phone to his son, Dr. Muhammad Abdullah Al-Masaary, who studied nuclear physics and speaks perfect, flawless English. In the next day, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights chose Dr. Al-Masaary as its spokesman with international media (12). Thus, Dr. Al-Masaary began to rise into fame and became the no. 1 man in the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, the author of most of its publications and statements, and the author of several books vehemently attacking Al-Saud family.

4- Prince Salman sent for 6 members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to come to him in Riyadh, and they signed before him a paper testifying that they founded the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. The high-rank scholars subservient to the KSA issued a statement on 13^th of May, 1993, to condemn the establishment of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, as religious courts do their mission properly all over the Saudi cities. The second reason was that no one was to found any entity without prior written permission of the king, and scholars unanimously asserted that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights members must be punished.

5- Of course, the statement of these scholars was a warning to the quelling and oppression of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights members, who got fired out of their posts and those among them who owned law firms and lawyers' offices or any other business lost their property. Two days later, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Masaary and his son, Dr. M. Al-Masaary, received two men from the American embassy in the KSA. Al-Masaary, the son, met with several journalists of the international media, and the Saudi authorities advised him to stop, but he did not. Hence, he got arrested on 15^th of May, 1993. 30 university teachers formed a delegation to intercede on his behalf to be set free; they met Prince Salman along with a delegation from Al-Qassim scholars, and then met with Ibn Baz. Meanwhile, Sheikh Ibn Jibreen declared his quitting the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights on 25^th of May, 1993, and the Saudi authorities confiscated the property of Al-Ouda and Safar Al-Hawali in Jeddah.

6- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights issued its Statement No. 2 on 25^th of May, 1993, to assert that its members are free thinkers who care for application of sharia and speak in its name using evidence and proofs from it to support their views. They asserted that even if they were wrong in their views, nobody had the right to punish them; sharia views must be refuted with other counter-views. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights asserted that it defends people suffering injustices, and that no country is totally free from a certain level of injustice. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights asserted that it is not a judicial body or a political party and sought no political ends; it sought only to apply sharia and human rights within a frame of Islam, not based on the Western model. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights members asserted that they care for the unity of aims and not to cause any trouble or revolts in the Saudi society; they work to deliver pieces of advice only in a peaceful manner under the Sunnite doctrine (i.e., Wahabism), and the Saudi authorities should stop arresting the members.

7- When the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights changed its tone into peaceful protest and advice, its supporters financed and helped it secretly as some arrested members were not released and their case was followed within the international media. This coincided with a human-rights conference held in Vienna in June 1993. Liberty organization adopted the case of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in its struggle against the KSA, but it had no sufficient information about human rights inside the KSA. That was why Al-Masaary and other members, including the unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'' wrote a report on restrictions on freedom of expression and holding of meetings and the monopoly of power, wealth, and authority by the Saudi royal family members. The report was audiotaped by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. This was the basis of another report by international bodies about freedom of expression and other civil liberties inside the KSA.

8- An arrest wave followed, and among the incarcerated ones were Al-Masaary, Saad Al-Faqeeh, Ahmed Al-Tuweijri as well as the unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family''. Hyman rights organizations, especially Liberty, tackled the topic of such arrest wave. When policemen interrogated them, they confessed to have written and audiotaped several lectures aiming for the general good and peaceful call to apply sharia. All arrested men were released in September 1993. Months later, Dr. Al-Masaary fled to London in 1994, thus the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights began is new phase of opposition from abroad.

9- Of course, the Saudi authorities did not confine the struggle against the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and other fundamentalists by security measures and arrests; King Fahd reinforced the powers given to the Shura Council and gave more powers to high-rank scholars subservient to the KSA within a panel headed by Ibn Baz. King Fahd created the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and the Ministry of Pilgrimage and appointed 210 members of 13 regional councils covering 13 Saudi regions to raise the level of administration and development (13). The formal address of the KSA directed itself to respond to questions posed by human rights organizations, attacking the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights as an illegal entity.

The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights moved to London and struggled against the KSA:

1- Once Al-Masaary released from Saudi prisons, he was smuggled to Yemen and then he went to London, followed by Saad Al-Faqeeh. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights began its fierce intellectual war of ideas against the KSA and attack on the Saudi royal family within the arena of European capitals, international media, and international news agencies.

2- Such intellectual war of ideas began with publications and statements issued by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, starting with Statement No. 3 on 20^th of April, 1994, with news of basing their activities in London from now on.

3- Of course, statements and publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights carried its stances and views on Saudi affairs, especially measures to quell, oppress, and terrorize the members by incarceration. Statements and publications addressed members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights inside the KSA and gave them orders, urging the KSA to release the arrested members. Of course, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights denounced and condemned the Saudi authorities and attracted supporters inside and outside the KSA.

4- Statements and publications would carry a main title related to the main topic tackled; for instance, Statement No. 5 was titled ''A Poet Still Persecuted and Imprisoned'', while Statement No. 9 was titled ''The Saudi Role in Yemen: Will the Nation Revolt?". Since Statement No. 36, titles began to be unified under the words ''Rights Forum'', as Al-Masaary published statements online under that name.

5- Apart from statements, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights issued separate publications from London that were never published before in the KSA, and Publication No. 1 was issued on 29^th of May, 1994, and the last one was No. 44 on 28 of April, 1994.

6- After a halt, Al-Masaary began to issue more publications; as No. 45 was issued on 26^th of April, 1995, and weekly he published them on Tuesdays until Publication No. 158 on 15^th of Nov., 2000. Al-Masaary made publications tackle many political issues in the KSA and the Arab world under the title ''You Have the Right to Know'', and statements would brief what publications would explain in detail. Of course, news banned in the KSA was tackled in statements and publications, as well as orders to members inside the KSA like famous sits-in arranged by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to defy the Saudi authorities.

7- In many instances, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights had received articles and protests of Saudi citizens as well as banned news and rumors that found its way to the statements and publications. Al-Masaary would write his views on Arab issues and affairs like in Palestine and Sudan as well as the UN. Al-Masaary would later on collect his views in a book form published online, with a focus to attack virulently the KSA as well as all Arab regimes in the last years of the 20^th century.

8- Apart from statements and publications, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights issued special letters under the title ''Letters and Orders'' when circumstances entail a certain discourse of a defined course of action. For example, in April, 1994, we find the special title ''Open Letter to All Scholars, Students, and Thinkers'' and in Sept., 1994, we find the special title ''Scholars Address the Nation and assert their Demands''.

9- The internet, facsimile, phones, and other means of communications allowed room for ongoing contact between the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and its supporters outside and inside the KSA and to spread all statements, letters, and orders. This way, Saudi citizens sent easily their complaints and protests against the KSA to the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. This made room for huge anti-KSA propaganda and against the royal family as well. This way, sits-in were arranged inside the KSA and the ultraconservative Saudi society was exposed and was made open via all written items issued by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights that entered every house, human rights organizations, and West media. All such written items are now available on the internet under the title of ''Rights Forum'', on the following link: http://www.cdlr.saudia.co.uk/forumdisplay

10- The two leaders of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights disputed with each other, until March 1996 when Al-Masaary received and leveled mutual criticisms with Saad Al-Faqeeh. Each leader, and men under each of them, caused disputes to escalate for one year and a half, over financial and managerial issues as well as intellectual and political differences. The main difference was that Al-Masaary wanted to change the KSA by force and armed jihad and calling for military rebellions, whereas Saad Al-Faqeeh was similar to the terrorist MB group in their hypocrisy, flattery, and dealing realistically with the Saudi royal family and government.

11- Saad Al-Faqeeh and his men left the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights which was headed solely by Al-Masaary now, as each leader, and his men, accused each other of being spies, traitors, and agents of the West. Al-Faqeeh formed another group called the Islamic Movement for Reform, and spread its ideas using a new radio station, whereas Al-Masaary went on writing books, statements, and publications (14).

12- Al-Masaary went on writing books, statements, and publications online in London, and he became the only spokesman and representative of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights until now as we write this book (2000 A.D.) according to Publication No. 151, and he launched a new website: http//www.cdlr.net

13- All writings issued by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and news about it in international media and human rights organizations will enable us here to trace the features of the struggle between the KSA and the (Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalist) Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in the 1990s.

The Saudi means of fighting the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights:

The Saudi government formed a supreme committee, headed by Prince Nayef, in June 1994, to follow the activities of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, with the results detailed below.

Arrest waves:

1- Unprecedented big arrest waves against fundamentalist opposition figures occurred in the KSA at the time, and the Saudi authorities in some cases re-arrested released ones, especially relatives of Al-Masaary and those who aided him to flee to London as well as persecuting the family members of Al-Faqeeh, and names of people arrested were mentioned in Statement No. 15 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, whereas a Saudi statement issued in 1994 mentions names of 110 persons incarcerated in Saudi prisons.

2- It is noteworthy that the Saudi authorities used to have justifications by scholars to persecute and prosecute members and supporters of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. Ibn Jibreen who left it and returned to the government issued a statement in 1994 criticizing the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and urging citizens never to read its writings. The same warnings were uttered and written by Ibn Otheimein. The Saudi Ministry of Interior issued a statement in 1996 to warn others against a deterring punishment in case of distributing writings of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. Publication No. 123 in 1997 written by Al-Masaary tackled the arrest of people accused of owning and distrusting writings of Al-Masaary or contacting him, and mentioned the arrest of fundamentalist Sunnite Wahabi opposition leaders Sheikh Al-Ouda, Safar Al-Hawali, and Yahiya Al-Yahiya and denaturalized Bin Laden.

3- Minister of Interior, Prince Nayef, asked for the view of Ibn Baz about lectures of Al-Ouda and Al-Hawali; he urged Ibn Baz to offer sharia justification to persecute and arrest both men. Ibn Baz sent a letter to him saying: (… Reading all lectures and sermons of both sheikhs, and after many discussions, we urge the authorities to ask them to repent and to prevent them from preaching ever again to any sort of gatherings …). A year later, in Sept. 1994, the statement of Interior Ministry came as follows: (… The Interior Ministry suspended and arrested both Al-Ouda and Al-Hawali and 108 off their followers to preserve internal security in the KSA…). Of course, the statement did not mention anything about trying them; only it referred to setting them free after interrogations and urging them to sign papers to promise never to repeat their 'crime'.

4- A huge campaign organized by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights inside the KSA against Saudi authorities because of eh arrest of the two sheikhs (17), and this campaign reverberated inside and outside the KSA, as human rights organizations and Amnesty International attacked the KSA in their reports because of the secretive suffering and fear spread within Saudi citizens who were forced to remain silent, with the motto of "stop the secrecy: stop the suffering". According to such reports, the arrested ones were not accused of anything and remained incarcerated from 1994 to 1999 without fair trial. Minister of Interior declared that they were arrested after one year of many attempts to make them repent from extremist stances and views as well as activism that threaten the unity of Muslims inside the KSA, and that they will be released very soon as they stopped their criticisms of the KSA (18). Publication No. 70 in 1995 by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights mentioned that the KSA promised London not to harm the incarcerated ones as well as not to harm Saudi opposition figures in London, but the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights accused the Saudi king of attempting to assassinate Al-Masaary and of trying to buy back certain members.

Denaturalization of Bin Laden:

1- Saudi authorities denaturalized Bin Laden in April 1994 as he is the leader of Sunnite Wahabi terrorist groups in Afghanistan and because of his connection with and support of opposition movements inside the KSA. Bin Laden had refused to obey orders of the KSA about not to invest his money in Sudan. Minister of Interior issued a statement about Bin Laden: (… His irresponsible acts caused much harm to the KSA and its relations with Sudan and he never obeyed orders given to him, and we denaturalized him as per article No. 29 of the statute of Saudi nationality …). The family of Bin Laden disowned him at the time, and it was rumored that he lived in Sudan under the protection of its president Omar Al-Bashir (19).

2- Peter Arnett of the CNN interviewed Bin Laden in March 1997, and Bin Laden criticized the Saudi government that submits to the USA and he protested the incarceration of Saudi opposition fundamentalists, and this was the reason he refused orders to come back to the KSA and lived for 5 years in Sudan before going back to Afghanistan.

3- On the other hand, Publication No. 2 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights mentioned that Bin Laden was prevented from ever entering the KSA again, in fact, and in Publication No. 3 asserted that the KSA trained an assassination group to get rid of Bin Laden, while in Publication No. 124 in 1997 asserted that Bin Laden, in his interview with Hamid Mir, opposed and criticized both the USA and the KSA and urged jihad against them both. Al-Masaary asserted in his writings that he defends and supports Bin Laden and would never cut relations with him.

Other measures to fight the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights:

The Saudi authorities did not confine its measures to arrest waves and denaturalization; they confronted the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights many times in London, as we detail below.

Electronic confrontations:

The Saudi authorities attempted many times to hack emails of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and to discover bodies contacting it in London and studies the means to stop channels of communications with the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, and when that was revealed to be impossible, they watched closely all outgoing and received calls and faxes. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights urged its supporters to contact it within the safe online means, while the KSA managed to control the facsimile of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to send untrue documents, causing confusion to fundamentalists. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights had to assert that it did not send such false documents and information (20).

Media confrontations:

1- Many measures were taken within the Saudi media, just as Ibn Jibreen who issued a statement against the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in 1994 and so did Ibn Otheimein in the same year. Other scholars talked against the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in the Riyadh newspaper in 1995 (21).

2- The Saudi authorities hired some journalists and newspapers in the Arab world and in the West to verbally abuse and to criticize the Committee of Defending Legitimate. A secular Arab writer verbally abused in his articles under the title ''War against the KSA'' both the Saudi formal religious institution and scholars and the Committee of Defending Legitimate. He wrote that both are in one trench of backwardness and that the opposition movement was born out of the Salafist bodies anyway. This secular writer called the Saudi cultural elite to ally themselves with the KSA against all Salafists and Wahabis. In an article of his titled ''Stupidity of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights'', this secular writer vehemently attacked it as it manipulates the oppressed Saudi citizens and misuses their dreams and that it attacks the West and its values despite their London residence. He attacked Al-Masaary in another article as he dreams of rule, power, and authority and thus he poses as more extremist than Wahabis inside the KSA and its formal religious institution. He accused Al-Masaary of masterminding some terrorist operations in Riyadh. In another article, he incited the Saudi authorities against formal religious institution, calling for more curbing and restricting it and to make all centralized power in the hands of the State. In another article, this secular writer attacked a newspaper called ''Al-Moslemoon'' (i.e., the Muslims) as it propagates extremism and fanaticism turning the lives of people into veritable hell with its fatwas. This secular writer virulently attacked Ibn Baz because of his erroneous views and fatwas and called the Saudi authorities to fire him because Ibn Baz could not cope with the modern age and because Ibn Baz attacked The French writer and philosopher converted to Islam Roger Garaudy, and he praised the Saudi ambassador in the UK. He attacked Al-Masaary in a series of articles and refuted his book ''The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA". In another article, this secular journalist called the Saudi royal family to desert Salafist Wahabi ideology and to ally themselves to secular elite members (22).

Salafist confrontations:

The above-mentioned secular writer perhaps represented a wing of the Saudi authorities; as measures have been taken later on to marginalize some Salafist bodies. Such measures were mocked by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and to deride the fact that in 1994, the Saudi authorities established the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, headed by the Defense Minister Prince Sultan (23). Of course, scholars loyal to the KSA were employed to attack the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, especially Ibn Baz.

Economic confrontations:

Such aspect was done via controlling charity and donations so as not to allow the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to receive any money from inside the KSA. Hence, Al-Masaary attacked what he called stopping and preventing charity, especially in the pilgrimage season, to make the royal family fully control charity work inside the KSA (24). However, such measures did not stop money donations to the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights; as bank accounts numbers of it are written on the website.

Political confrontations:

A) The KSA urged the UK to deport Dr. Al-Masaary:

1- Al-Masaary became a source of annoyance to the KSA because of his close relations with human rights organizations and international media in the West, especially that the USA in 1994 criticized harshly the violations of human rights in the KSA and Saudi officials would have to defend the Saudi stances before human rights organizations that get their information from the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. Hence, the KSA urged the UK to expatriate Al-Masaary from London, as we conclude this from declarations of Prince Nayef in 1994, as he warned against renegade fundamentalist campaigning against the KSA in London to jeopardize British-Saudi relations. In the 1994 publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Al-Masaary mentioned that media banned the news about the refusal of the British Interior Ministry to make Al-Masaary a political asylee in the UK as the Saudi authorities pressurized the UK to the extent of freeing all contracts between the KSA and the UK, a threat that forced the British side to postpone granting political asylum to Al-Masaary.

2- In March 1995 A British court refused a request of the British government to deport Al-Masaary to Yemen. In 1996, the British authorities ordered Al-Masaary to move to the Dominican Islands, because the Saudi ambassador in London threatened that the KSA would cut all economic ties with the UK and to make deals with other European countries if the British side insisted on granting political asylum to Al-Masaary, and the latter resorted to British courts that forced the British government not to deport him. Eventually, the British Ministry of Interior refused to grant political asylum to Al-Masaary but gave him a renewable 4-year period to stay in London. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights mentioned in its statements and publications that this was deemed a victory celebrated by its members (25).

B) The KSA went on with its reform policies:

1- Apart from confrontations against the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and its supporters inside and outside the KSA, King Fahd went on with reform policies and reinforced the Shura Council whose first session was on 3^rd of Jan., 1994, to discuss Islamic, social, and healthcare issues and to decide to form eight committees. King Fahd in 1994 made radical changes in ministries and appointed 10 men below the age of 50 who got their degrees in the USA as ministers whose expertise in their specialties was the criterion to choose them.

2- King Fahd admitted twice in May 1994 in Yathreb and King Saud University that mistakes have been committed in the previous reform projects (26) and that more reforms were underway to surmount admitted past mistakes.

The means of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to confront and struggle against the KSA:

1- If the KSA had power, authority, and hegemony, and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights had none of that, it had a more powerful tool; the power of the written word in an age that respects freedom of expression and human rights. Means of confrontations adopted by the KSA against the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights did not affect Al-Masaary much; he gained control of the struggle against the KSA for a long time until other members left the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights after long disputes with him, and we are not sure if such disputes were caused by the KSA or not. In sum, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights still stands as we write this book now (in 2000 A.D.) and continues to oppose the KSA and never ceased to find chances to attack and condemn the Saudi regime, even during pilgrimage season, as we read in Publication No. 45 in 1995.

2- We detail below the means of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to confront and struggle against the KSA

Means of modern technology:

1- Statement No. 22 tackled Sheikh Abdul-Aziz Qassim (we personally believe that he was the unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'') in Oct. 1994 because he participated in an excellent manner in the intellectual endeavors of reform and how to apply sharia by his special writings within the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, despite the fact that he never preached from any pulpit or used audiotapes to reach thousands of people.

2- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights used mainly facsimile and urged its supporters inside the KSA to use it in the Statement No. 26 in 1995 to receive orders and to exchange information.

3- Within the Publication No. 3, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights sent to its supporters inside the KSA a new way to contact it via phones without making such international calls appear in phone bills by using certain cards, and Publication No. 6 asserted the success of such means to keep the identities of supporters secret in the KSA so as not to allow authorities to persecute them. Hence, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights received incessant phone calls and faxes with useful information all the time.

4- The KSA tried in vain to intercept and interrupt such calls and communications, and when the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights announced it will launch a satellite channel, the Saudi authorities confiscated satellite dishes from all over the KSA within one month (27).

Means of poetry:

1- Supporters of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights inside the KSA used to compose poems for political purposes of condemnation and attack of the KSA and to express wishes for introducing reform, and many poets were incarcerated. Poetry retains its power and widespread in Arabia, unlike the case in other Arab countries. Such long and short poems were called ''the awakening verse'' and names of many poets of it were known and other poets remained anonymous.

2- It is noteworthy that supporters of the KSA used the same method and composed poems whose poets were anonymous to condemn, deride, and attack Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalists of the opposition movements, and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights considered such poems to be fabricated by the Saudi police and central intelligence.

3- Al-Samir was a poet persecuted by the Saudi authorities because of his poems supportive of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and deriding the royal family and the Saudi regime, and he had to flee the KSA and to send his poems home. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights took pride in him and in his poems, especially the ones deriding Saudi princes (28).

Means of Salafist ideology:

1- Naturally, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights used Sunnite Wahabi Salafism as the main tool to wage intellectual wars against the KSA to refute views of formal Saudi scholars, subservient to the Saudi State regarding the opposition and to invoke God's wrath within prayers against the KSA in the writings of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

2- Indeed, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights had outdone formal Saudi scholars in tackling Salafist thought an ideology and using it to refute Saudi claims and scholars' views on all issues to embarrass them as ignoramuses and to embarrass the Saudi State itself. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights had written such refutations as open letters addressed to the Saudi nation. Discourse and style of such open letters used all skills of experienced preachers who appealed to the emotional side of Wahabis, especially talking about Hell and Paradise and the fate of scholars who forsook Islam for the sake of money they received from the KSA.

3- Supplications and prayers to invoke God's wrath on the KSA was an effective propaganda used in the writings of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, as such method indicated its siding with the oppressed and the weak citizens who have nothing but to pray to invoke God's wrath against the oppressive unjust authority. Thus, such a method embarrassed the KSA, as a Salafism- and Wahabism-based theocracy, and its Wahabi scholars who control all mosques, as the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights urged its supporters inside the KSA to supplicate God in all mosques, especially on Fridays. The very first call for a sit-in of invocation and supplication after Friday congregational prayers is written in Publication No. 35 titled ''On Statement of the Sit-In'', referring to Statement No. 24 to form a sit-in to make groups of people recite the Quran and supplicate to God to end the tyranny of the KSA during the fasting month of Ramadan, and the last lines of that call are as follows: (… The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights knew that this request of forming this sit-in received much support by a large number of people, and many people now supplicate and invoke God to wreak revenge on the unjust, corrupt persons and to come to the aid of the incarcerated preachers and other persecuted persons …) (29).

4- Writings of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights interpreted ordeals and sufferings of Saudi authority men as divine retribution caused by supplication of the weak and the oppressed ones; as in the case when Prince Nayef was depressed and received psychological treatment, and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights asserted that its supplications would be enough to crush 50 men as Nayef, and such words frightened Saudi policeman, as per the claims of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

5- Another event to support the view of divine retribution caused by supplications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights was the policeman Saud Al-Sherbein, who persecuted and tortured Saudi fundamentalists in prisons including Al-Masaary himself before he fled to London, as he fell ill and suffered psychological disturbances. This policeman feared divine retribution and he had to visit all his victims to ask their pardon as he confessed he was executing orders of Saudi authorities. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights wrote his story and commented that his excuses and apologies are not deemed acceptable as no mortal should obey other mortals by disobeying God. Later on, this policeman was paralyzed and parts of his body got burned because of a car accident, and he had to undergo four surgical operations. Of course, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights expressed joy because of that and declared its intention to go on supplicating and invoking God's wrath on the KSA.

6- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights traced all news of misfortunes, ordeals, ailments, accidents, and catastrophes happened to Saudi policemen and interpreted them as divine retribution. Even some scholars declared their repentance while weeping before congregations in mosques. Even the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights interpreted illness of King Fahd as a result of supplicating and invoking God's wrath on the KSA (30). Of course, Wahabi mentality of the masses in the KSA believed such claims of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights who used this tool to terrorize its foes inside the KSA.

Sufi visions and dreams:

1- It is laughter-inducing to mention that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights used another weapon in the intellectual and propaganda war against the KSA; the weapon used by Sufis, the sworn enemies of Salafists, which are Sufi dreams and visions. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights considered dreams of its members as predictions to bring glad tidings. The weapon of supplicating God and invoking His wrath against the KSA was used during arrest waves as the Saudi State showed its might as an unjust authority, whereas when conditions calmed down and were considered stable as all arrested ones were set free, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights longed still for another victory to achieve its goal of making the KSA collapse one day. Such a goal was far-fetched in terms of a realistic look in the late 1990s, and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights resorted to Sufi visions and dreams to achieve it in the imagination and to address its supporters with words raising their hopes. Al-Masaary in his latest writings wrote heavily about visions and dreams, because he inwardly lost hopes of destroying the KSA when princes of the royal family disputed with one another. He would interpret the so-called visions and dreams as a harbinger of his victory over the KSA that will collapse and he would establish his own State instead in Arabia.

2- The so-called Sufi visions and dreams began to appear in the writings of Al-Masaary when the influence of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights weakened inside the KSA in 1997 when King Fahd declared his political reforms in the ruling system and established the Shura Council and celebrated the passage of one year of its sessions.

3- Hence, 1997 witnessed writing heavily about visions and dreams of the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. In Publication No. 125, a vision was written about Abdel-Karim Qassim, the Iraqi political leader, defeating Napoleon, and Al-Masaary interpreted this as a sign that Prince Sultan would be defeated and the KSA royal family will fled Arabia because of a coup d'état. In Publication No. 124, a vision was written about Saudi policemen burning their papers and documents, and Al-Masaary interpreted this as a prediction that the Saudi State will collapse soon. In Publication No. 126, a vision was written about a Saudi man presenting himself to European presidents in English as the very first president in Arabia, and Al-Masaary interpreted this as a sign that the KSA would be declared a republic one day and Islamic democracy will be applied in a caliphate. In Publication No. 126, another vision was written about the Saudi green flag as it fell down and turned black and then hoisted again with Islamic testimony written on it in white, and Al-Masaary interpreted this as a sign that the Saudi royal family would lose power and rule and a real Islamic State will be established in Arabia.

4- In Publication No. 129, a supporter of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights wrote that dreams and visions published by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights had a positive influence on its supporters inside the KSA and asked for more of them, as such visions cause fright to the Saudi royal family and their henchmen, beneficiaries, and high officials. A member of the royal family insisted that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights had gone bankrupt and resorted to imagination to make up for its loss of supporters and lack of victories. Such words are not of a frightened prince, but one that mocked and derided his weak foes. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights responded to such mockery by another vision: Al-Masaary opens a mosque that was used to be owned by Al-Saud family, interpreted as usual as the sign of the end of the KSA regime and Saudi rule. In Publication No. 135, a vision was written about a group of people reciting the Quranic Chapter 48 titled "victory", and some other men trying in vain to stop them. As usual, this was taken as a sign predicting the victory of Al-Masaary over the Saudi royal family. In 1998, within Publication no. 140, a vision was written about the Saudi government arresting a group of men within prison cells who saw an elephant made of wood and one companion of Prophet Muhammad and a wedding being prepared as Al-Masaary checking the cells. This wooden elephant was interpreted as Prince Sultan the hypocrite who was used to hearing words of hypocrites around him, and that the victory of Al-Masaary over the Saudi royal family was drawing nearer. In Publication No. 141, an apocalyptic vision of Doomsday was written and people were frightened except Al-Masaary who addressed Prophet Muhammad by asserting to him that his Sunna will be applied in Arabia by him. As usual, this was interpreted as a caliphate that would be established in Arabia and ruled by Al-Masaary as caliph.

5- As for 1999, it seemed that members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights remained awake and suffered insomnia for a whole year; no dreams or visions were ever published that year!

6- Yet, in 2000, members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights fell asleep blissfully again! In Publication No. 157, in May 2000, a vision was written about Omar Ibn Al-Khattab, a former caliph of the first century A.H., returning from the dead to rule and reform Arabia! This vision had details that filled two pages, reflecting that members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights despaired and felt that their hopes to destroy the KSA ruling regime were dashed. Another vision written in Publication No. 152 about Abraham and Moses facing Pharaoh of Egypt, and as usual, the interpretation was written to the effect that Al-Saud royal family members are like tyrannical pharaohs and that Saudis wait for a hero to defeat such tyrants soon enough.

Persuasion and intimidation of security policemen:

1- Among the goals of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights were to neutralize and undermine the power of the KSA not only by moral weapon of supplication and invocation of God's wrath on the Saudi policemen, but also its members threatened Saudi policemen who arrest, persecute, and torture prisoners by terrorist actions. At one point, Abdullah Al-Hudeif, a supporter of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, threw nitric acid over the policeman Saud Al-Sherbein (31).

2- Apart from terrorizing, threatening, and intimidation of policemen, members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights tried to persuade them to repent and leave their jobs under the KSA government. In many statements in 1994, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights addressed security national guards, policeman, and army officers that their mission was to defend the nation and not to restrict and persecute peaceful reformists and not to commit crimes of arresting people inside mosques, and that they were to beware the oppressed ones' supplications to God to punish the unjust ones, as such acts of policemen were prohibited as per sharia laws, as mentioned in Statement No. 15. About the successful sit-in in the Saudi city of Brida, Statement No. 32 expressed gratitude for the sympathetic stance of some security men and policemen who also expressed their being fed up with their jobs in quelling and oppressing the innocent. In another statement, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights mentioned that security men expressed their ire because of having to arrest sheikh Al-Ouda, while other security men were happy to practice transgressions, oppression, and torturing prisoners. Writings of the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights tried to use religious notions to appeal to such security men to stop their transgressions and to make use of their state of discontent and worry. This led the Saudi authorities to make sure that loyalty of security men in all security apparatuses was fully with the KSA (32).

Persuasion of Arabian tribes:

1- Because most security men belong to Arabian tribes, members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights emotionally appealed to the tribesmen and tribal leaders, as inner power of Arabia, in Statement No. 14, to persuade them to express discontent with and hate toward the KSA authorities that arrested callers of reform among Wahabi fundamentalists. In Statement No. 26, members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights reminded the Saudi nation that those incarcerated behind bars and closed prison gates were the best group of religious scholars, university teachers, free thinkers, and notable persons who belong to the best and biggest tribes.

2- Because of such persistence in appealing to tribesmen, some tribal leaders would intercede to urge the authorities to release their men, and in most cases, policemen refused such intercessions. But in many instances, the Saudi authorities had to postpone arresting some other men to avoid tribal demonstrations of protest.

3- Members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights published a daring secret interview between Prince Bandar and some foreigners, as he talked about chastising some tribes. Such interview invoked the wrath of many tribes and King Fahd himself had to visit such tribes to convince them that this interview was a lie and a falsehood and to appease their anger (33).

4- Apart from persuasion and appealing to tribes, members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights incited Saudi citizens against the Saudi state itself using Salafist notions and discourse, especially when arrest waves increased, as per Statements Nos. 24 and 26, when Al-Masaary wrote that all citizens must fight for the sake of incarcerated brethren and that they should no longer live in fear and disgrace, as rights are taken by force and not granted as gifts by tyrants.

5- Sometimes, members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights would use words to appeal to the nationalistic sentiments of Saudis; for instance, in Publication no. 41, about Prince Pindar and his being interviewed by foreigners, Al-Masaary wrote that this is high-treason against the tribes, as the royal family allied itself to 'infidel' foreigners against Muslim tribesmen and that it was a disgrace to allow the Saudi royal family to control fates of tribes and to punish tribesmen. Thus, members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights forced themselves as spokespersons on behalf of the nation; this was a mere ploy in the struggle for power.

The measure of success of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights:

Members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights could not manage to convince security men, policemen, and other powerful high officials and army men to join the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and the same applies to most tribesmen who ignored members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights below. The reason was of course that interests of such social categories were in joining forces with the KSA. Later on, members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights disputed with one another as we have written before and failed to achieve any decisive victory over the KSA so far; yet, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights achieved some scattered results as we detail below.

Raising political awareness:

1- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights managed to raise the political awareness of Saudis in general by presenting other views on all issues and topics instead of one unilateral view of the State that dominated for decades, especially that the king purportedly owned lands and people over them and knows best as per the dominant motto ''sheikhs know best''.

2- Some citizens created such political awareness when they cooperated with the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights by spreading and distributing its writings inside the KSA and contacting it to provide information and news; thus, that made statements and publications as important historical documents of the KSA in the 1990s.

3- Thus, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights helped in changing the mentality of Saudi citizens and their views regarding the Saudi authorities; sanctity, awe, and fear vanished, as they were replaced with criticism, fearless self-expression, and awareness of citizenry rights and human rights, as Saudi citizens read all writings of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights online or in print that exposed and scandalized the royal family members and the corrupt, unjust men loyal to them (34).

Attracting supporters to the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights:

1- Such political awareness raised by the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights made it attract more supporters in the late 1990s inside the KSA among the cultural elite especially Saudi ambassadors to many countries and to the UN, who claimed in a letter to Ibn Baz that they have documents that would incriminate the KSA regime. This led the KSA to check and watch over all its embassies and documents.

2- Many Saudi diplomats declared their being dissidents who oppose the KSA and sought political asylum in the UK as they were influenced by views expressed by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights

The success of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in spreading anti-KSA propaganda:

The emergence of such dissidents caused hot debates all over the West media and Arab media about conditions and circumstances inside the KSA; Muslims of the UK made a sit-in before the Saudi embassy in London to protest against the arrest waves inside the KSA. This means that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights had successfully invested such arrest waves in its anti-KSA propaganda. The fail attempts of King Fahd to urge the UK to deport Al-Masaary made Arab and British people sympathize with him and some invited him to deliver a speech in the House of Commons about Saudi State and its conditions and circumstances. Human rights organizations in Arab countries and in the West launched huge anti-KSA campaigns and spread information conveyed to them via the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights (35).

Planting dormant agents of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights inside Saudi apparatuses:

1- Some Saudi high officials did not declare their support of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights because they wanted to retain their posts to help members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to infiltrate into the Saudi government and security apparatuses, allowing them to gain useful information to be published, as the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights took pride in its secret agents as per Statement No. 29 in all Saudi governmental bodies and institutions, who also distribute writings and audiotapes of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights among Saudi citizens inside the KSA.

2- King Fahd held a secret meeting with certain princes; yet, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights knew of it and published details of it. When the KSA forged false statements and claimed they pertain to the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Al-Masaary wrote in Publication No. 28 that this falsehood was scandalous and brought no effect whatsoever, as its members infiltrated all apparatuses of King Fahd, and they knew all measures and steps he would take against them. When Prince Bandar met secretly with Israeli Mossad men and American CIA men inside the Saudi embassy in London without the attendance of the Saudi ambassador himself, the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights received full audio registration of such secret meeting and exposed how the prince verbally abused tribesmen inside the KSA, and such leaked verbal abuse caused negative influence and repercussions inside the KSA (36).

3- Such level of infiltration could be explained by disputes and conflicts among the Saudi royal family members and the involvement of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights within such conflicts, as its members never attacked Crown Prince Abdullah but attacked harshly Princes Sultan, Bandar, Nayef, and Salman as well as sons of King Fahd. When Prince Abdullah retrieved his full power and authority since April 1998, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights attacked him harshly, instead of inciting him against his brothers and family members as before, using lewd inappropriate words of verbal abuse (37).

Sits-in of protest swept over the KSA:

1- We remember that the Najd Brothers used to be powerful enough to hold opposition conferences that were transformed later on into armed rebellion and military revolts. Decades later, no one dared to hold public meetings to voice opposition views, until Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalism appeared and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights emerged. Sits-in and demonstration of protest swept over the KSA and the Saudi authorities faced this with incessant arrest waves, but sits-in increased inside and around mosques, a new phenomenon that never occurred before even by the Najd Brothers. But of course, all protesters stuck to peaceful nature of their actions and never sought to use violence against security men or policemen.

2- Calls to form sits-in began in 1415 A.H. in mosques in Riyadh, Jeddah, Brida, and Hael, and the very first one was formed under the banner "The Right of the Saudi Nation to Put their Rulers to Question". The Saudi authorities issued false statements as if by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to announce that the sit-in was cancelled, but members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights refuted such cancellation.

3- Some statements of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights asserted the success of sits-in in Jeddah, Hael, Riyadh, Al-Jouf, Al-Ahsa, Abha, Al-Baha, and Brida, as imams of mosques there managed to gather thousands of men and hundreds of women, while praising the neutral stance of security men in most cases, as per Statements Nos. 27, 28, 30, and 33.

4- Ibn Baz and other high-rank scholars subservient to the KSA issued a statement to attack harshly the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and its sits-in. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights announced in Publication No. 44 the postponement of one of the sits-in to another day to be set later on, and this indicated the influence of the conflict and dispute between Dr. Al-Masaary and Dr. Al-Faqeeh (38).

5- It is noteworthy that sits-in lessened in number because of arrest waves done by the Saudi authorities, and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights published four exceptional publication about arrest waves and urged the release of prisoners and had to postpone many planned sits-in in 1994 A.D. / 1415 A.H.

6- Despite the success of the KSA to stop sits-in, but such success was not achieved because of the endeavors of the Saudi State, but because of the influence of the conflict and dispute between Dr. Al-Masaary and Dr. Al-Faqeeh. Sits-in were cancelled and opposition had to be confined to media and internet from London.

7- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, with its writings and audiotapes, greatly influenced media of the West regarding criticism of the KSA and its internal policies. To prove it, we will quote below an excerpt expressing the view and assessment of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights of its activities and the reactions of the KSA, from the Publication No. 44 in 1995:

(… Title: You Have the Right to Know: the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and the Saudi State within this year. This week, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights celebrates its first year of activities from London, as it achieved many of its projects, while the Saudi regime achieved its own project. It is important and interesting to enumerate things done by both sides and how challenges were faced in order to assess achievements, gains, and losses and to predict the future based on the past and present and the pace of history and laws of social change. This year, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights managed to smuggle its leaders out of the Saudi State despite tight security measures and strict supervision on them, and these leaders established their headquarter in London. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights managed to make good use of technology to receive and distribute information with its supporters inside the Saudi State and to show the stances of the nation as opposed to formal stances of the Saudi State in many situations and events especially regarding Yemen. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights managed to give information to international media about all small and big events and occurrences inside the Saudi State, like the crisis of stampedes during pilgrimage season, proving that the Saudi regime specializes in reactions and not in doing actions. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights managed as well to invest most of such events and occurrences to serve its reform project; and this applies to anti-committee events like the refusal to grant Dr. Al-Masaary political asylum. Achievements of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights include political and economic report about the Saudi State and the documentary about events occurred in Brida. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights managed as well to stir and incite the Saudi citizens on time and to send them legitimate orders of its leaders, resulting in the successful sits-in in Brida. Leaders of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights contacted West media and provided information about the reality of the Saudi State and the credibility of the reform endeavors of the leaders in London. The greatest gain of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights was moral victory and not a material gain on the level of the nation and the level of defeating the Saudi regime; awareness of the Saudi citizens is raised and they participate positively in the reform projects with zeal. As for the Saudi regime, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights defeated it within two aspects: 1) exposing the illegitimacy of the ruling regime before all the masses, and 2) making the West countries cast doubts on the stability of the Saudi State for the next years. The Saudi regime throughout the last year has lived in constant unrest and instability, dealing with events and sits-in with slow reactions of someone who does not understand the background of anything. Many big crises occurred successively to paralyze the Saudi regime, especially when the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights declared its resuming of its activities in London. The Saudi regime was at loss about how Dr. Al-Masaary fled to the UK despite tight security measures. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights sent its faxes and telephones numbers to its supporters in inside the Saudi State, keeping constant excellent contact, while the Saudi rulers tried to in vain to stop such communications. When the Saudi regime was embarrassed by the crisis of stampede during the pilgrimage season, its reaction has been a scandalous one. Meanwhile, the Saudi regime got involved in the Yemeni war in a stupid manner and with big losses amounted to more than three billion $, apart from political and moral losses. Later on, the Saudi regime quelled the nation and the citizens who called for reform, arresting them as well as scholars and put them to prisons. The Saudi regime appeared before the Islamic world and the Western world as a tyrannical force that violated human rights and oppressed peaceful preachers and scholars who call for reform and as an unstable regime suffering unrest. The Saudi regime is in a dilemma: it cannot release the incarcerated men so as not to be morally defeated and it cannot keep them in prison cells as this will give more momentum to the opposition movements and fuel ire of the masses. The other scandal of the Saudi regime was the economic crisis and the Saudi budget; the regime had to impose more taxes and fees despite claims of strong economy; in fact, it is about to collapse as per newspapers in the West. Bovine stupidity of the Saudi regime appeared in its reaction to the existence of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in London; it pressurized the British side in secret and in public, and this brought free media coverage and publicity for the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. The backward, regressive Saudi regime was naïve enough to ask the British side to stop the anti-Al-Saud propaganda done by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights against, especially after the scandal of Muhammad Ibn Fahd with the British Minister Jonathan Atkins; the Saudi princes thought that governments of the world controlled their media with iron grip as the case inside the Saudi State. The worst crisis of the Saudi regime this year was escalating disputes among Saudi princes as their conflicting interests vary, whereas King Fahd and his close family are weak and cannot plan or take decisions individually. This failure of a regime resorted to mean and base methods like forgery of documents and fabricating rumors about the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights as well as bribing and buying other men and even assassination of some other men, but every failure brought the next for the naïve Saudi regime. Such were the 'achievements' of the Saudi State in this year, and if such ways would go on, we predict that more crises, ordeals, scandals, unrest, and upheavals would occur with more disputes among princes and economic failure until the regime would collapse. Of course, in such cases, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights will develop into an influential driving force in all events, and we implore God to punish the unjust …).

A commentary:

1- Events of the following years did not match predictions of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights; as its two main leaders, Al-Masaary and Al-Faqeeh, disputed with each other and the latter left it for the former. The Saudi regime won victory over the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights later on. Writings of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights showed between the lines signs of failure regarding mobilizing the Saudi citizens to win them to its side against the regime. Frustration is clearly shown between the lines of the writings of publications sent to the Saudi citizens to incite them against the Saudi authorities (39). To prove this, let us quote an excerpt from Publication No. 29 in Jan. 1995: (… O people of Arabia! If religious zeal did not stir inside all of you, what shall we do? If manhood, jealousy, honor, and dignity did not stir you to revolt, what shall we do? Did all of you lose religious zeal, manhood, jealousy, honor, and dignity? What shame and what disgrace! Were such calamites that befell you not enough to wake you up?! When will you revolt?! O people of Arabia! Asian and African people revolted and gained independence by toil and blood and by refusing and facing tyranny and injustice. It is a shame that free people of great ancestry like Arabs in Arabia would be submissive and less honorable! Until when such indifference would last?! No Saudi prince care for people's opinions about anything! O free people of Arabia! Drive away all doubt and sloth! Revolt and join the caravan of reform to save yourselves …).

2- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights realized the impossibility of attracting all the Saudi citizens in the struggle against the Saudi regime, analyzing this according to its viewpoint in Publication no. 31 in Jan., 1995, from which we quote this excerpt: (… Our calamity is not confined to this collapsing regime, but mainly to its influence in crushing trust in oneself among citizens who admit falsely that no rulers would be fit to rule Arabia after the removal of Al-Saud family. The cultural elite members would ask us: who would be the alternative?! Such a question reflects that Al-Saud family managed for the last 50 years to crush leadership vein inside citizens; as if leaders must come from the Al-Saud family exclusively. Detractors of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights never realize that Al-Saud family will never allow the existence of any independent body or institution inside the Saudi State, even charity organizations or social ones, and this ruling family never allow any gatherings, even familial ones within occasions of celebrations, and this shows how the Al-Saud family never leave room for citizens to lead or govern or control affairs …).

Footnotes:

1- "The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family", authored by one of the leaders of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, page 5, http://www.miraserve.com/books/b3.htm

2-"The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family", pages 6:7 and 10.

Al-Masaary (Dr. Muhammad Abdullah), "Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", 4^th edition, 1999A.D./ 1420 A.H., London, pages: 81, 85, 86, 87, 97, 141, and 150:152.

Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights: Statement No. 3, on 20^th of Apr. 1994.

Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia newspaper, 16^th May, 1992, pages 5 and 6.

3- Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia newspaper, 16^th May, 1992, pages 2 and 4.

4- Al-Masaary, ditto, pages 67:71.

5- Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia newspaper, 16^th May, 1992, pages 9 and 36:37.

6- "The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family", pages 5 and 6.

7- Al-Jazeera Al-Jadida newspaper, No. 6, March 1974, page 10.

8- Al-Masaary, ditto, pages 26:32.

9-"The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family", pages 6:16.

10- Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center of 1992 and 1994 on the civil society and democratic transition, and republished by Dar Souad Al-Sabah, pages 194:225.

A report titled "Egypt and the World", published by Al-Mahroussa Center for Publishing and Distribution, 1^st edition, 1994, Cairo.

11-"The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family", pages 16:22

12-"The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family", pages 22:24

13-"The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family", pages 24:27

14- Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center of 1993 on the civil society and democratic transition, pages 161:163.

15- Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center of 1996 on the civil society and democratic transition, page 300.

Statements of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 22, and 25, and publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, No. 3.

16- Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center of 1994 on the civil society and democratic transition, pages 166 and 167, and of 1996, page 297.

17- Statements of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 17, 18, and 19.

18- Saudi Arabia: Secrecy and Fear: www.amnesty.org & www.amnesty-arabic.org/arabia/text/secretstate-mde23-10-11-b.htm

19- Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center of 1994 on the civil society and democratic transition, page 164.

Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia newspaper, 16^th May, 1992, pages 9 and 36:17.

20- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 2, 42, and 43.

21- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 16 and 43.

Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center of 1994 on the civil society and democratic transition, page 163.

22- Abdel-Majeed (Muhammad), "In the Beginning was the Pen", undated, Cairo, pages 7, 13, and 15, 19, 89, 248, 291, 390, 405, 475, 485, 606, 669, 691, and 697.

Read the publication No. 48 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, which tackles about a Syrian editor-in-chief of a newspaper who commissioned an Egyptian journalist to ghostwrite a book attacking the Committee.

23- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 17 and 33

Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center of 1994 on the civil society and democratic transition, page 163.

24- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 7, 8, 10, 30, 33, 34, and 46.

25- Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center on the civil society and democratic transition, of 1994 pages 163 and 170, of 1995 pages 155 and 185, and of 1997 page 84.

Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 24, 82, and 84.

26- Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center on the civil society and democratic transition, of 1994 pages 162 and of 1995 pages 155 and 160:164.

Publication No. 1of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights

27- Publication No. 6 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center on the civil society and democratic transition, of 1994, pages 162 and 165.

28- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 12, 17, 30, and 41.

29- Publication No. 35 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

30- Statements Nos. 22 and 24 and publications No. 5, 9, 10, 22, 27, 35, and 43 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

31- Statement Nos. 18, 38, and 39, and publication No. 6 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

32- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 6, 39, 40, and 41.

33- The exceptional publication No. 1 and the ordinary ones Nos. 2 and 44 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

34- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 36, 39, and 43, to name but a few examples.

35- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 3, 4, 6, 10, 16, 32, and 46.

Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center on the civil society and democratic transition, of 1994, page 170.

Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia newspaper, ditto, page 26.

36- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 1, 16, 26, 28, and 41.

37- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 46, 60, 67, 74, 77, 82, 83, and 150.

Al-Masaary, ditto, page 7

Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia newspaper, ditto, page 34

Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center on the civil society and democratic transition, of 1998, pages 301:303.

38- Statements of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, and 34, as well as exceptional publications Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 and ordinary ones Nos. 46 and 47.

39- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 18, 19, 30, 31, and 33.

CHAPTER II: Analysis of the Struggle between the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and the KS

CHAPTER II: Analysis of the Struggle between the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and the KSA:

The Struggle between the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and the KSA: a struggle between two Salafist political creeds:

Introduction:

1- The Najd Brothers during the reign of King Abdul-Aziz were Bedouin military force that knew little religious knowledge within Sunnite Wahabism. Juhayman Al-Otaybi was an isolated Salafist Wahabi-cultured man whose influence was limited and whose knowledge was not deep enough in comparison to members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights who based their opposition on full knowledge of Wahabi ideology and jurisprudence. Hence, supporters and members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights were scholars and students of Wahabism and then became adepts to the thought adopted and propagated by Dr. Al-Masaary. Thus, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights represented the top of the intellectual confrontation within the struggle of Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalism against the Saudi regime. The dilemma of such Salafist opposition movement was that it shared a common background with the KSA: the Salafist, Wahabi ideology. Hence, both the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and the KSA assert their belonging to Wahabism and both depend on writings of its imams: Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Al-Qayyim, and Ibn Abdul-Wahab. Yet, deep intellectual analysis of the Salafist struggle for power and authority between the opposition and the Saudi regime would not have emerged if it had not been for the emergence of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, as it used such deep intellectual analysis to oppose and attack harshly the KSA, a Wahabi Salafist theocracy, and it had to find an intellectual Wahabi fundamentalist basis to such opposition against the Saudi regime

2- Thus, we can say here that the struggle of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights against the KSA was essentially a struggle between two Salafist ideas, notions, or schools of thought; i.e., the struggle between a theologian/scholar who claimed he represents sharia, on the one hand, and a ruler who claimed he represents the current power and authority under the banner of sharia, on the other hand. Thus, the arena for such conflict or struggle is to confiscate power, authority, and wealth as well as people of Arabia. This is the scramble to loot: for the sake of transient possessions of this world, and NOT for the sake of religion, of course. Such struggle for the transient things which are valueless in the Hereafter is typical of human beings as a bad habit throughout history, and oppressed, impecunious, weak people pay heavy prices for such a bad habit. Of course, the struggle for loot and power might be secular; i.e., it does not raise religious mottos or banners. Such struggle is worse when the two foes/sides struggling for loot and power use creeds in political conflict to gain power, authority, and wealth. The latter type is the kind of struggle between the Wahabi KSA and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. This type is doing grave injustices to God, His religion, His prophet Muhammad, as well as to people in general, when both warring sides use Islam as a banner or a motto to serve their purposes and reach their ends, while both sides have nothing to do with real Islam (i.e., the Quran alone, as per Quranists) and they contradict it. Within real Islam, the Quran, the Paradise dwellers will be the pious ones who did not want corruption or superiority on earth: "That Home of the Hereafter – Paradise – We assign it for those who seek no superiority on earth or corruption. And the outcome is for the pious" (28:83).

3- To understand the cultural and religious background of the struggle between the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and the Saudi royal family, we repeat here that the ruling system in the Sunnite religion usually makes the scholar/theologian and clergymen of all sorts as subservient to rulers and representatives of Sunnite sharia under the guidance of a caliph/ sultan/ ruler as one of his retinue. On the contrary, within the Shiite religion ruling system crystalized in the 20^th century, the imam / theologian / scholar is above all rulers and is made holy as a sanctified person representing religion/sharia within Shiite traditions. It is other way around in the history of Sunnite religion and ruling system; rulers were always above imams/ clergymen in most cases, and even sultans used to persecute and imprison scholars who oppose views/policies adopted by rulers. This occurred in history as in cases of scholars like Abou Hanifa, Ibn Hanbal, Malik, and Ibn Taymiyya. Moreover, Sunnite Wahabism has no extremism typical in the Shiite religion as regarding sanctifying dead and living, ancient or contemporary imams / scholars.

4- When Ibn Abdul-Wahab emerged as a revolutionary scholar who oppose harshly religious staples and notions of his era, which were mostly Sufi and Shiite ones, his alliance with M. Ibn Saud drew the policies and ruling systems of Al-Saud royal family, while giving the posts of scholars and all religious positions in general to Al-Sheikh family, who were descendants of Ibn Abdul-Wahab. Hence, since Al-Sheik family confiscates all religious authority and posts in the KSA, no opposition movements ever came out of their family. All opposition movements came from outside Al-Sheikh family. But the Wahabi opposition of both the Najd Brothers and Al-Otaybi lacked deep Salafist knowledge and theorization to support their stances; unlike the case of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights whose members and supporters in the 1990s delved deep into Wahabi ideology and Salafist thought to reinforce their views and stances against the KSA, and they surpassed the schools of thought of all Wahabi scholars of Al-Sheikh who served the Saudi State.

5- Once Prophet Muhammad died, the history of early Muslims knew early, gradually, and soon enough tyrannical rule, leading to monarchy and inherited kingdoms based on conquests by the sword as the only source of legitimacy of rule, with empires carrying the names of those who established it: such as the Umayyads, the Abbasids, the Fatimids, the Ayyubids, the Ottomans, etc. In such Sunnite empires or caliphates, rulers were seen as sole owners of lands and those living on it, and they were seen as having absolute power to do whatever they want without questioning: to grant, give, confiscate, imprison, punish, kill, forgive, wage wars, etc. and the same applies to governors ruling regions or cites under such caliph/ ruler/ sultan. This applies to the famous Umayyad vizier Al-Hajaj Ibn Youssef in the first century A.H. until any ottoman governor in the thirteenth century A.H. Such rulers, or rather tyrants and despots of the Middle Ages, had many people helping them to rule and govern, among them were scholars of Sunnite sharia, poets o propaganda, soldiers within a military army, judges, etc., and the main and sole sharia and political creed in that case was absolute obedience to rulers, based on deliberate misunderstanding of the following Quranic verse: "O you who believe! Obey God and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you…" (4:59). Ancient scholars felt that ''those in authority among you…'' to mean rulers / caliphs / sultans. This understanding was certainly wrong; the phrase simply means those experts in their fields, as we conclude from this verse in the same Quranic chapter four: "When some news of security or alarm comes their way, they broadcast it. But had they referred it to the Messenger, and to those in authority among them, those who can draw conclusions from it would have comprehended it…" (4:83). This verse shows clearly the meaning of people of certain knowledge or expertise in certain specialties. Obeying the messenger means the message itself: the Quran, because obeying mortals is linked solely to obedience of God by obeying His Quranic teachings. Shura in the Quran means direct democracy in the terms of our modern age of today, and it certainly contradicts injustice, tyranny, and despotism, which are grave crimes per Islam as far as the Quran is concerned; God made Moses' Pharaoh an imam followed by all unjust tyrannical self-deified rulers who claim their ownership of lands and souls of their subjects: "Pharaoh proclaimed among his people, saying, "O my people, do I not own the Kingdom of Egypt, and these rivers flow beneath me? Do you not see?" (43:51). Early Muslims in the first century A.H. sadly returned soon enough to the Middle-Ages culture of tyranny once Prophet Muhammad died in Yathreb after he ruled its dwellers using direct democracy. Such tyranny that lasted for about 14 centuries contradicts Islam (i.e. the Quran alone: Quranism) and made early Muslims follow the footsteps of Moses' Pharaoh as they distorted the meaning of 4:59 to mean obedience to rulers, after God and Muhammad, without questioning. Scholars of creed lived and supported such climate of despotism and tyranny. If one of them would protest or revolt – as Sunnite scholars usually represent the man-made sharia dominated in order to serve rulers – rulers would persecute, imprison, or kill him, and he would become a victim. Rulers would enlist the aid of other obsequious scholars against such a revolting protesting scholar to try him in sharia courts, as was the case with Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya.

6- Such state of affairs used to exist when Arab empires were strong: the Umayyads, the Abbasids, the Mameluke, etc., but things got complicated in eras of weakness during the Ottoman Empire, especially in the deserts of Arabia, where legitimacy was based on conquests by the sword whereas sharia laws dwindled and levels of knowledge of scholars were superficial at the time. This was the case in Najd before the Wahabi/Salafist call emerged. The Salafist KSA made religious scholars retrieve their high rank and stature, by making legitimacy of the Saudi rule based on both the sword of Abdul-Aziz and writings of Wahabi sharia authored by Ibn Abdul-Wahab.

7- The first and second Saudi States collapsed, and Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud re-established what he believed to be the kingdom of his forefathers using both the conquests by the sword and Wahabism/Salafism; he formed, trained, taught, and used the Najd Brothers to achieve his goal, but they soon enough militarily revolted against him in the name of Wahabi sharia and began the very first Wahabi opposition movement against the KSA. The Wahabi fundamentalist opposition movement of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights delved deep into Salafist ideology and Wahabi thought to found deeply the bases of their opposition and war against the Wahabi Salafist Saudi State. Both types of Salafism of the KSA and of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, as an opposition movement, reflect indeed the real political struggle for power, authority, and wealth. Both sides claim they have and confiscate Salafist legitimacy. The Saudi royal family claim it has the legitimacy of conquests by the sword and the obedience of rulers as per Sunnite Wahabi religion, whereas the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights claim the legitimacy of scholars, in the manner of 20^th century Shiites explained above, that claim they exclusively represent sharia laws and use it to declare the KSA authority as illegal and illegitimate to politically control it as well as its Saudi citizens. This CHAPTER II of PART III analyzes the struggle and conflict between the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and the KSA.

The views of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights concerning the KSA and its legitimacy:

The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights saw that the legitimacy of the Saudi State is centered only in adopting and applying Salafist thought. The unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'' writes the following: (… The founder of the third current KSA, Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, was in Kuwait when he told himself that he must re-establish the kingdom of his forefathers, and he attempted in vain to conquer Riyadh under this motto, but he failed … he succeeded only when he used the motto of renewal of Wahabi call and by sending preachers all over Arabia to spread such motto … When he made Riyadh his capital an main headquarter, he raised the banner of religion as a strong major force to defeat both Ibn Rasheed and Al-Sharif Hussein…) (1). The same meaning was repeated in Publication No. 20 in Nov., 1994, under the title: ''You Have the Right to Know'', when legitimacy of the KSA was said to be not based on free direct elections, a coup, a political party endeavor, or any achievement, but when Salafist sharia and legitimacy when Abdul-Aziz raised the banner of Ibn Abdul-Wahab when he conquered Riyadh, after he failed when raised the banner of retrieving his ancestors' kingdom, and under religious mottoes he defeated both Ibn Rasheed and Al-Sharif Hussein.

A commentary refuting the above views of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights concerning Abdul-Aziz:

1- The real reason behind initial failure of Abdul-Aziz to conquer Riyadh was that he headed an army sent by ruler of Kuwait, Mubarak Al-Sabah who wanted Riyadh to be under Kuwaiti rule, and that was why dwellers of Riyadh, including Al-Sheikh family members, fought fiercely against this army headed by Abdul-Aziz. But when he infiltrated Riyadh with 40 men to conquer it from within by making his men chant the slogan that sovereignty is for God and then to the son of Al-Saud, he managed to conquer it by the legitimacy of the sword. 50 years ago, Ibn Al-Rasheed conquered Riyadh and took it from Al-Saud and made his men chanting the same slogan: sovereignty is for God and then to Ibn Al-Rasheed. Thus, legitimacy in the culture of Najd meant at the time conquest by the sword, and this had nothing to do with Salafism or Wahabism.

2- Because Abdul-Aziz conquered Riyadh and other regions later, he deserved to be king, a fact acknowledged by his own father, Abdul-Rahman, and his sons, paternal brothers of Abdul-Aziz. Thus, the third KSA was spared conflicts, disputes, and rivalry that led to the collapse of the second KSA before. Abdul-Aziz became king and his brothers and relatives shared some measure of authority as per his permission under his rule and as per their participation in conquests.

3- Abdul-Aziz made use of the Najd Brothers, after inculcating into them Wahabi teachings, to establish his kingdom, but they were surprised when Feisal Al-Daweesh conquered Hael but Abdul-Aziz appointed a prince of his family as the governor of Hael. Tensions began to form between Abdul-Aziz and the Najd Brothers' leaders; Al-Daweesh wanted to rule Najd where his tribe was located, Ibn Bajad wanted to rule Hejaz as his tribe controlled routes leading to it, and Ibn Heithlein wanted to rule Hejaz as well where his tribe was located. Abdul-Aziz quelled their rebellion with the sword and reminded them that he owed the nothing as he taught and trained them to serve his purpose of retrieving the kingdom of his ancestors and he had the right to chastise them by the sword if they ever thought again of rebelling against him, as he said in 1930 to Al-Daweesh that as long as they received their share of spoils and loot and the like, they have no right to complain about anything, especially that they were no kings before he trained and taught them to serve him (2). Hence, the sword was used to make them serve Abdul-Aziz and he would not have hesitated to punish them by it as well if they did what made them deserve punishment. This is asserted by Hafiz Wahba when he writes that Abdul-Aziz would tolerate anything and become lenient toward anyone except when it came to his dominance and hegemony and his full control over governors ruling under him (3).

4- When Ta'if Conference was held in 1932, the affluent ones and the Wahabi scholars requested from King Abdul-Aziz to rename his kingdom as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (the KSA) as per the same pattern when past empires were named after the family name of the rulers: the Abbasids and the Ottomans, etc. and they had written their request in a discourse similar to the way to address an Ottoman sultan: (… People gathered here request H.R.H. and his majesty the King to fulfill their wish to change the current name of the kingdom from The Najd and Hejaz Kingdom into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as H.R.H. the King was the one to unify such regions of Arabia by the sword …). Of course, King Abdul-Aziz would have named his kingdom as the Arabian Kingdom, but Wahabi scholars and clergymen in that conference were bent on adhering to Salafist jurisprudence and ruling system as pertaining to their subservience to the rulers and to urge him to assert by such name his ownership of the land and people dwelling on it. Strangely, Abdul-Aziz as a king was more liberal and coping with the modern age than his scholars, but he agreed to their request to name the kingdom as the KSA, but ordered in the same royal decree the writing of a constitution (4), but this did not happen during his reign. King Abdul-Aziz ruled lone as per Salafist notions and traditions of making rulers own the land and people dwelling on it as he conquered them by the sword. When administration became complicated when oil was discovered in the KSA, he applied administrational changes as fitting his circumstances and cultural climate. He created ministries in the way we have tackled in a former chapter within paragraphs about King Saud. We conclude here that King Abdul-Aziz ruled within the legitimacy of conquests by the sword, acknowledged at the time by both the Wahabi scholars and the Najd Brothers.

5- Legitimacy of King Abdul-Aziz was linked to another one: retrieving the kingdom of his forefathers, as he refused to go beyond territories ruled by his ancestors in the first and second Saudi States. He refused to conquer Kuwait and Yemen when he had the chance, and even Philby, as we have mentioned in a former chapter, blamed him for it, but King Abdul-Aziz assured him that Saudis never ruled Yemen, but he had the right to conquer Jizan, Najran, and Aseer, and he wanted nothing from Yemenis but to let him have such regions, and so they did and he was content to settle that matter by negotiations (5). King Abdul-Aziz had another hard time to negotiate borders with Jordan, and he adamantly refused to extend his expansions to include fertile area in the south of Iraq, a point of contention between the Najd Brothers and King Abdul-Aziz, as they wanted to go on with Wahabi military jihad forever, as they never understood the logic of King Abdul-Aziz that he wanted only territories ruled decades ago by his ancestors. His reluctance about jihad to conquer more lands was criticized by both the unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'' and members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. We conclude then that King Abdul-Aziz raised the motto of retrieving ancestral kingdom not only when he conquered Riyadh in 1901 but all his life and during all his conquests, and even during negotiations about borders with Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen, and he never tried to annex lands never ruled by his family before. Even this issue of ancestral rule is still invoked within the conflict between Qatar and the KSA about borders now, as we write this book (2000 A.D.).

6- In sum, legitimacy of the KSA and King Abdul-Aziz approved by Al-Sheikh family and other scholars is based on conquest by the sword to get back ancestral right of ruing certain regions that formed the first and second Saudi States, and not based on Wahabism in itself; even Ibn Abdul-Wahabi never mentioned such view in his writings.

7- And we analyze below this topic from the Salafist point of view.

The sharia of Al-Masaary and criticizing Ibn Abdul-Wahab:

1- It seems that Al-Masaary felt that his proofs about undermining the Wahabism-based legitimacy of the KSA were weak, and he was bound to attack, criticize, and undermine Ibn Abdul-Wahab himself in the writings of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights

2- When Al-Masaary did just that in one publication of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, everybody inside the KSA protested, not just Ibn Baz and all high-rank scholars who issued a statement against Al-Masaary, but also many supporters of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. Thus, Al-Masaary had to eat his words and to claim that this was not his own opinion, but a forged document, by the Saudi policemen, passed off as one of the publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to defame it and to tarnish its reputation inside the KSA.

3- Accordingly, this publication criticizing Ibn Abdul-Wahab did not appear online or in print later on when Al-Masaary collected them together; he retained only his letter of disowning the 'forged' publication in Publications Nos. 43 and 44 in 1995, accusing scholars of being weak and ignorant liars to resort to such vicious ploys of forgery. He accused Saudi policemen of forging lies to defame him as part of the incessant war between the KSA and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. This led Ibn Baz and other high-rank scholars to issue a statement to attack Al-Masaary and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. Al-Masaary asserted that the stance of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights regarding Ibn Abdul-Wahab was that he was a great reformist who made intellectual jihad for the sake of the truth, and that criticizing the KSA when comparing it to pre-Umayyad caliphs had nothing to do with Ibn Abdul-Wahab and the very first KSA; he asserted that he only meant to criticize Sunnite scholars who defend tyrant Saudi rulers of these days.

4- Of course, justifications of Al-Masaary were not deemed convincing and most Saudis thought that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights hated and undermined Ibn Abdul-Wahab and not only the very first KSA, and thus, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights lost many supporters and lost its credibility inside the KSA, as such intellectual contradictions incurred condemnation; how come the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights would quote Ibn Abdul-Wahab and at the same time criticize him as well as the very first KSA he participated in establishing?

5- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights asserted once more its deep veneration and respect of Ibn Abdul-Wahab and quoted his writings to declare the third current KSA as an un-Islamic State ruled by infidel apostate rules as it rules not using Islamic sharia as defined by Ibn Abdul-Wahab, in Publications Nos. 16 and 22 in 1994. Hence, stances of the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights fluctuated between disowning or defending contradictory views vis-à-vis Ibn Abdul-Wahab and that made it lost much of its credibility.

6- After many members left the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights when Saad Al-Faqeeh left it, Al-Masaary controlled it fully, and he authored and published his seminal book titled "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", which was a revised edition of a former book of his titled ''The Decisive Proofs of the Apostasy of the KSA''. In the revised version, Al-Masaary attacked again Ibn Abdul-Wahab within his virulent attack of the KSA and its first State founded within the alliance or pact between Ibn Abdul-Wahab and M. Ibn Saud. There is a chapter in his book titled ''The Very First KSA: Queries Raised about Legitimacy'', where Al-Masaary tried to prove the illegitimacy of the first Saudi State as a one ruled by infidels and apostates as it separated itself from the legitimate Ottoman rule and because it allied itself to the British 'infidels'. Between the lines, Al-Masaary tries to praise Ibn Abdul-Wahab after criticizing him, but he describes him as a scholar with limited scope of intellect regarding understanding sharia texts. Al-Masaary accused Ibn Abdul-Wahab of copying and summarizing Ibn Al-Qayyim and Ibn Taymiyya without forming new, innovative, creative ideas and notions, as he never thought of that; he was merely an active sort of political activist somehow. Even before scholars confiscate religious affairs and Al-Saud confiscate rule within the very first KSA, Al-Masaary writes that Ibn Abdul-Wahab reduced his call to be a regional racist one, but he never doubted his loyalty to slam and that he never allied himself to the British 'infidels', as he forsook political life in his old age because the Saudi ruler at the time allied himself to the British. Of course, this last claim was a fabrication by Al-Masaary to assert his bias against the third current KSA that has lost its legitimacy in his view (6). Al-Masaary contradicts himself when he writes that the legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphate; he is thus unwittingly opposes Wahabism, as the Ottomans were worshipping Sufi saints, this is the creed the Turks converted to when Sufism was practiced under the banner of Islam, and this was the religion against which Ibn Taymiyya and his school of thought and disciples revolted during the Mameluke era and against which Ibn Abdul-Wahab protested during the last decades of the Ottoman era. Hence, when Al-Masaary would admit to the so-called legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphate, and it embraced a creed refuted by Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Al-Qayyim, makes Al-Masaary an enemy of both ancient scholars as well as Ibn Abdul-Wahab, despite his heavily quoting them as the betters and the masters of Ibn Abdul-Wahab. Hence, Al-Masaary and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights fell into flagrant contradiction. He had better criticize Ibn Abdul-Wahab in a more convincing, to-the-point manner within the Sunnite Salafist methodology itself if he had talked about how Ibn Abdul-Wahab quoted in a distorted manner the words and notions of both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Al-Qayyim and he would have compared their words and his. Thus, he would have discovered what we and others have; the fact that Ibn Abdul-Wahab was a Salafist dwarf when compared with Ibn Taymiyya despite the time gap between them. Of course, the Salafist extremist Al-Masaary would not in a hundred years criticize Ibn Abdul-Wahab and his school of thought from a Quranist point of view to show how Wahabism contradicts the Quran; as he is far from the Quranic guidance in the first place.

7- Al-Masaary and scholars of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights had ulterior motives within their criticizing and undermining Ibn Abdul-Wahab and his thought; they stick to another fundamentalist creed that they deem high above Wahabism. They resented the fact that Ibn Abdul-Wahab readily placed himself as subservient of the Saudi prince, thus setting the rule of placing scholars under rulers, a stance refused and rejected by Al-Masaary and the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. Their view is the other way around; scholars represent sharia and they are above any rulers and sultans, thus unwittingly imitating the Shiites. Al-Masaary and the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights never liked to imitate Ibn Abdul-Wahab in being subservient to the Saudi royal family and helping them to own lands and people living on them; rather, they aimed to place themselves high above all rulers and sultans, especially the Saudi royal family. If Ibn Abdul-Wahab placed himself in service of the Saudi family, he is unfit to be their imam. If Al-Sheikh family members, descendants of Ibn Abdul-Wahab, serve and live off Al-Saud family, they can go to hell.

8- Hence, Al-Masaary and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights differed in their Salafist Sunnite fundamentalist thought from both the traditional Wahabism and the Wahabi opposition movements of Al-Otaybi and the Najd Brothers, as both sanctified Ibn Abdul-Wahab, which has been the stance of formal high-rank scholars subservient to the KSA, as all of them were Wahabi brethren. Let us discuss below the difference between traditional Wahabism of scholars, representative of sharia, in service of political authority and the Wahabi fundamentalism that rebelled against such notion and makes rulers submitting to scholars who represent sharia, as called for by Al-Masaary and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

Between the fundamentalism of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and traditional Wahabism:

1- Al-Masaary and members the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights undermined Ibn Abdul-Wahab after quoting from his words what would serve their purpose of harshly attacking and undermining the KSA and its scholars.

2- The unknown author of the book titled "The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family" saw that King Abdul-Aziz managed to crush the Najd Brothers and their revolt and to unify the KSA and to spread security and peace within it, and this led him to turn into a tyrannical ruler under an un-Islamic motto of ''sheikhs knows best''. He criticized King Abdul-Aziz because he never cared about events occurring beyond the Saudi borders and never thought about establishing an Islamic Empire; rather, he insisted on the concept of a country and a nationality under Al-Saud family, as rulers knows best and expect blind obedience while addressing advice to rulers must be in secret and discreetly via mediators from sheikhs and scholars, like Ibn Baz for instance, because within such concepts, it is forbidden to criticize or advise rulers in public. Of course, such notions were embraced and propagated by Wahabi scholars in service of Al-Saud family. This author asserts that this was the state of affairs until King Feisal welcomed into the KSA the Egyptian MB members who fled Egypt to avoid persecution of the secular, Leftist Egyptian President Abdul-Nasser. As per this author, the MB members exchanged ideas and notions with Wahabi opposition figures; the former renewed their 'pure' Wahabi faith and the latter learned organization and the generality of the call to all Muslims worldwide in all the political, social, cultural, and religious aspects (7). Hence, a rift existed from now on between traditional Saudi Wahabism of formal scholars serving the KSA and the fundamentalist Salafist opposition movement that hated the KSA and sought to topple the Saudi regime one day. Hence, the terrorist MB members, in our opinion, influenced to a great extent the establishment of the Wahabi opposition in the 1990s.

3- Typically, Al-Masaary in his book ''The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA'' criticizes traditional Wahabism to make Sunnite fundamentalism of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights rise high above it, in a discourse filled with lewd terms and sarcasm as well as declaring others as apostates. He asserts that traditional Wahabi scholars focused on demolishing mausoleums and mosques with tombs while overlooking what he deemed as the core of Islam: to disown all tyrant rulers and polytheists, as per Wahabi notions in the writings of Ibn Abdul-Wahab.

4- In the 9^th chapter of his book, Al-Masaary under the title ''The KSA Is the Tomb of scholars and Prison of Preachers'' accuses Saudi scholars serving the KSA of deceiving Muslim nations by giving a sharia cover or coloring to all acts of the Saudi government in return for money, gifts, and luxurious living. Such corrupt scholars disregard and overlook the fact that the KSA has laws that oppose and contradict Wahabi sharia, and yet, such scholars talk constantly about ruling in the name of God and His sharia. In his opinion, such scholars ignore sharia texts of jurisprudence related to rulers; they focus only on hadiths and notions of fiqh related to blind obedience to rulers. Moreover, they ignore realities of life at our times that pose many challenges to traditional Wahabism. Al-Masaary thus contradicts the writings of Ibn Abdul-Wahab and creeds of the Najd Brothers, as he does not consider countries whose people worship toms and saints as polytheistic countries of apostates, though such worship of the dead and their tombs is deemed as polytheism as far as Wahabism is concerned (8). Thus, Al-Masaary contradicts himself and he discards the important notions deemed as core Wahabism in order to serve his purpose of reaching power, authority and wealth by becoming ruler of Arabia one day. This is the purpose of all fundamentalists like the terrorist MB members among others, as they want to reach such goal by any means even if they would discard traditional Wahabism that serves rulers.

5- Al-Masaary endeavored to convince readers that the KSA is ruled by apostates and infidels because it allies itself to the West and man-made laws, thus forsaking sharia laws and encouraging usury banks and failing to apply the principle of ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'' properly (9). Thus, Sunnite fundamentalism of Al-Masaary differs a lot from Salafist Wahabism.

6- Typically, Al-Masaary quotes Ibn Baz to prove his views contradictory, as he serves the KSA and the Saudi family and discards core of Wahabism. He mocked the fact that Ibn Baz had once declared the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, as an infidel and apostate, because he did not apply sharia laws, while the same applies to the KSA that does not apply sharia laws and rely on man-made laws: (… Ibn Baz declared vociferously that any State which does not rule using God's sharia and God's Word in the Quran is an unjust, corrupt one of pre-Islamic era, as he concluded that Muslims should disown such a state and deem it as an enemy and not an ally, until it believes in God alone and apply His sharia. Of course, we do not quote Ibn Baz as trustworthy scholar, for he is nothing of the kind, but we quote him sot prove his inconsistency before readers … his words about Abdel-Nasser applies now to Al-Saud royal family …) (10).

7- The only point shared by both traditional Wahabism and fundamentalism formed by Al-Masaary is to easily declare others as infidels and apostates. He used above views of Ibn Baz against Abdel-Nasser to oppose and attack Al-Saud family. Beforehand, he used quotes from writings of Ibn Abdul-Wahab to declare the ruling family members as infidels and apostates. Ibn Abdul-Wahab himself easily declared others as infidels and apostates in the manner typical if Ibn Taymiyya. Al-Masaary in his writings has widened the scope of declaring others as infidels and apostates, as he insists on declaring all Arab and Muslims rulers, kings, and presidents as infidels and apostates because they do not apply sharia laws. Al-Masaary here contradicts himself; as in previous writings, he tolerates those who worship tombs and dead saints, unlike traditional Wahabism. Yet, Al-Masaary has widened the scope of declaring others as infidels and apostates to serve purposes of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in fighting the KSA, by declaring as apostates all who oppose his views, Muslims and non-Muslims rulers and non-rulers alike (11).

8- Declaring others as infidels and apostates entails allowing looting and bloodshed of apostates as called for before by Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Abdul-Wahab, as the latter allied himself to Al-Saud family under the motto of conquering by the sword and raisin the motto of ''Blood for blood and destruction for all enemies!'' during military Wahabi jihad to unify regions under the banner of Wahabism, thus murdering and massacring the innocent Muslims after declaring them as infidels, polytheists, and apostates and confiscating their lands and possessions.

9- Al-Masaary approves this Wahabi jihad in the 5^th chapter of his boo, under the title ''Sharia Ways and Unifying Muslims'', as he favors incessant jihad to re-establish caliphate as religious duty, and he praises the Najd Brothers who revolted military against King Abdul-Aziz when he stopped their jihad within Iraqi borders. Al-Masaary resented the fact that the KSA signed in 1931the Kellogg–Briand Pact, after King Abdul-Aziz and the UK vanquished and killed off the Najd Brothers. Al-Masaary writes the following about the KSA: (…This vicious State is ruled by infidels and apostates who signed a pact that prevents jihad, and it is a grave crime against Islam (i.e., Wahabism, of course) to stop jihad to spread Islam (i.e., Wahabism, of course) all over the globe, and thus, the Saudi state prevents a religious holy duty of fighting infidels, polytheists, and apostates…) (12). This means that Al-Masaary agrees to the logic of the very first Saudi State of the duty to fight all those deemed infidels, polytheists, and apostates, and he attacks King Abdul-Aziz for his prevention of Jihad assumed by the Najd Brothers. Yet, he saw that the first, second, and third Saudi States as illegitimate. This is another piece of evidence that he manipulates Wahabi notions to fight and undermine the KSA by choosing and quoting views to serve this purpose, thus writing contradictions. His sole end here is to place scholars above the stature and authority of rulers.

The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights monopolizing sharia to control the Islamic world:

1- We have written about how the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights undermines the legitimacy of the KSA as it does not apply Salafist Wahabi sharia laws as it claims and that Al-Masaary criticized the first Saudi State and the distorted Saudi Wahabism in the 20^th century and used Wahabi notions to undermine and refute the stances of the KSA because the Saudi rulers adopt political creed of blind obedience to rulers by all scholars and the subjects, unlike the creed of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights about rulers serving under scholars of sharia, which in fact is the views of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, even if such views contradict and oppose everyone's opinions. We explain this further below.

2- The unknown author of the book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'' writes that intellectual preparation started years before the establishment of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, as pioneers of reform focused on two main topics: to convey the message of reform to the nation in an effective manner, and to establish organizations to apply Sunnite Hisbah (i.e. inquisition) on the nation and rulers. This means that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights wanted ardently to attract and win citizens inside the KSA to its side to apply its political project; the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights would apply Hisbah on both rulers and the nation, thus making itself an authority high above both, and no one would call it to question, as if this is divine right or deputization in the name of sharia!

3- In the West regimes, the people are the source of authorities and elect their representatives in such balanced authorities within an atmosphere of transparency and political and intellectual freedoms, so as not to allow one authority to rise above the other, and the people supervise and watch closely over the three authorities (the judiciary, legislative, and executive ones) by freedom of the press and media and NGOs.

4- As per the Quran, Prophet Muhammad ruled Yathreb by Shura, which means in our modern terminology direct democracy without representatives, and God has ordered him to apply Shura: "It is by of grace from God that you were gentle with them. Had you been harsh, hardhearted, they would have dispersed from around you. So pardon them, and ask forgiveness for them, and consult them in the conduct of affairs…" (3:159). This means that Yathreb dwellers were the source of authority of Muhammad as a ruler of this city-state; if they had dispersed away from him, he would have lost authority and protection against the Meccan persecution. Sadly, once Muhammad died, early Muslims were gradually transformed into tribal, monarchical military rule for the first time by the Umayyad Dynasty and to theocracies of the Abbasids and the Fatimids until the Ottomans, and eventually European colonial powers occupied Muslims' countries by making use of the weakness, backwardness, deterioration, degeneration, and tyranny of the Ottomans. This proves that Al-Masaary resorted deliberately to contradictions when he praises in his book the Ottoman Empire that collapsed in Turkey in 1924 and calls for its revival, and he attacks the KSA for separating itself from it at one point.

5-For the sake of such revival of the Ottoman Empire, Al-Masaary and the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights base their ideology on the notion that they are the sole owners of the right to fully control the State in Arabia, with its lands and citizens, by Hisbah that will be applied to both the nation and rulers. And the next step for the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights would be conquering regimes of all Arab countries and the Islamic world to unify them under one caliphate ruled by Al-Masaary as a caliph, as opposed to the West 'infidels', thus repeating the Sunnite Salafist notion of dividing the world into two camps: camp of peace and Islam and camp of war and infidels. Further details on this will be tackled later on in this book.

6- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights saw that sharia is teachings of Ibn Taymiyya in the first place and then Ibn Abdul-Wahab in the second place. Sharia of Ibn Taymiyya entails murdering Muslims for numerous trivial reasons and even for mere differences in views regarding faith, acts of worship, jurisprudence, etc., as this would make a man apostate deserved to be murdered brutally and his possessions confiscated, even if such a man is a Sunnite scholar! This is frightening! Scholars within the Ibn Taymiyya school of thought would order the murder of such 'apostates' without trial even if they repented! Other apparently less extremist Sunnite Wahabis of the 20^th century, like the terrorist MB members and theologians Sayed Sabek in his book titled ''Fiqh Al-Sunna'' and Abou Bakr the Algerian in his book titled ''Methodology of Muslims", repeat the same views! The application of such sharia of Ibn Taymiyya school of thought is a catastrophe leading to indiscriminate murders and bloodshed, and even if members of the Committee of defending Legitimate Rights would apply such notions, they would liquidate one another in case they would differ in religious views! The crux of the matter is the crisis of Sunnite Salafist Wahabism: it entails a thorough revision before calling for its applications. Such revisions is made impossible to apply because most of the notions within Sunnite Salafist Wahabism contain contradictions and illogical views that cause disputes and conflicts, along with contradictory hadiths authored by known and unknown persons who had ascribed it falsely to Prophet Muhammad after his death. Any Salafist scholar could not possible deny a hadith and declare it does not relate to Prophet Muhammad, especially when such a hadith is quoted by ancient scholars centuries ago. Hence, both the Wahabi terrorist MB members and the Wahabi members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights rely on slogans and mottoes as well as meaningless phrases like ''application of Islamic sharia'', "Islam is the solution", "Hisbah", ''honored sharia'', without agreeing upon what notions are deemed within sharia and what are not. It is a grave error to deem such man-made views as divine sharia, which found exclusively in the Quran, because human beings commit errors and mistakes and have their own prejudices and biases. Ancient scholars created their schools of thought fit for their eras filled with injustices and tyranny of despots and governors; thus, their schools of thought would never fit the modern age of ours, and we thank Almighty God that the KSA does not apply the dangerous Wahabi sharia to the letter!

7- The political creed of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights is to place itself high above rulers and citizens as the sole representative of faith and sharia and reserving to itself the right to perform Hisbah without being called to question by anyone else. The unknown author of the book titled "The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family" asserts that the letter of demands and the memo of advice were together a good first step, and he demanded the formation of a group of Wahabi scholars to choose/formulate laws and members of the Shura Council as well as to annul all secular, man-made laws that contradict Wahabi sharia. Another mission of such group was to apply Hisbah: to watch over people's dress codes, behavior in streets, work capacity and efficiency... etc. to fire all corrupt officials in the government of the KSA and to hold the accountable and try them in courts, even if they are ministers within members of the Saudi family. This group must re-build Saudi media and military army within sharia laws and adjust external policies to be based on enmity toward the West. Such group would be pioneers of reform and never would be questioned by anyone else!

8- The unknown author of the book titled "The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family" asserts that all Saudi citizens should be mobilized to join the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to apply justice and equality and to fight corruption after the failure of attempts of the memo of advice and letter of demands: (… The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights managed to convey its message of reform to all Saudi citizens with its details to appeal to the nation … and it is high time to tackle other complicated issues, and certainly pioneers of reform in the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights could manage all critical complicated issues …). He means here the Hisbah of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, but the dominant culture in the KSA would not tolerate any committee independent from the Saudi royal family, and the pioneers of reform realized this fact, but (… also realized the need to apply such concept within a group trusted by all people in an acceptable framework to cooperate to help the oppressed and the weak …). We conclude here that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights raises the motto of helping the oppressed and the weak to deceive the masses and to reach its ultimate goal: absolute tyrannical theocratic rule under concept of Hisbah over rulers and people, high above the Saudi throne. This is similar to the Shiite notion of placing the scholar above politics and rule and all rulers and governors, as we will tackle below.

The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights was influenced by the Shiite traditions, creed, and political movements:

1- Despite the fact that declaring Shiites as polytheists and apostates is a shared point between traditional Wahabism and rebellious fundamentalism of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, its supporters and members were influenced by the Shiite traditions especially the principles of ''the guardianship of scholars or jurists'' and the principle of ''Taqiyya'' (i.e., pretending to deny one's religious beliefs to avoid censure and/or persecution), as members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights show empty mottoes, regarding the oppressed and applying reform etc., and hide the ulterior motive of seeking power, authority, and wealth. Thus, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights has its own sharia and declares people outside its circle as infidels and apostates, as the case with Saad Al-Faqeeh and his supporters who left the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

2- Using Taqiyya, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights uses a mélange of issues and topics in a contradictory manner to hide its ulterior motive of seeking absolute power, authority, and wealth under the claim of divine deputization as the sole body representative of sharia. And we give the following example: Statement No. 9, on the Saudi role in Yemen and how the Saudi family members ignored to consult the citizens, attacks the Saudi government as it got involved in supporting separatist communists in Yemen. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights asserts the right of the Saudi nation to be consulted and to participate in decision-making process and to hold rulers accountable and put them to question. Such words and notions are OK, but they are used manipulatively as a mélange of ideas to deceive readers, and we discover this as we go on reading Statement No. 9: (…The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights sees that it is the duty of its scholars, thinkers, and the cultural elite boost the conditions of the KSA by applying Hisbah on rulers on behalf of the nation …). Of course, this tyranny did not deceive the Saudis. In Publication No. 15 in 1994, titled "Rule and Sovereignty with Sharia and the Nation", the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights write the following: (… Yemen events passed and the Saudi nation has the right to put to question those involved in supporting communists … as policies that adopt sharia entail that rule and sovereignty should follow both the Islamic sharia and the will of the nation … who has the right to apply Hisbah on rulers if they fail to deliver …)

3- This does not imply that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights truly believe that people is the source of all authorities; as among proofs cited by Al-Masaary to declare the KSA as ruled by apostates and infidels is holding Ta'if Conference in 1989 about crisis of Lebanon: (… heretic notions of such conference are so many; we give an example here; they said that people is the source of all authorities, and we cannot accept this heretic notion of the so-called democracy authored by the West infidels … it is as if the people are deities to legislate for themselves … since the KSA held such conference of heresies on Saudi lands, we see that scholars could not protest against such notions of apostasy in the land of monotheism!) (13). It is clear that Al-Masaary saw that the principle "people is the source of all authorities'' as part of apostasy and heretic notions, thus making members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights contradict themselves!

The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights considered itself the sole representative of sharia and the nation!

1- Al-Masaary writes in Publication No. 15 the following: (… It is among the essentials of the sharia politics that authority is derived from sharia to people …), and this indicates that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights considered itself as the sole representative of sharia laws, people, and the nation as well!

2- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights wanted to represent the nation based on their misinterpretation of this Quranic verse: "And let there be among you a community calling to virtue, and advocating righteousness, and deterring from evil. These are the successful." (3:104). In our Quranist point of view, we see that this verse means all the nation and citizens inside a given country and NOT a single group within society, and the evidence to support our view here is the context of this verse within its preceding and following verses: "And hold fast to the rope of God, altogether, and do not become divided…" (3:103), "And do not be like those who separated and disputed after the clear proofs came to them; for them is a great punishment." (3:105). Hence, these verses are dressed to the whole Muslims society and not special group of it. All Muslims, male and female, share this responsibility; see 9:71 and 103:3. This copes with direct democracy of Quranic Shura lost deliberately by early Muslims who formed the tyrannical caliphate ruling system that caused the emergence of Shiite religion and the Sunnite religion with their many doctrines and countless hadiths and traditional accumulated notions. Of course, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Abdul-Wahab as well as the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights follow the footsteps of such Arab ancestors in trying to restore theocratic Middle-Ages tyranny to struggle for power, authority, rule, and wealth. Thus both theocratic Shiites and Sunnites have one aim: to control the nation and to monopolize power and wealth and to crush dignity of citizens in the name of sharia and Islam, and the real Islamic sharia in the Quran is innocent of such Sunnite-Shiite crimes.

3- The concept of ''the nation'' for Al-Masaary is confined solely to his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights that deputized itself as representative of God! Manipulating the name of sharia, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights wanted to apply Hisbah on both rulers and citizens to check they apply sharia to the letter, thus imitating Shiite inquisition and Taqiyya to deceive people and own them as well as owning religion! This is the ulterior meaning of the sentence we quote from Publication No. 15 (… It is among the essentials of the sharia politics that authority is derived from sharia to people …).

4- Of course, such views of Al-Masaary copes with political Salafist creed of all caliphs (pre-Umayyads, Umayyads, Fatimids, Abbasids, etc.) about the deified ruler/sultan rule by faith and sharia and who was the shepherd and his subjects as the sheep of cattle who obey him blindly and he owned them to the extent that he would kill one-third of them to reform the remaining two thirds! Thus, it is a 'heretic' notion to Wahabi Salafists in general, and members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in particular, that people would be the source of all authorities. Thus, members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights deceive the readers with the words ''people'', ''nation'', ''absolute justice'', etc.

The Sunnite Hisbah and the claim of absolute justice:

Firstly: the notion of the Sunnite Hisbah:

1- Hisbah means literally ''accountability; it is a Sunnite concept similar to ''inquisition''. Hisbah for Al-Masaary means simply that the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights will be placed high above the Saudi authority, rulers, and citizens as per the Iranian model of Ayatollah or Khomeini guiding rulers and governors. The same applies to the case when a member of the terrorist MB member reaches the presidency in any country; he would be loyal and submissive to the supreme MB guide. This is political Hisbah of Al-Masaary who plays on words to deceive readers to cover his political ambition to monopolize power, rule, authority, and wealth instead of the Saudi royal family.

2- Al-Masaary authored a book titled ''Judging Rulers'', with a dedication to the leaders of the Najd Brothers: (… This book is dedicated to the great Hisbah jihadists Sheikh Sultan Ibn Bajad, prince of the Otaybah tribe, and Sheikh Feisal Al-Daweesh, prince of the Mateer tribe, who applied Hisbah with the sword on the tyranny British agent of Arabia Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud …). In this book, Al-Masaary tackles the Sunnite fundamentalist notion of divine deputization in political rule of theocracy to apply absolute justice of sharia.

3- We have refuted such notion elsewhere in our Quranist articles and books; but we briefly say here that such Sunnite false and un-Islamic notion is based on the erroneous understanding of the verb ''to judge'' in the Quranic context. Sunnite, Salafist, MB, and Wahabi understanding of this term is: to rule politically. This is a grave error. The literal meaning of the term in the Quran is simply to judge as in courts and judicial systems: "…If they come to you, judge between them, or turn away from them. If you turn away from them, they will not harm you in the least. But if you judge, judge between them equitably. God loves the equitable." (5:42), "…Those who do not judge according to what God revealed are the unbelievers." (5:44), "…Those who do not rule according to what God revealed are the evildoers." (5:45). "…Those who do not judge according to what God revealed are the sinners." (5:47). "…So judge between them according to what God revealed…" (5:48). "And judge between them according to what God revealed…" (5:49). Hence, the phrase ''judge between'' is within the context of judicial trials or settling disputes and does NOT mean ''to rule over'' people within a political sense. The same sense applies to the following verses: "…And when you judge between people, judge with justice…" (4:58). "When they entered upon David, and he was startled by them, they said, "Do not fear. We are two disputants; one of us has wronged the other; so judge between us fairly, and do not be biased, and guide us to the straight way."" (38:22). This means that Salafists who distort the meaning of the Quranic term ''to judge between people'' into ''to rule over people'' are deliberately distorting the Quran to serve their political and theocratic purposes. They forget that there is no notion of clergy in Islam (i.e., the Quran alone).

Secondly: Islamic notion of Shura (consultation):

1- We have explained in elsewhere in our books and articles that the concept of Shura in the Quran means that the nation is the source of all authorities and all power and that prophet Muhammad has been ordered to apply Shura in the Quran as he was the ruler of the Yathreb city-state. We have explained before that Shura was a religious duty for all Muslims in a given society, just like the religious duties of performing prayers and paying zakat: "And those who respond to their Lord, and pray regularly, and conduct their affairs by mutual consultation, and give of what We have provided them." (42:38). The duties of Shura, performing prayers, and paying zakat cannot be done by someone instead of someone else. Hence, Shura in Islam means direct democracy of citizens expressing their views themselves without representatives within a parliament. Like prayers performed in mosques, Shura in the Yathreb city-state used to be in mosques where men and women gathered together like a political assembly to discuss topics related to ruling Yathreb. Some men used to avoid attending such gatherings and God has warned against such avoidance: "The believers are those who believe in God and His Messenger, and when they are with him for a matter of common interest, they do not leave until they have asked him for permission. Those who ask your permission are those who believe in God and His Messenger. So when they ask your permission to attend to some affair of theirs, give permission to any of them you wish, and ask God's forgiveness for them. God is Forgiving and Merciful." (24:62)

2- Early Muslims observed the religious duty of Shura during the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad, and no further Quranic rebuke revealed after 24:62; on the contrary, we conclude that the gatherings were so big that conspiring secretly within them has been rebuked by God in the Quran see 58:8-11.

3- Some historical accounts during the period of pre-Umayyad caliphs tell us that Shura gatherings went on for while in the Yathreb mosque using the call for congregational prayers. Yet, all this was lost once the Umayyads made their theocratic hereditary monarchical rule, imitated by all successive caliphates like the Abbasids and Fatimids, etc. What proves this historical point is the fact that authors of historical books and books of hadiths and biography purportedly ascribed to Prophet Muhammad ignored to register and record in their books any sermons delivered by Muhammad or any minutes of any Shura councils during his lifetime. In fact, such writings of hadiths, biography, and jurisprudence were written in the early Abbasid era and later eras and not before that, and they are falsehoods and lies that fill countless volumes and tomes to serve the purposes of political and theocratic tyranny of despots and political clergymen and scholars who sought power or sought to please sultans in return for money. Sadly, Al-Masaary repeats the same ancient lies and falsehoods in his book titled ''Judging Rulers'' to lend the scholars of his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights an authority high above any rulers.

Absolute justice as defined by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights:

1- Al-Masaary claims that absolute justice could never be applied in this transient world unless via the dominance of Sunnite, Wahabi sharia! This is utter nonsense! Anyone who reads books of Sunnite mythology, falsehoods, jurisprudence (i.e., fiqh), differences, contradictions, extremism, and bloodshed would easily realize that 1) it is a religion of injustice and violation of human rights, and 2) it lacks any innovative, creative thinking in both fields of fiqh and politics. Most of Sunnite books focus on corporeal punishments, purification of body and things and other items, sex, trade dealings, and persecution and oppression of women and slaves. Sunnite books rarely contain anything about the relation between rulers and the ruled subjects, except in some margins in few book that tackled the notion that it is 'natural' for rulers to be tyrannical despots who represent divine right to rule, who deserve blind obedience by people, and who own lands and souls and everything and had the right to kill one third of the population to reform the two remaining thirds! Hence, we can hardly expect any justice within books of the oppression- and injustice-based Sunnite religion. To imagine that Al-Masaary and his members and supporters of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights want ardently to apply this unjust and oppressive Sunnite sharia in the name of the nation and Islam makes one shudder with fear and indignation!

2- Typically, it is a bad habit of all fundamentalists, especially Sunnite Wahabis and particularly Al-Masaary and the members and supporters of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, to talk on behalf of or in the name of the ''Islamic nation'', as if they knew the views of 1.5 billion Muslims on the globe! Such 1.5 billion Muslims never authorized anyone to talk on their behalf. Hence, both Al-Masaary and his members and supporters of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights seem to be on drugs and imagine things within hallucinatory sessions to please themselves!

3- Al-Masaary says that absolute justice could never be applied in this transient world, and this is true; it will be applied only in the Hereafter in the Day of Judgment by Almighty, Omniscient God; see 40:16-20. Absolute justice entails a never-erring Being who is All-Knowing; and all human being commit mistakes and have their own biases and prejudices, and they can be deceived, as occurred to Prophet Muhammad himself when the Quran rebuked him for a mistake in judging a case because some facts of this case were not mentioned to him; see 4:105:115.

4- Hence, absolute justice could never be applied in this transient world even during the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad who applied Quranic sharia as best as he could in the Yathreb city-state without seeking worldly ambition. With the passage of centuries, things got mixed up and overlapped among the worldly ambitions and religious terms and seeking the Hereafter, as we discern from the words of Al-Masaary in this quote: (… There is no doubt that there is no absolute justice except through Islam within the dominance of sharia; otherwise, absolute justice would not be completely applied …) (14). We translate his words as follows: he falsely promises readers to provide absolute justice if he would rule over Arabia, because sharia consists only of his own views; this is a lie to attract and win the masses in the KSA to his side and to undermine the Saudi government. Hence, Al-Masaary insults both the nation of Arabia and Islam violated as always by both Al-Masaary and all Wahabi in general in the opposition or subservient to the Saudi State, for the sake of transient glory of the world's power, authority, rule, and wealth, while forgetting all about the Hereafter and eternal life.

Between the Saudi royal family's claim of owning the State and the claim by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights of owning sharia and religion:

Firstly: between the deified caliph and the deified religious scholars who assume guardianship of faith and jurisprudence:

1- Overt, superficial look would make readers feel that Al-Masaary and his fellows of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights wanted ardently to revive Salafists' middle age, when a caliph ruled with absolutism, tyranny, and despotism doing whatever he liked without being put to question. This is shown as Al-Masaary laments the loss of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 despite the fact that it was the worst caliphate witnessed in Muslims' history for four centuries. In the modern age, the West knew principles of freedom and justice, while simultaneously Ottoman governors spread corruption on earth in the name of 'Islamic' caliphate. The cons of the Ottoman caliphate were deliberately overlooked by Al-Masaary and his fellows of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights; hence, the superficial look would see that the call to revive caliphate meant simply to promote the Ottomans and their ruling system. Yet, the deeper look that delves into things asserts something else; Al-Masaary and fellows of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights wanted ardently to establish their own more tyrannical State in comparison to the Ottomans. This is strange in our modern age of human rights and democracy, because the sharia of Al-Masaary and fellows of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights grants absolute power monopolized by a caliph in the name of 'divine' Wahabi sharia and would stop all councils or parliaments to deny nation's right to be the source of all authorities. Worse than the previous items, Al-Masaary and fellows of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights would make scholars higher above all rulers and governments in power and authority; this is sheer theocracy in its worst forms and utmost corruption, more than the Saudi regime itself.

2- Such extremist stances of Al-Masaary and fellows of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights against the KSA resulted from naming the kingdom after the Saudi royal family as the founder of it had legitimacy of the conquests by the sword to own and control lands and souls, and such traditional centuries-old notion was countered by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights with another traditional centuries-old notion of all rulers and nations submitting to scholars as representatives of divine sharia. Let us discuss below the two notions from the point of view of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

Secondly: the Saudi royal family's claim of owning the land and all persons and things in it:

1- We discern bitterness in the views of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in its writings and analyses. Publication No. 5 in 1994 tackles the arrest of Dr. Hussein Mashhour, the scientist of physics who got his Ph.D. thesis from the USA after being taught in the UK, and who came from the south of the KSA. Let us quote an excerpt: (… The mentality of possession within the Saudi ruling family shows the class distinction nature in Arabia; all of citizens in view of the royal family are mere ''things'' or ''subjects'' owned by this family, apart from foreign ''things'' owned because they reside in the KSA among working classes of all other nationalities …). This discourse asserts that Prince Sultan controlled education sectors despite the fact he was uneducated. When Prince Salman received a delegation from the teachers of King Saud University to beseech him to release Al-Masaary from prison as he was a great scientist in nuclear physics, Prince Salman refused, saying that he never cared about the degrees of people who oppose the KSA. The same applies to Dr. Hussein Mashhour: he was a mere 'thing' possessed among colored ''subjects'' from the south of KSA.

2- In Publication No. 12 in 1994, Al-Masaary sarcastically and bitterly questions the ownership of the Saudi royal family to the lands and people living on it: (… Are we better than other nationalities?! We are the only citizens on the globe to be owned personally by their rulers who trade with our fate and lands …).

3- In Publication No. 15, the topic tackled is the big insult or humiliated to be ascribed to the Saudi family within the Saudi nationality, as names of nationalities must be derived from countries and not names of persons or a certain family name, and Al-Masaary compares this humiliation to other names of other Arab and Islamic countries and nationalities. Of course, the same discourse denounces the denaturalizing of Bin Laden without fair trial to him in absentia and without any sharia proof or civil legal basis. This is the very first time we read the writings of Al-Masaary a reference to civil man-made laws in a positive way, as long as it would serve the purposes of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

4- In Publication No. 17 in 1994, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights tries to interpret the event of establishing the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs by the KSA: Al-Saud and the Saudi government (… with their mentality of possessing and enslaving people as things owned by the Saudi king thought that the citizens would applaud the establishment of such a governmental body to serve Islam, as if the royal family cares for the opinion of their owned ''subjects'' …).

5- In Publication No. 9, we read the following: (… What would you think of those who deal unjustly with people, humiliating, despising, and insulting them as if they were ''things'' owned by the royal family? …).

6- In Publication No. 135, Al-Masaary urges that citizens must get rid of the epithet ''Saudis'', as people of Arabia are not to be owned by l-Saud family members, with the exception of policemen and security national guards and scholars: they are truly Saudis in the sense of serving Al-Saud family.

7- In Publication No. 28 in 1994, he Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights sees that the mentality of owning people is the basis of corruption and bribery and stealing money from the State Treasury to the pockets of the royal family members by money gifts, confiscation of lands, salaries, commissions, confiscation of trade and the like, and thus public state money is stolen.

8- This interpretation by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights was repeated, as the Saudi family own the State, the lands, and the citizens in a provocative way, derived from Salafist thought, which led the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to have a strong reaction in the opposite direction. Hence, the contradiction in the stances of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights lies in the fact that it faced such Salafist notion of rulers' ownership with another Salafist notion no less worse than it: sharia represented in scholars who rise high above all authority of rulers, as the case in Iran, as the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights wanted ardently to embody sharia to place itself above all Saudi authority and citizens.

Thirdly: Quranic/Islamic sharia has nothing to do with the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights:

We briefly talk here about the essence of Quranic sharia, the only true sharia in Islam as per Quranists, as opposed to Sunnite Wahabi sharia manipulated by fundamentalists who deceive the masses in order to reach power, authority, and wealth by claims of applying sharia and refusal to accept the existence of civil laws. We summarize this topic in the following points.

1- Man-made civil laws begin with a constitution setting the main principles of a given country and its legislative objectives and how authorities (legislative, judiciary, and executive ones) are managed and distributed within certain statutes as well as philosophy of rule, economy, the relation of society with religions, the parliament, laws application and setting, role media, political systems, etc. as far as interests of citizens and their country are concerned, and this is the legislative objectives in the Quranic sharia applied by Prophet Muhammad in the Yathreb city-state, a brief era whose bright light went off in the tyrannical eras of oppression and injustice of the so-called caliphate.

2- We must bear in mind that legislative Quranic verses are less than 200 verses with repetitions of certain divine commands included. Such legislative Quranic verses are the real and only Islamic sharia; most of them revolve around details of how Islam cares for the rights of family, society, and individuals. Hence, the God in the Quran deliberately leaves ample room for human beings to set laws coping with needs of their age, within higher values and objectives of Quranic/Islamic legislation that include facilitation, justice for all, absolute freedom of faith and creed, equality for all, Shura and political participation of all which is similar to direct democracy in our modern-age terms, which is higher above than the widespread parliament-representatives type of democracy of today. Hence, within such basis, man-made civil laws could be set and be considered ''Islamic'' as long as they are set via people's will and agreement and as long as they are set in a way without contradicting the Quranic legislative objectives and higher values. Hence, the West democracies are the nearer application to the true Islamic sharia in the Quran. Thus, Sunnite and Shiite sharia laws, and other man-made ones ascribed falsely to Islam, that helped to establish ancient Sunnite and Shiites caliphates contradict the true Islamic sharia in the Quran. Evidence: the rise of tyranny, oppression, injustices, and corruption in all such caliphates throughout history of Muslims.

3- All tyrant rulers/ sultans/ caliphs used to raise the banner of sharia to justify their oppression, despotism, and injustice. But history tells us about certain few instances of real piety of judges and fewer instances of piety of rulers, despite the fact that the judicial systems of Middle-Ages Muslims overlap and did not distinguish between divine laws in the Quran and man-made ones in fiqh, and thought of the two as one divine source of sharia laws; a grave error. In fact, man-made innovative thinking in jurisprudence and interpretations of the Quranic verses reflect mentalities of their inventors and their dominant culture in their eras and NOT Islam per se, in addition to the catastrophe of fabricating hadiths ascribed falsely to Muhammad centuries after his death. This made room for ancient scholars to add, remove, exclude, and include anything they liked and led to the emergences of countless doctrines and school of thoughts under the three main banners of Sunnite, Shiite, and Sufi creeds, with differences between every generation of scholars. It is not surprising to read the phrase "scholars varied in their views of that subject" so frequently in Sunnite books and tomes, for instance. It is laughter-inducing to see scholars of our age making such vastly different and contradictory views as divine sharia and legislation; as if such human beings' views were infallible and irrefutable. It is a grave insult to God by them to ascribe and annex such views to His religion of Islam: the Quran alone.

4- Such vast differences even within a given doctrine have resulted in the overlapping between legislation and personal favored opinions of the judges within the Middle-Ages judicial systems of Muslims, instead of applying justice as much as they could, judges would find themselves before so many contradictory fiqh views to choose from! Hence, most judges were extensions of tyranny and corruption of caliphs and sultans whose caliphate and all their statesmen were corrupt and unjust. History tells us of few instances when just judges were persecuted and killed by rulers because they tried to apply justice.

Fourthly: the injustice of the fundamentalist Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, even before it would reach power and rule:

1- Fundamentalists never care to modernize fiqh (jurisprudence) to make it cope with modern age and to correct the countless mistakes of ancient imams and scholars by using the Quran as the only criterion; instead, they raise banner of ''sharia'' to deceive the masses to reach their only real political goal: to rule within a theocracy.

2- Human rights organizations as well as international law specialists of American-Arab origin in the West have showed loops, weaknesses, and shortcomings of the sharia judicial systems of the KSA as they lived for a while inside it to study things within a closer look, and the American Foreign Office report about human rights in the KSA contain a section about the lack of public fair trials within sharia courts (15).

3- Liberty Organization serious report about sharia judicial courts in the KSA and its shortcomings and loops has the title "Judicial Chaos and Absolute Authority of Princes", and it seems to be prepared by Shiite activists inside the KSA; the report begins with criticizing Liberty itself and its reports as they ignore deliberately the blight and suffering of Shiites and confined themselves to information provided by Al-Masaary and his Committee of defending Legitimate Rights, which praises persecution of Shiites inside the KSA. The introduction of the Liberty report indicates how information provided by Al-Masaary about Shiites was biased against the Saudi Shiite citizens, providing incorrect image about state of affairs inside the KSA. The report accuses the Committee of defending Legitimate Rights of being a political party representing one group for one purpose, and not representative of all Saudi citizens, and that their information has nothing to do with human rights but sectarian and political ambitions and ends. After such an introduction, criticizing Liberty and the Committee of defending Legitimate Rights, the report gives an image of the despicable conditions of sharia courts inside the KSA within these points: lack of moral value and esteem of the Saudi judicial system, chaos of the judicial system, restrictions of the judicial system, and violations of the of the judicial rights by people in power and authority, especially royal princes. This report reinforces its claims with respected transparency and realistic citation of events and occurrences to prove these claims, and then Liberty ends the report by apologizing for readers because it trusted the dubious figure of Al-Masaary and the Committee of defending Legitimate Rights, and then a Shiite organization translated the report into Arabic and published it online (16).

4- Readers of such Liberty report would wonder at the care of Shiites to apply justice for all Saudi citizens in the KSA within reforms of the judicial systems whereas Al-Masaary ignores this point totally despite its being worthy of discussion and criticism. We conclude from all writings of the the Committee of defending Legitimate Rights that its sole aim was to apply Hisbah (inquisition) on rulers an citizens as Al-Masaary thought of himself as the embodiment of sharia laws and he would apply his ''absolute justice'' as he called it, despite the fact that his the Committee of defending Legitimate Rights is prejudiced against Saudi Shiites.

5- We have noticed that in the letter of demands, reforms of the judicial system was an essential demand, but the Committee of defending Legitimate Rights deemed this demand as to abolish all civil courts and to retain and establish Salafist sharia courts alone – criticized by Liberty report – and thus, the Committee of defending Legitimate Rights confiscates talking in the name of sharia and aimed to control the Saudi judicial system to undermine and defeat its foes (i.e., the Saudi royal family members and men subservient to them) and to enable itself to apply Hisbah on all without anyone daring to criticize it or to put it to question so as not to be deemed an apostate!

6- Yet, to abolish civil courts and to replace them with Salafist sharia courts means that the members of the Committee of defending Legitimate Rights have to come up with innovative, creative ideas to cope with the modern age and its varied and many complications in the administrational, economical, financial, social, and political aspects, and such innovative thinking cannot be found in writings of Salafist imams from Ibn Taymiyya to Ibn Abdul-Wahab. Wahabi scholars failed before to do this during the reign of King Abdul-Aziz after oil discoveries led to modernization and complications that entailed introducing new experts in all aspects, civil courts included, and the queries posed here are as follows: how such innovative, creative thinking be possible by the likes of Ibn Baz who denied that the Earth revolves around the sun and insisted, based on his Salafist mentality, that it is the other way round?! How such innovative, creative thinking be possible by Al-Masaary and his mentality that declares everyone as apostates and his views that are contradictory?!

A general overview of the contradiction of the sharia of Al-Masaary:

1- Al-Masaary contradicts himself in his personal views about any topic and he would write one opinion in one place and would write the exactly opposite opinion in another place. Al-Masaary has changed his views a lot when he was an ordinary Salafist Wahabi person and after he has become a fundamentalist who drove away his allies like Saad Al-Faqeeh because they disagreed with his opinions. Anyway, Al-Masaary always accuses his foes of being infidels and apostates who had forsaken Islam, and he pick and choose from ancient scholars' views as per what would serve his argument, considering himself as the only person who confiscates the right to talk about sharia laws, his own Al-Masaary sharia!

2- We have discerned that even stances of Al-Masaary prove contradictory; he praises Ibn Baz at one point in Statement No. 2 in 1993 and at another point of the same statement, he attacks Ibn Baz harshly for his being in service of the Saudi royal family. Al-Masaary asserts his adherence to the creed of Sunnites regarding obedience to rulers and that his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights refutes any attempt to cast doubt on its loyalty to Wahabi sharia, and yet, he authored a book to undermine the legitimacy of the KSA and to demand that his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights would control the Saudi State in the name of sharia!

3- When human rights organizations commissioned Al-Masaary to write reports about conditions inside the KSA, he had provided doubtful information that lacked many items and ignored and overlooked 1) Saudi Shiites and their plight, 2) transgressions of Saudi religious policemen, and 3) corrupt judicial courts, and he called for more restrictions to be applied by the Saudi religious police on personal freedoms. It is strange that a hater of Shiites like Al-Masaary would adopt the Shiite notions of Taqiyya (hiding one's true stance or opinion) and guardianship of jurists and scholars whose authorities are above all rulers. He often quoted words of famous Shiite imams, and yet, he would also quote Sunnite scholars calling to punish Shiites by putting them to death as apostates as per Wahabi notions he embraces (17).

4- Despite the fact that Al-Masaary has found protection in London and the British laws that prevented his being deported upon Saudi requests, in his writings, he accuses the West laws and countries of pertaining to infidels and apostates and being based on 'heretic' un-Islamic notions. Al-Masaary resented in his writings the existence of international law, deeming it as crusaders' sharia of the Devil! These double standards of Al-Masaary cast doubts on his stances and views on all topics; he forgets that in the West he found protection and freedoms that made it easy for him to turn a church into a mosque.

5- When Al-Masaary rejects international law in his writings and books, he unwittingly discards human rights that enabled him to seek political asylum in the UK. He even cites as a proof of the KSA as a country ruled by apostates that it attended international conferences and gatherings about human rights. Hence, Al-Masaary manipulates human rights for his purposes and resented that its organizations defend his foes in creed, like Shiites, as he links freedom of expression and of belief to sharia restrictions; i.e., his views of Al-Masaary sharia to control people and their opinions (19).

6- Al-Masaary accuses his foes among formal Saudi scholars that they would choose erroneous views of ancient scholars that contradict real sharia laws, whereas his views and that of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights symbolize sharia laws! Al-Masaary accuses Ibn Abdul-Wahab of copying and summarizing views of ancient scholars while claiming that he purified religion from deviated thought or notions as per his own limited understanding of views of ancient scholars of the Middle Ages selected by Ibn Abdul-Wahab in his writings (20); yet, Al-Masaary overlooks the fact that he has adopted the same method and that he considers his views as divine sharia!

7- Suffice it to say that Al-Masaary admits in the blurb of the 4^th edition of his book titled "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA" that it is a revised edition; this means that he has removed, corrected, and changed some of his former ideas and added new ones, and this shows that his modulated opinions are not deemed divine sharia at all (found in the Quran exclusively as we have said before many times) and that his opinions could be refuted and faced from other sources or the same sources he used; let us quote an excerpt from the introduction of his above-mentioned book: (… This book is a revised version of our previous book titled ''The Decisive Proofs of the Apostasy of the KSA'' which had the biggest amount of details about sharia violations in systems, statutes, and laws of the Saudi State, but this book had its shortcomings that lessened its influence and benefit and people rejected it because of them, and we saw the importance of revising it thoroughly and adding new paragraphs from other sources like the memo of advice and writings of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights …)

8- Hence, Al-Masaary sharia in his writings merely consists of select passages and views of previous writers/authors that have nothing to do with our modern age, which entails from Muslims of today to create new fiqh (jurisprudence) to cope with our era, guided with the Quran: the true tradition of Prophet Muhammad. Such a mission requires lots of time and efforts, without any sort of political ambitions to reach power. It is a crime and a sin to sue the name of Islam in political endeavors or struggles, and to stop such crime is the very first item of intellectual and political reform.

9- Al-Masaary and his likes of those who sought power, rule, and authority cannot possibly provide innovative, creative thinking in elucidating true tenets and facts of Islam, found exclusively in the Quran. Al-Masaary and his likes cannot do this and do not love to do it in the first place; Al-Masaary and his fellows of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights are distorting Islam and manipulating its name as a raised banner to falsely justify their power-seeking ambitions. It is a crime that the West media, and Arab media later on, would call such deceivers as 'Islamists'. All haters of Islam use such a false term and so do superficial Muslims who do not realize the contradiction and the vast abyss between Wahabism and Islam (i.e., the Quran alone). We hope that our book here would elucidate this fact to clear the name of Islam and Muhammad, whom God has sent as a mercy of humankind and NOT to terrorize humankind.

10- We personally tend to think that Al-Masaary and his likes pose a veritable danger more than the one posed by the KSA; it is easy to attack those who assume rule and to hold them accountable and responsible for all negative things and injustice, but such rulers would compromise in order to keep the throne and then die eventually, unlike those who harbored destructive thought taking Islam as a façade. Destructive thought tends to outlive its authors, and it deceives the masses who ignore real Quranic facts and faith tenets and hate unjust rulers. Such ignorance and hatred are manipulated by Al-Masaary and his likes, and their destructive thought outlives them and outlives unjust rulers. To exemplify this, rulers who persecuted Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Al-Qayyim, and Ibn Taymiyya died and were forgotten, whereas the destructive schools of thought of such scholars linger until now in their books and by those who revive such schools now, as no one before us, Dr. Ahmed Subhy Mansour, dared to refute and criticize their schools, proving from within the Quran that they contradict the Quran. In sum, Al-Masaary and his likes are more dangerous than unjust rulers; the masses might think of them as heroes struggling against injustice, but they are in fact doing grave injustices to people, to Islam, and to God Himself.

11- We feel extremely sorry because most people do not understand this!

The contradiction of Al-Masaary in his call to reform ''the committee for the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'':

Firstly: on the Saudi reforms linked to the demands of the opposition movements:

1- When King Abdul-Aziz conquered Hejaz, he readily sent the Najd Brothers away from it and back to Najd, where they belonged, and they revolted against him. He established a less extremist sort of religious police with fewer powers named the squads of ''the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice'', fully controlled by the KSA. He established sort of parliamentary councils in Hejaz cities in 1924, as Hejaz was more modernized and open to the world in comparison to Najd. Scholars loyal to him in Ta'if urged him to rename his kingdom as the KSA to make it belong to his family of Al-Saud, and he agreed to their suggestion and ordered the writing of a constitution, which did not happen at all during his reign. He only chose his successor, the Crown Prince, and coped with the Salafist thought in naming a caliphate after its founder as people supporting him admired him very much as a great man who in the modern age managed to build a kingdom from scratch, and we detect this admiration from the lines written by historians and scholars who supported him and requested he would name his kingdom as the KSA.

2- In fact, the political mentality of King Abdul-Aziz preceded the dominant culture if his age; he realized the importance of introducing social changes and items of modernization gradually, and he used to say: "All in good time…", and he made gradual changes to cope with the closed minds of the Najd Brothers and to make people accept such changes easily within the dominated cultural climate in Arabia, which was based on traditions, Salafism, and ultraconservatism, especially in Najd. Let us take into our consideration that once he got rid of the Najd Brothers with the aid of GB, and after defining borders and settling this affair with all neighboring countries, he had to rest and enjoy his gains and victories after unifying most of Arabian territories and restoring the ancestral kingdom. Within such circumstances and conditions, it was easily accepted by his contemporaries that he would name his kingdom as the KSA, but after about 60 years, Al-Masaary saw that such appellation as heresy and apostasy (21), and this shows he did not understand the cultural climate of King Abdul-Aziz, as many Bedouins saw that he had the legitimate right of conquest by the sword to rename Arabia as the KSA.

3- Yet, reminding the Saudi rulers of the urgent need to apply reform is a very good thing done by all opposition movements, and done excellently first by Nasser Al-Saeed, whose influence and endeavors are undeniable as King Feisal had to introduce some reforms while he was the Crown Prince and Head of the Cabinet. After the terrorist action of Juhayman Al-Otaybi was put to an end, King Khaled had to order hastily the writing of a constitution and the establishment of the Shura council and local regional councils promised by King Feisal shortly before his assassination. Opposition fundamentalist movements after the Gulf War led King Fahd to introduce more reforms on all legislative and consultative bodies and to control all Salafist trend men when he controlled fully all Saudi religious institutions, established the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, and reformed the system of the religious police. Hence, all Saudi reforms were resulting from the endeavors of opposition movements to raise political awareness of citizens. Let us discuss in more detail such reforms and the stance of the fundamentalist opposition movements toward them.

Secondly: reforming religious bodies, especially ''the committee for the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'':

1- Reforms of ''the committee for the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'' began with King Fahd who dismissed its head Abdul-Aziz Ibn M. Al-Sheikh and appointed in his place Dr. Abdul-Aziz Al-Saeed in 1990. Al-Sheikh was dismissed because he made his religious policemen stop some American soldiers to force them to apply laws of ''the committee for the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice''. The new head, Dr. Abdul-Aziz Al-Saeed, graduated from the Cairo-based Al-Azhar University and was bent on reform and to face old traditional ways within the religious police by introducing limited organizational changes to lessen their transgressions and violations. He introduced a law permitting Saudi citizens to compel religious policemen to how their ID cards first before they take any measures and allowed citizens the chance to submit complaints against religious policemen in cases of transgressions.

2- The Saudi government gave training courses in 1992 to all religious policemen in their 400 branches all over the KSA to teach them their limits, duties, and missions, as countless complaints of furious citizens were received about their frequent violations and transgressions and their meddling and interference in the personal lives of citizens for no reason whatsoever. Such transgressions were suffered even by some governmental high officials, foreigners residing and working in the KSA, and some Saudi Princes, and King Fahd ordered religious policemen harshly that the KSA would not tolerate extremism any more (22).

3- Yet, Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalist opposition movement whetted the appetite of religious policemen to assert their power in the streets after the Gulf War broke out, and the USA Foreign Office reports on human rights in 1991 tackled in one section the frequent and flagrant violations of human rights perpetrated by Saudi religious policemen: (… Most Saudi citizens are being harassed by extremist fanatical religious policemen who observe and watch closely social behavior like closing down shops during prayers time and dress codes in public places. Some religious policemen transgress the limits of their job by arresting suspects for 24 hours before they turn them to civil authorities, and they harshly beat and verbally abuse incarcerated suspects and extort confessions by means of torture. Most religious policemen carry cudgels to discipline those who do not adhere to their rules, and sometimes this would lead to violence and quarrels in the streets. Some quarrels occurred recently between American soldiers there near their military basis and those religious policemen who wanted force foreigners to apply their rules in public. Yet the Saudi authorities are slow and reluctant in controlling such transgressions that increased after 1991 after the Gulf War broke out …).

4- This American 1991 report predicting increase incidents of transgressions by religious policemen led the KSA to train them in special courses in 1992, and this shows that many of the religious policemen were influenced by the Wahabi Sunnite fundamentalist opposition movement notions, and king Fahd had to interfere and warn that the KSA would not tolerate any extremism.

Thirdly: religious bodies and preventing non-Muslims from performing acts of worship:

1- Under the title ''Arbitrary Interference in Personal Affairs'', the American Foreign Office report has accused Saudi religious policemen of attacking houses to search them looking for proofs of non-Islamic rituals performed inside such houses of foreigners and Arabs, a flagrant violation to the freedom of religion of non-Muslims. A decree issued in 1991 to prevent all non-Islamic rituals on the KSA, leading most religious policemen in Oct. 1991 to arrest men and children who held a secret gathering to perform Christian rituals inside a house, as there are no houses of worship to non-Muslims in the KSA, which make non-Muslims pray and perform their rituals in secret (23). This is in contrast to the fact that Al-Masaary and most extremists live in the 'infidel' West countries and enjoy unlimited religious freedom but they hate and conspire against the West.

2- All reports of human rights organizations condemned transgressions of the Saudi religious policemen; the 1999 Amnesty International report mentioned that all non-Muslim foreigners residing in the KSA to work are prevented from praying and performing their rituals in secret, especially Christians, and they got arrested in case of being caught red-handed, accused of proselytizing Christianity in the KSA as Christian books were found with them. As per this report, Saudi religious policemen arrest such people without prior judicial permission and use violence for no reason at all, and the arrested Christians would remain incarcerated for long periods of time without trial or interrogation.

3- Violations and transgressions of Saudi religious policemen would reach Shiite citizens, as per the 1999 report of Amnesty International that mentioned the case of a Shiite imam who died in prison in 1998 because he was tortured to death accused of praying and calling to prayers in ways differed from the Sunnite ways (24).

Fourthly: the contradictions in the stance of Al-Masaary and his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights regarding ''the committee for the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'':

1- Hence, Saudi extremist fanatical religious policemen were influenced by opposition fundamentalists to become more violent bigots and the KSA tried in vain to reform them. But what were the stances of Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights regarding the Saudi religious policemen and non-Muslims foreigners performing religious rituals inside their houses in the KSA?

2- In Publication No. 8 in 1994, Al-Masaary attacked Prince Salman and Prince Nayef, accused them both of restricting the powers of the Saudi religious policemen, and in Publication No. 13 in 1994, Al-Masaary attacked the Saudi authorities of giving the green light to enemies of the Saudi religious policemen to take revenge from them. Al-Masaary in Publications Nos. 14 and 32 said that some foes of the Saudi religious policemen physically attacked members of the religious policemen. He asserted in Publication No. 48 in 1995 that many Saudi religious policemen were arrested, and in Publication No. 76, he mentioned that religious policemen arrested some civil policemen accused of being drug-dealers, but Minister of Interior released them soon enough and arrested religious policemen who arrested the civil ones!

3- In Publication No. 67, Al-Masaary criticized forcing Saudi religious policemen, influenced by fundamentalists, to show ID cards to citizens, as this was part of Saudi endeavors to quell and stop the fundamentalist Salafist trend rising within men of the State apparatuses and to marginalize their role inside religious policemen forces. Thus, we conclude that Al-Masaary and the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights defend the extremist trend within Saudi religious policemen. Criticism of Saudi religious policemen came from reports of human rights organizations and Amnesty International that defended before Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights as well as sheikhs like Al-Hawali and Al-Ouda, as well as Shiites, among others.

4- Contradictions of Al-Masaary increased after some members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights left the committee with Saad Al-Faqeeh; his support of Saudi religious policemen contradicts his previous views, and his views are apparently against religious freedoms of belief and performing rituals of non-Muslims inside the KSA, and such views were formulated within certain circumstances through which Al-Masaary passed when some members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights left the committee with Saad Al-Faqeeh, and he used the centuries-old Salafist motto "necessities permit the forbidden things" to justify his views. Let us briefly mention below some of such circumstances that drove him to suddenly change his views from liberal stances to extremist ones.

5- In Jan. 1996, the UK authorities ordered Al-Masaary to leave UK, and in the same month, he declared that all Jews and Christians working inside the KSA must have their own houses of worship in Saudi lands in case his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights would assume rule of Arabia. Such fatwa of Al-Masaary came within circumstances that drove him to resort to Taqiyya (i.e., to declare stances which are not his own to deceive others) and to publish such fatwa in the English-Language London-based newspaper ''Muslim News'': (… Current state of affairs inside the KSA would not allow room for Jewish and Christian workers inside the KSA to perform their religious rituals, but there will be ample room for this when the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights assumes rule in Arabia and would grant minorities all their rights including building churches, performing religious rituals, and drawing marriage contracts as per their own religious rituals as well as full religious freedom and personal freedom for all Christians, Jews, and Hindus, as this is permissible in the Islamic sharia …). Hence, Al-Masaary was addressing the West within such political discourse in his fatwa to make the UK help him to reach power and rule Arabia after he failed miserably to win over the Saudi citizens to his side and despaired to achieve any measure of success in making most Saudi citizens join his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

6- Let us bear in mind these events: Al-Masaary wanted to make sure he would be safe and linger more years in London; in March 1996, he suffered the crisis of some members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights leaving the committee with Saad Al-Faqeeh, and the KSA formally asked the UK to deport Al-Masaary in April 1996 and threatened to cut economic ties with the UK and to punish and imprison any Saudi citizens who would read, retain, or distribute propaganda and political writings of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. A terrorist explosion shook Riyadh in April 1996, and the arrested criminals admitted to the fact that they were influenced by ideas propagated by Al-Masaary and Bin Laden, and these criminals were put to death in May 1996. Yet, another terrorist explosion shook the city of Al-Dhahran (25). Such were the conditions and circumstances that coincide with the fatwa of Al-Masaary about religious freedom in which he did not believe as he shares all notions and ideas of the terrorist Bin Laden. Thus, Al-Masaary had to re-publish a revised version of his book titled "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", making use of writings of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, but instead of defending the Saudi regions policemen, we are surprised to read the exact opposite in the introduction of his book: (… And lastly, we talk about the Saudi religious policemen who undertake the mission of promoting virtue and preventing vice… in fact, it is an oppressive organization created by Abdul-Aziz after he got rid of the Najd Brothers who applied Hisbah on Abdul-Aziz and the Saudi family and most people in a harsh way regarding dress codes, personal behavior, performance of prayers, growing of beards, and the like… and they blamed Abdul-Aziz for his allying himself to GB and making peace with the Arabian neighboring countries instead of conquering them, as well as his imposing taxes and stopping their jihad so as to keep his kingdom within his control. Of course, the Najd Brothers performed Hisbah in a harsh way made uglier by their lack of deep knowledge of fiqh and Wahabi teachings, their superficial thinking, and their declaring Sufis and Shiites as apostates. The Najd Brothers used to spy on people inside houses and thus violating their privacy and personal liberty. After Abdul-Aziz got rid of the Najd Brothers, he established the religious police to undertake the mission of promoting virtue and preventing vice and apply Hisbah under the supervision of Saudi scholars, who issued a fatwa for Abdul-Aziz to kill the Najd Brothers, and who issued all their subsequent fatwas to serve his purposes, especially that giving advice to rulers must be in secret and discreetly to avoid disputes leading to calamities similar to what happened to the Najd Brothers! Of course, the oppressive Saudi religious policeman uses cudgels to terrorize citizens and have free rein to arrest and discipline them, with exception of Princes in palaces of course, as no one could discipline or question them, using methods of spying on people prohibited in the Quran. Salman Ibn Abdul-Aziz, ruler of Riyadh, has turned Riyadh into an espionage center serving him along with men of the Saudi central intelligence, thus distorting and tarnishing the image of Islam under the banner of reform …) (26). Hence, stances and sharia laws of Al-Masaary change as per changing conditions and circumstances, as he aimed to reach power to rule Arabia.

Between the reforms done by King Fahd and the Hisbah of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights:

Firstly: the opposition of traditional extremist Wahabis against reforms of King Fahd:

1- Le Nouvel Afrique-Asie magazine in its number issued on 31 April, 1992, published an article titled "Wahabis against Saudis" on the relations between the Saudi authorities and formal scholars and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, here's an excerpt from it: (… No agreements could be reached anytime soon between the Saudi royal family and extremist Wahabi London-based scholars, as the latter see that Islamic sharia is not applied to the letter by the KSA. Would troubles and unrest occur inside the KSA? Its princes feel threatened as they consider themselves as the sole guardians of Islam and its holy lands. In contrast fundamentalists see that Islamic sharia is not applied properly inside the KSA, and they make use of every error and mistake committed by the princes… fundamentalists focus on criticizing the corrupt scholars subservient to the KSA and reforms undertaken by King Fahd… as they see that such reforms would bring more man-made laws and not sharia laws, and they rejects the first written constitution. Formal Saudi scholars fear to lose their positions and money if the Saudi family collapsed and if a Shura council would be established to undermine their political power and authority they enjoyed for long… eventually, Ibn Baz urged that most of members of the Shura Council must be from among scholars, so as to face secular trends inside the KSA… there are lines of evidence to support the claim that fundamentalist trends spread within the Saudi religious policemen who attack Saudi Shiites who are declared as apostates… fundamentalists did not hesitate to attack harshly Ibn Baz himself and the formal State scholars, but after long silence on the part of the royal family, King Fahd announced that the KSA would no longer tolerate any form of extremism… the archenemy of Salafist fundamentalists is Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan the Saudi ambassador in the USA who support the KSA policies in allying itself to the USA and to urge princes to meet with pro-Israel Jewish Americans …) (27).

2- We conclude from this excerpt that youth loyal to the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights infiltrated the Saudi religious policemen and that Al-Masaary criticized reforms of King Fahd regarding Shura councils, the constitution, and the regional councils. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights undermined formal corrupt scholars and gained momentum and support inside the KSA as a result of King Feisal's policies in making Salafist trends rise all over the KSA and the Arab world, an obstacle in the route of all types of reform; even King Feisal could not establish a constitution and a Shura Council before his assassination.

Secondly: the Constitution reflects the Saudi royal family's claim of owning the land and things and persons in it:

1- The traditional Salafist notion of a monarch owning the land people on it appears between the lines of the Saudi constitution articles and their phrasing; for instance, Article No. 6 asserts that citizens will swear fealty to the king based on Quran and Sunna to obey him for better or worse and in time of prosperity and adversity. This shows blind obedience in the manner of subjects to self-deified kings of the Middle-Ages era! Of course, such notions of swearing fealty and monarchs owning lands and people were rejected for the first time by Nasser Al-Saeed.

2- Searing fealty is not linked with referendum and elections; as the king is the source of all authorities (judicial, executive, and legislative ones) and not people or the nation, as we conclude from Article No. 44. The king is the one to choose solely the members of the Shura councils and has the power to try its members in courts or to order the dissolution of the Shura Council by royal decree. Moreover, the Shura Council sessions open and close also by virtue of royal orders alone and its members are to submit an annual report of the activities of the Shura Council. Even royal decrees specify regions of local councils and appoint heads of the Shura Council and the local councils, making such heads and members swear fealty to the king and to be loyal to the KSA and Islam, etc. Such absolute power in the hands of the king during all his lifetime makes him never be put to question by anyone, and this is considered to be deification of mortals, as God alone is the One who will not be questioned: "He will not be questioned about what He does, but they will be questioned." (21:23), but it is the salient point of creed and political faith of Shiite and Sunnite theocracies.

3- We conclude then from the Saudi constitution that the king monopolizes all political power even using all his men in the cabinet and the Shura Councils, and subsequently, the king owns the land and the wealth and all the economic aspects inside the KSA, as per Article No. 9 that says that the king owns all Saudi sources of wealth, but he is to ensure safety of private property and will not confiscate it unless by virtue of laws and for the public good (28); this is apparently seems to be a step forward and better than the Salafist notion of absolute despot owning lands and persons on it, but this article allows the king to grant and give money and lands to members of his retinues.

4- Features of tyranny are very clear in the Saudi constitution, because the king, and not the nation, is the source of all authorities, and this contradicts Islamic justice that goes against the notion of one person monopolizing wealth and power without being questioned; yet, Article No. 8 mentions that rule of the KSA is based on justice, Shura, and equality stipulated by the Islamic sharia. How does such monopoly match real Islamic sharia in the Quran?!

5- Of course, such monopoly matches perfectly with the man-made Wahabi Salafist Sunnite sharia laws adopted partially by the Saudi royal family members as the see fit, harking back to the centuries of tyranny, despotism, and oppression under the caliphate system, when people would kiss the ground under the hands or feet of the Abbasid or Mameluke caliphs/sultans.

6- Despite shortcomings of the Saudi constitution, it is a good first step as the very first written one in the short history of the KSA after a long period of opposing the idea of writing one; it is a leap and a major step on the route to gain more social, political, intellectual, and economic rights and freedoms, away from the tenet of ''sheikhs know best''; and at least people got a chance, stipulated by the constitution, to say whatever they want to say to the king during the Shura Council sessions.

Thirdly: a comparison between Hisbah of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and the Hisbah inside the KSA:

1- The rejection of both formal KSA scholars and opposition fundamentalists to the civil laws, Shura Council, and the constitution was not based on their care to gain more freedoms and rights, and subsequently achieve more justice, but was based on 1) hatred and animosity toward anything coming from the West and unknown before by their ancestors, and 2) new reforms would undermine and lessen their stature, authority, and consequently their money. New reforms would be considered harmful to Al-Masaary and the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, as they would undermine their creed of Hisbah. Let us tackle their concept of Hisbah (i.e., inquisition).

2- Hisbah concept is never mentioned in the Quranic terminology in the Quranic text; it is a Salafist Sunnite traditional notion that briefly means a volunteer who would specify part his effort and time, presumably for God's sake, to check that everyone applies sharia laws, orders, and rules in daily life. Of course, this corrupt concept of inquisition had its political implications, as we will tackle in the points below:

2/1: Hisbah was at first a policemen-like job that was initiated during the Abbasid era and those undertaking such a mission became too powerful during the Mameluke era in Egypt and the Levant, and the Muhtasib (i.e., in Arabic, the one undertaking Hisbah) was usually chosen from among sheikhs, scholars and prices. Even the historian / scholar Al-Makrizi undertook such a job for some time, roaming bazaars and souks (i.e., markets) to check prices and discipline and punish corrupt ones in public in the streets. This job was not by volunteers; but it was a paid job whose man was chosen by a caliph.

2/2: In the Second Abbasid Era, the Ibn Hanbal doctrine scholars grew too powerful and controlled Iraq; they fabricated a hadith about changing vice or sins by sheer force using one's hands. Under such a motto, some groups of the Ibn Hanbal doctrine scholars controlled streets of Iraqi cities by virtue of the concept of Hisbah, persecuting severely Shiites, Sufis, and the Al-Ashaary doctrine followers in Iraq. Hence, Hisbah gained the meanings of control, hegemony, and dominance over people.

2/3: During the Mameluke era, sheikhs of Sufism became too powerful and close to sultans, instead of the Ibn Hanbal doctrine followers; thus, the Ibn Hanbal doctrine scholar Ibn Taymiyya and his disciples were persecuted by sheikhs of Sufism and Sufi Mameluke sultans, because Ibn Taymiyya wanted to change the vice called Sufism by sheer force. Sufis had no Hisbah concept; instead, they have a contrary Sufi-creed concept of non-opposition.

2/4: During the last century of the Ottoman era, M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab emerged to revive the Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya schools, calling for restriction and persecution of Sufis and Shiites inside Arabia and the Arab world, but he himself was opposed and persecuted for a period of time until he allied himself in a pact with M. Ibn Saud to promote virtue an prevent vice by force and to massacre infidels/polytheists (i.e., all non-Wahabis in general) and loot their possessions, enslave their women, confiscate their land lands within conquests.

2/5: Political necessities of the 20^th century forced King Abdul-Aziz to curb and then get rid of the Najd Brothers who aimed to apply Wahabism to the letter, including Hisbah concept, as they disciplines and punished those who did not close their shops during prayers time, those men and women who did not adhere to the dress codes, etc. Successors of King Abdul-Aziz modernized the KSA slowly but steadily in a way that would not undermine their confiscation of political power; thus, they stopped interference in personal daily life of Saudi citizens as long as they would not commit gross indecencies in public, in the streets, and as long as they would not criticize Al-Saud royal family, and this measure of 'freedom' contradicts Al-Masaary sharia, of course!

2/6: Al-Masaary sharia of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights includes Hisbah in the vein of the Najd Brothers; the members wanted to check private personal life of all Saudi citizens as well as their beliefs, behavior in public outdoors and indoors, and how they perform rituals and prayers, as per the backward sharia of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Abdul-Wahab that entails murdering those disobedient ones who oppose scholars even if such opposition figures pray regularly!

2/7: The fundamentalist Hisbah scholars would thus combine all types of authorities in their hands: they would incarcerate, accuse, incriminate, punish, and murder people; Hisbah scholars of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights would like to be legislators, religious policemen, judges, and executioners! The fact that Al-Masaary and the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights wanted to meddle and interfere in private life and conscience of people is considered the gravest worst type of injustice and unparalleled tyranny.

3- Hence, the difference has been shown here between the Constitution of King Fahd and Hisbah of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights; it is the difference between a low pit and a bottomless abyss!

The stance of the Wahabi scholars subservient to the Saudi authorities between the KSA and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights:

The political creed of scholars subservient to the Saudi State is simply that rulers know best for the general good and interests, and rulers must be blindly obeyed by everyone else. On the contrary, the political creed of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights is that sharia represented by its members would rise above all rulers and should apply Hisbah to both rulers and citizens. Let us examine more closely the stance of the Wahabi scholars subservient to the Saudi authorities between the KSA and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights

Firstly: Ibn Baz:

1- We can briefly say that he was hesitant in his stances despite his final siding to the KSA as Saudi authorities knew how to control him and to restrain him on the right time. But because of his hesitation, as he fluctuated between the Wahabi sharia stances adopted by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and his loyalty to the Saudi royal family, he used to assume the role of the mediator during crises between the KSA and members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights that demanded the release of its supporters from prisons. Because of his hesitation and fluctuation, members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights used to praise and find excuses for him at one point, as he defended its members, and to criticize him harshly at another point when he would side finally with the KSA. Hence, Al-Masaary sharia is filled with contradictions vis-à-vis Ibn Baz.

2- Ibn Baz was very enthusiastic regarding the letter of demands, supporting it within his letter of recommendation of one page and a half, advising the king and princes to refer the letter of demands to high-rank scholars to discuss implementation of it. With this stance of Ibn Baz, Ibn Otheimein reluctantly and cautiously supported the letter of demands in his turn, as Ibn Baz received the protest committee that delivered the letter of demands and the memo of advice later on, and he promised to meet with its members on a monthly basis. Ibn Baz was the one to prevent aborting the project of the letter of demands, encouraging the committee of protest to write it. Ibn Baz was the one used and manipulated by fundamentalists in many cases and steps (30).

3- When some supporters and members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights were incarcerated in Saudi prisons, Ibn Baz would readily assume the role of the mediator to beseech Saudi authorities to set them free or to alleviate their suffering in cells. But writings of Al-Masaary show that such mediation was for the sake of the Saudi State more that for the sake of members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. Let us quote some examples from statements and publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. Five months after the arrest of fundamentalists inside the KSA, Statement No. 24 in Feb. 1995 asserts that Al-Masaary was promised by Ibn Baz to release the arrested ones shortly, but this did not take place. Ibn Baz wrote a letter recommending the release of Al-Ouda and Al-Hawali, and fundamentalists made use of such recommendation in their struggle against the Saudi State, but princes made other scholars issue a fatwa against both men, and Ibn Baz had to sign this fatwa, and both men were arrested again (31). Their arrest was done for the purpose of forcing them to sign a commitment paper to stop their anti-KSA activities, but both men adamantly refused to sign such a paper. Ibn Baz was sent to them in their cell to convince them to sign, but they verbally attacked him and refused such humiliation, accusing him of being an agent working under the Saudi royal family instead of serving religion, as per Publication No. 38 in 1995. Yet, Ibn Baz mediated to allow families of both men, and families of other arrested men, to visit them in prison cells, as we read in Publication No. 25. Within the struggle of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights against the KSA, its members would distribute audiotapes containing letter of recommendation of Ibn Baz to both sheikhs among Saudi citizens, leading Saudi authorities to arrest those who distribute such audiotapes. Al-Masaary feared that the Saudi State might arrest and incarcerate Ibn Baz himself, as we read in Publications Nos. 17 and 19 in 1994, but this did not take place. When the fugitive sheikh Yahiya Al-Yahiya grew tired of fleeing Saudi authorities, he resorted to the house of Ibn Baz to surrender himself on condition of his mediation to Prince Salman in Riyadh. But after hot debate, the mediation of Ibn Baz was refused by Prince Salman and the fugitive sheikh Yahiya Al-Yahiya was imprisoned. Other sheikhs and scholars got arrested once they got out of the house of Ibn Baz, whose mediation was no longer enough in the eyes of Saudi princes. This means that the favor Ibn Baz found in the eyes of princes had its limits, and Al-Masaary had to admit that Ibn Baz was fully controlled by the Saudi princes. At one point, Saudi policemen prevented students' delegation from meeting Ibn Baz in his house who wanted him to intercede to set some arrested fundamentalists free. Policemen would watch closely his weekly sermons and forums so that no one would dare to send a written question to embarrass the Saudi government. The secretary of Ibn Baz wrote reports about him to the Saudi policemen, and Ibn Baz fired him from his post, as this secretary opposed Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalism. This secretary was rewarded by the Saudi authorities by being appointed by the Interior Minster as the head of the Saudi Wahabi Call Office in Ta'if. The following piece of information is mentioned in Publication No. 150 in 1998 (32): sheikh Ahmed, one of the sons of Ibn Baz, used to spy on his father's visitors and write reports about them to the Saudi policemen.

4- Eventually, when Al-Masaary began to adopt more extremist stances within his intellectual endeavors and his language and style of writing became too insulting to the Saudi state and rulers, Ibn Baz had nothing but to side with the KSA once and for all for the rest of his lifetime.

Secondly: Ibn Otheimein and Ibn Jibreen:

Ibn Otheimein preceded Ibn Baz earlier in siding wholeheartedly from the very beginning with the Saudi State; he reluctantly and cautiously supported the letter of demands as he was influenced by Ibn Baz, but when things got complicated in the struggle between Al-Masaary and the KSA, Ibn Otheimein readily and obsequiously supported the Saudi princes and worked hard to please the Saudi authorities Liberty report issued in 1993 in London asserted that Ibn Otheimein managed to convince 7000 persons to stop their planned sit-in or demonstration against the KSA to protest the arrest of Al-Ouda and Al-Hawali. Publication No. 37 in 1995 by Al-Masaary mentioned that Ibn Otheimein collected donations for the sake of Prince Salman Charity Organization in the time when the KSA confiscated money of charity organizations linked with the Sunnite Wahabi opposition movements. Unlike Ibn Otheimein, Ibn Jibreen began at first to pose as an enthusiastic fundamentalist scholar who participated in the early sessions and movements of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights inside the KSA, but the Saudi authorities pressurized him to stop attending such meetings and sessions, and he had to withdraw. Soon enough, he issued a statement against the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, but Al-Masaary did not criticize him as he knew about his being pressurized by the Saudi authorities, asserting that in his heart, Ibn Jibreen supported and sympathized with the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights (33).

Thirdly: scholars who did not hesitate to support the KSA authorities:

1- Many scholars did not hesitate to readily support the KSA authorities from the very beginning like Salih Fawzan and Salih Al-Sawlan, and members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights were not surprised at such stances, as we read in the writings of Al-Masaary.

2- Abdul-Aziz Al-Askar was a scholar held in high esteem by the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights because of his intelligence, deep knowledge, and connections, but he sued all such features to serve the Saudi royal family members and he distorted the image of both Al-Ouda and Al-Hawali. He was rewarded for his efforts by being appointed in a high religious position in the Saudi police forces, distributing his audiotaped religious sermons for free (34).

3- Al-Leiheidan was the scholar most criticized by the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, as his history consisted of taking money gifts from the king to do his biddings all the time, and he was the one to drive other scholars to issue a statement against the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. Al-Masaary admitted that Al-Leiheidan was a knowledgeable, intelligent, strong-minded, adroit, headstrong, and loquacious scholar, who used all such features to serve the Saudi princes and to issue fatwas on their favor at their requests. Members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights claimed that Al-Leiheidan justified countless stances of the KSA by his fatwas in return for money, including stances like arrest of opposition figures and supporters of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. Al-Leiheidan attacked verbally and harshly both Al-Ouda and Al-Hawali, and the Saudi State rewarded him for his refusal of the letter of demands by giving him 25 million SR and for his refusal of the memo of advice by granting him a piece of land (35).

Fourthly: Al-Gamia Group:

1- Al-Gamia Group consisted of scholars who sided with the KSA and vehemently and harshly attacked fundamentalism and Al-Masaary and his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. We know from the writings of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights that Al-Masaary considered Al-Gamia Group, headed by Abdul-Aziz Al-Askar, as a cover employed by the Saudi policemen in order to spy on preachers and scholars to write reports on them to see if anyone of them had joined or not the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. Prince Nayef joined Al-Gamia Group, and in Mecca, he delivered a lecture to verbally abuse the arrested fundamentalist sheikhs and scholars.

2- Members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights asserted that Al-Gamia Group undertook the mission of spreading intellectual propaganda of KSA-friendly type of Salafism within regions and cities where fundamentalist opposition gained momentum and more supporters among the masses. Al-Gamia Group travelled into such regions and cities to deliver lectures sponsored by the KSA, but the masses used to boycott such gatherings and lectures organized by Al-Gamia Group members. In many cases, some people would cut out electricity to spoil such gatherings, and in some others, quarrels would ensue during such gatherings and people would beat one another, leading the Al-Gamia Group lecturer to flee or to get hurt or injured! The Saudi authorities would often interfere and arrest such troublemakers. Al-Masaary depicted such events as part of the mission of Al-Gamia Group to spot and arrest young supporters of the fundamentalist opposition movement, and that it was natural that the masses would be repelled by and feel disgusted by scholars subservient to the KSA, especially when the Saudi policemen would arrest their favorite fundamentalist scholars and sheikhs because of their erudition and both intellectual and tribal ties. Al-Masaary proved his point by asserting that such quarrels occurred in regions that support fundamentalist scholars and sheikhs, like Al-Qassim and Al-Jouf. Moreover, scholars of Al-Gamia Group tried to convince Al-Hawali and Al-Ouda to apologize in writing to be set free, but they adamantly refused.

3- Naturally, the KSA rewarded Al-Gamia Group scholars by granting them high positions and posts in the governmental bodies and in universities, but we cannot make sure if such news is true or otherwise; we copy here in this point what writings of Al-Masaary and his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, and we do not take such information about intellectual foes of Al-Masaary as verified facts.

4- In spite of ordinary people's rejection of the lectures delivered by Al-Gamia Group scholars all over the Saudi regions – as per perceptions of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights – Al-Gamia Group scholars were welcome in Kuwait to deliver their lectures there. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights had to admit this fact but it asserted that Kuwaiti Wahabi fundamentalists rejected such lectures and gatherings and wrote a statement against them to expose the evil intentions of the KSA, proving that Al-Gamia Group scholars violated many sharia laws, as we read in Publication No. 149 in 1998, and we read also that Al-Gamia Group scholars were received warmly by Kuwaitis who arranged their sequence of lectured advocating obedience of rulers and the dangers of sedition and the threat posed by declaring others as apostates, calling people to engage into daily acts of worship instead of hating rulers and declaring them as infidels.

The features of debate between scholars of the KSA and scholars of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights:

1- Naturally, debate between scholars of the KSA and scholars of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights was centered on the priority of obedience: would obedience be first for scholars, who represent sharia or for rulers who apply it?

2- Debating this issue began once the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights emerged and was criticized by Saudi scholars as its members disobeyed the rulers and hence disregarded Wahabi sharia that entails obedience to rulers. Statement No. 1 in May 1995 asserted that the members and scholars of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights are free thinkers who bear in mind and take into consideration all sharia laws and aims, and that Saudi scholars need evidence from sharia, Sunna, and the Quran to prove the illegitimacy of the endeavors of members and scholars of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, as members always reinforce their views using sharia, Sunna, and the Quran. Hence, hot debate ensued between both sides: one that supports sharia of blind disobedience to rulers and one that calls for sharia evidence to support any political views at hand.

3- Naturally, debate is the forte and field of the members and scholars of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights as their knowledge of Wahabism surpass all formal Saudi State scholars. Another reason that gave momentum to Al-Masaary was the fat that Saudi State scholars are always accused of being obsequious and dependent on the Saudi authorities for their livelihood, which casts doubt on their fatwas and made them lose popularity among the citizens, who wanted sharia views that prohibits all types of injustices.

We give below features of this debate between both types of scholars: those of the KSA and those of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

1- When some Saudi formal high-rank scholars at first expressed their surprise at the letter of demands, one of them who refused to sign it wondered: "What have all of you left for the Saudi royal family?!" Of course, this question was posed to reflect an important idea: the letter of demands seemed to request that fundamentalists would monopolize rule and supervision of it. Another idea was that scholars were surprised that the notion of divine will that favored Al-Saud with authority, power, and wealth is being undermined by the letter of demands that requests equality. Traditional scholars used to link this verse "God has favored some of you over others in livelihood…" (16:71) with the permanent existence, authority, wealth, and stature of the Saudi royal family! This is a flagrant falsehood insulting to the Quran! (37).

2- Debate grew hotter between the KSA scholars and the members and scholars of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. The notion of obedience was put to question in terms of fundamentalist ideology. Ibn Otheimein once said that if the Saudi king ordered him to stop teaching at the university and to stop issuing fatwas, he would obey his biddings at once. He wanted, as a big well-known high-rank scholar, to set himself as a good example for others in blind obedience to rulers, but scholars of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights mocked his view and made it lose its allure and impact on the masses, as they refuted it in book titled "Aspects of Obeying Rulers within Prohibition of Disobeying God", a title no one can question its content.

3- It was easy for the scholars of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to refute Ibn Otheimein using theology and fiqh, and using the Quran: "…Obey God and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you…" (4:59) to prove that obeying rulers must be within obeying divine sharia laws when adopted and applied properly by the rulers, and thus, obeying rulers is not absolute in all cases; they are to be obeyed as long as they obey the Quran and sharia. Al-Masaary writes calmly and objectively in Publication No. 85 in 1995 that: (… Those persons disagreeing with us about the legitimacy of the Saudi regime and think of their views as sharia-based fatwas should also deem those who hold different opinions as innovative thinkers who brought new, creative views based on sharia as well …). But Al-Masaary used sarcasm and mockery later on in his discourse: (… And what would be the case if our rulers blindly obey the USA?) (38). The responses or refutations of Saudi State scholars of fundamentalists revolved around notions like ''the KSA is better than other Arab countries'' and ''do not spoil our lifestyle, prosperity, and sense of security". Thus, such scholars reflected their own personal interests that sought to follow the Saudi government to enjoy high stature and positions, money gifts, and a measure of authority over people. In contrast, Al-Masaary and his fellows have their own political ambitions and seek to adhere to sharia evidence or proofs monopolized by them, and they mock the KSA scholars: (… this stance of Saudi scholars tell us that there is no room for divine discourse of God in the Quran and hadiths of the Prophet, because their discourse of paramount importance is that of their rulers who said decisively that ''the KSA is better than other Arab countries'' …) (39), and of course, this response is filled with sarcasm.

4- The scholars of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights tackled an issue of Quranic terminology in an innovative manner never approached before by traditional Wahabi scholars subservient to the KSA, as we read in Publication No. 12 in 1994, as scholars of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights comment on the methods adopted by the Saudi scholars: (… Terms like ''wisdom'', ''general good'', and ''fitna'' are no longer sued by them as found in the Quran and Sunna as understood by the honored ancient scholars, because true meanings of such terms might jeopardize stature of Saudi rulers, and scholars of the KSA have to ignore such meanings understood by Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Al-Qayyim. Fitna for them differs from the meanings we find in the Quran (i.e., either ''religious persecution'' or ''ordeals, tests, and tribulations''): "…In fact, they sunk into fitna…" (9:49), "...Fitna is more serious than murder…" (2:191). Indeed fitna for Saudi scholars means troubles and ordeals derived from criticizing rulers and to permit sins. Even wisdom for them has a meaning different from the one we find in the Quran: "Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good advice…" (16:125), as ''wisdom'' means for Saudi scholars to flatter rulers and be subservient and obsequious to them, as they are more eager to please rulers than to please God. As for the ''general good'' term found in the Sunna, Saudi scholars distort it meaning by their claims that it means: rulers know best about the general good for their subjects. This stance is against sharia laws; rulers are not source of legislation in Islam to permit or to prohibit anything …).

5- Because the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights managed via its statements and publications to tarnish the image of the Saudi rulers, Ibn Otheimein refuted and responded to such views of Al-Masaary in his article in the newspaper ''Al-Moslemoon" (i.e., The Muslims), issue No. 602, in 1417 A.H.: (… If we would imagine for a while that rulers were apostates, this does not follow that we would incite people to rebel and revolt against them, causing chaos and massacres. No doubt that such false steps if ever taken would lead to nothing but destruction to the general good, as corruption and chaos would follow suit; besides, rulers are far too mighty and powerful to be defeated or ousted by such a small group of fundamentalists who aim to bring evil, corruption, and chaos to the KSA. It is very wrong and dangerous to read religious texts partially and with a certain bias and prejudice to prove one's erroneous views harbored beforehand in one's mind …). The response of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights was to remind Ibn Otheimein of his past fatwas about not to befriend 'infidels' (i.e., all non-Wahabis). The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights asserted that demonstrations in Algeria coped with sharia laws, as they are the means to pressurize rulers there. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights reminded Ibn Otheimein that part of faith tenets is to hate the unjust rulers and to disbelieve in them, as sharia laws entail to fight imams of disbelief. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights wondered what Ibn Otheimein means by ''general good'', was it related to sharia? What proofs does he have to assert his view? Would it be related to financial good of all Saudis to open brothels inside the KSA to stop rich Saudis to seek brothels in Europe?! This sarcastic question was directed to Ibn Otheimein. Of course, Al-Masaary saw that for Ibn Otheimein to imagine or to propose that rulers were apostates meant that he believes so and convinced by it in his heart.

6- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights asserted in its responses that Ibn Otheimein held wrong views to serve the Saudi government by asserting that no one had the right to incite others to revolt against rulers, using no proofs within sharia laws, causing poor attendance to the lectures and forums of Ibn Otheimein in Al-Qassim region, among other Saudi regions, attended by Al-Leiheidan. The Gamia Group scholars went on spreading the same views of Ibn Otheimein in vain within all their lectures, but people thought that such views were wrong, giving Al-Masaary the chance to refute them in Publication No. 130 in 1997: (… Saudi scholars see that formulating anti-sharia secular laws inside the KSA concerning usury banks and Saudi nationality is Ok, and they overlook and forget the fact that such secular laws are against Sunna and Quran and fiqh, and so is the KSA allying itself to the UN of infidels that reflect injustice and sinning … this is a worst type of tyranny and apostasy, making Saudi rules apostates and infidels, but scholars know this and dare not to express it … But even if they would not dare to declare their rulers as infidels and apostates, how could they allow secular laws to be set instead of sharia laws …) (40). Of course, Al-Masaary refuted all views of Saudi scholars in all his books and managed to convince readers because he delved deep into Salafist schools of thought more than any of his contemporaries.

More contradictions of Al-Masaary and his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights:

1- Contradictions in judging Saudi State scholars: within the margin of such hot debate, many remarks of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights refuted and exposed the hypocrisy and double-standards of the Saudi State scholars. We note that the discourse of Al-Masaary changed its tone gradually from calm, persuasive one to harsh attack and criticism, indicating that true sharia laws and rules of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights changes as per varying conditions and as what would serve its purposes. Let us exemplify this by tackling the stance of Al-Masaary vis-à-vis Ibn Baz and how it varied in different periods of time in the chronological order. In Publication No. 22 in 1994, Al-Masaary analyzed stances of Ibn Baz under the title "Calm down, O sheikh!", and Al-Masaary warned against attacking and criticizing Ibn Baz and praised him and his good traits, but he blamed him for making his brilliant mentality in service of Al-Saud family members, who never allow sharia to interfere in politics, economy, and rule, as if sharia laws were merely for acts of worship. He blamed Ibn Baz for preferring security and safety over dominance of sharia, and that he thought of reform as fitna (ordeals and troubles). He blamed Ibn Baz for thinking well of Al-Saud family members who misguide him along with other scholars, making Ibn Baz fluctuated between supporting the KSA at some points and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights at some other points. In Publication No. 31 in 1995, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights justified the attack on it by Ibn Baz with the fact that Prince Nayef forced Ibn Baz to declare such attacks in return for releasing some political prisoners or to ameliorate their conditions in prison cells, but then, Al-Masaary harshly attacked Ibn Baz, as he had done in his other writings in his books and publications later on, declaring him and other scholars as apostates who forsook Islam, and he quotes Ibn Abdul-Wahab to prove this: (… If you, O sheikh Ibn Baz, do not specify your stance regarding the Saudi regime that fights Islam and its preachers, you will remain a fool and a tool used by Saudi tyrants …). (… Those who think that rulers have the right to set laws and legislations that contradict Islam are apostates, no doubt …). (… All State affairs and matters must be judged by sharia laws; otherwise, those who reserve all power to rulers who disregard sharia laws are cursed apostates …) (41). Of course, Al-Masaary played on words in his discourse to accuse his foes of being apostates and infidels; in fact, the same phrasings and play on words might be easily applied to him in his turn by any scholar, because the issues he raised within Salafist thought are controversial ones. He said to his foes in Publication No. 85 the following words which we have quoted above: (… Those persons disagreeing with us about the legitimacy of the Saudi regime and think of their views as sharia-based fatwas should also deem those who hold different opinions as innovative thinkers who brought new, creative views based on sharia as well …). We remember that within Statement No. 2 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in 1993, Al-Masaary blamed Saudi scholars for condemning his views as innovative, creative thinking of men must not be condemned, even if they are wrong, and he quoted fatwas of Ibn Taymiyya to prove this point. Yet, Al-Masaary did not realize that this rule applies to all men and not to him alone; he went on declaring his intellectual foes as apostates who forsook 'Islamic' sharia. We conclude that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights excelled in fiqh debate to refute its foes and to manipulate ideas and play on words as per serving its purposes in the struggle against the KSA, and its Al-Masaary sharia is changeable as per variable conditions.

2- In dealing with others using peaceful opposition evolving into inciting violence and revolt: concerning putting Abdullah Al-Hudeif: Al-Hudeif was a supporter of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights who threw nitric acid over the policeman Saud Al-Sherbein to have revenge on him, and then he was arrested with other terrorists and all of them were put to death in Aug. 1995. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights managed to urge Human Rights watch to protest the putting to death of Al-Hudeif. That was a decisive point in the struggle route between the KSA and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights; its sharia fashioned by Al-Masaary was influenced by variable conditions and circumstances and by the character of its members, especially Al-Masaary. Let us trace this topic of Al-Hudeif in relation to the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. At the beginning, Statement No. 38 in Aug. 1995 was titled "Bloodshed begins by the KSA: The First Martyr of the Route of Reform", and Al-Masaary in it accused the Saudi government of framing others as some of the arrested ones were imprisoned before the accident of Al-Sherbein, who was merely a policeman accused of verbally abusing God and torturing the innocent in prisons to extort confessions, while Al-Hudeif did not kill him at all; he just threw nitric acid over Al-Sherbein. Al-Hudeif falsely confessed under torture to have killed him, and he was tried in secret, sentenced to be put to death though he killed no one. This sentence was against sharia, as aggressors do not deserve the punishment of being put to death; they were to be imprisoned. In Publication No. 61 in 1995, we read lines of threatening agents of the KSA and rulers among Al-Saud family, written by members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights: (… No previous rulers dared to shed blood except when applying sharia corporal punishment to to put murderers to death and those who raised arms against people, but it is unprecedented to descend to such malicious revenge against Al-Hudeif who did not kill anybody … This is thoroughly unacceptable and unjustified; how come the authorities would put him to death secretly without fair trial and take pride on this by bragging it in newspapers afterwards?! The KSA authorities think they address stupid masses and cowards fooled by false Saudi concept of sharia to be frightened by bloodshed … they feel they bribed judges to remain silent and never to protest lack of trial … the nation must be the judge, the legislator, and the executioner, not a herd of cattle or sheep! … no one would be afraid anymore since innocent blood was shed, as people would talk about such deaths instead of torture in prison cells of arrested innocent ones … this is an act of defiance by the KSA against the citizens who will avenge bloodshed sooner or later … the KSA is not away from examples of violence in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Bosnia, as violence might erupt anytime unexpectedly … this would be dangerous situation as the government is controlled by the whims of idle princes … Salman and Nayef will sink the Saudi regime into veritable series of bloodshed episodes … the Saudi regimes is filled with gaps and loops, unlike other Arab regimes … especially regarding the relation between the ruling system and the Saudi royal family, whose so many princes might be an easy target for revenge and they might be murdered … all Muslims all over the globe sympathize with the reform movement adopted by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and the desire to avenge bloodshed of the innocent ones … the vicious circle of bloodshed has begun, and members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights received countless phone calls from all over the world after the crime of putting Al-Hudeif to death, as the regime wanted to terrorize Saudi citizens, a flagrant violation of human rights … we have new members driven by revenge to join the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, and we have accepted their membership of course …). In Publication No 62, in 1995, we read the response of Al-Masaary regarding the Saudi government statement on putting Al-Hudeif to death, and the publication is titled "Decisive Proofs of Judges' Manipulation of Sharia Laws", as he asserted that the KSA had no right to kill someone who did not commit the crime of murdering anybody; nitric acid does not kill. The response to refute such decision to put him to death took 9 pages of fiqh-jargon-filled discourse, ending up in accusing the KSA authorities of two crimes: shedding innocent blood, of Al-Hudeif, and violating sharia laws. In Publication No. 64 in 1995, we read that thousands of Saudis attended funeral of Al-Hudeif with his family, while KSA judges asserted that those inciting against the regime would be incarcerated and tortured until fundamentalist activities would stop inside the KSA. News came in this publication that the recovered policeman Saud Al-Sherbein had returned to his work and went on interrogating and torturing prisoners to extort confessions from them. Hence, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights tried to incite Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalists to conspire against the KSA and to seek revenge by committing more bloodshed. Two months after putting Al-Hudeif to death, an explosion occurred in Bisha city on 21^st of Oct., 1995, and the Saudi authorities announced that this was not a terrorist act motivated by political reasons, but a personal quarrel among a group of citizens. This was not true; victims of the explosion were numerous. Yet, in Publication No. 17 in 1995, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights mentioned that it was a mere accident and not a terrorist act, agreeing for the first time with the KSA stance, so that no one would accuse its members of planning such explosion. Al-Masaary asserted his repeated analyses in Publications Nos. 72 and 73, affirming that such accident reflected the lack of security and safety in the Saudi cities, as any fundamentalist youth might make terrorist explosions in the future to express his frustration and to spite the Saudi authorities anytime as long as streets are not secured and guarded well enough; of course he seemed to incite more explosions to occur. Soon enough, an explosion occurred in Riyadh on 14^th Nov., 1995, and destroyed an American building owned by the USA embassy, killing 6 Americans and injuring 60 others, mostly Americans, as a type of warning to the USA and the KSA. When asked about his opinion about such terrorist act, Al-Masaary said that he does not support acts of violence, but he does not condemn this terrorist act, as his mission is to make Saudis aware of the illegitimacy of the Saudi regime, asserting that organizations declaring their responsibility for such terrorism do not exist; this is merely angry frustrated youth expressing discontent for lack of real reforms (42). The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights discussed this terrorist operation, asserting that security is not achieved by oppression and quelling but was done before by expecting blind obedience by the nation to the regime and its scholars, and when doubts cast upon both of the regime and these corrupt scholars, discontent and fury led to such terrorism. Later on, the Saudi authorities arrested the terrorists who perpetrated this crime and their confessions, extorted by torture, were published in newspapers that they were related to Afghans who trained them and were influenced by the thought of Dr. Al-Masaary and the thought of Bin Laden. Al-Masaary criticized severely such false confessions extorted by means of torturing the perpetrators, as he has nothing to do with their crime (43). Of course, we tend to think that the responsibility of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights lies in inciting and not planning such terrorism. We do believe that putting Al-Hudeif to death, and torturing him, was the decisive point that led the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to stop their peaceful call for reform and opposition by sits-in and to turn their Al-Masaary sharia into inciting of violence against the KSA, and this change in attitude began when policemen, like Saud Al-Sherbein, began to torture supporters of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in prison cells. This change in the stances of The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights began by psychological war against Saudi regime we have mentioned before (congregational supplication invoking God's wrath on foes, plus visions and dreams of predictions). Writings of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in Publication No. 9 clearly incited against Al-Sherbein who torture incarcerated ones, and this incitation might have caused accidents to him (car accidents burning his body, plus throwing nitric acid on him) planned by angry fundamentalists, especially that Publication No. 10 announced that the family of Al-Sherbein disowned him after he was exposed by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, and Publication No. 28 asserted that accidents occurred to him were signs of divine retribution. That was part of anti-KSA propaganda within the struggle of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights against the Saudi State. Sadly, once revered, Al-Sherbein tortured in prison Dr. Muhammad Al-Hudeif, brother of Abdullah Al-Hudeif, and no one can prove that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights planned such crimes of revenge or not, as it used rumors a lot to slander the KSA rulers and their men. Let us talk about rumors as a weapon adopted by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

3- Rumors, lies, and falsehoods as weapons of the peaceful opposition of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights: unlike what the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights declared in Publication No. 2 in 1993 that they are scholars with deep knowledge of sharia laws and aims and seeking peaceful change and reforms, when they struggled against the KSA and many of its youthful and elder supporters were incarcerated, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights had to make use of every possible political poly even if telling lies is against sharia laws to which they claim they adhere. Its members aimed at spreading lies, falsehoods, fabrications, and rumors about the Saudi royal family members and princes to spite them and make people hate them more. Hence, Al-Masaary sharia committed this sin so many times until it has become a habit of which members bragged. Here is an excerpt about a message, published in Publication No. 128 in 1997, sent to the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights by one of its agents in Al-Baha region inside the KSA, and Al-Masaary copied it in the Publication No. 128 after omitting some lines so as not to expose the identity of such an agent. This excerpt about this message proves that the endeavors of supporters within a peaceful opposition movement had nothing to do with sharia or religion; rather, they were political endeavors that coped with variable, changeable conditions. Under the title "Message of Al-Baha", Al-Masaary writes the following: (… We have received a long message with useful information from one of our agents and supporters from Al-Baha region, and we have decided to publish parts of it, omitting some parts for security reasons: "… You know all about persecution we pass through in our daily life by the tyrants ruling from Riyadh … the unjust ones who ignore the Quran! People of Al-Baha had their share of injustices, tyranny, and oppression, because they do not accept submission in public or in secret … but our plans are firmly settled because of the inspiration provided by the blessed ideas of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, and conditions will be ameliorated soon enough … I hope my message will reach you safely and not be discovered by the authorities, and I hope my message would find all of you in London safe and sound … we have made a list of names of our supporters and we have forced the authorities not to continue to pest us with spies watching over the people of Al-Baha, as the authorities feared the discontent of the masses now … in our secret meetings, we plan to make the awe and respect of the Saudi regime collapse and vanish … by spreading as many rumors as possible about princes vying for more power and authorities in a sort of internecine war inside the Saudi royal family because of conflicting interests … Callers for reform have become a thorn on the side of Al-Saud family … When superficial reforms are done by the King, we incite people to send complaints to the King, the crown Prince, and other princes, in order to undermine the importance of such useless reforms introduced by the Saudi regime and cast doubt on their utility … we use jokes spread about the royal family to make people lose their fear of Al-Saud family … we propagate rumors deriding all of them in a sarcastic manner, showing them as caring for extravagance and affluence and not about sharia at all … All news of our progress and plans and measure of success we achieve will reach you as soon as possible …as well as news about incarcerated ones in Saudi cells … about supporters who let us down and left us … about lack of security in the streets … we promise to follow your footsteps to achieve all our sublime goals shared by all of us … Please accept my best regards, respects, and wishes … May God help us all!" …). We conclude then that Al-Masaary sharia focused on fighting and resisting the little insufficient reforms done by the Saudi regime and to fabricate slanders, lies, falsehoods, and rumors to undermine supporters of Al-Saud family. This means that the sole aim of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights was to topple the Saudi regime. We are reminded here by the passive stance of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights toward King Fahd's Shura Council based on sharia, Sunna, and Quran, as demanded within the letter of demands. Hence, the aim of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights was not sharia or reform, but to reach power and replace Al-Saud! Thus, anti-KSA propaganda of rumors, lies, slander, and fabricated news would turn one day into bloody confrontations, after the stage of verbal abuse and sexual slanders. This does not conform to the Quranic teachings.

Al-Masaary sharia of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights resorts to verbal abuse and sex scandals:

Firstly:

In Publication No. 12, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights accused the KSA scholars of re-defining wisdom away from this Quranic verse: "Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good advice…" (16:125), as they made wisdom to mean submission to rulers and to flatter and please them instead of God. Does this means that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights sticks to 16:125? We think that the answer is: of course not. Telling lies, spreading rumors, and fabricating falsehoods and slanders cannot possibly be the application of 16:125. The matter evolved into spread sex scandals and slanders; this is against Islamic sharia in the Quran that punishes those who accuse others of illicit sex without tangible proofs. Of course, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights had no proofs about slander related to illicit sex scandals and/or crimes involving the Saudi royal family; most probably, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights fabricated such rumors and repeated it to pass as 'facts' within minds of Saudi citizens, with the political purpose to make the ruling Saudi family members lose their owe. For example, Al-Masaary accused Maha Al-Seideiry, wife of Prince Nayef, Interior Minister, of being involved in an extramarital relation and cheating her husband with a singer named Khaled Abdul-Rahman, and she used her power to release him out of prison. Al-Masaary used a sarcastic tone to compare putting Al-Hudeif to death and the fate of Khaled Abdul-Rahman who was released shortly after being arrested, within the authority by his 'paramour'. Hence, Al-Masaary knew no bounds in fabricating slanders to undermine the Saudi family members; under the title "Maha Al-Seideiry Madame Minister of Interior", he writes: (… We understand that Nayef is an unjust tyrant, but why would he be a salve of a woman who now fully controls prisons, cares, security guards, and State authorities in her hands at her disposal and service? We wonder very much that Saudi princes claim to be manly enough, while allowing Maha Al-Seideiry to control the KSA …). Some agents and supporters of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights asked Al-Masaary to drop this sensitive groundless subject, but he replied that his purpose was to prove the Saudi regime weak, brittle, and silly and that princes cannot take decisions on anything (44). Of course, Muslims' history knew many instances of strong women who assumed high authority and power during the reign of Abbasid, Fatimid, and Mameluke caliphs. There are many similar instances in history of the West and the East, not just the Islamic world. This is not something bad in itself within political life to a have a strong woman with political influence and power. One can criticize or praise her policies but not her being a female. It is a crime that Al-Masaary opposition movement that claim to care for 'Islamic' sharia to violate the Quranic teachings of not to accuse anyone, male or female, of illicit sex without tangible proofs that include four eye-witnesses; accusers without proofs must be punished by flogging; see 24:4-5. This is the punishment deserved by Al-Masaary for accusing Maha Al-Seideiry of sexual infidelity without tangible proofs and four eye-witnesses; he violates Islamic sharia in the Quran on purpose and yet dares to claim he speaks in its name! Shame on him! Al-Masaary sharia fashioned to serve his purposes has nothing to do with Islamic sharia. Al-Masaary commits yet a similar sin of slander of the same type; he accused one prince who holds high position, authority, and power in the KSA of being a ''passive'' or ''bottom'' homosexual man. Al-Masaary repeats such slander many ties in his writings to make readers believe it and he mocked that prince several times (45). Of course, such fabrications lack proofs, but it spread as rumors all over the KSA because of the publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights distributed by its agents and supporters inside the KSA. Another type of slanders of Al-Masaary is to accuse his foes of atheism, again without proofs, to make his fabrications as rumors to be spread all over the KSA. He once wrote that King Fahd does not believe that the Quran is the divine revelation, and he claims that the CIA knew of that and of the stance of King Fahd who denies God's existence (46). Thus, here, Al-Masaary wants to create troubles in the Saudi-American relations. In the same vein, Al-Masaary accused high officials in the region of Abha of demanding sexual favors as bribes from some women by means of embezzlement (47) citing many examples of such incidents (48). Of course, Al-Masaary uses lewd innuendoes and coarse language in phrasing such fabrications about the Saudi royal family members. In our quoting him below, we have omitted names of the Saudi royal family members, and we apologize for quoting Al-Masaary here, but we have to do this to prove his being a sinner who has no right to talk in the name of Islam or sharia. He writes about a high-position and high-rank Saudi figure: (… This sinner, passive homosexual, deviant, drug-unconscious man trembles in his chair of authority and rule! …). (… how come that his hypocritical dirty alcohol-addict bribe-taker who steals public money and commits fornication despite his old age would be a leader and an imam in prayers?!). (… How dare he, the passive homosexual, describe Chechnya war as an internal Russian affair? This prince of thieves and buggered men should remain silent, or else, he must speak in defense of his own bottom! …). (… This base, mean tyrant spends millions on gambling tables in one night, apart from large sums paid to the whores to spend one night in his bed …). (… We feel sorry to be bound to say that rule inside the KSA is in the hands of passive homosexual slaves and their American masters …). (… This ugly sinner of a prince cannot be beautified by international and local media at all … his sins could not be washed away with all water in all seas on the globe as he disobeys God and allies himself to infidels…) (49). Al-Masaary uses the same lewd, coarse language and discourse in his book titled "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", as he describes the KSA always in it as ''the corrupt, evil state'', and he describes its king as ''the sinful, tyrant Western agent''. In this book, he describes one of the Gulf monarchs as "the passive homosexual", and he later on at one point verbally abuses the whole Islamic world: (… The decisive proofs of the moral degeneration and the intellectual and political bankruptcy of the whole Islamic world include the fact that the Saudi regime still lingers despite its being primitive and backward as it is controlled by a corrupt mafia-like family marketing their regime to pass off as 'Islamic' …), and he did not forget to verbally abuse Abou Bakr the Algerian the non-Saudi scholar that allied himself to the KSA: (… We thank the Almighty that we do not suffer the same mental illness of Abou Bakr the Algerian who followed the herd of cattle and sheep of the KSA worshippers … God loves and favors us more than Abou Bakr the Algerian) (50). Thus, Al-Masaary commits the sin of speaking in the name of God to praise himself and abuse Abou Bakr the Algerian, and in the same vein, Al-Masaary accuses high-rank Saudi scholars of being like dogs and curs and agents of the devil (51). When the British Prime Minister at the time, Tony Blair, ignored a party held by Arab ambassadors, Al-Masaary writes: (… It seems that Blair realizes the fact that Arab regimes and ambassadors are merely a punch of animals and a herd of cattle, or base creatures that must be kept at bay, and he must be right …). Al-Masaary at one point verbally abused the Saudi ambassador by saying to him: (… You can bite your father's phallus, as Prophet Muhammad once said to one of his foes…) (52). Of course, we Quranists do not believe in Sunna and writings of biography of Prophet Muhammad that contain such coarse language; his only true character and lifetime events are the ones mentioned in the Quran, and God describes him in the Quran that he had great morals; see 68:4. Thus, he could never have uttered such verbal abuse ascribed to him by Al-Masaary and Sunna books. The Quran has ordered Muhammad, and all believers, to speak softly to people in a good way and to avoid nonsensical talk and to say peace to everyone. There is a vast difference and abyss between the divine Quranic sharia and Al-Masaary sharia.

Secondly: Did the Saudi authorities use the same type of discourse?

We quote comments of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights on a speech delivered by King Fahd that aimed to distort and twist the speech and to defame and tarnish its deliverer. In Publication No. 21 in 1994, under the title "A Reading in the King's Speech", Al-Masaary writes the following: (… Careful repeated readings of Fahd's speech shows the psychological pain and deep anxiety suffered by Fahd, as his speech is filled with weak, brittle defense words to ward off several accusations leveled against him. We feel that his saying ''we are not unjust rulers'' shows his fear of being accused of tyranny and despotism. The phrases "our minds, gates, and houses are open", ''we have no rulers and ruled in the KSA'', and "this is your State, not mine or any prince's" are showing that he is afraid of the accusation of being a dictator. His long phrases about Shura Council and being afraid of accusations of encouraging sins is shown in his words: "the State combats sins and prohibitions". His being afraid of the accusation of replacing sharia laws with secular man-made laws is shown in his phrase: "all our laws comply with Islamic sharia". Another accusation Fahd tried to refute in vain is squandering public money on useless wars: "we have some shortage of money as we have spent large sums on many international armies", "we felt obliged to offer the best we can". He tried to in vain to refute low public services by condescendingly saying that: "the State was never stingy with its citizens". Fahd negates the accusation leveled at him of the KSA being enslaved to the USA by saying: "we are not slaves of any other country". He tried in vain to defend the judicial system that sentenced many persons to prison by asserting he does not interfere in court rulings. He negates people's fury because of low economic status by asserting that he himself never got bored or annoyed by such phase of stagnation that will not last. He claims he allowed west army forces to settle in Arabia after long thought and for the general good, taking the decision after long prayers performed by him to seek God's guidance. Fahd insisted that media slanders about his family members are not true and that the Saudi State never interferes in the work of high-rank scholars. He tried in vain to explain the usefulness of Shura council and constitution, but he was not convincing to the doubting masses. He felt people hate him and growing sick of him, as he said: "we never wished or expected to be a king one day". Finally we feel bound to say that Fahd apparently reads carefully every word of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, as we have managed to influence his psychological status and that of his family members…). We notice here that Al-Masaary did not use coarse, rude language, because King Fahd did not; on the contrary, King Fahd spoke politely. If the opposite would have happened, Al-Masaary would have seized the chance to attack King Fahd's style. We tend to think that such quotation shows Al-Masaary as losing control and grip of his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and his ability to influence events inside the KSA. Of course, Al-Masaary sharia of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights changes and varies as per different conditions and circumstances, and declaring others as infidels or apostates is one of the main weapons employed by the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

Between enlightenment and declaring others as apostates in the sharia of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights:

Al-Masaary declares all his foes and all those who disagree with his opinions and views as infidels and apostates, and this applies to KSA scholars in Publications Nos. 152 to 156 in particular. Al-Masaary declares all Muslim rulers as apostates: (… All rulers who allied themselves to infidels in the West and cooperated with them against Iraq are no longer considered to be Muslims; they are apostates that must be killed and their money confiscated and they must be toppled and dethroned… and we dare Ibn Baz to contradict us here …) (53). It is strange that Al-Masaary who declare others as infidels more that the KSA scholars generally do would also declare himself as more ''enlightened'' and ''tolerant'' than these scholars are. This asserts that Al-Masaary sharia changes as per his whims because of his sole aim to oppose, undermine, and topple Saudi rulers and rule Arabia in their place. During Ramadan 1418 A.H., the Saudi Interior Ministry issued a statement to warn non-Muslim residents inside the KSA against eating, drinking, and smoking in public during daytime of the 30-day month of fasting so as not to ''hurt'' feelings of fasting Muslims, and the statement asserted that violators would be punished. Al-Masaary mocked such fear of ''hurting'' feelings of fasting Muslims while no one cares about hurting citizens'' feeling regarding foreign armies and military bases in Arabia. He refutes the statement as ''vice'' introduced by force to Islamic sharia, citing the following lines of evidence:

A) Prophet Muhammad never warned the Jewish population in Yathreb against eating during daytime.

B) Eating in public or in secret during daytime in Ramadan is a right for all people, Muslims or non-Muslims, and no one had the right to restrict them, as there is no sharia proofs to support restricting them.

C) Imposing such warning on non-Muslims is deemed compulsion in religion.

D) This warning is insulting to Prophet Muhammad, as his biography shows him eating at one time inside the house of a fasting relative of his, in a non-Ramadan day.

E) Imposing such a warning is a betrayal to Muslims as it prevents them from the reward of patience.

Hence, Al-Masaary moves the pendulum very fast from extremism and fanaticism to tolerance and flexibility, based on the sharia proofs he claims sticking to it. The above item no. (B) is not consistent with divine order to Muslims in the Quranic Chapter Two to fast Ramadan. Ironically, Al-Masaary talks in item no. (C) about the Quranic principle of ''there is compulsion in religion'' despite the fact that this verse along with other 500 verses in the Quran refute the so-called apostasy punishment.

Changing of the sharia of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights concerning fellows of struggle:

Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights accused Dr. Saad Al-Faqeeh of being an apostate as he left and deserted the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights after a long period of disputes and intellectual conflicts, as we read in Publication No,. 44 in 1996 and we apologize for the coarse language in this quote: (… The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights has made a pledge before the nation of Arabia to continue the sharia and political struggle against the evil Saudi regime of apostates of a tyrannical ruler who allies himself to West infidels, uses secular laws instead of the sharia laws, and enables the West infidels to occupy lands of Arabia to humiliate Arabs and steal their wealth before wiping them from the face of the earth. We are to fight such tyrant and rule instead to apply sharia laws in all affairs in our lives in Arabia and to restore rights negated and stolen wealth and to make rule by elections without tribalism and hypocrisy typical of Al-Saud family members and their cronies … we know that it is a long bumpy route ahead of us, and some of us will be lost … and some of us might betray us and join the side of our enemies or might give up the struggle because of their weakness, old age, or change of heart and opinion … some traitors might compromise their faith and tenets and political stances and negotiate with the enemies. For about one year and a half, we could not settle the disputes between us and Dr. Saad Al-Faqeeh who used to control finances of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and headed the editing of its writings to satisfy his ardent desire to control and domination over others, but he refused the principle of Shura consultation and exchange views via open discussions. We tried in vain not to stir his anger and not to provoke him to stop any conflicts inside the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights that has a higher aim, but Al-Faqeeh insisted to be adamant in his stances and fossilized views, and confrontations had to be made. He let us down in many situations … especially the case of deportation of Dr. Al-Masaary … as a lawyer, Dr. Al-Faqeeh threatened not to support us in any case as long as we disagree with his decisions and control … once rejected by us, he left the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights forever, and we warn our supporters against dealing with him as he no longer represents the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. We note that we have written documents and audiotapes proving the following points against Dr. Al-Faqeeh: 1) he refused to admit to the fact that the Saudi regime is ruled and run by apostates and refused to publish writings to that meaning, 2) he kept regular contact with some Saudi princes, thus betraying the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights by communicating with its archenemies, 3) he exposed some of our agents inside the KSA and never cared about their fate in Saudi prisons and refused to give money to the families of the arrested ones, 4) he insisted on employing certain persons never approved by other members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, for suspecting their being spies on us from the British or Saudi apparatuses, 5) he insisted on casting doubts on many members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and their families inside the KSA, and finally, 6) he adamantly refused to spend money of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights on some of its members who needed it, claiming he was saving money for the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. After long deliberations by the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, we decided to dismiss him and to suspend his membership in the London headquarters …). It is clear that such accusations leveled by Al-Masaary against his fellow in struggle, Al-Faqeeh, were akin to moral assassination of Al-Faqeeh, and they cast shadows over the personal traits of Al-Masaary; how could he verbally abuse his fellow struggler suddenly after years of joint endeavors inside and outside the KSA?! Some members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights tried to reconcile Al-Faqeeh and Al-Masaary, and the former accepted their mediation while the latter refused any type of reconciliation, as we read in Statement No. 45 in 1996: (… While the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights dismissed Dr. Al-Faqeeh and suspended his membership on 4^th of March, 1996, Al-Faqeeh was planning to monopolize control and hegemony over the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, confiscating the only key to its headquarters … after his dismissal, he brought the British police to re-gain the headquarters as he claimed the location to be his, and after long debates, the British police told him to resort to British courts to sue the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and Dr. Al-Masaary if he had proofs that the location is his … British authorities felt sorry for such divisions inside the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, but stood on our side as we regained the key to the location of our headquarter … some members tried to settle the disputes between Al-Masaary and Al-Faqeeh, especially the father of the former, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Masaary, but negotiations went on for a long time and works of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights were suspended unduly while avoiding media coverage as much as possible… Negotiations failed miserably … facsimile broken down as Al-Faqeeh changed numbers of it and of the phones by notifying the telecom company to stop old numbers … this was deemed a violation against the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights … Dr. Al-Masaary has headed the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, while Al-Faqeeh was irrevocably dismissed … Al-Faqeeh took revenge by verbally abusing the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in the media, claiming that it is deviated from its original path by some members who tarnished its name and reputation! …). Of course, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights issued a statement in English to the press to justify and explain its stance in April 1996, asserting that it has documents, eye-witnesses, and audiotapes furnished upon request to prove everything in the statement, and in it, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights asserted that 1) some dismissed members slandered Dr. Al-Masaary and accused him of betraying the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, a false and groundless accusation spread by Al-Faqeeh by fax inside and outside the KSA, 2) such events prove that Al-Faqeeh and his mediators were biased against Al-Masaary and leveled groundless accusations at him, 3) money confiscated by Al-Faqeeh was owned by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, whose members accused him of theft and dishonesty, 4) the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and its spokesman, Al-Masaary, was facing a fierce war threatening its very existence, a war fought by Al-Faqeeh among others, and 5) British courts will undertake the cases and help the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to regain their possessions, headquarter, and money… all agreements previously done with Al-Faqeeh are annulled and we warn our friends against dealing with him …). This shows that Al-Masaary sharia of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights deemed Al-Faqeeh at first as a fellow struggler for God's sake against the evil KSA, but later on, it deemed him a traitor who allied himself to infidels. Al-Masaary sharia accepted mediation of reconciliation at first and then refused to comply with mediators and negotiations, and this shows that Al-Masaary does not accept compromises; his fellow members must be 100% agreeing with his stances and views as the head of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, or else, be deemed a traitor and an apostate as per Al-Masaary sharia. This Al-Masaary sharia is fashioned as per his whims and desires, and it changes as per variable conditions and circumstances to serve the power-seeking Dr. Al-Masaary who sought to be appointed as ruler of Arabia one day. Thus, he contradicts Quranic sharia that advocates justice above all, especially within the Quranic Ten Commandments in the Quranic Chapter six: "…And when you speak, be fair, even if it concerns a close relative…" (6:152), "…Stand firmly for justice, as witnesses to God, even if against yourselves, or your parents, or your relatives. …" (4:135), and "O you who believe! Be upright to God, witnessing with justice; and let not the hatred of a certain people prevent you from acting justly. Adhere to justice, for that is nearer to piety; and fear God. God is informed of what you do." (5:8). Had Al-Masaary adhered to the Quranic Islamic sharia, he would have acted justly with his foes by balancing and mentioning both their pros and cons, their good qualities and their defects, and then, he would have tackled his point of view of how he excelled and surpassed them. But he saw nothing in his foes except pure evil and he confiscated to himself what he saw as the ''absolute truth''. Such a mentality made him lose more supporters and friends gradually until he stands alone now in his political struggle eventually as we write this.

Lastly:

1- The only tool owned by Dr. Al-Masaary was his pen, and his writings declared all his foes as apostates and infidels, even his fellow in struggle Dr. Saad Al-Faqeeh. Declaring others as apostates requires murdering them as per the Sunnite Wahabi creed or sharia, which is totally foreign to real Islamic sharia laws in the Quran. We wonder very much what Al-Masaary would have done if he owned an atomic bomb?! No doubt he would have destroyed everything and everyone by it! this shows the veritable danger and threat posed by Wahabism, a creed based on the fundamentalist Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya doctrines and the urgent need to refute and debunk Wahabism from within true Islam and Islamic sharia (i.e., the Quran alone) by Quranism and fellow Quranists; the writings authored by us for more than 20 years since 1977 until now as we write this book in 2000 A.D. revolve around this point.

2- Al-Masaary himself was a victim of this fundamentalist Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya doctrines on which the Wahabi ideology is based; if he had continued his studies in his field of nuclear physics, he would have benefited scientific research outside and inside the KSA, instead of becoming a writer of terror theories and notions of Salafism / Wahabism in his writings that we have analyzed in this chapter.

3- All this asserts the responsibility of King Feisal who was to blame for accentuating the Wahabi Salafist thought to color lifestyle and policies of the KSA, spreading and propagating Wahabism all over the world, and dwarfing and quelling the secular trends inside the KSA, driving Saudi natural science experts to quit their careers and their homeland to devote their time to use the fundamentalist Salafist thought to fight and undermine the KSA, leading eventually to the result that the KSA has suffered because of Al-Qaeda, Bin Laden, and their likes.

4- The suffering of Al-Saud family will go on; as such ordeal is derived from the Wahabi ideology, and as long as the royal family links itself and the KSA to Wahabism; i.e., as long as the pact between M. Ibn Abdul-Wahab, founder of Wahabism, and Ibn Saud, the forefather of Al-Saud family, remains valid.

5- Evil doings always turn against the evildoers; this has occurred in the 20^th century events in the KSA, as we have written in this book, and the 21^st century will bring about more events against the KSA inside and outside it to bring about its collapse as long as the KSA adheres to the Wahabi ideology. Wahabism must be intellectually refuted from within Islam (i.e., the Quran alone) by Quranism and Quranists. Almighty God has sent His prophet, Muhammad, as a mercy to the humankind, but the fundamentalist Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya doctrinal Wahabi terrorists made 'Islam' a tool to terrorize the humankind.

6- Until now, these criminals and terrorists do not feel ashamed of themselves and their deeds!

CHAPTER III: The Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice as a Sharia Frame of the Criticisms

CHAPTER III: The Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice as a Sharia Frame of the Criticisms leveled against the KSA by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights

Analysis of the methodology of condemnation of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights used against the KSA:

Introduction:

We analyze in CHAPTER III the following: 1) how the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights used the ''Wahabi'' notion of ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'' as a ''Salafist'' sharia frame to oppose the KSA and the bases on which it has been established as a State, and 2) the methodology of condemnation used by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to deny the right of the KSA to exist. This analysis covers three main aspects: A) the right of Hisbah adopted by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, B) the right of verifying accusations adopted by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and its condemnation of the Saudi practices and rule, and C) the verbal rejection and disownment turning into the call and practice of violence.

A) The right of Hisbah:

1- We have tackled before how the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights claimed for itself to be deputized by God to monopolize Hisbah on the Saudi authorities and the Saudi citizens, as if it were the sole representative of Wahabi sharia. This includes naturally that it monopolizes as well the 'Wahabi' notion of ''the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice'', without allowing anyone to do the same with its members. Such aims of Al-Masaary are not hidden; they are very clear in all his writings and books. This is concluded from the insistence of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to talk in the name of sharia and declaring its enemies and intellectual foes (especially Saudi Wahabi scholars) as apostates and infidels who have forsaken sharia. Even in cases when the members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights would make mistakes and commit errors that derive condemnation and criticisms by others – especially within events of Dr. Saad Al-Faqeeh leaving it – such condemnation and criticisms by others would make members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights assert they own the absolute truth and consequently harshly attack and verbally abuse others, and even sometimes resort to dreadful slanders and spreading of rumors and sex scandals. Hence, members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights began to harbor extremist political visions and notion and to link them to sharia, as we discern from political analyses written by Al-Masaary, instead of using good advice and wisdom as ordered by the Quran. Thus, members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights had descended to such malicious revenge as to fabricate slanders and rumors without proofs instead of verifying and investigating the truth, and they had deserted their style of peaceful opposition to call outspokenly for outright violence and to incite vociferously all their supporters inside the KSA to commit acts of violence and terror.

2- The fact that members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights want to monopolize the right to apply Hisbah made them move further away from the true Islamic sharia in the Quran that contradicts the notion of clergymen and theocracy and made them lose credibility as they committed sins of sexual slanders and spreading lies and falsehoods. They talked about their foes as if they were pure evil and deserve to fabricate rumors, lies, and falsehoods about them. This exaggeration made members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights forget that no human being and no regime is void of mistakes and errors, especially tyrannical regimes and rulers in the Third World where corruption spreads and there is lack of transparency, impeachment, and questioning; yet, this is not an excuse to reach an extreme of unjustified virulent attacks using lies, falsehoods, rumors, and fabrications by those who claim to represent sharia.

3- We assert here that condemnation by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights of the Saudi government is based on the points of view of its members, and such points of view might be true or untrue. As long as the Saudi government does not respond as a defendant and ignores the accusations and writings of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to clarify matters, our job here is confined to analyzing writings and accusations of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights while asserting that its members committed many errors to be deplored for sure.

B) Verifying accusations:

1- Most of the accusations leveled by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights against the Saudi royal family members were serious as they put to question their honor and religiousness and not only their political performance. Such accusations entail decisive proofs; otherwise, the accusers would be foes of the Quranic sharia and man-made laws that prohibit sexual slander. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights must provide such proofs or to stop such unproved verbal abuse.

2- Of course, many time at the beginning, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights was demanded by its supporters to provide proofs of its accusations that were not so many at first in July 1994, but Al-Masaary merely responded by asserting that he never would publish anything without verification, as we read in Publication No. 10: (… Many of our supporters asked us about verification of news provided by us … and we assert that we always verify any piece of news that reaches us before writing it, and even if our style of discourse is not that precise, we remind our readers that this is not even up to 1% from Saud media flagrant lies …). After Al-Masaary monopolized and fully controlled the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, he went into an extreme as far as rumors and slanders are concerned, and when asked about verifications and proofs, he wrote the following in Publication N. 145 in 1998: (… Ibn Baz and his likes demanded from us to provide documents and data as well as eye-witnesses to prove all information we provided about scandals of the Saudi family members, but would judges of Al-Saud family mafia believe us?! They would much rather surrender to Al-Saud in return for money …). Of course, this was not an acceptable excuse for not providing proofs; he should have provided them if he owned them or else never to repeat such type of accusations. Al-Masaary seemed to be eager anyway to tarnish reputations of persons with or without proofs, and he linked himself to sharia, which is worse unless he means his own fabricated sharia fashioned specially to serve his purposes. Since Al-Masaary controlled his sharia and his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, no one obliged him to provide any type of proofs, but the editor-in-chief of the Saudi newspaper "Okaz" verbally abused Al-Masaary in his editorial describing him as an inveterate liar, and Al-Masaary sued him for slander in courts of Jeddah. We will trace below if the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights have stuck to its claim of verification as per Publication No. 10.

3- We offer the following remarks:

3/1: the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights corrected some names and pieces of news mentioned in its writings, as we read in Publications Nos. 36, 67 and 132. Chief among such news corrected later on was one about the disappearance of Prince Feisal, the son of King Fahd, as the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights claimed at first that he was involved in a murder, and it was transpired later that he was furious at his father over a certain dispute. Of course, we can never verify the authenticity of news provided by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, but we comment here that at least in some instances, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights would correct some, and not all, of its news, accusations, or names mentioned by mistake.

3/2: The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights sometimes verified some pieces of news provided to it by using other sources, such as in the case when Al-Masaary in his book titled "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA" used data of an annual report of the London-based Strategic Studies International Institute to prove that the Saudi military army spends too much money on buying arms despite its being a very weak military army (54). Al-Masaary asserts in his book and in Publication No. 43 that all numbers and data he mentions and his preciseness of translation could be easily verified when one gains access to such report as well as to the British documentary movie aired in 1995 about a British Minister offering sexual bribes by providing sex-workers to some Saudi princes, whose names are mentioned in Publication No. 43, among commissions in deals of weapons. This movie featured a short interview with Al-Masaary. In Publication No. 14 in 1994, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights mentioned that a female British author announced its forthcoming book about financial and sex scandals involving Saudi princes and some British executives who provided sex workers to them every night in a hotel in Jeddah, disguised as nurses. It is laughter-inducing that such news in Publications Nos. 14 and 43 were written in a manner that reminds us with Salafist method in writing down oral narratives of narrators from past eras and generations: "so-and-so said that so-and-so said that so-and-so said that the Prophet said that …etc."; this is indeed funny; as it is impossible to verify such series of dead narrators of the so-called hadiths fabricated by them or by others who use the names of dead people. In the case of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, news spread from living people in the same era without enough verification. It is funny that this Salafist method in writing down oral narratives of narrators is based on claims of the honesty, trustworthiness, and other personal traits of narrators, allowing no one the chance to criticize the text itself, and removing all non-Muslims from the series of narrators for merely being non-Muslims! It is as if all Muslim narrators can never be wrong! Al-Masaary in his books shows imitation of Salafist method of authenticating narrators: how come he declares all non-Wahabis as apostates and infidels and yet copies their news and remarks?! We judge the Al-Masaary as per his methodology; he ignores that sharia laws entail eye-witnesses or defendants' confessions, and that accusers without tangible proofs deserved to be flogged for slander.

3/3: The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in one case provided a formal Saudi document as proof to accuse some princes of smuggling weapons and arms, and this document was a letter from a high official in the Saudi Defense Ministry to a high official in an airport in Riyadh to allow the passing of a cargo of arms and weapons coming from the USA. Yet, when the letter is carefully read, we find no proof of smuggling; it is importation doe formally and publically between two countries and with the permission of the Saudi Defense Ministry. This shows that Al-Masaary was fishing for mistakes and mishaps even if he had to imagine them!

3/4: The most serious accusations of sex scandals, homosexual practices, and sexual indiscretions or infidelities leveled by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights against the Saudi royal family members lacked any tangible proofs, though they must be proved and verified before spreading them in writing, and since the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights never had such proofs, it thus violated Quranic teachings despite the assertions of Al-Masaary that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights represents sharia.

C) Verbal rejection turning into the call and practice of violence:

1- At first, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights resorted to verbal opposition and condemnation instead of committing violence, and this was asserted after the flight of Al-Masaary to London in statement No. 3 in 1994, so that change is introduced gradually in a civilized manner.

2- When some members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights inside the KSA were arrested, Al-Masaary asserted peace to his supporters there and never to fight security men, especially when the two sheikhs, Al-Hawali and Al-Ouda, were arrested and some youth resorted to violence, as we read in an exceptional publication in 1994: (… the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights allows and endorses no acts of violence … some youths misunderstood our discourse and style of zeal and enthusiasm as a call for committing acts of violence while quoting the notion of changing vice by one's hands by sheer force. Policies of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights stick to changing by the word and not by the sword, and we urge zealous youth to practice self-restraint and not to physically attack Saudi security men and policemen…).

3- When the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights received a statement from some group called ''militias of faith'' that it threatened the Saudi authorities to release Al-Ouda and Al-Hawali before the end of five days, or else explosions of location linked with Western interests in the KSA would take place, Al-Masaary condemned such threat of using violence and insisted on the peaceful nature of his activities within the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, warning its supporters that this statement is forged by the Saudi central intelligence to tarnish the reputation of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

4- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights asserted its peaceful activities in Publication No. 35 in 1995 despite severe confrontation with the Saudi State, affirming that it dispels anger of the frustrated Saudi youths by engaging them in a peaceful opposition movement instead of resorting to violence.

5- Once more, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights asserted its peaceful nature and actions in Publication No. 36 in 1995, as peaceful sits-in called for by it affirms the concept of cooperation in righteousness and piety to reject vice.

The responsibility of resorting to violence:

1- In order to be fair, peaceful stance that turned into incitation and threatening and then later on to acts of violence and explosions inside the KSA is the responsibility of both the KSA and Al-Masaary and his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. Once Al-Faqeeh left the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Al-Masaary fully controlled it and used coarse lewd language and resorted to slanders and rumors to threat the KSA and to incite violence. Such verbal abuse reflects an ardent desire to destroy and wreak havoc in the KSA. Al-Masaary had but one weapon: a pen to distort, condemn, incite, slander, spread rumors, fabricate, lie, scandalize, mobilize, and expose. What would be the case if he happened to own WMD!

2- The fault of the Saudi authorities was to torture scholars and persons incarcerated for political reasons. We personally assert that, as a former prisoner because of our free thinking and Quranism, the experience of being imprisoned is so painful that it never leaves the inner psyche of the thinker even after being released to live in peace; let alone those who have been tortured. Of course, Al-Masaary was once incarcerated and tortured in Saudi prisons, and he repeatedly said that he has a personal desire to wreak revenge on the KSA and its king, princes, scholars, policemen, and high officials. Hence, after the case of Al-Hudeif and the conflicts with Al-Faqeeh, Al-Masaary invoked Wahabi sharia notions to assert that the Saudi State is a vice that must be removed by force, as per Ibn Hanbal Sunnite Wahabi concepts.

3- To incarcerate and torture someone because of his ideas and views is the worst crime committed by any country; a cultured person who owns nothing but his pen can never forget being tortured and losing his dignity by executioners of any regime, and his physical wounds might be healed, unlike the psychological ones that might drive him to take revenge and/or to be an extremist who would resort to inciting terror and violence in their books: this occurred to terrorist MB members and Salafists Sayed Qotb, Shukry Mustafa, and Omar Abdel-Rahman tortured in the 1960s in Egypt by high-rank officers like Safwat Al-Ruby and Hamza Al-Bassiouny. Likewise, Saud Al-Sherbein had tortured Al-Masaary in his prison cell, and this drove him gradually to incite violence, as a reaction to torture, in later stages of his wirings within the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

We give examples below.

1- Of course, peaceful condemnation was praiseworthy in the early stages of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, before the KSA put Al-Hudeif to death in Aug. 1995. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights mentioned in Publication No. 55 in 1995 that all Muslims must renounce and condemn the Saudi regime in their hearts so as not to support the unjust ones who commit crimes and justify them. In Publication No. 46, we read that such denunciation in one's heart is a religious duty as vices spread on the land.

2- When Al-Hudeif was put to death, we find in Publication No. 61 that Al-Masaary incites acts of bloodshed and violence against the KSA for the first time, making the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights the sole body of condemnation of vice above all Saudi scholars, especially Ibn Baz, as we read in Publication No. 73 in 1995: (… Changing vice is not the mission of Ibn Baz and his fellow scholars as they have no power at all to undertake such a mission; any Muslim is required by sharia laws to change vice … with priority to political vice …). Here, we see that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights stripped Saudi scholars from their role in condemning vice and made incitation and political activism against the Saudi State the first duty of a believer; that is, the Saudi State is a vice to be changed by force as per Sunnite Wahabi Ibn Hanbal doctrine notions and concepts.

3- Conflicts between Al-Masaary and Al-Faqeeh reached the point of no return, and Al-Faqeeh left the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in March 1996, and explosions occurred in Riyadh, while Al-Masaary wrote in Publication No. 75 in 1995 that violence is the only way and the sole means to zealous, frustrated, and furious youths who found all gates shut before them. He asserted that the only solution to avoid violence is to regain social balance by setting free all political prisoners and to admit to the right of the nation to apply Hisbah to rulers. He insinuated that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights must control Arabia and apply Hisbah as it considered itself the sole representative of both the nation and Wahabi Salafist sharia.

4- Al-Masaary attacked harshly the Saudi government when it announced that four youths confessed to exploding a location of American marines as they were influenced and incited by writings of Al-Masaary and Bin Laden. In Publication No. 97, Al-Masaary accused one of the Saudi royal family members of planning the explosion and to extort confessions by torturing the four youths. In Publication No. 98, Al-Masaary cast doubts on such confessions and asserted their being severely tortured. In Publication No. 99, Al-Masaary wrote letters to high-rank Saudi scholars about the Riyadh explosion, considering it a sharia-based duty/jihad to change vice by force, making vice to mean the KSA itself. When the Saudi authorities announced that the four youths were put to death after confessing to have committed the Riyadh explosion, Al-Masaary in Publication No. 102 in 1996 attacked and criticized the American existence in Arabia and condemned putting to death of the four youths even without proper trial. He called all Islamic organizations to organize a protest march at the gates of the Saudi embassy in London, and it was planned and done actually on 16^th of June, 1996, as mentioned by Al-Masaary in Publication No. 104. We conclude here that peaceful rejection and condemnation by words turned into incitation of violence and terror embodied by explosions in the KSA, while Al-Masaary, as an inciter of such terror, justifies violence using sharia of changing vice by force as per notions of Sunnite Ibn Hanbal Wahabism.

Grounds on which Al-Masaary based his views of seeking to destroy the Saudi regime:

1- In Publications Nos. 131 to 138, in Dec. 1997, Al-Masaary serialized a research on ''sinning rulers", demonstrating his sharia-based views that prohibits letting sinners rule and necessitates their being dethroned by force, and he supported his views with many proofs, and then, he quoted views of some ancient scholars (e.g., Ibn Hazm and some Hanafi doctrine scholars) that tolerated the existence of sinning rulers, and he refutes such views while accusing their holders as troubled, hypocritical group who applied the Shiite principle of Taqiyya (i.e., expressing in public views contrary to one's real views). Al-Masaary wrote: (…Hanafi doctrine scholars asserted such erroneous views of tolerating sinning rulers/caliphs, as the Hanafi doctrine was the formal one adopted by the Abbasid caliphate and later sultanates under it as well as the Ottoman caliphate, and accordingly, most scholars drew nearer to caliphs and urged people to offer blind obedience to caliphs instead of questioning and correcting them however their sins, injustices, betrayal, and tyranny might be …). Hence, Al-Masaary contradicts himself when he said that the Ottoman empire a legitimate sharia-based caliphate while the very first KSA as rebellious one against the Ottoman legitimacy and thus, he sees that the KSA lacked any legitimacy.

2- The stance of Ibn Hanbal against the Abbasid caliphate goes against the above-mentioned views of the Ibn Hanbal doctrine Sunnite Wahabi scholar Al-Masaary; Ibn Hanbal was incarcerated and tortured because of his fiqh views and not political ones during the reign of the Abbasid caliph Al-Mutassim; yet, he remained loyal to the Abbasid caliphate, and no one can accuse him of applying Taqiyya as no one except God knows the innermost of people's hearts. Ibn Hanbal never participated in a revolt led by scholars at the time against the Abbasids under the motto of preventing vice and forcing virtue, despite the fact that most rebels were followers of his doctrine.

3- Hence, Al-Masaary spared no intellectual weapon to call for the removal of toppling of the Saudi regime, ruled by 'sinners', as vice to be changed by force as per Wahabi notions. In Publication No. 173, Al-Masaary asserted that sharia courts is the only body to issue a ruling to dethrone or abdicate sinning, unjust rulers, and NOT Shura councils as they are secular bodies. If sinning rulers do not apply the sharia courts ruling, they must be fought to death as apostates even if most citizens would be killed in that military jihad or murdered for not participating in that jihad! (… If sharia courts do not exist, we cannot be sure if Sunna and Quran would be applied fully and correctly, and rulers in that case must be declared as apostates, and scholars' in such cases as these is to pressurize the masses and citizens to make sharia dominates indeed by establishing sharia courts with full judicial authority. If rulers adamantly refuse to establish sharia courts, they would be deifying themselves and rebelling against God's sharia and must be fought fiercely with all power and might until they e dethroned even if most people die as a result …). This means endless fighting until the two sides are killed off or annihilated! Of course, this is utter madness!

4- Such incitation of terror and civil war by Al-Masaary is sheer madness, and he asserted in Publication no. 138 that the KSA is ruled by apostates who monopolize power and authority with no room for sharia to be applied, and this is apostasy. He saw that the only solution is to abdicate and dethrone sinning rulers by force as vice to be removed as per Wahabi religious duties by one of the two means: (A) a military coup akin to surgical operation to remove cancerous cells, even if heroes of such coup failed, they would be martyrs, or (B) all citizens (i.e., scholars, security guards, policemen, etc.) must unite to dethrone Saudi rulers peacefully without bloodshed, however dangers faced might be. (… The rule of sinning kings and princes is illegal and against sharia laws as per most views of most people and scholars … those rejecting our view here are apostates who have forsaken Islam …). Here, Al-Masaary declares all those opposing his views as infidels or apostates, both his contemporaries and ancient scholars, and this asserts his biggest error and mistake of having the nerve to decide who are true Muslims and who are not; this is sinful self-deification. Shame on him!

Types of items adopted by the KSA and condemned as sins and vices by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights:

Firstly: the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights criticized the KSA foreign policies:

Introduction:

Political differences are natural even inside any given political party or the ruling party, and differences or disputes are bound to occur between the ruling party and the opposition parties. But when such opposition is a political and religious fundamentalist movement, instead of seeking political compromises, disputes are turned by fundamentalists into deep-seated hatred, violence, mutual accusations, and declaring others as apostates, even if the sole reference is one for both sides: Salafist Sunnite Ibn Hanbal doctrine-based Wahabism. Disputes of that type escalate until two options are left: either to obey rulers in power or to obey those opposition figures confiscating Wahabi sharia. Thus political disputes between the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and the KSA grew deeper, especially in relation to internal and external policies of the KSA, as we analyze this in light of how such policies change as per the interests of the Saudi royal family and as per the influence of Sunnite Wahabi opposition fundamentalists.

The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights condemned the Saudi foreign policies:

1- The views of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights regarding Saudi external policies are based on uniting the Islamic world in one caliphate facing the West, especially the USA, as we will tackle later on. Such outlook dominates over the vision of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in its condemnation of the Saudi external policies. Within critical reading of writings of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, we notice the difference in the stance regarding the relation of the KSA with the USA and the communists as per the above-mentioned political creed of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

2- As regarding the USA, let us bear in mind the Gulf War that resulted in the military existence of the American bases in Arabia as the main reason behind forming the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights as an opposition movement. Naturally, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights condemned severely the American existence inside Saudi lands and American interference in Saudi policies, even if it led to something good, as in the case when the USA interfered to pressurize the KSA to set free all incarcerated scholars who supported the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to defend human rights. More details are given below. In Publication No. 20, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights condemned the fact that the USA controlled all Saudi air fields during Clinton's visit to the KSA. In Publication No. 32, Al-Masaary condemned American interference to settle disputes among Saudi princes. In Publication No. 34, we find condemnation of American incitation of Saudi meddling in Yemen war, and of course, we find no praise at all to the American role in anything. In Publication No. 45, al-Masaary attacked severely the Saudi king, accusing him of kneeling to the USA and submitting to its will while tyrannizing over Saudi citizens. Al-Masaary condemns the USA for its silence regarding arrest waves of supporters of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights inside the KSA, as if the USA was responsible for their protection, as we read in Publication No. 11, Al-Masaary asserts that the USA ignored an imprisoned Saudi supporter who has the American nationality. The condemnation is repeated in Publication No. 15, with assertions that the USA should not work for its interests alone! Yet, another publication in 1994 about arresting Al-Ouda and Al-Hawali asserted that an American high-stature and high-rank delegation visited the Saudi king to urge him to adopt human rights and to set them free, and to apply reforms so as to avoid the fate of the Iranian Shah. Al-Masaary claimed that the king was furious and asserted he knew his country better than anyone. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights showed no praise at all at such American gesture, though it resulted in setting free some men and youths, including Louaï, the son of Dr. Al-Masaary, a fact celebrated by the Committee of Defending Legitimate without thanking the USA, while asserting in Publication No. 29 that such release was not a grant from the KSA done condescendingly, but rather, it was a preparation for introducing reforms on all levels, especially human rights. Al-Masaary never expressed gratitude to the USA for its role in setting such prisoners free!

3- The same applies to the relation between the KSA and Israel; as the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights accused the Saudi princes of supporting and conspiring with Israel against members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate, against all Arab countries, and against the (Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalist MB-linked) Hamas movement in Gaza Strip. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, in Publication No. 12, accused Prince Bandar of being a traitor as he declared in a TV program that Hamas is a terrorist organization. In Publication No. 16, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights accused the KSA of cooperating with Israel to vanquish all Sunnite fundamentalist movements, as arrest waves of the members and supporters of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights commenced while coinciding with the KSA stopping its boycotting Israel. In Publication No. 28, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights accused Israel of infiltrating and controlling Saudi security apparatuses and Saudi airports that quell Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalists, as Saudi rapprochement with Israel coincided with arrest waves as we read in Publication No. 39 in 1995. In another later publication, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights condemned and accused American companies working inside the KSA of being owned and controlled by Jewish Zionists.

4- The Saudi meddling in Yemen war to unite south and north Yemen by supporting Yemeni communists of south Yemen against authority in Sana'a. The Saudi political motive was to avoid border troubles in southern Saudi regions of Aseer, Najran, and Jizan. The KSA feared that Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalism would emerge to threaten its borders, while the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights saw that uniting Yemen serves its purposes as a step toward uniting all Arab and Islamic countries. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights felt that Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalist trend is rising in Sana'a and thought of the Yemen war as between communist infidels and believing Wahabi fundamentalists. Hence it attacked the KSA supporting communists in Yemen and harshly criticized Prince Sultan who controlled the Yemen file (55).

5- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights condemned the KSA for its ever-changing and never-stable external policies, especially regarding Iraq and Iran, as per Publication No. 14 in 1994. Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights forgot two items: 1) the fact that all political relations of any given country change as per interests. Al-Masaary forgot the British motto: "The UK has no steady friends, but it has steady interests", and 2) the fact that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights itself changes its stances as per conditions and circumstances using sharia laws as pretext, while the KSA change its policies as part of political acumen that, as it should be, has nothing to do with religion.

The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights condemned the Saudi internal policies:

Torture:

1- This is the worst accusation leveled at the KSA, and we tend to believe that such a crime indeed takes place as known of all prisons in the Arab, underdeveloped, and ''Islamic'' countries that incarcerate political prisoners; besides, human rights organizations assert that the KSA tortured incarcerated supporters of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. This led the KSA to defend itself at some points, and to ignore the matter altogether at some other points when such accusations are leveled against the Saudi regime.

2- Al-Masaary was tortured in a Saudi prison before his fleeing the KSA to London upon his release, and Liberty Organization issued a statement in London in Aug. 1993 to denounce the fact: (… Liberty got news from the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights that Dr. Al-Masaary is being tortured physically and psychologically for three months in his prison cell … he is being suspended by a rope for hours to be beaten severely, made to suffer sleep deprivation, and forced to solitary confinement in his cell … this means that he is being tortured was for the purpose of extorting a certain confession from him, and since he was arrested in May 1995, he was not allowed to contact a lawyer or a relative …). Another Liberty statement was issue about Dr. Ahmed al-Tuweijri who was arrested in Aug. 1993 and was severely and painfully tortured, and this was affirmed by Amnesty International and Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia magazine (56).

3- Within the writings of Al-Masaary, the fear of being tortured again is evident between the lines as he accused Prince Nayef, the Interior Minister, of inflicting such suffering on prisoners, as we read in Statement No. 39 titled ''How Al-Hudeif Died": (… sources mentioned that the martyr suffered torture as he refused to sign any confessions to please the Saudi security men … they plied his body and tied his head between his thighs and beat him severely with big cudgels … plying his body might have caused paralysis in his lower body as his backbone or neck was about to be broken … sources asserted that the Interior Minister ordered torture to be focused on his upper body that would feel the severe pain, and his head received the beatings until his neck bled and he suffered brain hemorrhage and lost consciousness … fearing to be exposed, the Interior Minster ordered his neck to be cut off and announced hastily that he was put to death for his crimes … ). We personally tend to think that such details are not true; they were authored by Al-Masaary, as he was not an eye-witness and he never told his readers what 'sources' he had contacted. His aim was to expose and scandalize the KSA even by fabrications, and he succeeded in that. No human being can stand such torture for long as described by Al-Masaary.

4- Al-Masaary went on fabricating unbelievable narratives about types of torture suffered by prisoners in Jeddah prison and in other cities.

5- But we believe that he was right about his assertion about the fact that torture was never applied to incarcerated high-rank scholars and those descended from wealthy families who supported the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

6- Al-Masaary did not confine his exposing torture to his writings; he held a conference in London about torture and its victims in collaboration with Readers Organization, and he authored a chapter inside his book titled "Judging Rulers" to prove that torture is against sharia laws (57).

Confiscation of financial dues:

1- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights denounced and condemns many instances of the Saudi regime adamant refusal to give financial dues to employees and workers in many companies and in the army, retired people, contractors, subcontractors, as well as students. Some complained in writing to Al-Masaary to embarrass the Saudi regime and to offer to provide information in return for help to get their financial dues. At one point, the Saudi government was running debts; it had to pay 850 million SR to just one company. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights asserted that debts of the private sector to the Saudi government reached the sum of 20 billion SR, and this caused the confiscation of financial dues for a while as there was no cash to pay salaries in many public sectors, especially hospitals.

2- Foreign workers in the KSA suffered greatly from the above-mentioned conditions, as they were deprived for a long time from their low wages and measly stipends as they worked in cleaning and other similar menial jobs. Sometimes, some of them organized few demonstrations and went on strikes in Riyadh, Hael, Al-Ahsa, and Mecca. They were forced to resume their work and end every single strike, as we read about workers in King Khaled International Airport in Riyadh. In some cases, strikes turned into vandalism and acts of violence in Jeddah, Ta'if, and other cities. In few cases, some workers were deported to their countries without receiving their financial dues. In one case, a governor of a village forced a foreign worker to sign papers asserting that he had received his financial dues before his deportation, which was not true, and this worker revenged himself by stabbing this governor with a knife.

Injustices done to foreign employees and workers:

1- Since it has become a recurrent phenomenon that foreign employees and workers lost their financial dues and suffered various injustices, human rights organizations had to write reports about it (58), as we read in the report of the USA Foreign Office report published in 1991 about human rights in the KSA. This report stressed the fact that foreign employees and workers suffered inequality and many injustices when compared to their Saudi counterparts, especially because of the enslavement-like sponsorship system (i.e., Al-Kafil).

2- The Committee of defending Legitimate Rights exposed and scandalized the KSA about the issue of injustices and crimes suffered by foreign employees and workers inside the Saudi State: (…The Committee of defending Legitimate Rights condemns and denounces the racism and xenophobia practiced by the Saudi regime against foreign employees and workers by leveling accusations against them without proofs and making them suffer within despicable working conditions and low wages, while receiving very bad treatment like slaves that made them lose their dignity, and the regime would confiscate their financial dues to boot …). In Publication No 24 in 1994, the Committee of defending Legitimate Rights denounced deportation of foreign employees and workers after arresting them without trial and without investigation, while they stay legally inside the KSA, and they were deported without receiving their financial dues (59).

3- We tend to believe that the Committee of defending Legitimate Rights provided true and authentic information and news about this topic as sources were provided to verify them. Indeed, most Arab workers and employees who resided for a while in the KSA bear witness to countless similar episodes of tyranny and injustice suffered by foreign employees and workers. This is inexcusable, as the KSA grew filthily rich from oil revenues; how come they deprive deported or staying foreign employees and workers from their financial dues, amidst news of affluence, extravagance, and luxuries enjoyed by the Saudi princes?!

The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights condemned the deteriorated security level in the KSA:

Introduction:

Philosophy of tyranny is usually based on torturing opposition figures as well as weak, silent ones to impose the awe of rulers or the State of oriental Arab rulers who think they own lands and souls of people. West democracies make the nation as the source of authorities, as in the case of the American administration and institutions whose members are elected, questioned, and can be renounced by the people. The USA employees in public service, including any American president, aim to serve the people and receive salaries from tax payers. Such presidents are to be in service of people not to rule over them, and they cannot be harsh with them or else would lose his job. This reminds us with "It is by of grace from God that you were gentle with them. Had you been harsh, hardhearted, they would have dispersed from around you…" (3:159). American presidents eat and go to markets; this reminds us with "And they say, "What sort of messenger is this, who eats food, and walks in the marketplaces?" (25:7). Such Quranic phrases we use to explain how West democracies are not 'infidel'; rather, they are nearer to Islamic Quranic sharia. Yet, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights agrees with the Wahabi monarchies in declaring West countries as 'heretic' and their notion of democracy as 'apostasy' and against Salafist sharia of the Middle-Ages caliphates. Hence, according to such thought, creeds of tyrannies of Arab regimes are based. Security, services, facilities, wealth, power, and lands are for Arab rulers and not for people who must accept the very little granted condescendingly to them by such rulers who must be praised by the subjects all day long and all night long. Such is the cultural of tyrannical rule adopted by the Saudi kings and princes and advocated by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights that seeks to reach power in Arabia to restore an Ottoman-like Middle-Ages caliphate in the 21^st century! That is why the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights condemns and denounces torture, deteriorated services and security, as well as confiscation of financial dues without mentioning that the roots of such injustices is Wahabism and its tyranny philosophy. Thus, Al-Masaary believes that tyrants can do whatever they like, despite the fact that he and many members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights live in London and enjoy West tolerance, freedoms, and democracy, but the hate to see such concepts applied in Arabia! Let us tackle the deteriorated security level in the KSA denounced by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to slander the Saudi regime and tarnish the reputation of the KSA.

Deteriorated security level:

1- In Publication No. 7 in 1997, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights asserted that it received messages and letters to confirm the deteriorated security level in the KSA: thefts, robberies, rapes, kidnapping of male and female children and teenagers, massacres in villages, and stolen cars in main cities especially the capital. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights superficially claimed that the causes of such deteriorated security level were the spread of poverty and that the Saudi government spreads corruption and immorality on purpose, while it occupies itself with political security and neglects general internal security. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights urged the citizens to learn self-defense. In Publication No. 11 in 1995, Al-Masaary mentioned that in one week in Al-Qassim region, tens of houses were robbed and several cases of rape, kidnapping, and murder occurred. In Publication No. 19, we read about a university teacher robbed and beaten severely in broad daylight. In Publication No. 20, we read about several robberies in airports. In Publication No. 21, we read about numerous cases of smuggling arms, weapons, and drugs, while cases of rape and murder have increased, crimes involving security men and policemen. In Publications Nos. 26 and 28, we read about women and young girls being kidnapped in Yathreb, Brida, and Jeddah. In Publication No. 29, we read about a crime every five minute in Jeddah: rape, kidnapping, murder, and robbery. In Publication No. 30, we read a sarcastic article about Al-Ahsa with rate crimes more than LA in the USA! In Publication No. 32, we read about crimes committed by policemen and about increasing crime rates in Mecca and Yathreb, including massacres! In Publication No. 35 in 1995, we read about Al-Saud royal family caring only for security of their own members and that of their cronies while ignoring general security in all villages and cities. Thefts reached to mosques, electricity cables, and the treasury of Interior Ministry. In Publication No. 36, we read about statistics crimes of one night in Riyadh: 31 stolen cars, 3 car accidents, 5 house robberies, 3 cases of stabbing, and 6 cases of shootings. In Publication No. 41, we read about 1200 cars stolen in Jeddah and Mecca during Ramadan. In Publication No. 42, we read about an attempt to kidnap female teachers in a school-bus in Ta'if and about robberies committed by gangs in Mecca and Ta'if. Further details are mentioned about drug dealers, pimps, and smugglers of arms and weapons working for Saudi princes, crimes involving corrupt policemen, and an incident of kidnapping young girls in Al-Qassim and asking for ransoms. Of course, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights blamed the Saudi State of all this as it busied itself with arresting fundamentalists (60).

2- We feel bound to mention that such deterioration of security level is nothing in comparison to the state of affairs and daily life in Arabia before King Abdul-Aziz had united the regions under the name of the KSA. Bedouins lived off looting, raping, stealing, robberies, and raids as daily lifestyle, not deemed a crime or a source of disgrace. The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights never gave Abdul-Aziz the credit for establishing security, even if security levels were lower later on, if we are to believe all that was written by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights about the KSA in the 1990s.

3- If members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights were secular, they would have sarcastically asked about the application of Salafist Wahabi sharia. Why thieves did not have their hands cut off? Why the committee of the promotion of vice and the prevention of vice could not stop such crimes instead of meddling in the personal life and freedoms of Saudi citizens?! Thus, the KSA ignored the real Islamic sharia of preserving lives, possessions, and honor of people and providing them with security.

The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights condemned the deteriorated level of services:

1- Introduction for which we do not offer any apologies: It is funny to expect a tyrant who thinks he owns the lands and people on it to serve citizens deemed by him as cattle to be manipulated for his benefit. This is the mentality of the oriental tyrants, and hence, all services and facilities levels must be deteriorated. We remember that in one of our articles in the 1990s in Cairo, we have urged Egyptian citizens to leave the narrow Nile valley in Lower and Upper Egypt to live in Egyptian regions with scarce population like the North Coast of the Mediterranean Sea and the West Coast of the Red Sea. Arab conquerors made Egyptians leave the fertile green north coast cultivated by romans; Abbasid rulers left such areas to deteriorate in Egypt by many loot-seekers who no longer can serve Abbasid armies that were relying on Persians and Turks. President Mubarak paved and built cities for the affluent ones in Sinai coasts, while Cairene slums and poor villages lack rudimentary facilities. The same goes for the oil-rich KSA; the royal family members live in luxury, affluence, and extravagance, and could not spend much for facilities, while bathrooms of gold were built in Saudi royal family members' palaces. This reminds us of this Quranic verse about unjust towns: "How many a town have We destroyed while it was doing wrong? They lie in ruins; with stilled wells, and lofty mansions." (22:46). The signs of destroying towns or societies include the existence of a minority that monopolizes wealth and authority and live in spacious palaces, while the vast majority is oppressed with no facilities or decent living. Such societies will revolt against injustice one day and engage into destructive civil wars or would wait for destruction coming from outside, as the case in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The following verse seems to address now Al-Saud royal family and all corrupt tyrannical Arab regimes: "Have they not journeyed in the land, and had minds to reason with, or ears to listen with? It is not the eyes that go blind, but it is the hearts, within the chests, that go blind." (22:47). We detail below how The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights condemned the deterioration of facilities, health care services, and education, as per its publications, as accusations leveled against the Saudi government.

Health care services:

In Publication No. 18 in 1994, we read about economic recess and depression forced the Saudi Ministry of Health had to refer 25% of patients from public hospitals to private ones. In Publication No. 20, we read about a letter sent to the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights by a mother who suffered carelessness and reduced services in public hospitals. In Publication No. 21, we read about a preacher in Yathreb sermonizing about the bad healthcare in hospitals of the city, as the Ministry of health could not spend money on them in 1993 and 1994. In Publication No. 30, we read about how the Saudi State neglects hospitals as it busied itself with fighting and arresting fundamentalists and providing the citizens with football matches, and how prices of medicaments increased and hospitals could no longer perform their duties for lack of finances, tools, apparatuses, and lack of efficient medical personnel, as unsterilized tools transmitted infections from one patient to another. In Publication No. 40, we read about a hospital in Brida that collapsed, killing 42 persons under the rubble, and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights accused the Saudi State of betrayal and negligence. In Publication No. 44, we read about the case of several deaths of born babies inside hospitals in many regions, plus the negligence leading to more deaths of patients inside a hospital in Al-Qassim.

Deterioration of education:

In Publication No. 5 in 1994, we read about how King Fahd Stadium maintenance reached the total sum of 100 million SR, while the budget of maintenance of all Saudi schools reached the total sum of 95 million SR. In Publication No. 10, we read about reducing numbers of accepted students into schools and into universities; one faculty that used to accept 1000 students reduced the number to 220 students. In Publication No. 18, we read about stopping of the process of building new schools and classrooms in many regions, while more schools were demolished. In Publication No. 23, we read about details of how education deteriorated as the Ministry of education failed to build or to rent new buildings in 1993 and 1994 and failed to pay rents of buildings used as public schools, about 80% of total number of public schools, and that many Arab non-Saudi teachers were deported and fired without replacements, and in many cases, school textbooks were not available. In other schools, air-conditioners broke down and electricity cut-out increased, and no one had the means to provide maintenance for lack of budget-money. In other schools, no chairs or desks were available and students sat on the floor.

Deterioration of electricity:

The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights noticed since Publication No. 3 that Saudi media frequently notified citizens about stopping in water supply and electricity and urged them to lower their use and consumption of electricity. Ministry of Industry closed down many factories to reduce electrify consumption, saying that turbines of electricity could not work unless within 60% of their capacity because of lack of maintenance; the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights commented that this was a disgrace in an oil-rich country. In Publication No. 9 in 1994, we read that one-third of Riyadh dwellers living in blackouts for a whole month as the maintenance works were not done before. In Publication No. 19, we read that no new buildings were provided with electricity as turbines of electricity could not provide and cover that increased number of buildings. Many dwellers of several cities sent written complaints to the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights about frequent blackouts, and such complaints were published in Publication No. 43.

Deterioration of other services:

In Publication No. 13, we read about Abha Region Water Company that closed down because it did not receive its financial dues from the Saudi government for three years. In Publication No. 44, we read about Jeddah streets flooded with sewerage water as the sewerage system collapsed. In Publication No. 32, we read about complaints of many villages about bumpy unclean routes that lacked rest-houses and gas stations, whereas the farm owned by Prince Sultan had a route built specially for it in Al-Qassim. In Publications Nos. 9 and 33, we read about unclean city roads, even in Mecca, with accumulated mountains of garbage as there was no budget to hire workers to collect them.

1- Other publications tackled how the Saudi government tried to gain more money to cover State budget deficits: by increasing taxes, car fines, bills of water and electricity, houses rents, obligatory donations, increased prices of goods, annulling subsidies, and merging schools. It was a familiar scene to see a poor man begging for money at gates of mosques carrying an electricity bill (61), and this led to car accidents, pollution of environment, and increased corruption rates (62).

2- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights blamed the economic deterioration on the Saudi royal family members that live luxuriously in affluence and extravagance by stealing public money (63), and Al-Masaary analyzed all aspects of such deterioration and corruption.

The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights condemned the manners and behaviors of the Saudi royal family members:

Introduction:

Some reduced performance might emerge in any of the economy and the services of a given country for a while, but the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights linked deterioration of all aspects in the KSA due to lack of budgets to the extravagance of the royal family members who specify for themselves countless sums from oil-revenues and public money via financial corruption. Al-Masaary used this argument to call for his right to apply Hisbah on the KSA rulers – a demand understandable within the Wahabi sharia of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights whose members could not accept Hisbah being applied to them – as the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights placed itself as the sole representative of sharia laws in a way we have explained above. This extremist view of Hisbah is a reaction to the fact that the Saudi royal family members felt they own the land and its wealth without citizens having the right to question them. Such is the Salafist views about rule that prevent the KSA to live as European monarchies where democracy, transparency, and human rights are applied, drawing them nearer to the Islamic notion of justice in the Quran. Let us tackle below the accusations leveled by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights against the Saudi royal family members, who never refuted such accusations, as part of the condemnation of Al-Masaary toward the KSA and his call to topple its regime.

Money specified for the Saudi royal family members:

1- In Publication No. 3, we read that money specified annually for the Saudi royal family members reaches several billions SR, and the Ministry of Finance could not provide it unless by running debts. Each of the princes/sons of King Abdul-Aziz receives annually at least 100 million SR, while other relatives of the Saudi royal family receive one million SR.

2- In Publication No. 14, we read that once prince threatened the king to commit suicide if his annual allowance is not increased just as prince so-and-so, and Al-Masaary writes in that publication that the king ordered a sum for him that would have been enough to provide a large village with water supply and electricity.

3- In Publication No. 38, we read that the regime urges the citizens to lower consumption of almost everything, whereas the Saudi royal family members spend extravagantly to maintain their luxurious lifestyle without anyone daring to ask them to lower their expenditures, though they consume more than 7 billion $ annually, without having to pay for fees/bills of electricity, water, phones, etc.

Extravagance in expenditures of the Saudi royal family members:

1- In contrast to deteriorated level of facilities and services provided to suffering citizens all over the KSA, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights enumerates episodes of extravagance of the Saudi royal family members: such as building the spacious palace and farm of Prince Mashaal whose space is larger than that of the monarchy of Bahrain, as we read in Publication No. 24.

2- In the same Publication No. 24, we read details about possessions of Prince Khaled Ibn Sultan in the KSA, Egypt, and the USA, and about costs of his bodyguards.

3- A spacious, luxurious palace was built for King Fahd with the total costs of 40 billion SR, apart from other palaces built specially for the king in different places by the Bin Laden Company.

4- King Fahd granted Prince Abdul-Majeed, via royal decree, a piece of land whose space is 1 million square kilometers.

5- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights estimated that annual costs of maintenance works inside the royal-family palaces built in the USA are 2.5 billion $.

6- Electricity bills – unpaid of course – of just one palace of the several palaces of Prince Nayef in Jeddah was the total sum of 8 million SR, and Al-Masaary wondered about the electricity bills of his other palaces.

7- Prince Abdul-Aziz Ibn Fahd, the son of King Fahd, had a palace built for him in Riyadh in 1416 A.H. that cost more than 1 billion SR, and via royal decree, the palace was provided with every luxury that money could buy, including 80 phone lines for international and local calls.

8- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights detailed the costs of the three-month journey of Prince Abdul-Aziz Ibn Fahd to Spain, France, and the USA, with a retinue of 100 persons, and each person received a weekly allowance of 5000 $.

9- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights detailed the costs of the journey of Prince Sultan to Morocco for hunting and fishing, along with other princes and relatives, as each day expenditures reached the total sum of 5 million SR, and Al-Masaary mentioned that Prince Sultan dismissed and fired 90 employees from their posts so that there would be a budget enough to redecorate his private plan, with costs reaching tens of million SR within two-month works.

10- The Committee of Defending the Legitimate Rights detailed extravagance of the Saudi royal family members in holding conferences and sports events (64).

The Committee of Defending the Legitimate Rights accused Saudi princes of smuggling money abroad:

1- When King Fahd was admitted into the ICU in a big hospital, the Committee of Defending the Legitimate Rights accused Saudi princes of smuggling countless sums of money abroad in Sept. 1995. Surprisingly, many Saudi citizens smuggled large sums of money abroad. The Saudi State raised interest rates to be 14.5% for internal loans.

2- In Publication No. 32 in 1995, we read that the International Money Transferals Center in Geneva asserted that countless sums of money were smuggled out of the KSA in just two months. Experts in the investment markets in both the USA and Europe asserted that Saudi princes are looking for chances to invest their money abroad. Strangely, the Saudi State issued a law to prevent the transferal of more than 50.000 SR at a time outside the KSA. Yet, the Saudi princes as usual managed to find ways to smuggle their money. We find that this piece of news provide by the Committee of Defending the Legitimate Rights is contradictory; how come the KSA wanted to stop transferals of money outside and allow the Saudi royal princes to smuggle their money?!

3- In Publication No. 39 in 1995, we read that the money transferals abroad made by the Saudi royal family members reached the total sum of 9.5 billion $, and this indicated that the Saudi princes intend to flee when the time comes when any economic collapse would occur to ruin everything in the KSA. Understandingly, the KSA made the terrible mistake of imposing high fees on pilgrims entering Hejaz.

Confiscation and appropriation of lands:

A) This crime is related to the Wahabi political creed of the Saudi royal family members that think that they own the lands conquered by the sword by King Abdul-Aziz. Lands in Arabia have come to have very great value in comparison to the times of King Abdul-Aziz; as modernization led to building more lands within urban planning and providing facilities, making investments in land very lucrative for persons in power, especially the royal family members and their cronies, regardless of the lands' original owners among Saudi citizens or tribes. Hence, the Committee of Defending the Legitimate Rights spoke about confiscation and appropriation of lands.

B) We mention briefly some details below from writings of the Committee of Defending the Legitimate Rights.

1- Al-Masaary asserted that high-rank officials of the royal diwan appropriated areas and pieces of lands around the Sacred Kaaba Mosque in Mecca, with each piece worth 40 million SR.

2- Al-Masaary asserted that Prince Turki Ibn Fahd, King Fahd's son, appropriated a vast stretch of land south of Brida city that used to be owned by its rightful owners who had legal contracts to prove their rights.

3- In the same way, Prince Feisal Ibn Bandar confiscated a vast stretch of land in northern KSA, along with one of his brothers.

4- Prince Sultan Ibn Fahd confiscated a vast stretch of land whose space reached 12 million square kilometer south of Brida, and its rightful owners had legal contracts to prove their ownership of it.

5- Within royal decrees, all buildings on the highway Al-Qassim–Riyadh were demolished within 40 kilometers; as such location was appropriated by the king himself, while Prince Sultan confiscated another space of 40 square kilometers within the same area.

6- Al-Huda region dwellers sent a written complaint to the Committee of Defending the Legitimate Rights as all their lands were appropriated despite their having legal contracts of ownership, and Al-Masaary asked them to send a copy of them and the file of the case to draw the attention of international media to help them.

7- Al-Masaary said that Prince Saud Ibn Abdul-Mohsen appropriated a piece of land that was the location of a foreign company.

8- Prince Sultan warned people of Hael that he wanted to have a piece of land to build a military base, but after confiscating it, he distributed it among his sons and daughters and cronies. Hence, the Committee of Defending the Legitimate Rights asserted that the princes occupied all lands in a sort of occupation and conquest against the will of citizens.

9- The Committee of Defending the Legitimate Rights focused on Prince Muhammad Ibn Fahd as he appropriated to himself a public park despite the protest of citizens in the area.

10- Prince Abdul-Aziz Ibn Fahd confiscated a stretch of land near Kuwait.

11- Prince Sultan confiscated to himself a vast stretch of land outside Mecca.

12- Princess Hessa Al-Faisal confiscated a piece of land southern in Ta'if.

13-- Al-Huda region dwellers sent a second written complaint to the Committee of Defending the Legitimate Rights about their problem as Saudi princes prevented them from building anything there.

14- Prince Sultan appropriated the largest gas station in the route between Jeddah and Yathreb.

15- Prince Sultan appropriated a vast stretch of land with a space of 23 million square kilometers in a Shiite-populated area in Ta'if.

16- Prince Feisal Ibn Turki confiscated a large garden in Ta'if.

17- Prince Feisal Ibn Turki confiscated a stretch of land in northern Brida.

18- Al-Masaary protested against the confiscation of beautiful areas near tribal locations on the Res Sea coast by the Saudi royal family

19- Prince Ahmed Ibn Abdul-Aziz appropriated a large garden near a market in Ta'if.

20- Another prince appropriated a piece of land, 100.000 square meters in Yathreb, which was prepared for a project related to social solidarity and insurance.

21- Prince Sultan confiscated many large pieces of lands in Al-Ahsa region, which include streets, water canals, and farms, to annex them to his farm, named Sultana, and villagers there felt extremely worried that Prince Sultan might covet their lands one day.

22- Prince Sultan Ibn Nasser Ibn Abdul-Aziz appropriated a vast stretch of land in Mecca and demolished buildings in it.

23- Prince Feisal Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud appropriated a public park that the KSA spent 10 million SR to make it for the dwellers of the region of Al-Baha.

24- Prince Abdul-Aziz Ibn Fahd appropriated a piece of land that cost 55 million SR in Yathreb.

C) Confiscation of lands had some side effects as we write below.

1- Rich tribesmen of Al-Qahtan tribe made a sit-in in a mosque to protest the appropriation of their lands

2- The agent of Prince Al-Waleed Ibn Abdul-Mohsen was shot by a landowner who was reluctant to give up his land to the prince.

3- People of Al-Qassim region protested when the king granted their lands to Prince Youssef Ibn Saeed, and the response they received was that their legal contracts of ownership are without value as all the land of the KSA is owned by the Saudi royal family, and this means that such contracts signify temporary ownership, as the princes can re-gain such lands anytime they wish! Of course, such a response asserts the Middle-Ages caliphs' notion of owning the lands and people on them.

Of course, there were countless other examples mentioned by Al-Masaary in his writings to denounce and condemn the Saudi royal family, to the extent that some supporters of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights told Al-Masaary in their letters that they grew sick of stories about confiscation of lands and money and they had enough of them (65).

D) Yet, an important aspect was overlooked by Al-Masaary about appropriation of lands; some stretches of lands were owned by no one in the first place and some dwellers or Bedouins lay their hands on it illegally and then wrote down contracts. When such lands acquired more value when buildings and facilities were established in them in several projects, princes thought they must appropriate them to themselves. We write this here as Al-Masaary did not write about such a possibility because of his prejudice and because the royal family members did not respond to such accusations. We do not defend the Saudi royal family members of course, but we assert the point to verify objectivity as much as possible.

Monopolizing areas and trades by the Saudi royal family members:

The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights accused the princes of turning public parks and lands into private property by illegal appropriation as we have written above, and it accused them of monopolizing trades and areas by confiscation and never allowing others in them or in such trade activities.

1- A message sent to Al-Masaary by protesters against the Saudi government mentioned that the Saudi authorities prohibited fishing for 9 months and allowed it for 3 months only, in order to make room for ships owned by princes' companies the chance to get bigger cargoes of fish and make the biggest profit.

2- Al-Masaary mentions that Prince Saud Ibn Nayef monopolizes DHL Company for shipping and deliveries to serve his own companies and business, and most other international companies failed to break into such monopoly for ten years, to the extent that FedEx Company submitted a complain to the USA government, which phone-called King Fahd to seek a solution. King Fahd allowed FedEx to work inside the KSA undercover to serve businesses owned only by Prince Saud Ibn Nayef.

3- Prince Muhammad Ibn Fahd monopolized a cellular phone company that made subscribers pay 10.000 SR and wait for their turn to get this service, and thus, he prevented Saudi citizens from gaining benefit and reductions that would have happened if other competitors were allowed in the KSA.

4- Prince Sultan made a restricted zone for himself on a vast stretch of land and allowed no citizen to enter it to hunt animals. One of the prince's guards shot a citizen to his death when he trespassed this zone as a poacher, and at one point, the guards arrested some other citizens who entered this zone by mistake.

5- Prince Nayef made a restricted zone for himself on a vast stretch of land in northern Al-Qassim region (66).

Commissions received by the Saudi royal family members:

The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights focused on accusations leveled against the Saudi royal family and their cronies who received commissions from the KSA deals with other countries, especially to but arms and weapons. We briefly mention some examples of such accusations below.

1- When news spread in London that Mark, the son of the Prime Minister Margret Thatcher, received a commission of 12 million Sterling within a project in Al-Baha region in the KSA, Al-Masaary said that this is legal despite the fact that Mark made use of his mother's position, and he asked: (… We wonder how much money the other Saudi side had received as a commission … How much Sultan had received in return for such a project? Military deals usually bring 45% commission distributed among the Saudi princes and their retinue and cronies … if Al-Baha project costs reached 70 billion Sterling, we can conclude then that the commission reached the total sum of 30 billion Sterling, and Sultan would not take farthing less than 10 billion Sterling …).

2- Al-Masaary asserted that all profits of all projects of the Ministry of Defense are divided between Prince Sultan and Prince Abdul-Rahman and his sons.

3- Under the title "The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights Exposes the Biggest Scandal", Al-Masaary mentioned that he had a report prepared by a West country apparatus, asserting that the net profits of the king and princes Sultan, Khaled, and Bandar during the Gulf War reached 25 billion $.

4- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights accused Prince Sultan, the Defense Minister, that he made use of his position to steal large sums of money, as he claimed that he spent hundreds of billions $ on the Saudi army, but what we see on the ground costs less that 5% of such sums, while Sultan received endless commissions from the West.

5- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights mentioned that the sum of about half a billion SR was wasted to build one electricity station and one of those who built it stole 1.5 billion SR as commissions from France and Sweden.

6- Commissions are linked to corruption of course, as bribes and commissions were incessantly offered to princes to allow certain foreign companies to undertake certain missions or works inside the KSA.

7- Many pieces of news mentioned by the publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights were mentioned in Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia under the following titles "The KSA Takes Loans to Pay Commissions of .5 Billion $ Received by Defense Minister and his Sons" (67).

Misuse of power and manipulation of authority:

1- When the Saudi State in some cases confiscated the financial dues of many persons, some other trade was established based on such corruption and injustice, as some princes opened offices to buy debts of contractors due to the government within prices between 20% to 40% and to use their power and authority to gain more money, and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights traced news of such offices in all its publications.

2- Misuse of power and manipulation of authority included princes buying lands with prices much less than the real value of such lands and selling their lands for prices much more than their real value. In many instances, the king would grant lands to Prince Sultan and the Saudi government would buy such lands from him in return for more than 5 billion $ to build projects of petrochemicals. In many cases, the Saudi nationality was granted to non-Saudis in return for high exorbitant prices (68).

Accusations of committing crimes leveled at some Saudi princes:

The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights wrote accusations without proofs or evidence leveled against some princes who are allegedly involved in drug dealing and weapons and arms trade as well as facilitating prostitution. Some other princes were accused of ordering the severe beatings or the murder of certain persons for no reason, and the criminals would not be punished of course (69). Having presented some of the accusations leveled against the KSA and Saudi rulers by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights that condemned and denounced the KSA and wanted to topple its regime and replace it by Al-Masaary as ruler, in the next chapter, we offer a critical reading of the views expressed by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in its writings as we personally denounce and condemn its Al-Masaary sharia that contradicts the Quranic sharia of Islam.

CHAPTER IV: An Additional Chapter: A Critical Reading of the Fundamentalist Salafist Committee of De

CHAPTER IV: An Additional Chapter: A Critical Reading of the Fundamentalist Salafist Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights

Introduction:

This chapter includes critical reading and analysis covering three aspects: 1) the notion of befriending ''believers'' and disowning ''disbelievers'' in the West as a step in the route to establish an ''Islamic'' Caliphate or Empire to face and fight the West, 2) Al-Masaary sharia regarding human rights, women, Shiites, freedom, media, and banks interests, and 3) a general evaluation, within psycho-sociologist viewpoint, of the Salafist / Wahabi thought of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

First Aspect: refutation and criticism of the notion of befriending ''believers'' and disowning ''disbelievers'' in the West as a step in the route to establish an ''Islamic'' unified Empire to face and fight the West:

The Quranic refutation of the Wahabi/ Salafist notion of dividing the world into two camps

Firstly:

1- The notion of ''to disown and to befriend'' in the above-mentioned lines refers to the Shiite creed notion that started at first as the creed to befriend, love, adore, and ally oneself to Ali Ibn Abou Talib, the supreme Shiite mortal deity and the son of the paternal uncle of Prophet Muhammad, and to disown and hate other enemies of Ali: Aisha, Abou Bakr, Omar, Othman, Talha, Al-Zubayr, Amr, Mu'aweiya, etc.

2- Al-Masaary and his fellows adopted this Shiite notion and adapted it to their views about the West; they revived the Middle-Ages culture that dominated in caliphates; i.e., the world is divided into two camps: the Muslims/peace camp and the infidels/war camp. Religious wars between Sunnites and crusaders and/or Europeans went on within borders of the caliphate/empire for centuries at different time points, and Christian minorities in the 'Muslims' camp paid a heavy price for it by being persecuted. Each camp consider the other camp as unbelievers: Europeans deemed Muslims and Arabs as Saracens and Muslims deemed Europeans as polytheists or infidels. This was wrong; as each camp claimed it owned the absolute truth and confiscated Paradise before God's judgment in the Day of Resurrection.

3- Mostly, the West countries got rid of such backward culture once they embraced secularism and the global village asserts the value of the human being and human rights, making no room for tyrannical rulers. Thus, Al-Masaary call to unify all Muslims into one empire under Salafist Wahabism (or any other creed for that matter) to wage war on the rest of the world in endless conflict does not fit into the 21^st century, and it has nothing to do with Islam as there is no such notion as religious war in Islam; God has sent Muhammad as a mercy to the humankind, not to massacre the humankind or to wage wars on them.

Secondly:

Before we discuss views of Al-Masaary and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, let us briefly demonstrate below our Quranist outlook to this topic.

1- Wars in Islam are temporary, self-defense ones and never waged for the sake of aggression; self-defense wars end as soon as aggressors would stop their aggressions; see 2:191-194, 8:38-39, and 9:36.

2- The main aim of self-defense wars in Islam is to impose the principle of religious freedom and to prevent compulsion in religion and religious persecution (i.e. fitna in Quranic terms); see 2:193, 2:217, and 8:39. Polytheists have this bad habit to coerce others to embrace the dominant religion or creed, and this is denounced and rejected by Islam; see 2:256 and 10:99. As religious freedom in Islam is absolute; God created people free to believe or not to believe, and He will judge and reward or punish them in the Hereafter; see 18:29, 17:107, 41:40, and 39:7. And that is why religion is faithfully and wholly God's concern and His matter (not any mortal's) to judge humans in the Day of Judgment; see 39:46.

3- Those who coerce and force people in religious matters and persecute others for religious reasons must be stopped or fought as per Quranic teachings, and their aggressions must be stopped even by fighting to stop such persecution; see 8:39 and 3:193. If their aggressions would stop, self-defense war must cease immediately and God might forgive aggressors if they repent, stop their sins, and make amends; see 8:38-40. Hence, Quranic verses about fighting was for self-defense against persecution and fighting and aggressions against them by Qorayish tribe polytheists who drove the early believers out of Mecca and fought them near Yathreb, their new homeland, and God aimed to preserve houses of worship of Jews and Christians there in Yathreb as well; see 22:39-40.

4- Islam in terms of overt behavior means literally peaceful demeanor in dealing with all people in general (Muslims and non-Muslims alike), and even in battlefields, when an aggressor/ fighter would utter the word of peace and would seek to be saved, his safety must be preserved by Muslims; see 4:94 and 9:6. Islam in terms of heart and belief means literally submission to God alone, and not to mortals, in matters of religion in the Quran; see 6:161-163.

5- All celestial messages from God came with Islam: literally, this means peace with human beings and submission to God alone without associates, deities, and partners; each prophet/messenger talked in the tongue of his people while conveying the message of Islam; see 14:4. All prophets/messengers mentioned in the Quran uttered and conveyed the message of Islam in different tongues to different peoples in various eras and localities; see 2:128-136, 3:52, 3:76, 3:84-85, 12:101, 10:72, 10:84, 10:90, 27:30-31, and 27:44, to quote but a few verses. Hence, Islam is the religion of God in many eras and tongues; but what happened (and still happens) is that people go astray, distancing themselves from the Truth and they fall into disputes, conflicts, and differences concerning religion, thus forsaking and neglecting the true religion conveyed by the messenger or prophet sent to them; see 3:19. Hence, prophets have been sent later on to correct faith tents distorted by people in past eras, and the last divine celestial message is the Quran, in Arabic, preserved by God until the Day of Resurrection, asserting the previous celestial messages and teachings. Yet, the same occurrence has repeated itself: people go astray, distancing themselves from the Truth and fall into disputes, conflicts, and differences concerning religion, thus forsaking and neglecting the true religion, because devils of Satan did not tender their resignation; their mission to tempt human beings will go on until the End of Days. This is one reason, among so many, of why ''Muslims'' whom we call the Muhammadans in all their doctrines, creeds, and sub-creeds repeat notions and words of their ancient ancestors, and those of polytheists mentioned in the Quranic stories, and lose faith of true Islam, found exclusively in the Quran alone. God will never accept any faith except Islam in the Last Day in the Hereafter; see 3:85.

6-Hence, Islam is a universal religion for all humanity, calling them to peace in dealing with one another and to devote their hearts to God in submission to Him, to worship him alone with no other deities, without adoring and worshipping things, locations, or mortals (prophets, messengers, sheikhs, scholars, the so-called saints, etc.)

7- Those who deal peacefully with others are deemed Muslims in terms of behavior, regardless of their faith and creeds, as one's faith will be judged alone by God in the Day of Resurrection, as the Quran repeats many times that God is the Sole Omniscient Judge concerning religious differences of human beings; see for instance 39:46. Thus, God deputized no mortals to judge others on religious matters in this life; people are free in their religious choices, beliefs, practices etc. without supervision and persecution and their duty is to live on earth in peace. No mortal can be our judge in such matters, as he/she will be judged like all of us in the Hereafter, to be rewarded or punished for eternity; see 22:19-24. Omniscient God did not allow Muhammad to know fates of others in the Hereafter; see 3:128-129. This is about Islam in terms of faith and heart, judged solely by god alone in the Hereafter, as for behavioral peace (i.e., Islam in terms of demeanor), countries must make/apply laws to ensure human rights, dignity, security, peace, justice, etc. in this life. People must abide by such laws, both secular and the ones derived from Quranic teachings.

8- Those who adopt peaceful behavior toward others are Muslims in terms of demeanor (even if they have any other faith or even atheism). Others who combine Islam in terms of peaceful behavior and in terms of heart-faith and beliefs in obeying God and worship Him alone in submission and devotion, as per the Quranic teachings, deserve to enter the House of Peace: Paradise of the Hereafter; see 6:127, and peace is the word uttered to them by angels; see 15:46, and uttered to them by God; see 36:58.

9- The meaning of ''belief'' is synonymous with ''Islam'' (i.e., peace with others and submission to God)in Quranic terms; as the word ''belief'' and the verb ''believe'' in both Quranic terms and the Arabic tongue mean literally "security, safety, and peace". To ''believe in'' in Quranic terms is associated only with God without other partners; see 2:285 and 9:61, while to ''believe with'' in Quranic terms means to trust humans based on security and safety; see 3:73. Hence, Prophet Muhammad believed in God alone, he and believed with believers i.e. he trusted them and felt secure with them.

10- Hence, those who achieve ''belief'' and ''Islam'' means that they trust people and be trusted by them as safe secure ones who do not commit violence or aggressions, and this makes them believers regardless of their faith, or lack of it, as faiths will be judged alone by God in the Last Day. The best ones are those who combine behavior of trust and peace (and never do injustices to others or commit aggressive acts against them) with devotion and submission to God alone while never doing injustice to God by worshipping things, mortals, or beings beside Him; see 6:82, and such ones will enjoy eternal peace and safety in Paradise; see 15:46. They will never have fear during the Day of Resurrection: see 21:103 and 27:89.

11- Accordingly, polytheism and disbelief in terms of behavior toward others mean committing aggression, doing acts of violence, and performing injustices against them. Polytheism and unbelief in relation to God mean to have other deity or deified person or thing to worship beside God. In the Quranic text, we find repetitions of describing polytheists as unjust people who commit crimes, violence, aggressions, and injustices to others and to God's religion and sharia in the Quran, as God's law means to preserve human rights in this life; that is why punishments in the Quran are for aggressions against people and possessions, while violating God's rights will be punished only in the Hereafter by the Omniscient Almighty, as the Quran contains no punishment to be exacted by human beings on human beings for anything related to religious beliefs and practices, or lack of them. Hence, we humans must focus and care only to observe our peaceful behavior and how we deal justly and fairly with others and expect this to be reciprocal. Our demeanor must be peaceful and must be free from all acts of violence and aggressions. Hence, the signs of disbelief are committing aggressions and violence, as we know from God's words to Muhammad in 6:38 and 9:36, as aggressors can be peaceful if they stop their aggression and repent and make amends. God is with the righteous and pious ones who do not commit violence, aggressions, and injustices, as God does not love aggressors; see 2:190. Self-defense wars are legislated in the Quran when believers are being attacked or persecuted, and they fight to defend themselves while asking God for victory; see 2:286. Disbelievers in this verse means aggressors and NOT those who have other creeds. Polytheism and disbelief in one's heart in terms of faith tents and notions is none of our concern; this is Our Omniscient God's business in the Hereafter, not ours. God tells us beforehand that the vast majority of human beings do not believe in God alone in real, acceptable faith, however Prophet Muhammad wished otherwise or thought to guide as many people as possible; see 12:103. Even the minority of believers would mix their faith with polytheistic notions; that is, to have beside God male and female saints, mortal deities, and sanctified dead ones whose tombs are being worshiped and made holy; see 12:106. When they enter Hell, they will ask to be let out of it, and their request will never be granted, and they will be told: "That is because when God alone was called upon, you disbelieved; but when others were associated with Him, you believed. Judgment rests with God the Sublime, the Majestic." (40:12). Hence little faith is not enough in the Last Day; see 32:29, and little faith derive God's curse; see 2:88 and 4:46. Real believers increase their faith and belief using the Quran, and disbelievers increase their disbelief by rejecting the Quran; see 8:2, 5:64-68, and 9:124-125. Thus, faith and belief in ones' heart might decrease or increase as per situations and stances of every human being in this life. God says about hypocrites in some situations: "…On that day they were closer to disbelief than they were to faith. They say with their mouths what is not in their hearts; but God knows what they hide." (3:167). Hence, God alone, and no mortals, knows our faith: "…God is well aware of your faith. You are from one another…" (4:25). Hence, god tells us in the Quran that hypocrites will enter depths of Hell, but no one waged self-defensive war against them because they were peaceful in terms of behavior and never fought early believers.

12- Finally, we tackle the notion of befriending and allying oneself to others in the Quran: it simply means that in times of war against believers, peaceful Muslims who engage in self-defense to impose religious freedom and to stop aggressions and persecutions of a power that seek to impose its intellectual and political hegemony on them must never befriend or ally themselves to aggressive enemies; this is treachery and betrayal, while peaceful non-Muslims who never committed aggressions against Muslims, we can befriend them and have good relations with them; see 60:8-9. Hence, we are not to ally ourselves to enemies who fight us in times of war, whereas in times of peace, one must be peaceful with all non-Muslims as long as they never wage war of aggressions against Muslims (70).

13- In fact, once Muhammad died, early Muslims forsook the Quranic teachings and engage in internal and external political struggles and conflicts; this led them to force a local tribal flavor on Islam, instead of its universality and human rights. Hence, the notion of war camp of infidels (West and Europe) against peace camp of Muslims (Arabs) emerged, and it is against the Quran of course, because of wars between Arabs and Byzantines and other Europeans for centuries, especially Sunnites against crusaders. Hence, befriending and alliance and disowning notions were twisted to mean hatred of all non-Muslims in all times and supporting caliphs in their aggressive expansionist wars. Of course, hadiths had been fabricated to support this twisted meaning, and spreading of misinterpretations of the Quranic terms and notions was done on purpose to serve despots and tyrannical caliphs. Corrupt clergymen even dared to assert that some verses of the Quran were annulled and not to be applied as hadiths replaced them! This is heresy indeed. We have proved in one of our books that the Quranic term ''Naskh'' does not mean to annul or to replace but to repeat, confirm, affirm, and assert. But distortions and misinterpretations and fabricated hadiths led to the emergence of the Sunnite creed in the Abbasid Era, with later-on sub-creeds and doctrines and schools of theological thought, until the Ibn Hanbal extremist doctrine emerged and then revived by Ibn Taymiyya in the Mameluke Era in Egypt. It was revived once more by Ibn Abdul-Wahab and reamed Wahabism (hence, Wahabism = Sunnite creed). Wahabi confiscate the right to talk in the name of Islam while their ideas and views contradict Islamic sharia (the Quran alone) as well as Islamic values, legislations, morals, notions, etc. It is strange that at our modern times, humanity reached near the great Quranic ethics and moralistic notions in terms of legislations in the West, whereas Al-Masaary and his fellows, who use global-village modern technology invented by the West as they live in the UK enjoying peace, are keen on reviving the Middle-Ages culture of Salafist Wahabi traditions to fight the West after unifying Arab countries under their rule! This is not morals and ethics of the Quran! They feel they are doing and seeking the best thing, and we condemn and denounce this as un-Islamic thought and demeanor. Let us discuss and refute their ideas below.

Al-Masaary between admiring the West and declaring it as ''camp of the infidels'':

1- It is strange that Dr. Al-Masaary, the former teacher of physics in Riyadh-based King Saud University, who owes a lot to the West that taught him physics in a British university, would head a group or committee and author books that call for hating and fighting the West countries as camp of the infidels. Ye, between his lines, we discern deep admiration of West values like democracy, transparency, and human rights; for instance, he deplored the fact that no Saudi scholars condemned torture in prisons while infidels of the West denounced and condemned it. Al-Masaary asserted that he had to immigrate out of the camp of Muslims to seek safety in the camp of infidels: (… The West infidels control oceans and the outer space though they do not believe in God…as their societies are based on certain dynamics of trust, transparency, truthfulness, and putting rulers to question…they are features fit for Islamists but they do not apply it… ) (71). This means that Al-Masaary admitted that the West applies Islamic notions, unwittingly, in all systems. We might wonder why he declared the West as camp of disbelievers who are using infidel and heretic legislations. Of course, this is among many contradictions of Al-Masaary in his concocted sharia and his strange views.

2- Al-Masaary developed notions of hating and disowning the West while befriending and allying oneself to Islamic countries that will be unified under his rule in one empire as he headed the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights alone after Saad Al-Faqeeh left it. Al-Masaary held close relations with jihadists and extremists in the West and he held close relations with Bin Laden who use his terrorism and weapons to realize views, advocated before by Al-Masaary, against the USA that represent the leader of capitalist world of hegemony over weak third-world countries. Al-Masaary once wrote: (…how come a man can be a good Muslims and a good French citizen at the same time? This could not be…), when the French Interior Minister praised Prince Nayef at one point in time. This means that Al-Masaary saw that a European Muslim is not to be considered a good Muslim because of his non-Arab West nationality! Al-Masaary in his last publications before 2000 A.D., and in all his books, advocates the revival of caliphate ruling system and to unify all Muslim nations under his rule and control to regain Arab hegemony over the world as a religious mission! Al-Masaary saw that Arabia is the best place to be the nucleus of such caliphate or his Islamic State on an international level to convert the globe to Wahabism. Once Arabia would be one day under his rule, all supporters of Islamic caliphate must immigrate to it. Hence, Al-Masaary does not believe in nationalism, tribalism, or nationalistic feelings. Islam (i.e., Wahabism in his views) is the nationality he seeks for all Muslims! How come a religion would be turned into homeland?! He refused to enlist the aid of the West powers to establish such a caliphate; that was why he attacked King Abdul-Aziz as he allied himself to GB and showed tribal racist views as he called his kingdom after his family name. Such racism and tribalism and allying oneself to the West are roots of apostasy for Al-Masaary. After allying oneself to his imaginary Islamic State in Arabia, Al-Masaary urged that Muslims must disown and hate the West and would never allow the West and the USA to interfere in Arabia and in the caliphate, and in case of inter-Arab wars, no West infidel country is to interfere (72). Al-Masaary never mentioned that what would be the case if the wronged, oppressed part enlisted the aid of the UN and the West democracies. What if the oppressed ones would seek weapons and arms for self-defense against aggressors? Al-Masaary saw that all Arab regimes must be toppled to unite all Muslims by force and felt bound to disown and hate the West to convince all Arabs to follow him to unify them in spite of themselves, so that Al-Masaary and his fellows would apply Hisbah and Wahabi sharia on them by force! Once his imaginary caliphate would be established, fighting the West would be his next religious duty or mission! We cannot quote all details of such madness in this last chapter; we might do this in a coming separate book, but here, we will give general outline of views and visions of Al-Masaary and how he declare others as infidels and apostates.

3- Al-Masaary saw that all legislations and laws of the West as heresy against Wahabism in the war camp of infidels, as per Wahabi notions, and he called for changing all regional and international relations based on his views; since Saudi laws and external policies contradict his vision, he declared it as an infidel country ruled by apostates. Let us give brief examples below.

3/1: Al-Masaary denounced good relations between the KSA and other countries in the world, as Saudi rulers exchanged greetings on occasions of infidels, just like free masons and secular devils, as he puts it!

3/2: Al-Masaary saw that this is submission to the West infidels and allying oneself to disbelievers and atheists under 'corrupt' banners of international peace, human fraternity, interests of countries, equality of all people, and the like among mottoes that deceive the naïve idealistic people, as he puts it!

3/3: Al-Masaary criticized Saudi laws that prevent criticism of kings, presidents, and diplomats of countries that signed agreements with the KSA, especially Article No. 28 in Saudi constitution that stipulates that Saudi media is to show respect other countries and freedom of people to live in their countries the way they like while condemning any aggressions against rights of peoples and individuals. Al-Masaary saw that such article mentions nothing about Islam and fighting infidels, and thus, it indicates freemasonry of the KSA regime!

3/4: Al-Masaary asserted that Saudi laws are not just texts; rather, they are a method adopted by the KSA against Islam. He quoted speech of the king about respecting different ways and lifestyles of all countries without meddling in them as much as to expect no country to meddle in Saudi lifestyle and ways, and then, Al-Masaary asserted that such notions were masonic fraternity and were non-Islamic notions, as Muslim countries must unite and never ally themselves to West infidels.

4- Al-Masaary imagined that Islam (i.e., his Wahabism of course) urges eternal hatred of all non-Wahabis even if they were peaceful and charitable. That was why he attacked the idea of borders and nationalistic feelings and the idea of not to interfere in affairs of all Islamic countries, and he verbally abused King Abdul-Aziz as the infidel ruler who signed in 1931 the Kellogg–Briand Pact, as Islam in his view urges incessant wars against all non-Wahabis until their conversion! Dr. Al-Masaary has deserted nuclear physics, the useful branch of science that he has specialized in, and he failed to continue teaching and making discoveries in it in order to devote his time to the Salafist/Wahabi falsehoods. Dr. Al-Masaary must be mentally treated at once at the expense of the Saudi royal family that has caused his mental disturbance!

Al-Masaary sharia and declaring the UN and other regional and international organizations as pertaining to disbelieving infidels:

1- Establishing the UN to spread peace, justice, prosperity, and human rights symbolizes the maturity of human beings after horrors of World War I and World War II. The UN in our opinion represents the nearest Islamic vision of human rights advocated in the Quran if we understand it according to its own terminology without theology, fiqh, hadiths, Arabic dictionaries, etc. Of course, the UN (especially the Security Council) is man-made work that needs to overcome its shortcomings and to stop superpowers from controlling it as per their interests; any mistakes of the UN might be changed and remedies when new generations would be more mature and stick more to human rights of all peoples to stand against political greediness of international companies and superpowers in the West to stop their manipulation of weak, poor third-world countries and to stop supporting tyrants who oppress weak peoples.

2- If Ibn Abdul-Wahab would have lived to witness the UN, he would have declared it an infidel institution headed by atheists and infidels and must be fought to stop it from establishing peace on Earth. Of course, Wahabism supposes that all Wahabis must be engaged in incessant wars until Doomsday against the war camp of the infidel West countries. Al-Masaary and Bin Laden continued where Ibn Abdul-Wahabi left, as they believed in an ongoing religious war against all atheists, Jews, and christens in the West via indiscriminate killings, destruction, and corruption all over the world in the manner of 9/11.

3- As the UN, as well as all regional and international organizations, is based on acknowledging defined borders among countries and never to allow military, or otherwise, interference in other countries' affairs. That was why Al-Masaary attacked the UN and similar organizations in a serialized article in Publications Nos. 131 to 135 in 1997 under the title "Destroy the UN!", and he repeated such discourse in his book titled "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of thee KSA".

4- Al-Masaary saw that the UN charter is based on apostasy as it is not based on Wahabi sharia! He urged Muslims all over the globe to discard such organizations of infidels, especially the UN, and to reject infidel Arab rulers who bragged of following the UN, especially Gulf monarchs who pledged to respect the UN. Al-Masaary mocked them and said they pledged a pact with Satan and apostasy to forsake Islam (i.e., Wahabism, in his view), as the UN charter is against Islam in his own opinion as it hinders the religious duty of Wahabi jihad!

5- In the same vein, Al-Masaary saw that the Gulf Cooperation Council is an 'infidel' regional body of Satan that cooperates in ''evildoing, heresy, sins, and apostasy'', as he attacked its regulations and laws deemed by him as un-Islamic. Al-Masaary attacked all agreements done by it and attacked the Saudi relations with the 'infidel' Arab League established with the help of the KSA with charter of apostasy, as Arabs were imitating the 'infidel' UN like monkeys, as he puts it! Al-Masaary saw that the Arab League charter is heretic and a sign of the will to spread apostasy, freemasonry, and atheism and urging people to forsake Islam, a disgrace added to the 'evil' KSA that raise banners of monotheism and sharia. Al-Masaary mocked Articles Nos. 8 and 21 of the Arab League charter regarding deepening ties among Arab countries and coordinating their political plans while respecting ruling regimes of each Arab country, as he wondered how an Arab should respect the Libyan tyrant Kaddafi who denies Sunna and the Syrian tyrant Hafiz Al-Assad, the CIA agent.

6- In the same vein, Al-Masaary attacked all organizations, meetings, agreements, and decisions of the Arab League, especially the agreement of joint defense, as tyrannies seek to support and aid one another, as he puts it, and he attacked all Saudi agreements between Arab countries.

7- Al-Masaary mocked conferences of the Islamic Summit, calling them conferences of havoc-wreaking endeavors: (… we heard no one of them calling to reject West secular laws and to stop allying oneself to West infidels to begin endeavors to unite all scattered Muslims under one banner instead of West defined borders … West powers aim to make Arabs suffer fragmentation and never to unite as one empire of strength to serve an Islamic higher aim of reviving caliphate …).

8- Al-Masaary here claimed falsely that God ordered armed jihad to commit aggressions against everybody in order to establish one political bloc or empire under the banner of Islam (his Wahabism, of course), and hence, Arab countries with borders are seen as rebellion against God's commands to establish a caliphate! That is why he opposed all organizations like the UN and the Arab League, and he made himself the sole guardian and the embodiment of Wahabi sharia!

9- It is noteworthy that Al-Masaary saw that Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was a good step to unify Arabs in the Gulf, and Saddam Hussein's endeavor was commendable in term of Sunnite Wahabi sharia that requires vice to be removed by force! Even Muslim blood that was shed in such war was OK for Al-Masaary for the sake of removing borders defined by infidel West powers. Al-Masaary saw that rulers of Kuwait were infidels and apostates who never apply sharia laws and deserved to be fought like all Arab regimes that need to be toppled in order to establish the 'Islamic' caliphate (73). Was Saddam Hussein a saint for Al-Masaary?!

10- Dr. Al-Masaary has deserted nuclear physics, the useful branch of science that he has specialized in, and he failed to continue teaching and making discoveries in it in order to devote his time to the Salafist/Wahabi falsehoods. Dr. Al-Masaary must be mentally treated at once at the expense of the Saudi royal family that has caused his mental disturbance!

Al-Masaary sharia in establishing a unified Salafist empire (camp of peace):

Firstly: Al-Masaary sharia in establishing a unified 'Islamic' empire or caliphate:

1- Al-Masaary claimed falsely that nationalistic tendencies and tribalism are racist notions prohibited by Islam; he formulated such erroneous view based on a hadith about he who sticks to un-Islamic ways deserve to be said to him in public: ''You can bite your father's phallus!''. Of course, we have refuted before such coarse language and asserted that Prophet Muhammad would not utter such bad language. The view of Al-Masaary about refusing to acknowledge nationalistic feelings or sentiments could be refuted using the Quran itself; in Quranic stories of prophets, every prophet addressed his people by saying "O my people!"; for instance, see 7:79 and 7:93. And God says in 49:13 and 30:22 that it is His will to create human beings different in skin color, languages, nations, and tribes though they have descended from one parent: Adam and Eve. This was why every prophet used the tongue or language of his people; see 14:4. This asserts that nationalities are part of human life and existence that need not to be discarded as Al-Masaary had imagined. Yet, no nationalities, tribalism, or relatives would benefit anyone in the Last Day of Judgment; we know from the Quran that even some relatives of prophets rejected their call to Islam and died as disbelievers, like Noah's wife, Lot's wife, Noah's son, and Abraham's father.

2- Al-Masaary wrote the following: (… the whole world is divided into two realms: the realm of Islam and the realm of apostasy, with no medial position or a third option at all …). This is an indication that he supported this Salafist notion of declaring others as infidels who deserve going to Hell; Al-Masaary here deifies himself, as God alone is the Sole Eternal Judge to decide who enters Hell and who enters Paradise for eternity; see 42:7. Al-Masaary wanted ardently to apply Hisbah (i.e., inquisition) to be the judge of a doomsday here on earth of his own fashioning and design before the Day of Judgment in the Hereafter, to punish 'infidels' as much as he pleases and chooses! Al-Masaary asserts that in his Islamic empire, no infidel would enter without prior permission. We wonder if Al-Masaary would introduce visa system in 'Islamic' empire; this is an invention by 'infidels' of the West. It is a funny thing that Al-Masaary sought in vain many times to get the British nationality! Why does he live in a capital of the infidels, then?!

3- Al-Masaary asserted that in his imaginary Islamic empire, it is not permitted to have two or more caliphs, in order to avoid conflicts, disputes, rebellion, and lastly failure. To have several caliphs simultaneously means to destroy unity of Muslims under one empire. Here, we see how Al-Masaary was unrealistic; history of Muslims witnessed many caliphs simultaneously and many civil wars, conflicts, and disputes. In fact, such troubles went on for the last 14 centuries until now! Disputes and conflicts were daily bread for most Muslims throughout their history, in both political and religious aspects. Hence, Al-Masaary was so engrossed in theorizing that he forgot to be realistic, and he used his imagination to aspire to the impossible, as ancient scholars had done before him. when Al-Masaary declared all Islamic countries as infidel ones ruled by apostates that must be toppled and punished by God just because they refuse to be united, he unwittingly applied this notion on the caliphate he desired to establish; during the Abbasid caliphate, so many caliphates were established within and without Abbasid control: such as the Umayyads in Andalusia and the Fatimids in Egypt and North Africa. All such caliphates had political legitimacy, and we are not to judge the creed or faith of its rulers, as this is solely God's business in the Hereafter. We are not like Al-Masaary who deified himself and thought he was the incarnation of sharia itself and declared all people as apostates.

4- Al-Masaary saw that the only way to unify Muslims in one empire was military jihad, the supreme Wahabi religious duty, and its caliph must be a free man who has sovereignty and independence, like most Arab rulers in the 1990s, with the exception of the Christian Lebanese president, in his opinion, and thus, all Muslims must swear fealty to this caliph once he unites all the Islamic world and apply sharia laws to the letter without secular laws at all, especially usury of banks. This caliph must expel all diplomats and ambassadors and must annul all agreements and cut ties with all organizations like the UN and the Arab League. Other countries can join the caliphate after dethroning the tyrant rulers using armed rebellions, revolts, revolutions, or coups, to make all Muslims obey the one imam/caliph (74). We understand here why Al-Masaary hated the principles and laws of the UN and asserted that they are against Islam, without quoting any hadith or Quranic verse, as it seemed that Al-Masaary considered himself as an official spokesperson of the Wahabi sharia, his Al-Masaary Wahabi sharia of course!

Secondly: application of Al-Masaary sharia in the case of Sudan:

The application of the imaginary Al-Masaary sharia aims solely at establishing Al-Masaary caliphate as an international ruling system of an ''Islamic'' State unified under his rule to fight others and spread terrorism, bloodshed of Muslims and non-Muslims, violence, and aggressions on Earth. His hopes however are dashed as they are impossible to be realized; yet, Al-Masaary is relentless in spreading and propagating his call. When the Sunnite fundamentalist regime in Sudan was defeated at one point in time, Al-Masaary wrote in Publication 120 in 1997 that an all-out jihad war was not out of place there; it was the best option in his opinion. We quote here decisions by Al-Masaary he advised Sudan regime to apply, and we apologize for those who will feel offended by them: (… Initial policies are not empty repetitive mottoes; rather, they are deeds and words based on sharia laws such as the following: 1- declaring jihad directly using this very word without disguise or roundabout manner; all indirect terms and words must be discarded. General mobilization must be announced to apply radical changes in all Sudan in the name of jihad and jihadists whom people admired, as the model of Afghanistan is still alive in our minds, 2- the call must be addressed to all Muslims all over the globe to participate in jihad with their might, money, arms, weapons, tongues, and pens, 3- Sudan is to be declared as Islamic camp of peace and consequently the home for immigration to welcome all Muslims coming to join jihad and to give them the Sudanese nationality, but Sudan rulers are still reluctant in their steps, 4- Sudan is to declare and wage wars against its African neighbors: Uganda, Ethiopia, Eretria, and Kenya, 5- opposition figures in Sudan must be deemed as apostates and infidels whom one cannot ally oneself to them and their money should be confiscated and their wives divorced within sharia courts, and if they resist, they must be killed off, and they are not to be negotiated with, 6- Sudan must disown, reject, and cut ties with all regional and international organizations established by the infidels, such as the UN, the Arab League, and the International Bank. Sudan must help Libya and Iraq to stop their being sieged by the West, and to disregard Security Council resolutions, and 7- Sudan must stop its kneeling down to hypocritical apostates who are agents of the West, such as Fahd Ibn Abdul-Aziz of the KSA, Mubarak of Egypt, and monarchs of the Gulf, and to ally itself to Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya as they never participated in the sin of fighting with the USA in the Gulf War …)

We note here that Dr. Al-Masaary has deserted nuclear physics, the useful branch of science that he has specialized in, and he failed to continue teaching and making discoveries in it in order to devote his time to the Salafist/Wahabi falsehoods. Dr. Al-Masaary must be mentally treated at once at the expense of the Saudi royal family that has caused his mental disturbance!

Refutation of Al-Masaary calls to establish an 'Islamic' empire:

1- In his book titled "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", Al-Masaary writes about ''rules of sultans'', as he was influenced by the ancient book of Al-Mawardy (who died in 450 A.H. in the Abbasid era in Baghdad) titled "Rules of Sultans". Al-Masaary revived in his mind that point in time in the Abbasid era, when the Ibn Hanbal doctrine scholars controlled streets of Baghdad to remove vice by sheer force. Al-Masaary wanted ardently to impose such historical phase on all of us, Arabs, and would accuse us of being apostates if we refuse it! Al-Masaary asserts in his book a veritable falsehood: Muslims are one nation of one creed. He overlooked the fact that there are other creeds and divisions of Sunnites, Shiites, and Sufis, and sub-creeds and doctrines derived from the three sects; how come that one could say they are one nation?! Al-Masaary himself belongs to a tiny sect under Wahabism, namely, the Wahabi opposition, and Wahabism is merely a sub-creed of Ibn Hanbal doctrine which is part of the several Sunnite religion doctrines. Even his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights was divided and some of its members left it, but instead of settling his disputes with Dr. Al-Faqeeh, he aimed at unifying 1.5 billion Muslims! Very funny and strange indeed! Al-Masaary thus confiscates the right to talk in the name of the so-called Muslim ''nation'', and his daydreams make him want to impose one regime on 1.5 billion Muslims on earth, and he supports his views by quoting Quranic verses and Sunnite Salafist hadiths.

2- Al-Masaary overlooks the fact that many Quranic verses talk about what should be in terms of creed tenets and acts of worship, judged alone by God in the Day of Judgment and not now on earth by morals. Al-Masaary forgets that the mission of any Islamic country is NOT to guide people to Paradise; both guidance and misguidance are a personal individual responsibility; even Prophet Muhammad could not guide those he wished to guide. The main mission of any country that applies the Quran is to protect absolute religious and political freedom to all citizens equally, to provide justice and social solidarity, and to ensure security and safety. Such a country is NOT to occupy itself with ideals; rather, it must be concerned with dealing with reality and general interests of citizens.

3- For sure, what should be is that Muslims would share the testimony of Islam: There is no God but Allah, and subsequently never to worship, sanctify, and deify mortals and things. Yet in reality, most ''Muslims'' are Muhammadans, as we call them, and this means that they deify Muhammad and portrait a divine, deified image for him in their minds as a deity beside the Almighty in this life and in the Hereafter, and they worship him in many ways that include pilgrimage to his so-called mausoleum. To imagine that Muhammad is the best of all human beings or the best of prophets/messengers of God is a violation of the Quran; as God in the Quran considers distinguishing between prophets/messengers as a sin of disbelief; see 2:136, 2:285, 3:84, and 2:150-152. Muhammadans are subdivided into three sects of Shiites, Sunnites, and Sufis, and its sect has its own deified, sanctified, and 'holy' imams and saints, and followers of the three sects worship tombs, adore deities among dead mortals (prophets and the so-called saints), and declare each other as errant infidels. Yet, Al-Masaary overlooks all this polytheism, because he is like the terrorist MB members who seek not reform, but seek to reach power and authority in as many countries as possible.

4- If Al-Masaary had read the Quran devoutly and asked God for guidance, he would have understood that God addressed prophets regarding what should be; see 21:92-93. And the Quran tells us about reality in life: of differences, fragmentation, fissures, disputes, conflicts, and misguidance. God is the Sole Judge of all such things in the Last Day; see 21:94. This pattern of the contrast between what should be and reality in life is repeated in the Quranic Chapter 23; what should be is read in 23:51-52 and reality of life past and present is read in 23:53. Yet, messengers and prophets never fought people to establish a State of compulsion in religion; see 23:54. Hence, the divined celestial sharia is one in its essentials in all eras; see 21:25, 4:163, 39:65, 41:43, and 42:14. Hence, we conclude that Islam is God's religion to all humans as in all previous celestial messages conveyed by prophets, and this common sharia made all believers in all eras one nation in worshipping God alone with no associates and in doing good deeds in piety. Thus, they are one nation despite difference of eras and locations and generations. This does not signify any political unity at all; peoples of prophets can never unite into one political unity or entity; and the same applies to supporters of Al-Masaary sharia. Even in our era of the global village, Muslims can never be united in one political entity; even the Quran talks about reality in life that occurs past, present, and future, leaving judgment for God in the Hereafter: "But they tore themselves into sects with books; each sect happy with what they have. So leave them in their bewilderment until a time." (21:53-54).

5- Al-Masaary overlooks the fact that once prophets died, their peoples mostly had gone astray; and once Muhammad died, Muslims were divided into sects for political reasons and fought one another, and political differences and disputes turned into disputes and differences in intellectual, fiqh, and creed issues among doctrines and sects, and Al-Masaary merely embraced one sect evolved within extremism and fanaticism and demanded to rule over all Muslims as their caliph!

6- Al-Masaary overlooks that he must belief at first in tenets and facts of the Quran as the sole source of Islam, contradicting Sunnite Wahabism of course, and he forgets that Islamic piety prevents one from political ambition which is based on superiority on earth and corruption as well as hypocrisy, deceit, and spreading falsehoods; see 28:83. The worst type of corruption is to use God's religion of Islam to seek superiority on earth and corruption to reach power, authority, and wealth.

7- Al-Masaary overlooks the realities in daily life of Muslims of today, as the vast majority he talks in its name ignores his very existence! No one cares about his enmity toward the KSA. This vast majority is concerned with its own worries and adds their local color and culture to their view of Islam: hence, Egyptian Islam differs from both Iranian Islam and Saudi, Bedouin Islam, and so one and so forth.

8- Al-Masaary overlooks the fact that he is misusing Islam (i.e., the Quran) on purpose within political pursuits and conflicts, which makes disputes impossible to settle. Usually, political disputes can be settled and people would reach compromise within secular contexts of interests. But once creeds enter into such political disputes, this corrupts politics and kills all freedoms; as foes would be declared apostates and would be persecuted in many ways and human rights would be annulled and ignored.

9- Dr. Al-Masaary has deserted nuclear physics, the useful branch of science that he has specialized in, and he failed to continue teaching and making discoveries in it in order to devote his time to the Salafist/Wahabi falsehoods. Dr. Al-Masaary must be mentally treated at once at the expense of the Saudi royal family that has caused his mental disturbance!

Al-Masaary sharia declared all human rights organizations in the West as pertaining to disbelieving infidels:

The main topic for Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights is to form a Muslim empire to fight others, and thus, Al-Masaary in his writings and books has his own stances regarding human rights, usury banks, Shiites, women, freedoms, and media, and we trace briefly such stances below.

Human rights:

1- Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights made all West human rights organizations as their foes and enemies, since Statement No. 2 where Al-Masaary refuted accusations of Saudi scholars leveled at the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights. Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights saw that human rights as a concept differs within Islam (i.e., Wahabism in their views) in compassion to its anti-sharia concept in the West. Hence, Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights declared such human rights organizations as ruled by infidels and disbelievers and should be discarded and avoided by true Muslims (i.e., Wahabis) and be replaced by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

2- Yet, Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights never relented in nagging human rights organizations to help them in many instances; Liberty Organization protected and propagated Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights when some supporters were arrested in the KSA, and it made the topic reach international media, resulting in the release of Al-Masaary from prison, as its report showed all details about rights and demands of Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights as an opposition movement.

3- Hence, we conclude then that Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights made Liberty as its loudspeakers outside the KSA to gain international fame and recognition. This led other human rights organizations contact Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to receive reports about the KSA. Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights took advantage of such reports by writing them in a way to support their political claim to rule Arabia.

4- Human rights organization stand by all oppressed ones regardless of their ethnicity, creed, nationality, and political stances. Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights harbor Salafist extremist views contradicting such human rights; yet, they received the aid of human rights organizations, which were deceived by reports authored by Al-Masaary. When Liberty and other human rights organizations contacted the KSA for further details, they discovered that Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights deceived them and made use of them for the sake of protection, in London, and political propaganda. Human rights organizations discovered as well that Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights overlook rights of Shiites, rights of women, and religious and political freedoms. Liberty organization had to apologize for its reliance solely on reports provided by Al-Masaary as a big mistake.

5- Al-Masaary who lives as a political asylee in London saw that one of the proofs that the KSA is ruled by disbelief and by apostates within illegitimate anti-sharia regime is that it opens its gates for non-Muslim workers and employees: Christians, Buddhists, Baha'is, Sikhs, seculars, and communists, etc. that the KSA employ and never seek to convert them to Wahabism, thus accusing the KSA of being an evil State of Free Masonry.

6- Al-Masaary protested against the KSA joining international agreements of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural human rights, and he harshly criticized Article No. 118 of the international declaration of human rights that stipulates that people are free to adopt and change their thought and religious creeds.

7- In Al-Masaary sharia of his Muslim empire, no non-Muslim would share any aspects of rule: (… Non-Muslims must never participate in aspects of rule, and would never swear fealty to the caliphs at all like the rest of believers …) (75). Al-Masaary forgets that in the Quran, we find that direct democracy of Islamic Shura (consultation) in the Yathreb city-state headed by Prophet Muhammad allowed all Yathreb dwellers (Muslims and non-Muslims alike) the right of political participation, even hypocrites had freedom to spread their anti-Islam propaganda and to spread vice instead of virtue, without being punished in this life, as God will punish them in the Hereafter; see 9:67-68. Believers in Yathreb at the time had the same freedom of speech and actions; they responded by spreading virtue instead of vice, and will be rewarded accordingly in the Hereafter; see 9:71-72. This was the summit of political, religious, and intellectual freedoms in rights of citizenry in the Yathreb city-state; all Yathreb dwellers were equal regardless of their faith, or even lack of it. That is why the Quranic way of address is directed many times to those believers (i.e., those who preferred security and peace and trust, regardless of their faith); see 4:136, and the Quran urges them in other verses to add devotion of the belief in God alone in their hearts in terms of faith and Quranic tenets. One of the last revealed verses showed divine commands of avoiding idols and deified things; see 22:30, and this means that polytheistic practices were done within an atmosphere of freedom in Yathreb by some Muslims there, who enjoyed all rights of citizenry. Such repeated polytheistic practices made God in the Quran repeats the same commands of avoiding certain practices in 5:90-92, and this means that Prophet Muhammad never reproached or punished them at all and never killed anyone for that reason as Salafist falsehoods claim he had. The KSA to that day puts to death those accused of apostasy and sorcery! Prophet Muhammad never controlled believers of his time as his sole mission was to convey the Quranic message; see 88:21-26. Hence, we conclude that human rights organizations are nearer to Islam, whereas Al-Masaary Wahabi one and the Wahabi Saudi one have nothing to do with Islam in the Quran, as Quranism is a religion of peace, justice, and freedom.

8- Amnesty International published its report about human rights in the KSA in 2000 A.D., and the Saudi regime protested. Al-Masaary criticized in Publication No. 156 Amnesty International as it is linked to the infidels of the UN and other similar bodies that spread atheism and Free Masonry, as he puts it! He is ungrateful toward human rights organizations that helped him as well as his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

9- Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights gave themselves the right to interfere and meddle in the lives of others and deny the rights of others to stick to their religions and political views; this is a violation of human rights, showing the vast difference and abyss between Al-Masaary sharia and human rights organizations.

10- The sharia laws of Al-Masaary, and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, contradict Islam, the religion of peace and gratitude; see 2:237 and 24:22. Al-Masaary should have expressed gratitude toward human rights organizations, but he did the exact opposite by declaring them as evil bodies of atheists and infidels. This contradicts Islam in the Quran that orders justice even if it goes against interests of relatives or goes for interests of foes; see 4:135, 5:8, and 6:152. Yet, Al-Masaary links himself forcibly to Islam! Dr. Al-Masaary has deserted nuclear physics, the useful branch of science that he has specialized in, and he failed to continue teaching and making discoveries in it in order to devote his time to the Salafist/Wahabi falsehoods. Dr. Al-Masaary must be mentally treated at once at the expense of the Saudi royal family that has caused his mental disturbance!

Second Aspect: Al-Masaary sharia in internal policies:

Media and freedom:

1- Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights not only deny and confiscate religious freedom, but also deny and confiscate intellectual freedom of though and expression, as Al-Masaary links such freedoms with limitations of Wahabi sharia laws; hence, Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights monopolizes sharia and would control people's life by virtue of Hisbah (i.e., inquisitions) if people and rulers would dare to disobey the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, and sharia-based courts will try all transgressors of Al-Masaary Wahabi sharia after accusations are leveled against violators! Thus, people would stoop working and watch over their words and deeds! This is Middle-Ages terrorism!

2- Relying on Salafist Wahabi sharia-based courts that Al-Masaary wants to establish means that those thinking outside the sphere of beliefs of the judge will be tried and punished or maybe killed for apostasy! This judge will never be a fair one as he is a biased foe at the same time; that is why people are not to interfere and judge others' religious beliefs; this judgment is an indication of severe injustice and corruption. All peoples are intellectual foes of one another in relation to faiths and religious beliefs; see 22:19-24. Such differences will be judged by God in the Last Day (and not by human beings in this transient life) with the result of people that will be divided by God into two groups in the Hereafter: in Hell or in Paradise for eternity. God never deputized mortals, like Al-Masaary and his members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights or any other human beings, to judge people on earth, as such judging is grave injustice to people and toward God; Al-Masaary here has deified himself, a grave sin!

3- Al-Masaary is used to repeating a dangerously wrong phrase in all his writings: (…all sharia texts assert this view …). This falsehood makes us conclude that its author ignores the Quran, which has over 1000 verses that assert absolute religious freedom and the intellectual freedom of thought and assert individual responsibly of one's choices before the Almighty in the Last Day without human interference. This issue is tackled by us in our books published in Egypt before the emergence of Al-Masaary; punishing the so-called 'apostates' by death was a notion fashioned during the Abbasid era for political reasons, and it was a notion based on false, weak hadiths that contradict hundreds of Quranic verses. We are to fight aggressors who raise arms against us, not peaceful people who hold different religions than ours. Strangely, Sunnite fundamentalists in Egypt had to admit in the 1990s that the so-called apostasy punishment is not part of Islamic notions in the Quran; the Cairo-based Al-Azhar Sunnite institution had to admit that deniers of Sunna as the sole source of legislation are not deniers of Islam, and this means that refuters of the so-called apostasy punishment are Muslims and not infidels (76). This means that Al-Masaary overlooks hundreds of Quranic verses that assert absolute religious freedom and the intellectual freedom of thought and he embraces instead Salafist notions and hadiths fabricated by ancient scholars that contradict the Quran.

4- Al-Masaary asserts that there should be sharia-based regulations to control media and especially freedom of the press. He harshly attacked audiovisual Saudi media and accused it of spreading immorality and atheism and inciting crimes and corruption typical of the West, especially by viewing pornography and sexually explicit material after midnight. Al-Masaary saw that the KSA corrupts and destroys Arabs in terms of ethics, morals, and intellect by its written and audiovisual media outside the KSA, as enemies of Islam assumed posts to spread all corrupt notions and low-art materials in all Arab countries. Al-Masaary quotes eth attack of Saudi scholars on media, especially Ibn Otheimein, and he claimed that the Saudi audiovisual media imitates pornographic material in French and Israeli TVs (77).

5-Al-Masaary claims to be a prude and wears the garb of virtue to manipulate Wahabi sharia laws and to urge control of media to make himself appear to his readers as a more pious and religious man than the said regime. He overlooks the fact that in his own writings, he uses verbal abuse and coarse language so often that no written media could possible allow in the Arab world. We personally had to omit many bad words while quoting him in this very book. Such bad language and coarse words of sexual innuendoes and verbal abuse show the true sentiments of Al-Masaary and his sharia of lies and falsehoods. Let us be reminded that he accused, without tangible proofs, that many Saudi royal family members practice illicit sex (with sex workers, within homosexual practices, and within sexual infidelities), mentioning them by their names in dreadful slanders that contradict the Quran. We omitted such names in our quoting him before in previous chapters, so as not to be sinners like Al-Masaary.

6- Al-Masaary wrote in Publication No. 1 on 29^th of May, 1994, that the publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights will be an alternative for the Saudi media of falsehoods under control of the West, to cater for those who seek the truth about events, while sticking to sharia laws. Did Al-Masaary stick to sharia laws of Islam or even Wahabism? The answer is a definite no, as we quote his words in Publication No. 156 on 5^th of April, 2000, about King Fahd, to exemplify and prove out point: (… And we return to the ignorance and impertinence of this thief of a king … the scum of the earth, the blind-hearted scumbag … who will carry heavy burdens of sins in the Resurrection Day, in which he never believed … we are sure he will burn for eternity in Hell … this sleazebag is not only stealing money, but is also fighting Muslims in Afghanistan, Algeria, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt … this infidel king finance contra rebels in Nicaragua! Why this apostate of a king is doing that?! … He is a cockroach under boots of the USA, its ally, who is exposed to the whole world as a traitor of all Arabs and of Islam …). This is the lightest type of coarse language and verbal abuse featured in that publication!

7- Justice in the Quran includes to exact punishments and to take revenge from aggressors and violators, while charity in the Quran is above justice: to forgive the trespassers, violators, and aggressors, for the sake of God to please Him, as pious people treat others kindly and charitable in all cases, saying the word of peace especially during the call to God, forgiving the ignorant who verbally abuse believers; see 16:90, 42:40, 23:96, 41:33-35, 15:85, 43:88-89, 25:63, and 45:14-15. This is the real Islam in the Quran that contradicts the sharia of Al-Masaary and his fellows who want non-Wahabis to apply the Salafist hadith of biting their father's phallus! Such words are signs of sick minds! Dr. Al-Masaary has deserted nuclear physics, the useful branch of science that he has specialized in, and he failed to continue teaching and making discoveries in it in order to devote his time to the Salafist/Wahabi falsehoods. Dr. Al-Masaary must be mentally treated at once at the expense of the Saudi royal family that has caused his mental disturbance!

Al-Masaary sharia in relation to issues of women and Shiites:

Women in Al-Masaary sharia:

1- When the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights emerged, Saudi women were being educated and assuming roles in public life, and members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights urged women to join and support it. Many women participated in peaceful sits-in planned by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, including the one in Brida. Many female supporters of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights under Sunnite fundamentalist banner were arrested, such as Dr. Fatima Nassif in 1994, and a wife of a supporter related to the family of Al-Hudeif in 1995. Such arrests of women were manipulated by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to urge women to participate more in the opposition movement; in Publication No. 35 in 1995, we read: (… we urge the Muslim women to perform their sharia duty and to invest their position and dignity to serve the fundamentalist call as much as they can, especially in distributing publications and audiotapes, as their chances and free mobility is more than men …). At the same time, the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights spread the rumor that inside some governmental institutions, high officials rape women (78).

2- Saudi formal high-rank scholars objected vociferously any positive steps to develop status of Saudi women and giving them their human rights. Yet, the KSA allowed women to be educated and disregarded such scholars. Women were employed upon graduation from universities, and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights tried to manipulate women to support the opposition, and some women did just that and without waiting for anything in return.

3- The Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights deceived and made use of such women, and Al-Masaary attacked human rights of women as equal to men in all aspects and fields, and he quotes Saudi scholars to prove that equality between the sexes is apostasy and heretic notion against Wahabi sharia. Al-Masaary attacked human rights organizations in relation to women's rights as they attacked Wahabi sharia laws as unjust toward women (78).

4- Sunnite fundamentalism emerged before Al-Masaary and his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights have emerged, and it hates women's rights just as Al-Masaary and his fellows do; this is exemplified in the stance regarding female demonstrators in a march that demanded their right to get driving licenses and to drive cars. One member of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, who is the author of the book titled "The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family", mentions that female demonstrators in 1990 in Riyadh defamed 'religious' values and 'Islamic' teachings as they threw headscarves (i.e., Sunnite veil of hijab headwear) on the street and stepped on them in contempt as symbol of slavery and subjugation of women. Of course, the Sunnite fundamentalists were furious at such effrontery to one of their symbols, and they saw such act as contempt of Islam itself. This led Saudi scholars to deliver sermons and speeches against education of women and developing their status, as such things pertain to secular, atheist trends of the West. Even sheikh Al-Hawali, one of the founders of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, delivered a sermon about corruption family values by the so-called liberation of women. While sheikh Al-Ouda, also one of the founders of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, delivered a sermon about how the West people corrupt the Saudi society and youths (79). This means that Sunnite fundamentalist opposition movements that includes the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights are against liberation of Saudi women and against their rights, but Al-Masaary manipulated some educated women to support his call using concepts of Wahabi sharia, while ignoring its misogyny. When human rights organizations began to take interests in the KSA, they discovered that the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights overlooked the plight of Saudi women and Shiite citizens. As a result, Al-Masaary declared such human rights organizations as ruled by infidels and atheists.

5- International human rights organizations' reports about the KSA detailed violations of women's rights in all aspects of Saudi life and showed that Islam (the Quran) is not the reason at all behind such violations, and quoted enlightened scholars' views in Egypt and elsewhere. Report of the USA Foreign Office about the human rights in the KSA, issued in 1991, mentioned punishments of women of the demonstration of 1990 in Riyadh and that women enjoy very little social and meager margin of political rights as they are treated as inferior to men, and they cannot travel without prior written permission of their husbands/fathers (80). Amnesty International report, about the human rights of women in the KSA, mentioned details of discrimination against Saudi and non-Saudi women inside the KSA, within laws and social norms, as their political, civil, and social rights are confiscated despite their active participation in charity works, and urged the KSA to annul laws that permit such discrimination (81). The Guardian, the UK newspaper, mentions in 1999 that Saudi regime educates and employs women despite Wahabi scholars' rejection and opposition, and that women who will be allowed to drive cars and get driving licenses must be over 35 and must have the prior written permission of their husbands. Women driving hours would be from 7 am to 7 pm. The newspaper asserts that there will be female members in the Shura Council (82). Of course, such pieces of news were untrue.

6- Egyptian enlightenment movement surpassed the closed-mindedness of Salafist traditions as far as women are concerned, and we are honored to have participated in this movement using the Quran to prove equality of sexes in it, as Quranic commands and prohibitions address both men and women in terms of language and discourse and words used in Quranic verses. Both Muslim men and Muslim women have the same religious duties and acts of worship (48:17); Arabian Muslim women during the lifetime of Muhammad immigrated (4:98) like Arabian Muslim men and participated in defending Yathreb and participated actively in promotion of virtue and prevention of vice (9:71). Many historical accounts of historians Al-Tabari and Ibn Saad prove such active participation of all aspects of life in Yathreb city-state, and such relative accounts do not contradict the Quran, of course, and we can thus believe them. For further details, we refer readers to our book titled "Women's Right to Aspire to the Presidency of Any Islamic State" (83).

Shiites in Al-Masaary sharia:

1- Of course, all wringing of Al-Masaary and his publications overlooked Shiites and their plight and suffering within despicable conditions inside the KSA; yet, he once mentioned in Publication No. 24 that the Saudi stances against Shiite Iran is not based on sharia laws and that spending millions to refute Shiites creed notions and tenets in the KSA was done for political reasons only and not to support Wahabism, as relations with Iran used to fluctuate between good and bad, especially in relation to allowing and not allowing Iranian pilgrims to march in protest, with prior Saudi permission, during some pilgrimage seasons. In general, as Sunnite Wahabis, Al-Masaary and his fellows hated Shiites inside and outside the KSA, but they did not declare such hatred overtly in their writings.

2- Al-Masaary and members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights overlooked rights of Saudi Shiites and never tackled their plight and persecution in their writings; this was evident in never mentioning them in their reports submitted to human rights organizations, which had to contact Saudi Shiites themselves to talk about their being persecuted and their suffering of discrimination and animosity shown to them by Saudi scholars and extremists. Amnesty International urged the KSA to annul al laws that encourage discrimination against Saudi Shiites (84). Dr. Al-Masaary has deserted nuclear physics, the useful branch of science that he has specialized in, and he failed to continue teaching and making discoveries in it in order to devote his time to the Salafist/Wahabi falsehoods. Dr. Al-Masaary must be mentally treated at once at the expense of the Saudi royal family that has caused his mental disturbance!

Refutation of the Sunnite Al-Masaary sharia in prohibition of banks interests:

1- The unknown author of the book titled "The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family" says that women driving cars is a war against Islam and so does infidel atheist laws of usury and interests of banks systems inside the KSA. Al-Masaary and members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights tackled in many publications that the apostate Saudi rulers committed the sin of allowing banks to be built inside Arabia and tried to stop the establishment of an Islamic Bank, thus stopping the chance of repenting the sin of usury. The unknown author of the book titled "The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family" urged Saudi to withdraw their money from all banks to undermine the economy of the KSA, an evil State that resort to usury when dealing with foreign banks, a sign of the KSA lack of legitimacy and its waged war on Islam, as the Quran prohibits usury in 2:278-279 (85). Of course, Al-Masaary here does not come up with something novel; he quotes the views expressed by Saudi scholars before him.

2- Indeed, the trend of Quranism as an enlightened trend led by us in Egypt has refuted the Sunnite fundamentalist stance against banks; let us not forget that some Sunnite fundamentalists deceived some gullible Egyptians and stole their money by urging them to stop dealing with banks of 'usury' and to put their savings in 'Islamic' investment companies, which went bankrupt soon enough! We refuted the Sunnite fundamentalist stance against banks using the following facts.

A) Prophet Muhammad and the caliphs until the Umayyad caliph Abdul-Malik Ibn Marwan used Byzantine currency and the Persian currency without adding any Arab or Islamic symbols on them; dinars and dirhams are mentioned in the Quran; see 3:75 and 12:20. The Umayyad caliph Abdul-Malik Ibn Marwan began to use coins with Arab or Islamic symbols on them and they did not prevent the using of Byzantine currency and the Persian currency, and therefore, it is not prohibited in Islam to deal with banks of the West countries.

B) Usury prohibited in the Quran is the one linked to charity money of alms and zakat; i.e., instead of paying alms to the poor, one would give the poor loans at interest rates. Such bad practice was spread in Mecca in the 7^th century and is prohibited in the Quran; see 30:28-29, 2:261-274, and 2:275-283.

C) Ancient scholars did not understand such verses properly; they prohibited all interests and they deemed them as usury and cursed all those involved in it, overlooking all about such context in the Quranic Chapter two: 2:261-274 and 2:275-283.

D) Usury or interests in trade are permitted in the Quran under two conditions: mutual consent; see 4:29, and such interests or usury are not compound interests; see 3:130. Hence, to borrow money at interests within trade projects is permissible, while not harming others involved in such dealings; see 2:282.

E) Islamic sharia laws in the Quran encourage quick move of financial capitals cycle, especially by giving donations, alms, charity, and zakat to the poor, as Islam prohibits monopoly of money by an affluent minority; see 59:7. Islam in the Quran prohibits all types of extravagance and encourages investment and trade under conditions of mutual consent and lack of compound interests (86). That is the brief summary of our innovative thought in this subject, within our project to spread Quranist enlightened trend of reform from within Islam in Egypt. As a result of our writing on that subject, Al-Azhar had to declare that dealing with all banks in Egypt is permissible and not against Islam. It seemed that the Sunnite fundamentalist movement in both Egypt and the KSA dedicated time and efforts to declare its foes as infidels and apostates in order to seek to reach power and political authority and it manipulated the name of Islam in their corrupt notions causing bloodshed and causing non-Muslims worldwide to accuse Islam of backwardness, terrorism, and fanaticism. This is the worst sin of Sunnite fundamentalists, especially Al-Masaary and his likes. Dr. Al-Masaary has deserted nuclear physics, the useful branch of science that he has specialized in, and he failed to continue teaching and making discoveries in it in order to devote his time to the Salafist/Wahabi falsehoods. Dr. Al-Masaary must be mentally treated at once at the expense of the Saudi royal family that has caused his mental disturbance!

Third Aspect: psycho-sociologist analysis of the Salafist trend in the KSA:

Firstly: sociology of the Egyptian terrorist MB group:

1- Muhammad Ali Pacha of Egypt and his successor and son Khedive Ismail created a renaissance in education that allowed youths of lower classes to ascend the social ladder, like the famous Azharite author and translator-cum-writer Rifaa Al-Tahtawi the francophone sheikh in the 19^th century. Class barriers and distinctions dominated the first half of the 20^th century, and social mobility allowed others to ascend social ladders and to change social values and mores, while middle classed of educated white-collar employees grew bigger. Political life flourished in that liberal era, and this raised political awareness led people to form secret and overt parties and groups to engage in politics; such as the secular communists and the Wahabi terrorist MB group. Sadly, the Wahabi MB group spread all over Egyptian soil with headquarters in every city to recruit youths in the name of Islam; frustrated impoverished youths found in Salafism an outlet to achieve dreams of gaining power and wealth while feigning to serve Islam! Some other poor youths joined the army and formed the Free Officers movement that planned and executed the 1952 coup. When the 1952 military coup occurred in Cairo to put an end to corrupt monarchy and to establish the Arab Republic of Egypt, the terrorist MB members urged the Egyptian public to accept the coup and to rename it as the 1952 revolution. Strangely, the terrorist MB members felt that the Free Officers of the coup must reward them for their services and allow them a margin in ruling Egypt. Such a request was haughtily refused by President Gamal Abdel-Nasser who persecuted the terrorist MB members and imprisoned many leaders and members of the illegal Wahabi terrorist MB group. Most of the terrorist MB members fled to the KSA, their spiritual homeland, and returned to Egypt in the 1970s when the next president of Egypt, Sadat, welcomed them back and supported their establishing Sunnite Salafist fundamentalist trends in Egypt to help him face, crush, and vanquish Nasserist and communists.

2- We conclude from the above that education played a great social role in alleviating political disputes and class conflicts; ambitious youths ascended the social ladder and used their knowledge to revolt against the Egyptian social norms at the time or to ameliorate conditions in Egyptian social life. Hence during the Nasserist Era, education removed social class barriers and clever sons of the poor studied at Egyptian universities and got employed as per their personal abilities and cleverness, not based on their classes, families, connections, authority, or wealth.

3- Such state of affairs ended once Sadat came to power in 1971; his so-called open-door policies, plus allowing room for Wahabi Salafists and MB members to infiltrate Egyptian life again, negatively influenced education levels. People scrambled for money to gain as much as they can within all possible legal and illegal means. Poor youths joined Salafists trends to vent their frustrations; especially that Sadat welcomed such destructive trends. Political opposition of fundamentalists grew stronger in Egypt, until struggle between them and Sadat regime ended in his assassination by terrorist MB Salafist members. Sadly, all extremists and fundamentalists that formed overt and secret groups of opposition and terrorism as well as preaching and charity organizations during the reign of Mubarak came from the terrorist MB group and are financed by the KSA.

4- Rich Egyptian Wahabi Salafists and MB members used to live in the KSA and formed connections there, and Bin Laden was the result of the marriage between Wahabi opposition movements inside the KSA and the terrorist MB members who lived there for a while. Hence, the conditions of the emergence of the terrorist Egyptian MB group are similar to those of Al-Masaary and his fellows, who were disciples of the terrorist MB members at one time.

Secondly: sociology of the Wahabi fundamentalist movement in the KSA:

1- We find almost similar features in the current Saudi Sunnite fundamentalist opposition movement; education and modernization spread and reached a zenith during the reign of King Feisal, but sticking to Salafist traditional staples resulted in the emergence of the current Saudi Sunnite fundamentalist opposition movement. Salafist traditional staples are based on the notion of changing/removing vice/sins by force while declaring others as apostates and infidels; such notions allow ample scope to reject any status quo using Salafist Wahabi sharia-based pretexts and to incite revolts or rebellions by quoting ancient scholars. Ironically, the same Salafist Sunnite sources of ancient volumes, tomes, and books are used by formal high-rank Saudi scholars to promote notions of blind obedience to rulers, and they could be used to urge following a dissident or a rebel who claims to embody and represent sharia!

2- Hence, overambitious youths who studied Salafism/Wahabism inside the KSA and delved deep into it might think they deserve to rule Arabia instead of affluent, corrupt Saudi prince who claim to apply sharia but they do not. Saudi reality imposes on such youths to get satisfied only by their being employed and rewarded handsomely with big salary. Even promotions are restricted to cronies and retinue of the Saudi King and princes and no other persons, however clever or excellent in their fields, is admitted into such closed circle. Thus, frustrated youths have no place under the sun because of a social, religious, and political status quo. Hence, nothing left to such youths but to claim to be more pious and religious than the Saudi royal family and to speak in the name of 'Islam' (i.e., Wahabism in their views) to try to remove the vice or status quo imposed by the Saudi regime, by aiming to outdo and surpass Saudi high-rank formal scholars who are dunces and hypocrites manipulated by the unjust regime to praise and flatter the king and princes and who know very little about Wahabism in comparison to frustrated fundamentalist youths. Accordingly, fundamentalists gain popularity in the Saudi street and this would encourage them to seek playing political roles, imagining that the weapon of sharia words and notions might overthrow the Saudi regime.

3- Hence, we understand now the basis of the struggle between the Wahabi Sunnite fundamentalist opposition movement and the Saudi royal family, and we discern how such opposition differs from that of the Najd Brothers who had military skills but little knowledge of Wahabism and had no technology and sense of cultural and political changes as available in the 1990s. The Najd Brothers were thus defeated by Abdul-Aziz and GB who had more brains, acumen, culture, technological advances, money, authority, and modern weapons. When Juhayman Al-Otaybi had deeper and greater knowledge of Sunnite Wahabism/Salafism, Saudi rulers never cared about him at first, and he had to draw everyone's attention by force when he committed the crime of invading the Sacred Kaaba Mosque. When the Egyptian terrorist MB group members inculcated and injected their ideologies to Saudis, the current Wahabi Sunnite opposition fundamentalists emerged to inherit all this and then some, and fundamentalists added their own imprint in the 1990s. Of course, Wahabi opposition fundamentalists had no weapons and arms like the Najd Brothers, but they have the powerful weapon/tool of the word; they know how to manipulate words, terms, Wahabi/Salafist notions, and faulty logic to engage into peaceful yet ferocious struggle against the KSA. Unlike the Najd Brother, Wahabi opposition fundamentalists have used all products and inventions of the West and lived in Europe, but they have declared people of the West as infidels. Wahabi opposition fundamentalists hope one day to achieve what the Najd Brothers and Al-Otaybi failed to do: to reach power in Arabia and to unify all the Islamic countries under one caliphate of Salafism under their rule. If the Najd Brothers lacked the means and the brains, and if Al-Otaybi had the deep Wahabi knowledge but lacked the experience and the means, the Wahabi fundamentalist opposition movement of the 1990s represent a strange alliance of independent Wahabi scholars, who did not work under the Saudi regime, and some university teachers who were taught abroad in the best universities in the West.

4- The last phrase is exemplified in the alliance between the judge sheikh Abdulla Al-Masaary, the opposition scholar, and his son Dr. Muhammad Al-Masaary who got a Ph.D. degree in nuclear physics. Both the father and the son had deep and thorough knowledge of Wahabism/Salafism. Dr. Al-Masaary excelled and outdone high-rank scholars like Ibn Baz and Ibn Otheimein and their likes and he deserted nuclear physics. What has driven him to do so? The answer is so easy: his political ambitions nurtured by Salafist ideology inside the mind of anyone who delve deep in it. Of course, Al-Saud family do not care about Ph.D. degrees of their subjects, as such princes think they own the land and people on it, as per Middle-Ages mentality of rule revived by Wahabism. Prince Salman was beseeched by some scholars to release Dr. Al-Masaary from prison, but Prince Salman told the mediators that he does not care at all about knowledge and degrees of Dr. Al-Masaary. Yet, it is certain that the deep Salafist knowledge of Al-Masaary proved dangerous when used in his books and writings to undermine the KSA and its regime, especially when formal State scholars failed miserably to refute him. Even if Dr. Al-Masaary were to receive a Nobel price, he would have been still regarded as merely one of the subjects owned by the Saudi family members. Hence, he hated the KSA and its rulers who think they own Arabia and its dwellers. He felt inferior to princes who expected him to be a faithful servant to them, and this made him furious and eager to seek to vent his fury and frustration by undermining the KSA by his writings to wreak his revenge while sating safely in Europe. Hence, his deep knowledge in physics s useless to him, while his deep knowledge in Sunnite Wahabi traditions is the one needed to make him rise above Al-Saud royal family and demand to rule their kingdom; he would brandish the weapon of sharia against their weapon of sword-conquest legitimacy. He felt that one day, his project would succeed and many followers would join him to topple the Saudi regime, and then, he would be appointed as caliph/ruler over Arabia and later on over an empire ruled in the caliphate system comprising all Arab-Muslim countries!

5- Like Al-Masaary, several rich Salafist Sunnite Wahabi fundamentalists combined both higher degrees and deep knowledge of Wahabism, and they could not confine their ambition to being employed with high salaries as scholars or employees; rather, they sought to share power and authority of Al-Saud royal family. Regional and international circumstances like the Gulf War and the Afghanistan war made such Wahabi-cultured elite members gather and form opposition movement that began with letter of demands and memo of advice, and the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights emerged as a result. It issued several statements and publications, and Dr. Al-Faqeeh and other members left it after months of unsettled disputes. Their dream is impossible to achieve: an empire/caliphate unifying all Arab and Islamic countries. Such notions and dreams led members of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights to use political propaganda of spreading rumors and Sufi-like talk about visions and dreams, and eventually Al-Masaary resorted to harsh arracks using verbal abuse and coarse language as he failed to change realty and to incite Saudis to join him and topple the Saudi regime by a revolt or a coup. Other non-Saudi jihadists imitated Al-Masaary and found safe homes in the West countries to conspire against their former homelands under the pretext of establishing a caliphate that will fight the West. The modern world all over the globe no longer care about Salafist dreams and ancient Middle-Ages notions, despite propagating them using modern technology and media and telecommunications. Yet, no one can move back in time or to force the Time to move anticlockwise.

6- It is clear that Islam – the Quran alone – is valid and applicable in all eras, as we have explained in all our Quranist writings in Arabic and in English but Muslims must distill Quranist vision that cope with modern age of human rights, democracy, citizenry, and higher Quranic values of peace, justice, charity, equality, freedom, etc. Quran must be read and understood according to its own terms as Quranists do in order to realize that the Quran copes with all of the above values and human rights. All fiqh (jurisprudence) and hadiths under the three main labels of Sunnite, Shiite, and Sufi sects are man-made, fabricated rubbish that reflects Middle-Ages types of injustices and NOT Islam found exclusively in the Quran which is preserved intact for 14 centuries until the end of days. Quranism proves that Quran urged to protect all of the above values and human rights that were confiscated by 14-centuries-old corrupt caliphate ruling system.

Psychological view of Al-Masaary and members of his Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights:

1- The West has allowed Al-Masaary and his fellows the freedom of expression, but we want here to use writings of Al-Masaary in order to analyze briefly the psychological state of Al-Masaary and his fellow jihadists who live in London. Let us quote some words from Publication No. 142 about the Iraqi siege crisis. Al-Masaary and his fellows who live in London declared 'war' on the USA and the UK, and British and international media paid attention to them. This is what Al-Masaary aimed for; to get attention of international media to catapult him into the heart of events, even if this would make the West and East people mock and deride him: (… All Islamist organizations in London, including the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, took the initiative to declare and wage war on the USA and the UK governments on 10^th of Feb. 1998, and this led to reactions that have shaken international media and political milieus worldwide … our spokesman was interviewed several times and delivered several speeches to written and audiovisual media … and he talked with the British defense minister himself … this led to hot debates online and Scotland Yard had to interrogate Islamist leaders living in London … we urged the UK not to engage into war against the Iraqi Muslims … The Times asserts that at least 100 Islamists might be deported … this is intellectual terror or psychological war, and we think that British police is not going to do any exceptional measures at all … especially that many British citizens and institutions, especially the Anglican Church and the Catholic Church, as well as many syndicates, socialist parties, etc. oppose the UK getting involved in Iraq … even the old hag Madeleine Albright and the American Defense Minister were defeated in a debate within the CNN channel by Ohio university students … so many opposed such war and formed protest marches and sits-in before the American embassies in many countries an before the British House of the Commons … fatwas were issued by all leaders of Islamist groups in the Arab world … to declare anyone helping in war against Iraq as infidels who helped in shedding Muslim blood … all fatwas declared war on the USA and the corrupt, unjust usury-based capitalism as well as the call to destroy institutions of injustice and oppressions like the UN, IMF, etc. … to convert the West to Islam and to save the oppressed people all over the globe that suffered enough from the USA oppression and injustices …)

2- We conclude from the quote above that although the West provided fundamentalists with protection and human rights, they ungratefully declare war on the West countries. Of course, this was merely an empty claim to get media attention, but rumors and fear spread for a while, but stopped when the West realized how weak and silly such dwarfs were. The worst catastrophe is that the West countries think falsely that such terrorists are typically representing Muslims and Islam; this falsehood is refuted only via Quranism: true Islam for Quranists like us the author of this book that you are reading right now and founder of the Quranist trend.

3- Al-Masaary and his fellows are extremists who declare themselves as more Wahabis than their masters: the terrorist MB group members, as Al-Masaary declared it a big mistake that some MB members cooperated with Arab regimes to inculcate people their Wahabi notions before reaching power one day after gradual pavement of the route: (… gradual application of Islam by the MB members who collaborate with corrupt Arab regimes will never begin by remaining silent regarding infidel laws and rule of apostates, as this destroys real call to God and Islam … such corrupt regimes must be toppled by force … MB members participating in elections in any Arab country are committing a big mistake and forsaking Islam by reinforcing the corrupt regimes that made peace and applied normalization with Israelis … ) (87). It is funny that Al-Masaary calls for unifying the 'Islamic' nation while he attacks his masters the terrorist MB group members though he shares their ideology. Let us be reminded that Al-Masaary expelled Al-Faqeeh from the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights just because he tended toward adopting policies of the terrorist MB group in infiltrating inside the regime and not to declare rulers as apostates, as he faced reality and dealt with it realistically, unlike Al-Masaary.

4- Such psychological illnesses of Al-Masaary were never suffered by one of those who never joined the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, the enlightened reformist thinker Dr. Ahmed Al-Tuweijri who combined deep 'Islamic' studies with degrees from the West universities. Al-Tuweijri belongs to a family of high authority with close contact and relation with the Crown Prince Abdullah. Yet, Al-Tuweijri disregards such authority and wealth of his family and initiated a peaceful call for reform. He was driven to tender his resignation from his post, and when he submitted a paper of reforms that takes into consideration the special culture, conditions, and circumstances of the KSA, he was incarcerated on 30^th of Aug., 1993. Liberty Organization described him as a model of modern Muslim reformers that was eager to satisfy all secular, liberal, Sunnite, and Shiite trends inside the KSA as equal citizens, with enlightened vision concerning rights of women, Shiites, and all types of freedom (88). We are sure that if Al-Tuweijri had gone to London to join Al-Masaary, disputes would have occurred because of different visions, and Al-Masaary would have expelled him from the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights and declare him as an apostate. Hence, Al-Masaary and his few fellows left represent an extremist, fanatical trend among fundamentalist trends in general, and they are throbbing with animosity and deep-seated hatred toward everyone, and they declare both their arch-enemies and intellectual foes as apostates, while most people hated and attacked by Al-Masaary and his fellows remain silent and ignored the very existence of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

Lastly:

Dr. Al-Masaary has deserted nuclear physics, the useful branch of science that he has specialized in, and he failed to continue teaching and making discoveries in it in order to devote his time to the Salafist/Wahabi falsehoods. Dr. Al-Masaary must be mentally treated at once at the expense of the Saudi royal family that has caused his mental disturbance!

A final word on the man-made Sunnite sharia:

Salafists and their likes consider their views and notions as divine sharia, though their notions and views are mere man-made discourses influenced by psychological and social factors. This applies to all ancient or contemporary Sunnite scholars, like Al-Shafei, Ibn Taymiyya, and Al-Masaary. The big error has been to consider their views and notions as divine sharia that entails military jihad or endeavors for the sake of applying it by force. In that way, such Sunnites and their likes do grave injustice to God and to people. There are man-made, fabricated religions of the Muhammadans that are peaceful and acknowledge pluralism, such as Sufism and its sub-sects, and there are man-made, fabricated religions of the Muhammadans that urge violence and terror, such as the Sunnite Wahabism that calls for jihad military fighting to impose itself on people. Such violent man-made, fabricated religions of the Muhammadans pose a threat and a veritable danger to the international peace and need to be refuted from within Islam (i.e., the Quran alone) in order to clear the name of Islam tarnished by them and in order to save the human civilization.

Footnotes of CHAPTER II, CHAPTER III, and CHAPTER IV of PART III:

1- "The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family", page 1.

2- Wahba, ''Arabia in the 20^th Century", 1956, Cairo, page 300.

3- Wahba, ditto, page 280.

4- Umm Al-Qura Magazine, 23^rd Sept., 1932.

Kishk, ''The Saudis and the Islamic Solution'', pages 691 and 692.

5- Kishk, ditto, 81 and 259.

6- Al-Masaary, "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", pages 116 and 120.

7- "The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family ", pages 2, 4, and 10.

8- Al-Masaary, ditto, pages 72, 78, 100, and 116:117.

9- Al-Masaary, ditto, pages 6, 7, 9, 13, 11, 15, 16, 17, 43, 84, 94, 101, and 105.

10- Al-Masaary, ditto, page 12.

11- Al-Masaary, "The Fatwa on Polytheistic Rulers", undated, London, pages 2, 7, and 9.

12- Al-Masaary, "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", pages 35 and 110.

13- Al-Masaary, ditto, page 59.

14- Al-Masaary, "Judging Rulers", 2^nd edition, 2000, London, pages 69, 84, and 88.

15- Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia, No. 16, May 1992, pages 38 and 42.

16- Liberty report: http://www.e-group.com/massage/taqarir./12

17- Al-Masaary, ditto, page 6 and 7.

18- Al-Masaary, "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", page 131.

19-"The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family ", pages 15 and 16.

20- Al-Masaary, ditto, pages 8 and 116.

21- Al-Masaary, ditto, pages 6 and 105.

22- Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia, ditto, page 39.

23- Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia, ditto, pages 43 and 45.

24-http//www.amnesty-arabic-org/saudianarabia/text/se../secretstate-made23-01-00-bh:p8

http//www.amnesty.org.saudiaarabia:secrecyandfearpp:6,7,10

25- Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center of 1996 on the civil society and democratic transition, pages 297:303.

26- Al-Masaary, ditto, page 17.

27- Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia, ditto, page 26.

28- Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center of 1992 on the civil society and democratic transition, pages 194:214.

29- Mansour (Dr. Ahmed Subhy), a study titled ''Democratic Elections in Egypt'', published in the annual report of civil society and democratic transition, 1997, Cairo, pages 429:432.

30- "The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family ", pages 13 and 19.

31- Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center of 1994 on the civil society and democratic transition, page 166.

32- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 16, 17, 19, 21, 25, 33, and 56 as well as the exceptional one No. 2.

33- ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'', page 25.

Publication No. 16 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

Statement of Liberty, London, on 23^rd of May, 1993.

34- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 6, 19, 20, and 33.

35- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 16 and 43.

36- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 20, 21, 23, 44, 57, 59, 63, 69, 70, and 149.

37- Publication No. 87 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

38- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 38, 45, 58, and 145.

39- Publication No. 13 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

Al-Masaary, ditto, page 8.

40- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 110, 114, 130, 131, 132, and 133.

41- Al-Masaary, ditto, page 9.

42- Annual Report of Ibn Khaldoun Center on the civil society and democratic transition, of 1995 pages 156 and 165, of 1997 pages 297:303.

43- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 97 and 98.

44- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 5, 15, 31, 34, 35, 61, 67, 68, 75, and 78.

Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia newspaper, ditto, page 5.

45- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 17, 33, 34, 37, 40, 46, 122, 131, 149, and 152, to name but a few examples.

46- Publication No. 145 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

47- Publication No. 78 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

48- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 20, 23, 26, 30, and 31.

49- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 122, 131, 135, 150, and 152.

50- Al-Masaary, ditto, pages 31, 32, 55, and 116.

51- Publication No. 130 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

52- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 121, 130, and 135.

53- Publication No. 147 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

54- Al-Masaary, ditto, page 141.

55- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 6, 9, 13, 15, 33, 34, and 37 as well as statement No. 9.

56- Liberty report, ditto, page 9.

Al-Haramein, ditto, pages 1 and 2.

Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia, ditto, pages 26 and 38.

57- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 67, 123, and 147.

Al-Masaary, ''Judging Rulers'', pages 197 and 207.

58- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 17, 19, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 70, 72, 74, 76, 84, and 142.

Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia, ditto, page 47.

Liberty report, ditto, page 6 and 7.

59- Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia, ditto, pages 38, 45, 46, and 47.

Statement No. 23 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

60- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 57, 71, 72, 73, 84, and 114.

61- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 9, 11, 14, 15, 18, 23, 25, 28, 31, 36, 38, and 76.

62- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 15, 17, 21, 23, and 24.

63- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 26, 27, 32, and 39.

64- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 5, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 27, 41, and 42.

65- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 3, 4, 5, 10, 14, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 32, 42, 44, 54, 56, 59, 66, and 76.

Liberty report, ditto, pages 6 and7

66- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 17, 21, 34, 36, and 39.

67- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 4, 5, 18, 20, 21, 24, 37, 41, 49, and 112.

Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia, ditto, page 19.

68- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 6, 7, 9, 10, 15, 25, 34, 35, 37, 41, and 79.

69- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 6, 14, 43, 70, 84, 131, and 133.

70- Mansour (Dr. Ahmed Subhy), a study titled "An Islamic Vision Concerning the Relation with the Other", published in the book of the third intellectual forum of the Egyptian organization of human rights, 1992, Cairo, and published in ''Humanity and Development'' Magazine, 19^th year, issue No. 60, Jan. 1998, page 11.

71- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 18, 24, 43, 55, 102, 139, and 138.

Al-Masaary, "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", page 12.

Al-Masaary, ''Judging Rulers'' page 88.

72- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 33 and 136.

Al-Masaary, "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", pages 3 and 6.

73- Al-Masaary, ditto, pages 3, 11, 19, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 38,40, 41, 43, 44, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 62, 80, 84, 85, 92, 96, and 131.

Al-Masaary, ''Judging Rulers'', page 7.

Al-Masaary, "The Fatwa on Polytheistic Rulers", pages 4:10.

74- Al-Masaary, "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", pages 106:115.

Al-Masaary, ''Judging Rulers'', page 7.

Al-Masaary, "The Fatwa on Polytheistic Rulers", pages 17:20.

75- Al-Masaary, "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", pages 26, 27, 41, 42, 62, 99, 100, 108, and 113.

Liberty report, ditto, pages 1:3.

76- Mansour (Dr. Ahmed Subhy), ''Punishment of Apostasy'', published in Arabic in 1993, 1995, and 2000, Cairo, and translated into English in 1999.

Mansour (Dr. Ahmed Subhy), a study titled ''Freedom of Thought between Islam and Muslims'', published in 1992 in the book of the Third Intellectual Forum of the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights.

Al-Banna (Gamal), the following books published in The Islamic Center, Cairo, ''No for Traditional Scholars'' 1995, ''Islam and the Freedom of Thought'' 1995, and ''Punishment of Apostasy Is A Fabrication of Ancient Scholars".

77- Publications of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights, Nos. 13, 55, 73, and 148.

Al-Masaary, "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", pages 16, 26, and 27.

78- Publication No. 78 and statement No. 31 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

Al-Masaary, ditto, page 42.

Liberty report, ditto, page 20.

79- ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'', pages 7:9.

80- Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia, issue No. 16, May 1992, pages 38 and 44:46.

81- Saudi Arabia: Secrecy and Fear: www.amnesty.org, pages 4 and 17.

82- Annual Reports of Ibn Khaldoun Center of 1999, published in 2000, on the civil society and democratic transition, pages 295, 297, and 298.

83- Mansour (Dr. Ahmed Subhy), a research paper titled ''Women's Right to Aspire to the Presidency of Any Islamic State", published earlier in 1999 in the periodical of (Rowaq Arabi), issued by the Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies, issue No. 15 & 16, 1999, Cairo, pages 64:99.

Mansour (Dr. Ahmed Subhy), a research paper titled "Rights of Women between International Agreements and Political Islam", published in the series titled "human rights debates" No. 6, 1999, issued by the Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies, Cairo, pages 67:75.

Al-Banna (Gamal),"Muslim Women between the Quranic Sharia and Restrictions of Scholars", Islamic Center, 1998, Cairo.

84- Liberty report, ditto, 1 and 2.

Amnesty report about secrecy and fear, pages 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 17.

Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia, ditto, pages 38, 43, 44, and 47.

85- Statement No. 35 and publications Nos. 18 and 39 of the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights.

Al-Masaary, "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", pages 15 and 22.

''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'', page 9.

86- Mansour (Dr. Ahmed Subhy), an article titled "Which Is Permitted or Prohibited: Banks or 'Islamic' Money Investment Companies", published in the governmental daily Cairo-based Al-Akhbar Newspaper, on 29^th of June, 1998.

Mansour (Dr. Ahmed Subhy), an article titled "The Issue of Usury and the Crisis of Innovative Thinking", published in the Cairo-based Al-Akhbar Newspaper, on 30^th of May, 1990.

Mansour (Dr. Ahmed Subhy), an article titled "The Issue of Usury and the Crisis of Morality", published in the independent Cairo-based Al-Midan Newspaper, on 15^th of Oct., 1996, among other researches delivered and submitted within several intellectuals forums covered in Arab and foreign newspapers.

87- Al-Masaary, "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", pages 120 and 121.

88- Liberty report, ditto, London, on 14^th Sept. 1993.

CONCLUSION:

CONCLUSION:

N.B.: this conclusion was published separately in Arabic on our website on the 12^th of Nov., 2012, two years before serializing this book into articles two years later and before compiling these articles in a book form later on.

The conclusion of an unpublished book about the Wahabi opposition movements:- (Nov., 2012)

Introduction:

1- Our Quranism website sometimes is attacked by hackers who try to creep into it like crawling insects to try to block it or to destroy its content, but we try as best as we can to stop them. This ongoing struggle has lasted since last week. We got used to this ongoing war against Quranism since 1977, when we have begun preaching Quranism, and the rounds of this war differ in persons, locations, and timings, but it remains a struggle between a free pen of a free thinker refuting religious myths on one hand, and those who are making a living off such religious myths on the other hand. Such beneficiaries hate the Quranic Truth, and consequently, they ardently want to break our free pen with all their might and power. This ongoing war against Quranism (i.e., true and real Islam as we see it) has a new field now: the cyberspace of the internet. Enemies and foes of Quranism fail to intellectually refute us using logical thinking and reasoning; hence, they use their full potential and power within several countries, billions of money, and billions of followers to destroy the Quranist thought. Previously, foes incarcerated us and persecuted us in many other ways in Egypt. When we left for the USA as a political asylee, we have enjoyed freedom of thought, expression, and belief away from the hands of our persecutors. Yet, hackers never cease to try to block and destroy our website, which is modest and simple yet unique in its intellectual content. If we have been afraid of anyone, we would not have continued our intellectual peaceful reform for more than 35 years. In fact, we feel indebted to our foes as we make good use of their folly and ignorance; a researcher/thinker like ourselves who lack means and money needs the barks of such ignoramuses so that publicity is done to Quranism for free, without exerting efforts on our part. People hear of Quranism as long as our foes verbally abuse us. The caravan of Quranists has been launched since 1977, and it has never lacked barking dogs, bringing free propaganda to Quranism, more fame to our person, and more momentum for us to write more and more articles and book/researches. God has been very good to our humble person: He has granted with a soul which is seeking and enjoying challenges. We have defied the persecution inflicted by our foes on us with more researching and producing more books and articles. We have written so far more than 2000 articles, books, researches, and fatwas (religious edict or view), and we have several writings that wait to be published online, including dramatic, artistic works penned by us in Egypt years ago.

2- Challenges and the needed courage to rise to face them become more prominent when aggressions and persecutions aggravate. We feel bound to mention here that the worst period of persecution we have gone through was shortly before seeking political asylum in the USA and fleeing with our life before our enemies would manage to assassinate us. During this period of suffering, we have written this book about the Wahabi opposition movements in the KSA. During our period of ordeal, we insisted with great vehemence to write this book, in order to challenge such an ordeal and to face our feeling of being continuously threatened. We might have been assassinated anytime during those long months before we left to the USA. We have written that book while knowing beforehand that no publisher would publish it in print anywhere in any country. We have written this book to react to the persecution we have suffered without deserving it. We were living at the time in the low-class Al-Matariyya district in the Egyptian capital, Cairo, impecunious and in constant fear of double trouble: the terror caused by the government of Mubarak that wanted to incarcerate us and the worse Salafist/Wahabi terror that ardently seek to murder us. Our suffering at the time egged us on to write this book about the Wahabi opposition movements in the 20^th century. We have written it to occupy our mind away from fear of being assassinated. We felt quite sure that any worldly ordeal must come to an end eventually, and whatever we write will not be in vain or a waste of time and effort. Such were the circumstances of writing this book at the time.

3- This period has covered several months from 2000 to 2001. This was the worst ordeal we have undergone: to live in constant fright of being either arrested or murdered. The Saudi embassy in Egypt has been the body unofficially controlling the file of persecuting Egyptian Quranists. Some Quranists were active in their intellectual endeavors in Ibn Khaldoun Center, in Cairo, and we have been the director of a weekly forum in it. We undertook the supervision of all research activities inside it, and this included a project/program of reforming education systems in Egypt and another project/program of teaching Egyptians their political rights. Mubarak closed down Ibn Khaldoun Center, where we used to work and get a regular salary. The owner of the Center, Dr. Saad Eddine Ibrahim, was arrested in June 2000 under orders of Mubarak, along with some persons working in the Center and some of our fellow Quranists. Al-Akhbar daily Cairo-based governmental newspaper mentioned at the time that we ourselves got arrested, but this was a lie. It seemed that the authorities left us to live in constant fear of incarceration to force us to keep a low profile to avoid being arrested anytime. A police force from Al-Matariyya District Police Station positioned itself before the building we live in, to watch over us, waiting for orders of our arrest. While gathering and collecting material for this book, we felt frightened whenever our door was knocking. We feared at the time that the police force would arrest us and confiscate the draft of this book, as we have lost a draft of one of our books before when we got arrested in Nov. 1987. Thus, we have finished writing this book within a year of severe persecution since the closure of Ibn Khaldoun Center. We have written this book from June 2000 to June 2001.

4- This book tackles several different types of Wahabi opposition movements against the rule of the Saudi royal family, beginning with the fanatical Wahabi Najd Brothers who opposed their master, Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, the very first king and founder of the third, current KSA, and who were his faithful bigots and soldiers whose disputes and conflicts with him drove them to rebel against him until he defeated and crushed them. Another opposition movement was peaceful and noble, initiated by the moderate Sunnite human-rights Saudi activist Nasser Al-Saeed. Another opposition movement was initiated by the Wahabi sheikh, theologian, and clergyman Juhayman Al-Otaybi who led and organized a movement that occupied the Kaaba Mosque in Mecca in the first day of 1400 A.H. another opposition movement that close the book was initiated by the religious panel formed by the end of the Gulf War by the leader Dr. Al-Masaary and his men, a movement that eventually begot Osama Bin Laden. Thus, our book has been based on researching Saudi opposition movements coming forth from inside Wahabism itself in order to assert an important fact that typically repeats itself: any theocracy suffer those who revolt against it based on self-proclamation as more ''pious'' and so more fit to rule instead of a present ruler who would be declared an ''infidel'' or an ''apostate''. This has occurred in the KSA and in Afghanistan, and we fear that this might occur in Egypt within a decade or so after writing this book.

5- Having finished writing this book, we got news of our imminent arrest, and a day before the police force came to our apartment to arrest us, we managed to flee their constant watching over us. We remember our happiness inside the plane, heading to the USA, on Monday, 16^th of October, 2001, looking in relief at the Egyptian deserts out the window, with every fiber of our being feeling grateful and thankful to Almighty God as He allowed our narrow escape from out persecutors: Mubarak and the Wahabis. Since then, we have enjoyed our dignity and freedom in the USA, with the grace and bounty of God, and we have launched our website to spread Quranism. The Wahabi war against us and Quranism goes on within the cyberspace. Some parts of this book have been published here online, especially parts about the MB terrorist organization established by agents of Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud in Egypt in 1928 to replace the Najd Brothers and the parts about Nasser Al-Saeed, the greatest man born in Arabia within the last millennium. It is high time to publish the whole of this book online.

6- Within circumstances of Wahabi and Salafist hackers trying to block our website and destroy its contents, we have re-lived the atmosphere of the times when we have written this book in Cairo. We publish this part of the book now in 2012 as a reaction to such hackers/aggressors and to give an overview about the circumstances and conditions in the Middle East region before the 9/11 attacks in the USA, in order to compare them to the circumstances and conditions in the Middle East region now after the so-called Arab Spring that has turned into a bleak wintry long night of Wahabism and Salafism that will wreak havoc in the Middle East region and all over the world at large. Our dear readers will find that what we have written in 2000-2001 is still valid and related to our era now.

Lastly:

We are still engaged into an ongoing war that has begun since 1977 in Cairo, when we have started to spread Quranism. We spread innovative, original ideas and Wahabis of all sorts have no response but aggression and verbal abuse against us, because they could not refute our school of thought: Quranism. Our insistence grows more solid as our thought and notions stir their fury and expose their utter ignorance and sheer fraud. Quranism threatens the very existence of the Wahabi/Sunnite, Shiite, and Sufi religions. Thus, the difference between Quranists and Wahabis is shown; we, Quranists, write innovatively and originally to reveal forgotten and deliberately ignored facts of the Quran, and they, Wahabis, use all their power, might, wealth, and influence to misguide people and to lead them away from the divine path of God: the Quran. Each party of the two will be rewarded in the Hereafter according to their work and deeds. Almighty God will judge us and them in the day of Resurrection to reward each one individually as per one's faith and deeds, either in Hell or in Paradise. The sorrow of those denying the Quran and leading others away from its guidance will be immense and boundless. God says in the Quran: "Most surely We will support Our messengers and those who believe, in this life, and on the Day the witnesses arise. The Day when their excuses will not profit the wrongdoers and the curse will be upon them, and they will have the Home of Misery." (40:51-52). "Losers are those who deny the encounter with God. Then, when the Hour comes upon them suddenly, they will say, "Alas for us, how we have neglected it." And they will carry their burdens on their backs-evil is what they carry."(6:31). "O man! You are laboring towards your Lord, and you will meet Him. As for him who is given his book in his right hand. He will have an easy settlement. And he will return to his family delighted. But as for him who is given his book behind his back. He will call for death. And he will enter the Hell-Fire" (84:6-12). God says nothing but the Absolute Truth.

The conclusion written in 2001:

– 1 –

When Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud began establishing the third current KSA, he put into his consideration the local, regional, and international powers. The international powers meant at the time GB. The regional powers meant Iran, Iraq, the Levant, and Egypt, and the last three were under the British occupation at the time. Shiites were reigning supreme in Iran, and in the royal line of rulers in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan among the family and descendants of Al-Sharif Hussein. Egypt consisted dominantly of Sunnite Sufis. As for local powers surrounding the KSA, they were Yemen, Oman, and other Gulf countries, with an influential portion of Shiites population in them as well. In addition, there is Shiite population in the eastern region and Al-Ahsa region, where oil has been discovered later on, and the Shiite Al-Sharif Hussein family members ruling Hejaz region, where Mecca and Yathreb are located. Shiites, we must remember, are the historical archenemies of Al-Saud royal family and their victims since the rise and collapse of the first and second Saudi states especially during Bedouin and military raids against Shiites. Thus, Shiites surround the burgeoning kingdom of Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud in the east (Iran and the Gulf state), in the north (rulers/descendants of the Shiite Al-Sharif Hussein in Iraq and Jordan, and Shiites of Syria), and in the south (Yemen). In addition, Shiites inside the borders of the third, current KSA are deemed as time bombs. Hence, the burgeoning Saudi kingdom had no choice but to try very hard to control Egypt (a vast majority of Sunnite Sufis at the time) by converting Egyptians to Wahabism; or else, if Egypt were left alone with no Saudi influence, it might have joined the Shiite blocs surrounding the KSA, to the detriment of the Saudi kingdom. The Shiite influence poses a continual threat to the Saudis until now. There was another reason for Abdul-Aziz to endeavor to dominate Egyptian political, social, cultural and religious life; historically, Egypt was the country behind the collapse of the very first KSA in 1818 by the Egyptian army sent by the governor of Egypt at the time, Muhammad Ali Pacha, led by his son Ibrahim Pacha, under the Ottomans' orders. Egypt was the indirect agent causing the collapse of the second KSA by inciting internal strife, conflicts, and disputes among emirs and governors of regions of Arabia, again under the supervision of the Ottomans. Hence, Abdul-Aziz realized that the fate of his burgeoning kingdom is directly linked to the two most – and only – powerful regional powers: Iran and Egypt. Let alone the international power, GB, which had great influence in the whole of the Middle East at the time. Thus, Abdul-Aziz had to win over GB to his side and to convert Egyptians from Sunnite Sufism dominant at the time to the Sunnite Wahabi Ibn Hanbal religion. Of course, the political conditions and circumstances of Egypt and of the international powers helped Abdul-Aziz to achieve such goals, and above all, the discovery of oil in the KSA aided him a great deal. When Abdul-Aziz made sure that Egypt and GB were on his side and supported his KSA, he felt that conditions were settled in his kingdom; he could keep off any Shiite threat inside the KSA and around its borders. In brief, the Middle East has but two main poles: Iran and Egypt, while countries in the middle between both poles (i.e., Arabia, the Levant, and Iraq) are located within the frame of political and religious competition between both poles. That was whyAbdul-Aziz endeavored – and succeeded – to make Egypt as the strategic depth of the KSA, and then, he made pacts with his allies (i.e., GB and, later on, the USA). Thus, among the staples of the Saudi foreign policies, above anything else, are to win over Egypt and the USA to the side of KSA in all times. Yet, this staple was jeopardized when Nasserite Egypt emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, when President Gamal Abdel-Nasser ruled Egypt, and his Nasserist ideology of Pan-Arabism that oriented Egypt to assume leadership of the Arab world. Future evidence will reveal that the Saudi hands, during the reign of Feisal, were behind the setbacks of Nasserite Egypt in order to retrieve Egypt into the Saudi Wahabi orbit and under American influence when Sadat succeeded Abdel-Nasser in the 1970s. Historically, reading political events in Egypt from 1976 to 2000, we conclude that the KSA has benefited politically from Egypt, to the disadvantage of Egyptians. Thus, the KSA has benefited from the Egyptian strategic depth during the Egyptian monarchy epoch before 1952, and then, this depth caused great alarm and posed as a threat during the 950s and the 1960s. Upon the death of Abdul-Nasser in 1970, the KSA has taken advantage of Egypt to lead the Arab and Islamic world, manipulating Egyptian strategic depth and making use of an impoverished Egypt after the 1973 war. The KSA managed to subjugate Egypt in the political, religious, and cultural domains. To quote an example: let us not forget that the KSA drew benefits from the 1973 war despite the fact that it never participated in it; oil prices soared up high in the KSA and its royal family gained billions of US$ without efforts, whereas Egypt was on the brink of bankruptcy. The Open-Door policy of Sadat made the Saudis culturally and religiously able to invade Egypt, buying Egyptian minds and bodies of Egyptian women. It is infuriating to imagine how such results occurred via blood of Egyptian martyrs of the 1973 war! It was unprecedented in history that a victorious nation, like the Egyptians in 1973, would turn some of its male citizens into workers and servants of another nation, i.e., the Saudis, and reduce some of its female citizens into slave-like existence in clandestine marriages with male Saudis or without marriage at all as sex-slaves to the Saudi tourists. The beneficiaries here, in the KSA, never fought in the 1973 war, but they gained the fruits of such victory to be leader of all Arabs in the Arab world countries and leader of the Islamic world countries instead of Egypt. The KSA has intentionally forgotten the Wahabi, Salafist theology of Ibn Taymiyya about Rikaz zakat; Rikaz is the theological term about zakat alms/charity from revenues gained from whatever extracted from inside the earth, like oil of course, and the rate of Rikaz zakat is one fifth of the revenues to be given to the poor, in that case, to be given to the poor Muslims from Bangladesh to Somalia! Islamic justice should have made the KSA give Egypt it share from the revenues of oil (Egypt deserve about half of it from 1974 until now, in retrospect) whose prices soared up in 1974; instead, the exact opposite occurred: the Saudis bought minds, manpower, and bodies of male and female Egyptians with the lowest prices possible. The Saudis at the time dealt with Egyptians with a backward mentality of enslavement. Things went upside down; Egypt used to control Hejaz and the Levant for centuries as vital points of strategic depth of the Egyptian State, and in the 20^th century, Egypt is under the control of Najd, a region in Arabia that was never of much consequence to anyone. In sum, the KSA has dominated the Egyptian strategic depth and made use of it to spread and propagate its Wahabi culture and to dwarf the secular, Shiite, and Sufi cultures in Egypt and the Arab world at large. Despite any feelings of fury an Egyptian reader would feel when reading the previous lines, and despite the dire consequences of this strange Saudi invasion of Egyptian mainstream culture, this Saudi influence is a historical exception of the permanent rule that will never be wiped out: originally, east of Arabia strategically follows Iran (the eastern pole of the Middle East), and the west of Arabia strategically follows Egypt (the western pole of the Middle East). As for Najd, it fluctuates between the two poles, as it is in cultural debate and conflict with Iraqi borders and borders of the Levant. Both the Levant and Iraq strategically follow both Iran, within its western borders, and Egypt, within its eastern borders. Historically, Iraq and the Levant suffered raids, savagery, and backwardness of Najd. We must remember that this permanent rule had two exceptions in history: 1) Arab conquests led by the Qorayish tribe, and whose armies consisted mainly of Najd dwellers, among other regions submitted to Qorayish after wars of the caliph Abou Bakr, the very first caliph/ruler. 2) When oil was discovered after Abdul-Aziz unified Arabia under his rule as he established the third, current KSA. Within exceptional conditions in the first case, Qorayish tribe ruled Egypt within the pre-Umayyad caliphs and within the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs. Revolts sprang from desert-Arabs and Bedouins who tried to take over the rule, in the names of Al-Khawarij, Al-Zanj, and the Qarmatians, and in all such cases, the capital of the Arab caliphate was a developed city, not part of deserts, such as Damascus and Baghdad. Thus, revolting groups at the time had to move into modern, civilized areas of centuries-old cities to begin their revolts. In other words, they had to move themselves into the eastern pole, Iran, even in its neighbor: Iraq. As for Egypt, it was a dependent region under the Umayyad rule based in Damascus, but in the Second Abbasid Era, Egypt grew more independent and enjoyed partial self-rule and nominal influence of the Abbasid caliphate for a while, and it was ruled independently away from the Abbasids by the Shiite Fatimids. The Shiite capital in Egypt, Cairo, competed with the Sunnite Abbasid capital, Baghdad. Even the Shiite Fatimid sultan and sheikhs reached Iraq and delivered sermons in mosque of Baghdad at one point during the revolt of Al-Basasiri. Thus, in all cases, political disputes and conflicts in Arabia always had to be linked and related to the two poles: Egypt and Iran, away from Arabian deserts. Historically, all revolts initiated in Hejaz to restore its former stature as the center of caliphate, in Yathreb, failed miserably for centuries, despite the religious and historical vital importance of the Hejaz region as it contains the cities of Mecca and Yathreb. This is exemplified in revolts in Hejaz initiated by "Abdullah Ibn Al-Zubayr" during the Umayyad caliphate and that initiated by "Muhammad Al-Nafs Al-Zakiyya" during the early years of Abbasid caliphate. It was clear to everyone, since the Arab conquests era, that historically and politically, the role of Arabia is to be subordinate and subservient to the rich, civilized, ancient two poles of the Middles East: Iran and Egypt, and that the ambitious ones among Arabian men who sought wealth must direct their raids and/or conquests to these two poles, and if ever succeeded, their connection with Arabia would dissolve. Historical accounts tell us so about Mu'aweiya Ibn Abou Sufyan and his descendants (i.e., the Umayyad Dynasty) especially in Andalusia (Spain) and the Abbasid Dynasty in Baghdad and in Cairo during the Mameluke Era later on after the fall of Baghdad. The role of Arabia in the past centuries was to raid and loot within its borders and beyond them, whether such raiders carried a certain religious ideology or not, until Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud managed to establish his Sunnite Wahabi kingdom. When the Najd Brothers under Abdul-Aziz tried to repeat the military expansion beyond borders of the KSA, they failed miserably and failed to revolt against their king. Oil was discovered in the kingdom in a historical breakthrough that allowed the Saudi influence to peacefully spread insidiously within Egypt very fast in a relatively short time, and throughout the Islamic world at large later on and even within Muslim minorities in the east and the West countries. Yet, oil revenues and influence do not change the permanent strategic rule we have mentioned above; rather, they confirm it. we assert here that the Saudi political influence over Egypt and other countries is a temporary stage; things will return to its stable circumstances and conditions as per the permanent rule sooner or later, with Iran and Egypt controlling the Middle East as before. Arabia, sooner or later, will return to its original role as subservient and subordinate to Iran and Egypt. Elderly Saudi citizens still remember the Egyptian Kiswah caravans that brought annually the expensive cloth for the Kaaba, alms for the poor, and money sums to help local Arab sheikhs and leaders working under Egypt that controlled Najd at the time. Let us bear in mind that the international power on which the KSA relies; i.e., the USA, will NOT remain forever dominant over the countries of the planet; the American hegemony and dominance are linked to how much oil is confiscated by the USA from the KSA, as done since the Gulf War and its consequences until now. The USA will certainly use up all the remainder of the Saudi oil within a few decades, and most probably the USA will confiscate the Saudi money in its banks, and at a certain point, the Saudi royal family will not be of much consequence or importance to the American foreign policy. That is, the USA will reject and forsake the Saudi royal family once a crisis occurs, or even because of being fed up with such a family, or just for the sake of change. What about cases of American soldiers suffering dangers in the future akin to what occurred in Somalia or Beirut? This might occur as long as there is much international resentment against the USA foreign policies, especially because of the USA being the chief ally of Israeli Zionism amidst Arab regimes subservient to the USA. Such conditions will give momentum to the emergence of more and new opposition movements in the KSA that will pose a threat to the interests of the USA and its military bases. Hence, the Viet Nam complex would drive Uncle Sam to leave the region and let the Saudi royal family face its fate. Hence, what Abdul-Aziz had set in his regional policies (about the Egyptian strategic depth) and his international policies (allying himself to GB and alter on to the USA) and what the KSA adopted as foreign policies later on after the discovery of oil in Arabia asserted the permanent rule we have mentioned above. The KSA will not be able to use any plans, plots, or strategies if the kingdom is shaken violently from within by new opposition movements, especially by the Shiites in Al-Ahsa linking themselves to Iran, the eastern pole, and to the rest of the Shiites in the Islamic world, and by the Sufis inside and outside the KSA if they to unite themselves against the KSA.

– 2 –

Egypt is the very first and most ancient central state in human history that still stands today, chiefly because of the River Nile, which entailed a strong, powerful central regime/rule to protect and care for irrigation and agricultural activities and to build systems and establishments to preserve stability of Egypt as an agricultural country. Such stability allowed belonging to the homeland to begin with one's village, province, and eventually to Egypt. Such belonging to one's homeland had exceeded one's loyalty to one's family; as the State had undertaken the defense of one's land, houses, possessions, and family. The central Egyptian State in certain points in history expanded southwards within the reach of its influence, until the sources of the Nile and some ports in Somalia and Eritrea. The Egyptian influence and expansions in many points in history reached the whole Levant, parts of Iraq and Asia Minor, during the Mameluke Era and the reign of Muhammad Ali Pacha. Iran has some historical similarities as in the Egyptian case; before the Arab conquest of Persia, the Persian empire competed with the Byzantines militarily, and the Persian influence and expansions reached at some points Asia Minor, Iraq, the Levant, and Egypt itself. Once grown tired and weak because of wars against the Byzantines, Persia fell into the hands of Arab conquerors to be a mere province, like Egypt, in the Arab Empire. Persians played a major role in crushing the Umayyad caliphate and in establishing the Abbasid one, with the latter being controlled by Persians for several decades until the collapse of the Abbasids by the Moghuls who invaded Persia, Iraq, and the Levant. The Abbasid caliphate had to move into Cairo, the Egyptian capital. We conclude from such historical facts that the two major regional poles in the Middle East, Iran and Egypt, are real, stable, and ongoing States for centuries until now, and countries between the two poles are temporary ones that rise and collapse and change continuously. Of course, political upheavals, unrest, and instability of Iraq and the Levant are not caused only by their being situated between the two major powerful poles. Iran and Egypt; there are other reasons: the fertile soil of the Levant and Mesopotamia lacks the natural barriers that would ward off and deter Najd Bedouin raids who for centuries kept raiding cities located near the southern borders of the Levant and Iraq for loot. Bedouins could not possibly direct their raids to Egypt, which is naturally protected by barriers like the Red Sea, Hejaz mountains by the Red Sea coast, and Red Sea mountains within Egypt itself. Of course, Bedouins could not possibly direct their raids to Iran, as the Persian Gulf and the Gulf nations prevented such course of action. Besides, both Egypt and Iran had the ability at the time to deter Bedouins' raids if some desert-Arabs would have infiltrated into their lands, even in times of weakness and deterioration. Thus, the south areas of Iraq and the Levant were inevitably the main scene of Bedouin raids for loot. Apart from raids, there were immigration waves of Arabian tribes into Mesopotamia that led to more turmoil and sectarian strife in this region which was the crossroads of many races, cultures, and creeds. That is why Mesopotamia (today's Iraq) has its pluralistic nature and diversity of many races, cultures, and religions. Such factors led to the erection and collapse of several temporary states and city-states, which rose and fell according to various local, regional, and international conditions and circumstances. Let us bear in mind that the map of the countries we know now as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan is drawn by a British officer named Mark Sykes and a French one named François Georges-Picot, within the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916. Despite establishing such countries with defined borders acknowledged internationally, instability reigns supreme in the Levant and Iraq because of many coups and shifting loyalties. For tens of centuries, Iraq and the Levant region countries never knew the notion of a state stable within certain borders that lasted long enough to make one belonging to a homeland more than to one's tribe, clan, family, sect, doctrine, creed, or denomination. The opposite is true in Egypt and Iran (Persia). Even the democratic Lebanon is an example consolidating out view; its democracy is for clans, tribes, and sects and heads/leaders of each of those, and loyalty is for those three, and not for Lebanon as a country. When leaders disputed at one point in history, Lebanon was about to get lost during the civil war in the 20^th century. The geopolitical nature of "Mesopotamia and the Levant" has no natural insurmountable barriers between both regions and the two poles (Egypt and Iran) on one hand, and between Mesopotamia and the Levant and Bedouins of Arabia on the other hand. Lacking insuperable barriers, Mesopotamia and the Levant is a region located amidst immigration waves coming from the north and the east. This geopolitical nature led to mosaic-like cultural pluralism of tribes, clans, denominations, and ethnicities, despite the fact that the majority speaks the Arabic tongue and embrace Islam. Sadly, this mosaic of various ethnicities and cultures led to more doctrinal divisions inside each religious denomination or sect inside what we call now Islam and Christianity. There are many sects that call themselves Shiites and so many other sects deeming themselves as Sunnites, apart from several Christian denominations. More divisions are caused by ethnicities, tribalism, and races: there are tribal factions' disputes and conflicts, and there are Kurds of cities and those of mountains, Syriac Christians, Assyrians, etc. as well as waves of immigrants like Armenians and Circassians. Geopolitical conditions worsened in Mesopotamia and the Levant when crusaders in the past and Zionists in the present established their theocracies, and the Sykes-Picot Agreement exacerbated matters in Mesopotamia and the Levant that redistributed and re-divided the region as per interests of Zionists, GB, and France, not taking into consideration any national interests of local dwellers of the region of Mesopotamia and the Levant. Hence, coups, tyrannical regimes, political unrest, upheavals, and turmoil go on in Iraq and the Levant. We remind our readers that this digression is closely linked to the topic of our book here about the KSA; this digression shows clearly that there are so many time-bombs or mines within the northern Saudi borders in Mesopotamia and the Levant that might move into Arabia anytime to denote there. More mines and time-bombs were caused by desert-Arabs and Bedouins of Najd in their raids and immigration waves into the north that caused more trouble and unrest in Iraq and the Levant. Such unrest has prevented the establishment of stable, unified, continuous states similar to that in Iran and Egypt. Thus, Iran and Egypt has remained and will remain the only two powerful poles in the Middle East, with Arabia, Mesopotamia, and the Levant as regions subservient and subordinate to them as a permanent rule.

– 3 –

As for Arabia, it is a more difficult area to be unified as one state, except with tyranny and oppression. The Hejaz region is open to the world for trade and religious tourism (pilgrimage), and it could not possibly be compatible with the closed Najd region that retains centuries-old Middle-Ages view of the world. Historically, relations between Najd and Hejaz were bad for centuries. Arabs of Yemen and the Gulf region preferred keeping to their coasts for living, travel, trade, etc. and kept good relations with countries in Asia, especially the Indian subcontinent and Indonesia, and such Arabs took no interest in Najd, Iraq, and the Levant. As for the inside of Arabian deserts, loyalties vary as per tribal factions and intertribal relations; each tribe seemed to be a mobile city-state, to which a Bedouin belonged. Tribes in general never submit to any State except by military force, oppression, and tyrannical power, as we know from writings of Ibn Khaldoun and his views about tribal fanaticism; please refer to our book, published on our website, titled "A Historical Study of ''The Introduction'': A Book Authored by Ibn Khaldoun". Oppression in Arabia finds justification under the banner and motto of ''jihad'' to justify expansion, invasion, massacres, fighting, and looting. Thus, the Saudi family members, despite being a few persons, managed to subjugate a large number of powerful tribes all over Arabia and to impose on them Wahabism as the only ''true'' form of Islam; a dangerous falsehood of course. Soon enough, the Saudi family gave its name to the lands and regions unified in the name of the KSA, thus omitting regional names in which others took pride like ''Hejaz'', "Najran", ''Aseer'', ''Tehama'', and ''Al-Ahsa''. In addition to oppression, tyranny, and compulsion to convert to Wahabism, the Saudi royal family has controlled oil revenues, and thinks arrogantly that a ruler owns land and its inhabitants as per Sunnite Middle-Ages jurisprudence and theology. Such Wahabi ideology does not fit in and is not compatible with the 20^th century culture of human rights. Thus, the KSA had to undertake some ideological changes in the Wahabi thought, but the problem was that opposition movement against the Saudi royal family sprang forth from inside the Wahabi ideology itself, by people who claim to be ''more religious'' and ''nearer'' to Wahabism that Al-Saud family. Of course such a claim was a façade to cover the ardent desire of the foes of Al-Saud to settle old accounts. Usually, a Bedouin never forgets his vendetta and his desire to take revenge; there are several tribesmen who sought revenge from Al-Saud family. Hence, dangers that might pose a threat to divide the KSA begin with repulsion and discordance between the geographical regions of the kingdom: Hejaz, Najd, Aseer, and the Eastern region (including Al-Ahsa). Loyalty to one's tribe is the priority, before one's country in that case, especially when one family, Al-Saud, confiscates all wealth and power and authority, allowing only a small margin of them to its minions loyal to the royal family. This Saudi state imposes its Wahabi ideology by force, coercion, and compulsion on those who do not accept it inside the KSA: such as Shiites, Sufis, and those who claim to be descendants of Ali Ibn Abou Talib: the Al-Sharif family. The KSA cannot possibly let go of Wahabism anytime; as a state, it derives its alleged legitimacy from such ideology. The Saudi repeated declaration that its legitimacy is derived from conquests by the sword to ''retrieve'' the kingdom of the Saudi ancestors is dangerous enough; this implies the right of others outside the royal family to revolt and rebel against by the sword (or other arms) as well to ''retrieve'' their lost freedom, honor, and possessions before the emergence of Al-Saud family. The most dangerous source of threat that might lead to the division of the KSA is its Shiite minority, which includes the Al-Sharif family, the victims of the KSA past and present. This minority is the ally of the eastern pole: Iran. Another danger that poses a threat to divide the KSA is the royal family itself; its members are now so many, and each with his ever-growing privileges that cause disputes among such members, who live in luxury and opulence that sap their vitality since the third generation. Let us remember that oil revenues made this royal family and the citizens jump suddenly from the Bedouin stage to the stage of opulence and luxurious standard of living, without gradual phases between both stages to allow room for civilizational maturity to make citizens cope with quick cultural changes and modernization. Hence, this huge leap was sudden; citizens during the reign of Abdul-Aziz considered the wireless and telegrams as diabolical and satanic devices, and their sons now use the internet and embrace the ideas of Ibn Abdul-Wahab and Ibn Taymiyya. It is expected that modern technology will be misused in the KSA, in an age of mixing luxury with Wahabi backwardness. This problem aggravates in the cases of filthily rich people and the royal family; this applies to most rich Arabs in the oil-rich countries in the Gulf region. Hence, oil revenues turn by Arab rulers into weapons and arms to allow Arabs to kill and fight one another, on behalf of the white men (or WASPs) in the USA and Israel. This is part of the heavy price paid for opulence and luxury when mixed with backwardness and lack of civilization. The Gulf War is a good example showing this Arab folly. Within such internal and external dangers that threaten the future of the third, current KSA, no grandchildren of Abdul-Aziz bear his traits that allowed him to establish his kingdom amidst certain various impossibilities. We predict that the next age will witness imminent collapse of the third KSA, similar to the end of the second KSA, when princes and the royal household members engaged in countless conflicts and disputes which would not be settled. Another possibility is that one, or both, of the two regional poles, Egypt and Iran, would interfere to bring about the downfall of the KSA, similar to the end of the first KSA in 1818. The third, current KSA has use oil revenues to buy the Egyptian strategic depth for itself; yet, dangers still murk inside the oil-rich Eastern region (including Al-Ahsa), located near Iran, the eastern regional pole. This research ends with this recommendation to avoid bloodshed of Arabs and Muslims and to clear the name of Islam from accusations of terrorism and extremism that have tarnished its name: we hope that the KSA and the rest of the Arab regimes and the Islamic non-Arab countries would apply Islamic justice and human rights, which are preached in the Quran centuries before the West countries formed, applied, and called for them. This way, the KSA would protect itself from collapse and downfall. The required remedy is the intellectual project of religious reform preached by the writer of these lines, who suffered persecution in Egypt because of the KSA on several occasions, as we have mentioned in the introduction to this book.

Signature:

Dr. Ahmed Subhy Mansour

26^th of June, 2001, Cairo, Egypt.

SOURCES AND REFERENCES OF THE BOOK

SOURCES AND REFERENCES OF THE BOOK

Firstly: manuscripts and documents:

Manuscripts:

"Takseer Al-Ahjar", an ancient manuscript in Dar-Al-Kotob (i.e., he Egyptian National Library and Archive), Cairo, 4040, Taymoriyya manuscripts.

"Historical Accounts by Al-Biqaay", an ancient manuscript in Dar-Al-Kotob (i.e., he Egyptian National Library and Archive), Cairo, Volume No. 5631, History manuscripts.

Documents:

Documents in the Iraqi National Library and Archive, 15-5-1922, Baghdad.

Documents in the Iraqi National Library and Archive, Baghdad, December, 28-10-1922, 30-11-1926, No. 619, No. 4 page 709, and No. 197, 1-11-1927.

Secondly: sources and references in Arabic and translated into Arabic:

Mansour (Dr. Ahmed Subhy):

An article titled "The Egyptian Religiousness and the Najd Religiousness", published in ''Humanity and Development" Magazine, issue No. 61, April and June 1998.

A study titled ''Democratic Elections in Egypt'', published in the annual report of civil society and democratic transition, 1997, Cairo.

A study titled "An Islamic Vision Concerning the Relation with the Other", published in the book of the third intellectual forum of the Egyptian organization of human rights, 1992, Cairo.

A book titled "Inquisition between the Quran and Tradition", Al-Mahroussa Printing and Publishing House, 1995, Cairo.

A book titled "Punishment of Apostasy", published in 1993 and 2000 in Cairo, translated into English in 1999, and published as a supplement in Cairo Magazine, issue No. 152, 1995.

A research paper titled ''Women's Right to Aspire to the Presidency of Any Islamic State", published earlier in 1999 in the periodical of (Rowaq Arabi), issued by the Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies, issue No. 15 & 16, 1999, Cairo.

A research paper titled "Rights of Women between International Agreements and Political Islam", published in the series titled "human rights debates" No. 6, 1999, issued by the Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies, Cairo.

A research paper titled "Human Rights in the Thought of Islamists", published in the series titled "human rights debates" No. 7, 2000, issued by the Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies, Cairo.

An article titled "Which Is Permitted or Prohibited: Banks or 'Islamic' Money Investment Companies", published in the governmental daily Cairo-based Al-Akhbar Newspaper, on 29^th of June, 1998.

An article titled "The Issue of Usury and the Crisis of Innovative Thinking", published in the Cairo-based Al-Akhbar Newspaper, on 30^th of May, 1990.

An article titled "The Issue of Usury and the Crisis of Morality", published in the independent Cairo-based Al-Midan Newspaper, on 15^th of Oct., 1996.

A study titled ''Freedom of Thought between Islam and Muslims'', published in 1992 in the book of the Third Intellectual Forum of the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights.

And several articles published before in the Friday issues of the independent daily Al-Alam Al-Youm Newspaper, within the section titled "Islamic Topics", between 1992 and 1993.

Abonti (Salvatore), ''The Kingdom of Imam Yahiya'', translated by Taha Fawzy, Cairo, 1947.

Al-Assad (Muhammad), ''The Way to Islam'', Dar Al-Elm Lilmalayeen publishers, Beirut, translated by Afeef Al-Baalbaky.

Abou-El-Shaar (Amin), ''Memoirs of King Abdulla'', published by Amin Abou-El-Shaar, 1965, Oman.

Al-Ashaary (Abou Al-Hassan), who died in 330 A.H.

"Articles of Islamists", edited by M. Mohei-Eddine Eid Abdel-Hameed, Al-Nahda Al-Masreiyya Library, 1969, Cairo.

Al-Ansari (M. Ibn Abdullah Ibn Abdul-Muhsin), ''Tuhfat Al-Mustafeed in the Ancient and Modern History'', editions of Riyadh, 1960.

Al-Banna (Gamal),"Muslim Women between the Quranic Sharia and Restrictions of Scholars", Islamic Center, 1998, Cairo.

Al-Otaybi (Juhayman), ''Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi", published and edited by Dr. Rifaat Sayed Ahmed, Jaffa Center, 2^nd editions, 1998, Cairo.

Al-Hosni (Abdul-Razik), ''History of Ministries in Iraq'', 1934, Baghdad.

Al-Heidary, "Onwan Al-Majd in Chronicles of Baghdad, Basra, and Najd", 1334 A.H., Baghdad editions, Baghdad.

Al-Khateeb (Abdul-Hameed), ''Abdul-Aziz the Just Imam'', 1951, Cairo.

Khazaal (Hassan Khalaf), ''Political History of Kuwait'', Aliya editions, 1962, Kuwait.

Khila (Mahmoud Kamel), an MA thesis, in the Faculty of Arts, Cairo University, titled "The Political Development of Jordan", 1969.

Al-Khamees (Abdul-Rahman), ''Lions of Al-Saud'', 1972, Beirut.

Al-Zahaby (M. Ibn Ahmed Ibn Othman), died in 748 A.H., ''The Justice Balance", edited by M. Ali M. Al-Bijawi and Fatheiyya Ali Al-Bijawi, Dar Al-Fikr Al-Arabi publishers, undated, Cairo.

Ahmed (Rifaat Sayed), "The Desert Saint", Riyadh Al-Rayyes editions, 1991, London and Cypress.

Ahmed (Rifaat Sayed), introduction to the book titled ''''Letters of Juhayman Al-Otaybi".

Al-Rasheed (Abdul-Aziz), "History of Kuwait", undated, Beirut.

Al-Rossan (Mamdouh Arif), "Iraq and Arab Politics 1921:1941'', an unpublished M.A. thesis, Faculty of Arts, Cairo University, 1972.

Al-Rihany (Amin), ''Najd and its Annexes'', 3^rd edition, 1964, Beirut.

Al-Rihany (Amin), "History of Najd", 1928, 5^th edition, Beirut.

Al-Zarkeley (Kheir Eddine), ''Arabia in the Reign of Abdul-Aziz'', 1970, Beirut.

Qassim (Jamal Zachariah), ''The Stance of Kuwait vis-à-vis the Saudi Expansion in Al-Ahsa and Najd'', an article in the History Magazine, number 17, 1970.

Ibn Saad (Muhammad), died in 222 A.H., ''Al-Tabakat Al-Kubra", Dar Al-Tahrir publishers, 1968, Cairo.

Al-Siyouti (Jalal Eddine), died in 911 A.H., ''History of Caliphs", edited by M. Abou-Al-Fadl Ibrahim, Cairo edition, Cairo.

Al-Shaarany, ''Lataif Al-Ninan", Dar Al-Hadeeth, undated, Cairo.

Arslan (Shakib), '''Funny Stories from History'', 1350 A.H., Cairo.

Al-Shamlan (Seif Marzouk), "On History of Kuwait", undated, Cairo.

Al-Safady (Salah Eddine Khalil Ibn Aybak), died in 764 A.H., "Al-Wafy in Deaths", 2^nd edition, edited by S. Diedring, 1981, published in 22 volumes by the German Orientalists Society.

Al-Mukhtar (Salah Eddine), ''History of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia'', undated, Al-Hayat Library, Beirut.

Ibn Al-Sirafy (Ali Ibn Dawood), died in 900 A.H., "Inbaa Al-Hasr in Chronicles of People of the Age", edited by Hassan Habashy, 1970, Cairo.

Al-Tabari (Abou Jaffer M. Ibn Jarir), 224:310 A.H., "History of Al-Tabari", edited by M. Abou-Al-Fadl Ibrahim, 4^th edition, Cairo.

Al-Farhan (Rashid Abdullah), ''A Short History of Kuwait'', 1960, Cairo.

Philby (John), "Arabia: Three Years of Wahabi Rule", Contemporary Magazine, London.

"History of Najd", translated by Omar Al-Deirawi, 1952, Beirut.

Al-Jawziyya (Ibn Al-Qayyim), died in 751 A.H., "Al-Wabel Al-Sayyib Min Al-Kalim Al-Taiyyib", edition of 1952, Cairo.

Al-Jawziyya (Ibn Al-Qayyim), "Al-Manar Al-Manif Fe Al-Sahih Wa Al-Daweef", edited by Dr. Abdul-Ra'uf Saad, edition of 1952, Cairo.

Abou Al-Ela (Mahmoud Taha), "Geography of Arabia", 1930, Cairo.

Abou Aliyya (Abdel-Fattah Hassan), "Development of the Saudi Society", an unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Faculty of Arts, Cairo University, 1972, Cairo.

Al-Attar (M. Abdul-Ghafur), ''The Hawk of Arabia'', Mecca editions.

Al-Alawy (Abdulla Hassan Ibn Feisal), ''Sidq Al-Khabar in Al-Khawarij of the 12^th Century'', 1927, Latikia.

Kishk (Jalal), ''The Saudis and the Islamic Solution'', 4^th edition, 1984, Cairo.

Abou-Al-Mahasin (Jamal Eddine), died in 874 A.H, "Al-Nojom Al-Zahira", 83/9, edited by Faheem Shaltout (1938-1972), Cairo.

Abdel-Majeed (Muhammad), "In the Beginning was the Pen", undated, Cairo.

Ibn Abdul-Wahab (Muhammad), "Kashf Al-Shubuhat" + 13 Messages, 4^th edition, Cairo, 1399 A.H., edited and published by Moheb Eddine Al-Khateeb. We have quoted in our book from six Messages:

- Message on Monotheism

- Message on Fundamentals of Faith for the General Public

- Message on Three Issues

- Message on The Meaning of Taghut

- Message on Six Events from Prophet Muhammad's History

- Message on Our Faith Rules to Differentiate Believers from Infidels

Abdou (Muhammad), "Islam between Science and Modernity", Enlightenment Series, GEBO Publishers, 1993, Cairo.

Mahmoud (Hassan Suleiman), ''Kuwait Past and Present'', undated, Cairo.

The book titled ''The Earthquake of Al-Saud Family'', without author's name, found in the following link:

http://www.miraserve.com/books/b3.htm

Al-Masaary (Dr. M. Ibn Abdullah), "The Fatwa on Polytheistic Rulers", undated, London.

Al-Masaary (Dr. Muhammad Abdullah), "Judging Rulers", 2^nd edition, 2000, London.

Al-Masaary (Dr. Muhammad Abdullah), "The Decisive Proofs of the Illegitimacy of the KSA", 4^th edition, 1999, London.

Al-Makrizi (Taqei Eddine Ahmed Ibn Ali), "Khetat Al-Makrizi".

Annual Reports of Ibn Khaldoun Center of 1996, published in 1997, of 1998, published in 1999, and of 1999, published in 2000, on the civil society and democratic transition.

A report titled "Egypt and the World", published by Al-Mahroussa Center for Publishing and Distribution, 1^st edition, 1994, Cairo.

A report by Liberty Organization (National Council for Civil Liberties: NCCL)

A report issued by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights: an annual book comprises all statements, reports, and newsletters issued by the Committee of Defending Legitimate Rights in its first year, plus reports of Liberty Organization by the end of the book, undated, published on the following link:

http://www.cdlr.saudia.co.uk/forumdisplay

Amnesty International reports:

http//www.amnestyarabicorg/saudianarabia/text/se../secretstate-made23-01-00-bh:p8

http//www.amnesty.org.saudiaarabia:secrecyandfearpp:6,7,10

Report of Islamic Uprising commemorating the 7^th memory of the Kaaba Mosque accident, issued by the Islamic Revolution publishing

Thirdly: periodicals, newspapers and magazines:

The governmental Cairo-Based daily Al-Akhbar Newspaper, 24^th Nov., 1979

Al-Osboue Al-Arabi newspaper, No. 1058, 21^st Jan., 1980

The following issues of Umm Al-Qura Newspaper:

No. 115, 3^rd year, 25^th Feb., 1927

No. 111, 3^rd year, 28^th Feb., 1927

No. 308, 7^th year, 31^st Oct., 1930

9^th year, 23^rd Sept., 1932

No. 169, 4^th year, 9^th March, 1928

No. 167, 4^th year, 24^th Feb., 1928

No. 165, 4^th year, 10^th Feb., 1928

No. 291, 6^th year, 4^th July, 1930

No. 51, 2^nd year, 18^th Dec., 1925

No. 287, 6^th year, 6^th June, 1930

No. 292, 6^th year, 11^th July, 1930

No. 303, 6^th year, 16^th Sept., 1930

No. 289, 6^th year, 2^nd Feb., 1930

Vol. 12, 2^nd year, June, 1913, page 576

No. 57, 2^nd year, 19^th Feb., 1926

No. 352, 8^th year, Oct., 1931

No. 302, 19^th Sept., 1930

No. 292, 11^th July, 1930

No. 208, 5^th year, 18^th Dec., 1928

No. 298, 6^th year, 21^st Aug., 1930

No. 67, 2^nd year, 9^th Apr., 1926

The Kuwait-based Al-Anbaa Newspaper: 22^nd, 24^th, and 25^th of Nov., 1979

The Lebanese Al-Anwar Newspaper: 16^th Jan., 1980, 24^th Nov., 1979, and 22^nd Nov., 1979

The Cairo-based governmental daily Al-Ahram Newspaper: 22^nd, 24^th, 25^th, and 30^th of Nov., 1979

Al-Ahram, No. 14500, 15^th Oct., 1924, an article on war in Arabia

Al-Ahram, No. 14502, 17^th Oct., 1924, an article on Wahabis and Hejaz

Al-Ahram, No. 14512, 29^th Oct., 1924, an article on Wahabis and Hejaz

Al-Ahram, No. 14508, 24^th Oct., 1924, an article on Hejaz

Al-Ahram, No. 14501, 16^th Oct., 1924

The Saudi newspaper Al-Youm, 9^th Jan., 1980

The Economist, 15^th Dec., 1980

The Saudi newspaper Al-Bilad, 24^th Nov., 8^th Dec., and 11^th Dec. 1979

The Lebanese Al-Hawadeth newspaper, 7^th Dec., 1979 and 18^th Jan., 1980

The Guardian, 4^th Feb., 1980

Al-Jazeera Al-Jadida, a Yemeni newspaper used to be issued by the Democratic Popular Party beginning in 1970, South Yemen, No. 6, March 1974

Arabia Magazine, issued dated 16^th May, 1992

The Saudi newspaper Al-Jazeera, 22^nd Nov., 27^th Nov., 25^th Nov., 10 Dec., and 11^th Dec., 1979

The Cairo-based governmental Al-Gomhouriyya Newspaper, 24^th, 26^th, and 27^th Nov., 1979

The Lebanese newspaper Al-Dostour, 24^th and 30^th Nov., 1979

Der Spiegel, 23^rd Dec., 1979

The Kuwait-based Al-Rai Al-Aam newspaper, 23^rd, 24^th, 25^th, 26^th, and 28^th Nov., 1979 and 9^th Dec., 1979

The Saudi Al-Riyadh newspaper: 22^nd, 23^rd, 25^th, 26^th, 28^th, and 29^th Nov., 1979 and 1^st and 4^th Dec., 1979

Al-Zahraa Magazine, Vol. 8 part 18, 15^th Feb., 1925, Vol. 4 part 1, and part 51, 1343 A.H.

The Lebanese Al-Safeer newspaper, 6^th Feb., 22^nd, 24^th, and 29^th Nov., and 2^nd, 12^th, and 21^st Dec. 1979, 9^th, 10^th, and 20^th Jan., 1980, and 1^st Feb., 1980

The Kuwait-based Al-Siyasa Al-Kuwaitiyya newspaper, 25^th Nov., 1979

The Saudi Middle East newspaper, 27^th Nov., 1979

Al-Shura Magazine, No. 69, 2^nd year, 18^th Feb., 1926, No. 169, 4^th year, 16^th Feb., 1928

Al-Fath Magazine, No. 178, 19^th Dec., 1929, No. 166, 4^th year, 17^th Feb., 1928, and No. 66, 2^nd year, 2^nd Apr., 1926

The Kuwait-based Al-Qabas newspaper, 18^th Dec., 1979, and 21^st Nov., 1979

The Saudi Al-Qibla newspaper, No. 453, 5^th year, 26^th July, 1921, No. 492, 3^rd year, 1343 A.H., and No. 454, 5^th year, 3st Jan., 1925

The Lebanese Al-Louaa newspaper, 22^nd Nov., 1979

Le Point, 28^th Jan., 1980

Le Monde, 22^nd Nov., 24^th Nov., and 3^rd Dec., 1979

Lughat Al-Arab Magazine: Vol. 1, 2^nd year, Aug. 1912, Vol. 7, Jan. 1914, Vol. 8, 5^th year, undated, Vol. 10, 5^th year, No. 637, Vol. 11, 8^th year, May 1913, Vol. 5, 3^rd year, Nov., 1914, Vol. 1, 3^rd year, July 1913 and March 1914

The Cairo-based Al-Muqattam Newspaper: No. 11246, 38^th year, 26^th Feb., 1926, No. 11029, 1925, No. 11077, 37^th year, 19^th Aug., 1925, No. 11074, 37^th year, 16^th Aug., 1925, No. 12006, 40^th year, 19^th Aug. 1928, No. 12202, 41^st year, 10^th Apr., 1292, No. 12268, 41^st year, 29^th June, 1929 (an of the newspaper with Abdul-Aziz Ibn Al-Saud), No. 12203, 41^st year, 11^th Apr., 1929

Al-Manar Magazine: Vol. 7, part 1, "Ibn Saud Conquers Al-Ahsa" 4^th July, 1913, Vol. 8, part 25, "Special Reasons to Conquer Hejaz" 27^th Nov., 1924, Vol. 8, part 25, ''Wahabis and Hejaz" 27^th Nov., 1924, Vol. 7, part 25, 18^th Oct., 1924, Vol. 8, part 26, "Hejaz and Arabs"

The Saudi Al-Madina newspaper, 26^th Nov., 2^nd, 6^th, and 11^th Dec., 1979

The Lebanese Al-Nahar newspaper, 21^st, 22^nd, 25^th, 24^th and 30^th Nov., 1979 and 10^th Jan, 1980

Nour Al-Islam Magazine, 28^th Shabaan, 1349 A.H.

Newsweek, 7^th Dec., 1979

Huda Al-Islam Magazine, 1935 A.D.

Al-Watan Al-Arabi newspaper, No. 147

The Kuwait-based Al-Watan newspaper, 22^nd Nov., 1979

Fourthly: references and sources in English:

Armstrong (H. C.), "Lord of Arabia (Ibn Saud)", 1954, Beirut.

Bell (Gertrude), "The Arab War", London, 1940.

Bullard (Reader), "The British and the Middle East'', 1952, London.

Burckharat (John Lewis), "Travels in Arabia", 1829, London.

Dickson (H. R. P.), "The Arab of the Desert", 1930, London.

Dickson, "Kuwait and her Neighbor", 1950, London.

Dickson (Violet), "Forty Years in Kuwait", 1970, London.

Glubb (John Bagot), "War in the Desert", 1960, London.

Hiro, "Iran under the Ayatollahs", 1985, London.

Hopwood (Derik), "The Arabian Peninsula: Society and politics", 1972, London.

Howarth, (David), "The Desert King: A Life of Ibn Saud", 1964, London.

Herwitz (I. C.), "Diplomacy in Near and Middle East", Document Record, VOL. 1, 1960, London.

Herwitz (I. C.), "Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension", 1969, London.

Kelly (J. B.), "Eastern Arabian Frontiers", 1963, London.

Lawrence (T. E.), "Seven Pillars of Wisdom", 1962, London.

Meullen, "The Wills of Ibn Saud'', 1958, London.

Philby (John), "Arabian Jubilee", 1951, Mecca.

Sanger (Richard H.), "Arabian Peninsula", 1953, Washington.

STITT (George) "A Prince of Arabia", 1948, London.

Twitchell (K. S.), "Saudi Arabia", 1958, London.

Wahba (Hafiz), "Arabian Days", 1964, London.

WARTH (C. H.), "The Arabs and the West", 1964, London.